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Abstract 
Enhancing cross-functional integration in new product development becomes 
increasingly important for industrial players to keep up with shorter product life 
cycles in technological innovation dynamics. Abundant research reflects the 
topic’s significance, yet ambiguity in empirical results persists and industrial 
adoption of existing methods remains incremental. This thesis employs a 
qualitative approach to build a case study at the design-manufacturing interface 
of new product development of electrified cars. Cross-functional coopetition, as 
the joint occurrence of cooperation and competition, is adopted to generate an 
in-depth understanding of integration dynamics. Socio-organizational and 
contextual aspects are found to shape integration in a new product 
development context substantially. A model of interface dynamics is developed 
which provides for analysis and prediction of these aspects’ impact on effective 
integration. A grounded theory approach to enhance integration is explored that 
introduces constraints as stimuli to consider manufacturability aspects in the 
design process. Constraint introduction is found to positively impact both cross-
functional integration and creativity, with eight characteristics of constraint 
quality identified as moderating factors. A theoretical model is contributed 
which outlines cause-effect relationships of constraints’ impact on antecedents 
of new product development success. It substantiates constraints’ role in 
innovation contexts and encourages application for design-manufacturing 
integration as well as for other interfaces or purposes. 
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1 Introduction and objectives 
1.1 Motivation and objectives 
"The long-term survival of a business enterprise hinges upon its ability to successfully 
introduce new products into the marketplace […]. The message to senior management 
is simple: either innovate or die!” (Cooper, 1996, p. 465). The fundamental importance 
of innovation for the sustainable success of any business is valid more than ever and 
uncontested in its significance. For innovation success, the generation of inventive 
ideas has proven to be less challenging than their consequent realization and 
industrialization (Neubauer, 2008; Bichlmaier, 2000; Schilling, 2017). Facing 
shortening product life cycles and higher customization, with its substantial 
consequences on time-to-market and product complexity, many companies strive 
towards optimizing the new product development (NPD) process (Schuh et al., 2013b; 
Lühring, 2006, p. 1). Integrating functional counterparts’ requirements and inputs into 
the design process, widely known as cross-functional integration, is of undisputed 
importance for this purpose, receiving significant attention in research and practice 
Lorenz, 2008; Brettel et al., 2011).  
Effectively integrating functional interfaces in NPD is becoming both more important 
and more difficult in today’s dynamic business environment. Globalization disperses 
functions of a single organization on a worldwide array; the widespread offshoring of 
manufacturing in particular cuts ties between design and manufacturing. Cultural 
distance and intellectual property considerations foster walling-off tendencies between 
remote cross-functional partners. Increasing product complexity results in higher 
specialization, inhibiting cross-functional exchange or rotation. Continuously 
expanding enforcement of profit-centre structures during the last years likewise 
contributes to isolationism rather than promoting cross-functional integration. Even the 
extensive penetration of information technology has shown to create further barriers 
based on incompatible software systems and data bases instead of enhancing 
integration by virtually connecting remote cross-functional partners (Boutellier et al., 
2008, p. 26; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000; Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 149; Ettlie 
and Stoll, 1990, p. 13). Complicating matters further, the same dynamics render cross-
functional integration more important: “[…] factors like rapid technological change, 
flexible production processes, and global competition are making close collaboration 
across functions even more crucial for the introduction of profitable and timely new 
products” (Olson et al., 2001, p. 258). The ever-proceeding expansion of knowledge 
enforces increasing specialization, making effective methods for cross-functional 
integration indispensable (Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 149).  
 
A broad body of relevant literature reflects the topic’s importance. Empirical efforts 
examining cross-functional integration’s impact on NPD success and theoretical 
contributions providing methods how to enhance cross-functional integration are 
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manifold. However, empirical results remain ambiguous and partially contradicting 
(Troy et al., 2008; Brettel et al., 2011), and existing methods lack sufficient industrial 
application due to their high theoretical burden as well as insufficient recognition of 
organizational and social factors (Lindemann et al., 2001; Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 
2013, p. 156; Cratzius, 2003, p. 96; Lühring, 2006, p. 13). The challenge of cross-
functional integration in a NPD context seems well acknowledged by academics and 
practitioners, yet remains unsolved for satisfactory industrial application and sufficient 
explanatory theoretical depth.  
 
Among the different functional pairings in consideration for a scientific reflection, the 
interface between the design department and the manufacturing department is of 
particular interest for innovative projects, as barely plannable design activities collide 
with highly structured production processes (Neubauer, 2008). Besides, this interface 
has been neglected in existing empirical studies of cross-functional integration with few 
exceptions (Brettel et al., 2011; Dekkers et al., 2013; Nafisi et al., 2016).  
 
The motivation for a scientific study on the topic is spurred by innovative NPD projects 
in practice, for which insufficient cross-functional integration crystallizes as a 
particularly pressing matter. To provide an example, the empirical case which is 
analysed in the course of the study at hand is concerned with the development of an 
innovative electrified powertrain for automotive application, supporting a shift towards 
environmentally friendly mobility. Sufficient integration of different functional 
requirements into the design phase is decisive hereof; from marketing for example, to 
enforce a high electric range, and from manufacturing to enforce low production costs 
for wide affordability. The resulting challenge represents a question of cross-functional 
integration, emerging from this and similar endeavours of innovative NPD alike.  
Due to its complex products, multi-layered NPD processes and its significant role of 
driving industrial innovation, the automotive industry appears to be a fruitful empirical 
environment for scientific engagement regarding cross-functional integration in NPD 
(Womack et al., 2006, p. 11; Fujimoto, 2000).  
 
With the problem of cross-functional integration in NPD being widely acknowledged, 
increasingly under pressure and yet insufficiently solved, the objective of the study at 
hand is to forge new paths to address the topic. Recent theoretical approaches will be 
integrated to this aim. First, coopetition, defined as the simultaneous existence of 
cooperation and competition (Tidström, 2014) and a highly acclaimed novel theory, is 
believed to provide an in-depth perspective of underlying mechanisms of cross-
functional integration in NPD. Second, the theory on constraints in innovation, finding 
insightful application in NPD contexts recently, is developed towards an alternative 
method to enhance cross-functional integration in NPD.  
 
  3 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis follows the aims outlined in the previous chapter, likewise 
taking into account the deployed case study methodology. Illustration 1 depicts the 
sequence of and the linkages between different chapters. 
 
After the introduction in chapter 1, subsequent sections outline theoretical 
fundamentals and the current state of empirical research on the theoretical approaches 
this thesis builds on: Research on cross-functional NPD (chapter 2), coopetition 
research (chapter 3) and research on constraints in NPD (chapter 4). Building on 
identified academic gaps in the underlying theory, chapter 5 presents the research 
need including a detailed discussion of the topic, as well as the presentation of the 
research model and research questions guiding the empirical study. In chapter 6, the 
design of the empirical study is delineated. This includes discussing the research 
methodology and deriving the case study design. A detailed description of data 
collection, data analysis and the fulfilment of quality criteria for qualitative research 
follows suit. Chapter 7 constitutes the core of the empirical study, with the central case 
study being portrayed in respect to all research questions. After a description of the 
empirical setting, cross-functional integration at the empirical object of analysis is 
examined by adopting a perspective of cross-functional coopetition. The summary of 
results, and the theoretical contribution following from it, is provided hereinafter 
(chapters 7.2-7.3). Chapters 7.4-7.9 illuminate different aspects of a theoretical 
approach on the enhancement of cross-functional integration building on the 
introduction of manufacturability constraints. Accordingly, the theoretical model to be 
derived from the results is presented subsequently. Chapter 8 concludes on findings 
and contributions to literature. Likewise, limitations of the study are discussed, avenues 
for further research are presented and implications for practitioners are provided.  
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2 Theories on cross-functional new product development 
2.1 Theory overview 
In the following, theoretical principles that are essential for the understanding of cross-
functional integration in NPD are summarized. This includes normative models of the 
NPD process itself, followed by the fundamentals of interface management. The latter 
is a required theoretical basis for fundamentals of cross-functional integration in NPD 
for later chapters throughout this thesis.  
2.1.1 Normative models of new product development processes 
It lies in the systematic nature of innovation, that it always takes place in a rather 
complex process involving several stakeholders from R&D, marketing and production 
(Fagerberg et al., 2005; Olson et al., 2001). NPD activities are characterized by 
unstable dynamics with regard to customer needs and technological possibilities, 
creativity requirements, communication intensity, planning intensity and 
interdisciplinary cross-linkages with activities on the individual, functional and inter-
functional levels (Negele, 1998; Paashuis, 1998). All of those emphasize the need for 
organizational coordination to maximize NPD success; NPD processes have therefore 
ever since been the subject of extensive research (Sosa and Mihm, 2008). Cooper 
(1996, p. 466) summarizes that it is the “new product process - its nature and quality - 
that has the strongest impact on the business's new product performance”.  
In the following, the evolution of such coordinated, normative models of NPD 
processes is presented.  
 
A first structured approach to NPD, called phased project planning, was introduced by 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the 1960s to manage 
NASA’s large-scale development projects. It differentiated four phases (preliminary 
analysis, definition, design, development/operations) with intermittent checkpoint 
reviews after each phase to ensure that mistakes are not carried forward into 
downstream phases. Phased project planning was soon adjusted to suit smaller and 
less complex industrial NPD projects (von Stamm, 2008, p. 49; Lorenz, 2008; NASA, 
1968).  
In the early 1980’s, Booz, Allen & Hamilton analysed existent NPD procedure models 
in the United States, coming up with a generic description of NPD processes that is, in 
variations, still valid for most companies up to this day (Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 1982). 
 
 
Illustration 2: NPD stages identified by Booz, Allen & Hamilton based on Fraker (1984, p. 38) 
S
tr
a
te
g
y
Idea
generation
Screening& 
Evaluation
Business 
analysis
Develop-
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After a phase-based view of NPD had emerged, integration or separation of different 
conceptions of stages evolved from the late 1980s onwards, with serial models 
evolving towards more connected models with links and feedback and finally 
concurrent models (Teece, 1989; Trott, 2003; Johannessen, 2009; Jürgens, 2000). 
Cooper (1990) describes the evolution along three generations, with the first one 
following a simple supplier-to-customer relation with information flows pounding back 
and forth between the stages.   
 
 
Illustration 3: First generation of NPD process models based on Albers and Meboldt (2007, p. 3) 
Entailing a rise of global competitive dynamics in the early 1990s, pressure for reduced 
cycle time and costs as well as for enhanced product quality led to the development of 
a more efficient and effective second generation of NPD processes, the stage-gate 
system. The central idea, from which it takes the name, are gates to separate individual 
development stages, inspired by production processes where value is created 
between gates that ensure quality and eliminate variance. The adoption of this 
production view to NPD are gates, that safeguard a certain quality standard and 
stages, that imply a higher product value for every stage downstream the NPD process 
(Cooper, 1990; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1991).  
 
Illustration 4: Second generation of NPD process models: The stage-gate process based on Cooper 
(1990, p. 46) 
While the stage-gated system experienced rapid adoption in the industry, criticism 
emerged towards the time-intensive passage of gates, slowing down NPD speed by 
setting back entire products at gates for merely one incomplete activity. Therefore, a 
third generation of NPD processes was developed to bring more flexibility and 
improved project prioritization to previously rigid stages, therefore named fuzzy stage-
gate system (Cooper, 1994). It supports a more fluent process, where stages may 
overlap and gates allow for conditional criteria to pass, as opposed to absolute 
measures that required fulfilment previously. While these improvements yielded higher 
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efficiency, complexity and coordination requirements were on the rise for stages whose 
limits are fuzzy and contingent on conditional criteria (Albers and Meboldt, 2007). 
 
 
Illustration 5: Third generation of NPD process models: Fuzzy stage-gate system based on Cooper 
(1994, p. 5) 
Until this day, the stage-gate system is widely utilized in practice and the most renown 
among existent NPD models, with a recent study identifying 88% of North American 
companies employing it in their NPD activities (Kahn, 2013, p. 28). Other structured 
models of NPD processes include the loose-tight concept (Albers and Eggers, 1991), 
in which innovation projects are managed in an increasingly tight manner towards the 
end of the process, or Lynn et al.’s (1996) probe-and-learn process which is 
specialized on scientific and technologically intensive NPD efforts (Gassmann and von 
Zedtwitz, 2003).  
 
In summary, normative models of NPD processes have evolved to become more 
flexible and comprehensive over time, entailing a higher burden for implementation. 
With rising product requirements, the need for reduced development cycle time and 
increasing interdisciplinary focus, complexity is becoming a major challenge in NPD 
management since the late 20th century. While the refinement of structured NPD 
approaches has been crucial to improve development activities, the interaction 
between different functional stakeholders of any stage-gate system remains difficult 
(Cooper, 1996; ElMaraghy et al., 2012; Simms and Trott, 2014).   
2.1.2 Management of organizational interfaces 
Whereas interface integration in a NPD context is at the core of this thesis, interfaces 
generally exist in a broad range of organizational situations. A fundamental 
characterization of interfaces, explanations on their emergence and instruments to 
manage them will be broadly outlined in the following. Barriers and supportive aspects 
to interface integration in the specific context of NPD will be discussed in a subsequent 
section.  
 
Interface management constitutes a central problem in management and 
organizational research that goes back to the times of Adam Smith: Referring to 
Smith’s conception of production based on the division of labour, List (1841, p. 224) 
notes that “the separation of business operations, without the unification of productive 
etc.
Gate 
2
Gate 
3
Gate 
4
Gate 
5
Gate 
1
Preliminary
Investigation
Business 
Case
Test 
& Validate
Develop-
ment
Stage 
1
Stage 
2
Stage 
3
Stage 
4
Id
e
a
  8 
forces towards a collective purpose, can hardly foster such a production” (translated 
from the German original). 
The fundamental root cause leading to the emergence of interfaces and all 
concomitant coordination difficulties is the steady increase of industrial specialization 
from the beginning of the industrialization age onwards. Given the simultaneous 
explosion of knowledge, with its velocity increasing up to this day, specialization is 
simply a necessary condition to support the expansion of knowledge (Ehrlenspiel and 
Meerkamm, 2013, p. 3). The result is the organizational paradigm of specialization and 
coordination mutually presupposing each other, with the emergence of interfaces 
being an unavoidable consequence thereof. Hence, managing interfaces emerges as 
an important management activity, as its failure to do so risks to eliminate the benefits 
from specialization (Brockhoff, 1989, p. 1; Cratzius, 2003, p. 17).  
 
Interface management denotes “the systematic management of collaboration between 
different functional areas, above all function areas of marketing, production as well 
research and development” (Brockhoff and Hauschildt, 1993, quoted by Cratzius, 
2003, p. 28, translated from the German original). According to Albach (1994, p. 198), 
the overall aim of interface management is closely related to NPD: the exchange of 
knowledge between functional departments in the innovation process.  
Following Brockhoff (1994, p. 10), interface management designates both an intra-
organizational and an inter-organizational perspective. Inter-organizational interfaces, 
occurring between individual organizations as opposed to intra-organizational 
interfaces between functional departments of one organization, are omitted from the 
scope of this thesis. For the questions examined in the empirical part of the study at 
hand, their inclusion is assumed to yield few insights, as the integration mechanics 
differ widely. Thus, differentiating causes and effects for inter- and intra-organizational 
interfaces would go beyond the scope of this thesis.  
2.1.2.1 Characterization of organizational interfaces 
While the expression “interface” originates from a technical context, designating 
transmission zones between software or hardware parts where energy or information 
is transferred, it is widely used in a broader social and organizational context to account 
for linkage points between organizational units or groups that work relatively 
autonomously in the greater context of an interlinked process or task (Specht, 2000; 
Lühring, 2006, p. 43; Brockhoff and Hauschildt, 1993, p. 3).   
 
According to Brockhoff and Hauschildt (1993, p. 4-6), organizational interfaces are 
specific types of a social relation characterized by six aspects: autonomy of 
organizational units, equal hierarchical position, and common superiors, enforced 
relations, interactional relations and lastly, the existence of conflicts. The last aspect is 
inherently related to barriers to integration, which are generic causes to interface 
conflicts that hinder integration. Barriers to integration are manifold, including cultural 
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divergence, information asymmetries, different strategic perspectives and physical 
barriers. They constitute an entire body of research itself, see Ginn and Rubenstein 
(1986), Gupta et al. (1986), Dougherty (1992), Brockhoff (1989, p. 43-84), Kahn and 
Mentzer (1994). 
2.1.2.2 Emergence of organizational interfaces 
Following Brockhoff (1994, p. 32), organizational interfaces emerge when a task or 
process requires more than one functional stakeholder and when classical approaches 
to organizational coordination do not apply: Hierarchical directives are not relevant, as 
there is no direct common superior. Market mechanisms, e.g. coordination via transfer 
prices or outsourcing to an external supplier, do not apply as economic reasons 
apparently led to an internal solution for the interface to materialize in the first place. 
Illustration 6 depicts internal and external causes for the emergence of interfaces, with 
external causes being imposed on an organization, e.g. through regulatory 
requirements, and internal causes created by the organization itself (Brockhoff, 1994, 
p. 18).  
 
 
Illustration 6: Causes for the emergence of organizational interfaces based on Brockhoff (1994, p. 18) 
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2.1.2.3 Instruments of interface management 
An extensive body of literature covers coordination mechanisms to improve interface 
cooperation, presenting instruments that draw on a broad range of organizational and 
management levers. With literature featuring instruments as diverse as corporate 
culture mechanisms, process organization and personal incentivization schemes, a 
summary of prevalent literature will be given in the following.  
 
Brockhoff and Hauschildt (1993, p. 7) take the hierarchical organization as reference 
point to their categorization of instruments to overcome interface difficulties. They 
distinguish between mechanisms that are hierarchy-neutral, hierarchy-complementary 
and hierarchy-substituting. Accordingly, hierarchy-neutral instruments can be applied 
to any hierarchy level and affect individual behaviour either implicitly or explicitly. 
Explicit mechanisms encompass incentive systems, recruiting schemes, education on 
the job as well as job rotation, while implicit mechanisms imply visions, goals and 
corporate culture. Hierarchy-complementary instruments focus on affecting group 
behaviour in a personal manner, with liaison people, central staffs, commissions or 
project management named as examples. The last group, hierarchy-substituting 
elements, make hierarchical structures and directives partially obsolete by affecting 
groups’ behaviour in an impersonal way. Markets and transfer price systems, programs 
and planning as well as spatial room arrangements, i.e. sitting together in one room, 
are mentioned as examples under this notion.  
 
Brockhoff (1995, p. 205) distinguishes between interface management as a main 
function and complementary instruments, with the latter differentiating between 
instruments that address the vertical organization (structure) and instruments that 
affect the horizontal organization (process). Details are provided in illustration 7.  
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Illustration 7: Instruments of interface management based on Brockhoff, 1995, p. 205) 
Griffin and Hauser (1996) describe social aspects of interface integration in NPD 
projects, such as communications patterns between different interfaces (see also 
Griffin and Hauser, 1992). They emphasize personal instruments, suggesting several 
mechanisms without joining them into a comprehensive instrument catalogue or 
overarching framework. Informal social systems, personnel movement, relocation and 
physical facilities find mentioning as levers to bring cross-functional stakeholders 
closer to each other, both physically and mindset-wise. Furthermore, they suggest 
incentive and reward systems to encourage members from different functional 
backgrounds to work with each other. In terms of organizational structure, different 
approaches, such as matrix organizations, project teams or coordinating groups are 
stated. Lastly, they suggest formal integrative management mechanisms to support 
integration in a manner similar to the normative models described above, e.g. 
formalized review procedures in Cooper’s (1990) stage-gate process.  
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Specht (2000) follows a logic of standard elements of organizational theory in putting 
forward his systemization of interface management instruments: He distinguishes 
mechanisms of the process organization, the organizational structure, culture- and 
individual-affecting instruments as well as information and communication instruments. 
With regard to the process organization, he names promotors, review, mapping and 
integrative planning systems and refers to existent methods, e.g. simultaneous 
engineering. Within the organizational structure, Specht differentiates between 
instruments of the primary organization, such as flat hierarchies or coordinating offices, 
and instruments of the secondary organization, such as project groups, management 
committees or linking pins. Similar to Brockhoff and Hauschildt’s explicit hierarchy-
neutral instruments, Specht’s culture- and individual-oriented instruments encompass 
education on the job, job rotation, incentive systems as well as corporate identity and 
leadership role model measures. Lastly, Specht’s information and communication 
instruments bring together physical and virtual ways of working and communicating 
with each other, ranging from video conferencing over shared databases and group 
rooms up to virtual reality and mock-up applications.  
2.1.3 Cross-functional integration in NPD  
2.1.3.1 Definitions of cross-functional integration in NPD 
No generally accepted definition of cross-functional integration has yet materialized in 
the existent literature (Olson et al., 2001; Brettel et al., 2011; Reiferscheid). Indeed, 
cross-functional integration is a concept with many different facets and interpretations: 
“[…] a great deal of variance exists in extant literature regarding how integration is 
defined and implemented and how relevant studies are conducted” (Troy et al., 2008, 
p. 132). Moreover, no prevalent generic term has emerged yet, with cross-functional 
integration, interfunctional cooperation or interdepartmental collaboration exemplifying 
just a few verbal manifestations. Throughout this thesis, the term cross-functional 
integration is used. 
 
Definitions of cross-functional integration in NPD 
Source Definition 
Kahn, 1996, p. 
139 
“It is proposed that interdepartmental integration be defined as a 
multidimensional process that subsumes interaction and 
collaboration” 
Song and 
Parry, 1997, p. 
4 
“Cross-functional integration refers to the level of unity of effort 
across functional areas in developing and launching a new product”  
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Song et al., 
1997, p. 37 
“Cooperation is broadly defined as coordination of behaviour […], 
numerous terms and phrases that have been used analogously, 
such as interfunctional integration, collaboration and teamwork. 
Basically, cross-functional cooperation refers to interdependency 
and information sharing between the various organizational units”  
Olson et al., 
2001, p. 260 
“Our operational definition of cooperation includes both the 
frequency of interaction and the amount of information and 
resources shared between a pair of functions involved in an NPD 
project: marketing – R&D, marketing – operations, and R&D – 
operations” 
Luca and 
Atuahene-
Gima, 2007, p. 
95 
“Cross-functional collaboration refers to the degree of cooperation 
and the extent of representation by marketing, research and 
development (R&D), and other functional units in the product 
innovation process” 
Brettel et al., 
2011, p. 253 
“The present study mainly relies on integration as the 
multidimensional construct including (a) the frequency of formal and 
informal communication, (b) the frequency and the amount of 
information and resources exchanged between the functions, and 
(c) the existence of collective goals” 
Engelen et al., 
2012, p. 53 
“CFI [cross-functional integration, author’s note] as a 
multidimensional process of interaction and collaboration between 
functions, where interaction refers to the structured nature of cross-
functional activities, such as the use and exchange of 
communication among functions, and collaboration is the 
unstructured, affective nature of cross-departmental relationships” 
Table 1: Definitions of cross-functional integration in NPD 
Table 1 lists definitions that are used by predominant authors in the field of cross-
functional integration. The central aspect common to all definitions is the exchange of 
resources, above all information, between different functional units in the NPD process. 
However, two aspects are seen as controversial: the degree to which stakeholders 
interact to exchange resources, and the functional units that are included in this 
definition. Therefore, two aspects are discussed in the following: At first, it will be 
discussed which functional units are involved in cross-functional integration. Second, 
I will investigate whether cross-functional integration concentrates on mere interaction 
or includes cooperation or collaboration. 
2.1.3.2 Functional units involved in cross-functional NPD 
With regard to functional units involved in NPD activities, the following is widely 
accepted in pertinent literature: R&D, marketing and production are perceived as the 
most important functional actors in NPD (Brockhoff and Hauschildt, 1993, p. 2; Olson 
et al., 2001, p. 259; Neubauer, 2008, p. 24; Brettel et al., 2011, p. 252). Nevertheless, 
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a multitude of empirical studies on cross-functional integration focusses only on R&D 
and marketing as central actors, neglecting the role of production. 
 
 
Illustration 8: Generic information streams between functional units in NPD adapted from Song et al. 
(1997, p. 37) 
Illustration 8 depicts generic information streams between the three central functional 
units and resulting respective interdependencies. Marketing has to identify and 
translate customer needs into a well-conceived product positioning, with R&D 
depending on them to prioritize product features. R&D needs to deliver functioning 
designs that are producible within costs that are non-prohibitive to customer pricing, 
hence they are exposed to several interdependencies with production regarding 
manufacturability, required manufacturing capabilities and design validation with 
prototypes. Production depends on marketing’s forecasts, and marketing in turn on 
production to have reliable information on inventory, lead time and cost projections 
(Brettel et al., 2011; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, p. 227 ff.).    
2.1.3.3 Manifestations of integration between functions 
Existent research presents several conceptions of integration; interaction, cooperation 
and collaboration are mentioned most frequently and shall therefore be described in 
the following.  
According to Kahn (1996) and Moenaert et al. (1994), interaction refers to the 
frequency of formal communication and is structural in nature. It includes coordinated 
interdepartmental activities, both impersonal and personal, such as routine meetings 
or the sequential exchange of standardized documents (Neubauer, 2008; Kahn, 2001).  
Collaboration, on the other hand, tends to be unstructured and intangible, hence 
representing a more informal aspect of integration. Kahn (1996, p. 139) describes it 
“as an affective, volitional, mutual/shared process where two or more departments 
work together, have mutual understanding, have a common vision, share resources, 
and achieve collective goals”. It touches upon qualitative, attitudinal aspects of 
integration as opposed to the mere frequency of interaction (Gerpott, 2005).   
Furthermore, cooperation constitutes yet another conception for cross-functional 
integration that looks into the content of interdepartmentally shared information and 
relations; going beyond the mere outward nature of integration. Following Song et al. 
R&D
Marketing Production
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(1997, p. 37), cooperation refers to “interdependency and information sharing between 
the various organizational units”.  
 
Different models of cross-functional integration manifestations build loosely on those 
conceptions; two prominent ones by Kahn (1996) and Olson et al. (2001) are outlined 
in the following.  
 
Kahn (1996) postulates a two-pillar model building on the interplay of interaction and 
collaboration as defined above. In a series of empirical studies (Kahn, 1996; Fisher et 
al., 1997; Maltz and Kohli, 1996; Kahn, 2001; Kahn and Mentzer, 1998), the impact of 
both interaction and collaboration on NPD success was examined. It is found that 
interaction alone is not sufficient to yield improvements in NPD success. Collaboration 
is shown to be the more effective integration manifestation for NPD success, with 
interaction taking a rather presupposive role as a precondition for collaboration to 
develop.  
 
Olson et al. (2001) builds on Song et al.‘s (1997) conception of cooperation and 
develops a model that measures the frequency of communication, the amount of 
shared information and levels of transferred work. The authors deliberately focus on 
those more behavioural dimensions of integration, which are easier to measure for 
researchers and easier to influence as managers. Attitudinal dimensions, as they are 
included in Kahn’s definition of collaboration, are therefore neglected.  
2.1.3.4 Importance of cross-functional integration in NPD 
As discussed above, NPD success is an undeniable requirement for organizations of 
all sorts and sizes. In particular for manufacturing companies, often with large asset 
bases forcing their management to generate a steady stream of business to cover fixed 
costs, predictable NPD success and rigid planning is essential for survival (Gao and 
Bernard, 2017).  
 
Cross-functional integration is undisputedly one of the factors that bring NPD projects 
to success: “The need for a close collaboration, especially in the early phase of the 
developments, is undisputed in academia and practice” (Lorenz, 2008, p. 11). In its 
complexity and uncertainty, the NPD process implies various interdependencies 
between different functions, making NPD fundamentally a multidisciplinary process 
and hence cross-functional integration a necessary antecedent of NPD success (Olson 
et al., 2001; Lorenz, 2008; Lee and Markham, 2016). Despite its recognized impact on 
NPD (see for example Ehrlenspiel 2017, p. 233 ff., Brown and Eisenhardt 1995, 
Boutellier et al. 2008, p. 156 ff., Albach 1994, p.198 or Wheelwright and Clark 1992, p. 
227), the implementation of cross-functional cooperation is a success factor for NPD 
that remains challenging for most organizations. Therefore, it remains one of the top 
  16 
list items of agendas in academia and practice alike (Gupta and Wilemon, 1996; 
Neubauer, 2008).   
 
Lindemann et al. (2001) emphasize the holistic importance of integrated NPD. They 
state that integration in NPD impacts all aspects of the so-called magic triangle (cost-
time-quality) in a universal way. Likewise they are noting flexibility and robustness of 
processes as beneficiaries of integrated product development. 
 
One of the most detrimental effects of lacking integration is that the entire design 
process is disassembled into sub-problems of different functions to be solved 
subsequently. This results in sub-optimization, potentially sharply disadvantageous of 
the global optimization that the new product would require from a life-cycle perspective 
(Minnaar and Reinecke, 2012).  
 
Often cited, the important role of NPD for the entire life cycle shows another essential 
need for cross-functional integration. The lion’s share of costs that occur over the entire 
product life cycle is determined in early phases of NPD. Hence, product designers, as 
the predominant stakeholders typically involved in early phase NPD, decide over costs 
that downstream functional areas are bound to bear, such as manufacturing, sales or 
aftersales, see illustration 9 for details (Negele, 1998; Lindemann et al., 2001; 
Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 668). This implies a natural requirement for 
downstream functions to become involved. Resulting cost saving estimations are 
impressive:  
Womack et al. (2006, p. 111) cite a two-third reduction of engineering efforts and a 
one-third reduction of development time. However, particularly in early phases, costs 
that occur later are hard to assess, which constitutes a central paradox in NPD cross-
functional integration: Consequences on downstream stakeholders are the easiest to 
impact when they are the hardest to assess (Hacker, 2002). 
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Illustration 9: Time gap between cost determination and cost occurrence in NPD based on VDI (1987, 
p. 3) 
Besides these arguments, today’s business environment requires cross-functional 
integration on an augmented scale. Innovation pressure is on an all-time rise, with 
higher frequency of new products and the need for shorter development times putting 
additional complexity to new product development, entailing higher pressure on cross-
functional integration alike: “The more innovative the NPD projects are, the greater is 
the need to integrate marketing and R&D functions within the company" (Fain et al., 
2011, p. 599). Olson et al. (2001, p. 258) enumerate macro trends such as rapid 
technological change, flexibility requirements of production systems and global 
competition that make “close collaboration across functions even more crucial for the 
introduction of profitable and timely new products".  
One of the underlying causes for this increased integration pressure is uncertainty, 
which is an inherent part of every innovation project. Breakthrough innovations call for 
large investments and carry tremendous risks. In this regard, cross-functional 
integration helps to compensate for instabilities of innovative products, as it increases 
planning accuracy and reduces manufacturing costs by integrating production. It also 
moderates market- and demand-related risks by integration marketing. Thus, cross-
functional integration helps mitigating the risks connected to innovation (Land et al., 
2012; Song et al., 1998).  
 
In summary, cross-functional integration becomes more important today to achieve 
higher innovation frequency, radically innovative products and reduced development 
time than it has already been, although very much the same reasons make cross-
functional integration more difficult to achieve as they all likewise increase complexity. 
A later section will touch upon these barriers to integration in NPD in large-scale 
industrial environments in more detail.  
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2.1.3.5 Detrimental effects of cross-functional integration in NPD 
While the majority of the literature focusses on positive effects of cross-functional 
integration, and indeed empirical studies propose that it is overall supporting NPD 
performance, it may likewise bear costs.  
High levels of integration entail high communication and alignment efforts, with 
reduced efficiency and lower decision speed as results. Reaching consensus across 
functions is typically more difficult than it is within a functional unit. This further 
increases alignment efforts and possibly requires specifically educated managers able 
to cope with the complex coordination of cross-functional processes (Brettel et al., 
2011, 2011; Neubauer, 2008; Song et al., 1998). Shim et al. (2016) argue that 
enhanced integration can possibly result in important information being disregarded or 
technological completeness being triggered, bearing costly delays of the development 
period. Moreover, integration violates basic management principles that state that 
authority should be linked to responsibility and every employee should be subordinated 
to a single manager. Those violations carry the risk of organizational conflict, resulting 
in personal distress that decreases overall productivity (Song et al., 1998).  
2.1.3.6 Barriers to integration specific to NPD contexts 
As specified above, interface management is a pressing business issue in manifold 
contexts. However, environments of large-scale industrial NPD expose certain barriers 
to integration that make cross-functional integration even more difficult.  
 
Following Lühring (2006, p. 66), higher levels of market uncertainty and technical 
uncertainty increase coordination requirements between functional areas. Hence NPD 
projects, which by their very own nature bear market-related and technical risks, 
demand generally higher coordination levels. Reasons thereof can be found in 
planning uncertainty which rises with longer development duration and lack of 
experience with product or process technologies that make it difficult to predict 
consequences on cross-functional counterparts (Thom, 1980, p. 27; Lühring, 2006, p. 
65).  
 
In addition, involved functional units as derived above (marketing, R&D and 
production) exhibit function-specific traits and cultures that pose significant barriers to 
integration. In his conceptual model of innovation processes, Seidel (1996, p. 28 ff.) 
distinguishes barriers along four different levels: The factual-intellectual level, the 
socio-emotional level, the value-based-cultural level and the creative-playful level.  
To begin with, the factual-intellectual level includes different objectives that involved 
functions have regarding their NPD activities. On this level, production often takes a 
position that opposes the objectives of the other functions. Marketing and R&D typically 
strive to bring about change through new products and new technologies, while 
production strives for stability and efficiency (Song et al., 1997). On the same factual-
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intellectual level, the involved functions need very different kinds of information. While 
R&D and marketing embrace uncertainty to establish innovative solutions, production 
prefers reliable and less volatile information (Lühring, 2006, p. 58; Neubauer, 2008).  
On the socio-emotional level, function-specific languages and subcultures, often 
named “thought worlds” in prevalent literature, take effect as well as very different 
academic backgrounds (Dougherty, 1992). Production again protrudes, with its 
members often lacking the academic background that its counterparts from R&D and 
marketing largely exhibit (Maltz, 1997). Different thought worlds likewise impact the 
value-based-cultural level, with different planning horizons taking a dominant role. 
Marketing’s preferences lean strongly towards short-term reaction times to enable fluid 
responsiveness for altered market demands. Both R&D and production, on the other 
side, prefer long-term planning horizons to support large-scale technological 
innovation and a stable process build-up, respectively (Lühring, 2006, p. 58; Song et 
al., 1997).  
Barriers to integration on the creative-playful level account for different functional 
affinities for creative solutions. Again, production takes the maverick position due to a 
function-inherent opposing attitude towards novel and inventive features, that 
endanger stability and long-term efficiency gains in the production process (Lühring, 
2006, p. 58).  
2.1.3.7 Barriers to integration specific to large-scale industrial environments 
Large-scale industrial environments pose particular barriers to integration stemming 
from three root causes: organizational size, complexity of products and suppression of 
innovative forces.  
 
To begin with, organizational size impedes cross-functional integration by the spatial 
and personal distance between involved stakeholders. For most cases, distance 
increases with increasing firm size: The larger a functional department, the more 
difficult is it to know all employees within the department or from the cross-functional 
counterpart department in person. In addition, the larger an organization, the more 
likely is it to have several, spatially distant sites, further impeding personal 
acquaintanceship with employees at other sites.  
Furthermore, higher levels of specialization occur in large organizations, which 
increases the distance between different functional thought worlds (Womack et al., 
2006, p. 63; Damanpour, 1996). Organizational size induces organizational layers and 
substructures detrimental to integration: While one layer of functional specialization, 
e.g. division of R&D, marketing and production suffices to small companies, large 
companies divide their activities between more functional units: Marketing tends to split 
up along products, R&D along technologies, production along locations or plants. 
Integrating substructures that organizationally do not fit to each other impedes 
integration. Formalized career paths and incentivization, as well as specialization and 
decreasing mobility within the company, all reduce a personal exchange and job 
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rotation between functions that would have supported integration (Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992, p. 256-258; Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000). Formalized decision structures, such 
as formal committees, often are rooted in a certain functional unit, with the first cross-
functional decision alignment occurring only on high hierarchical levels (Teece, 1999; 
Damanpour, 1996). Large organizations often operate on a global scale, with cultural 
distance and intellectual property uncertainties inducing them to wall off, again 
impeding integration. For production in particular, globalized organizations are 
prohibitive to integration, as production is often off-shored to remote locations while 
R&D and marketing often remain centralized (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2000).   
 
On the other side, large-scale industrial enterprises are often characterized by the 
complexity of their products, as those require high levels of specialization found in large 
organizations. While product complexity further induces specialization with all the 
effects on integration mentioned above, additional aspects come into play. At first, 
components of complex products exhibit high levels of both functional interdependency 
and process-related interdependency, so both R&D and production require so much 
alignment within their own groups of specialists that integration with other functions is 
at risk to be neglected. For the same reason, modularization in small cross-functional 
teams is often not feasible. Rising levels of regulations and security requirements for 
many complex products, such as in the automotive or aviation industry, increase 
pressure on intra-functional alignment and reduce leeway for design or process 
adaptations asked for by other functional units (Fujimoto, 2000; Wenzel, 2003). 
Furthermore, cost pressure often requires complex products to be designed as 
platform concepts today, further reducing the chance of other functional units’ 
demands to be respected. For example, production may ask for a certain design to be 
altered to enhance manufacturability, but R&D has its hands tied to remain within the 
specifications of the modular design. Likewise, production may refuse to produce a 
certain design as this would require alternations of production lines that are already 
used for other products on the same platform (Fujimoto, 2000).  
  
In summary, particular barriers to integration make cross-functional cooperation in 
NPD and large-scale industrial environments even more difficult. It is important to note, 
that of the involved functional units it is often production that is pushed towards a 
maverick position through the mentioned barriers, making the integration of production 
particularly strenuous. 
2.2 Existing methods to enhance cross-functional integration in NPD 
This thesis strives to shed a comprehensive light on existing methods and their 
application. Therefore, the literature groundworks must not be limited by disciplinary 
boundaries of a certain research field, but should cover all areas that might play a role 
in empirical applications.  
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As a consequence, the following literature survey includes both methods in  
engineering theory and management theory, with the latter likewise including aspects 
of social theory that are applicable to the object of research.  
2.2.1 Methods in engineering theory 
From an engineering perspective, the integration of different functional stakeholders 
within NPD is a frequently discussed topic for the same reasons that are valid for 
management research alike. Hence, a large body of literature on integrated NPD in 
engineering-related research fields is in place. While management research generally 
takes a broad methodical perspective applicable to many industries and problems of 
interface integration, the engineering perspective on integrated NPD often is narrower 
in scope, considering more specific questions such as assembly-optimized product 
design. In particular, methods of information-oriented integration, e.g. computer-aided 
design techniques, are frequently presented as specific methods to enhance cross-
function integration within NPD (Anderl et al., 2012, p. 7 ff.).  
 
In the following, five well-established method systems for cross-functional integration 
from engineering theory will be explained in more detail. Simultaneous engineering, 
integrated product development, axiomatic design and design for X all are methods 
that consider the integration of different interfaces, with the design-manufacturing 
interface being just one of them. On the other hand, design for manufacturing and 
assembly is focused particularly on the integration of manufacturing into the design 
process.  
 
Notably, any delineation between methods, approaches or individual techniques 
remains debatable. Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm (2013, p. 207) note that the method 
body on cross-functionally integrated NPD itself is complex, because individual 
methods and approaches have been developed from different perspectives and 
requirements and are far from being consistent and unitary. They suggest to 
summarize individual approaches and techniques as method systems, naming 
simultaneous engineering or integrated product development as examples of these 
systems. This delineation is followed hereinafter: simultaneous engineering, integrated 
product development, axiomatic design, design for X and design for manufacturing and 
assembly are considered as paramount method systems and presented in the 
following; individual techniques which are widely used within these method systems 
are explained furthermore.  
2.2.1.1 Simultaneous engineering 
Simultaneous engineering is a large research field serving as foundation for many 
methodical refinements in the field of new product development, such as integrated 
product development or TQM (total quality management) (Negele, 1998). According to 
the prevailing opinion, the terms simultaneous engineering and Cconcurrent 
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engineering (CE) are used interchangeably (Bullinger and Warschat, 1996, p. 15; 
Parsaei and Sullivan, 1993). According to Swink (1998, p. 103), simultaneous 
engineering is defined as follows: “In the CE [concurrent engineering, author’s note] 
approach, integrated, multi-functional teams work together, simultaneously attacking 
multiple aspects of new product development. Control and responsibility are shared 
among functions and development activities overlap […]. Concurrent engineering can 
therefore be defined as the simultaneous design and development of all processes 
and information needed to manufacture a product, to sell it, to distribute it, and to 
service it”. Minnaar and Reinecke (2012) take an analogy to manufacturing when 
explaining simultaneous engineering as a just-in-time method, where development 
information is exchanged immediately and in small batches. Illustration 10 shows the 
central idea of overlapping functional subprocesses, simultaneously run, with 
knowledge of downstream functions being available in early development phases and 
a resulting shorter development time (Stjepandic et al., 2015; Bochtler, 1995; Minnaar 
and Reinecke, 2012).   
 
 
Illustration 10: Reduction of development time through simultaneous engineering based on Bochtler 
(1995, p. 2) 
The vertical integration of tasks which, in conventional models of NPD, are only 
horizontally integrated, is in the focus of all simultaneous engineering efforts. 
Krottmaier (2013, p. 13 ff.) describes three methodological approaches for its 
operational enactment: the integration of process organization through parallelization 
and merging of competences, the integration of hierarchical organization through 
establishment of simultaneous engineering teams, and the integration of information 
through system and data integration. Product and process classifications, process 
interdependencies and life cycle interactions are resulting requirements for 
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simultaneous engineering, entailing high coordination and communication efforts 
(Prasad et al., 1993; Bullinger and Warschat, 1996, p. 57 ff.). Resulting high 
implementation costs and increased coordination complexity are often mentioned as 
reasons for low industrial application levels of simultaneous engineering (Kessler and 
Chakrabarti, 1999; Kessler, 2000; Bullinger and Warschat, 1996, p. 41 ff.), although its 
relevance and success potential has been studied and proven manifold, see Cratzius 
(2003, p. 96) or Lorenz (2008) for an overview. A strong process overlap can likewise 
result in risk being carried forward and potentially multiplied, making simultaneous 
engineering less suitable for radical innovation projects and early project phases 
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Herstatt and Verworn, 2007).  
2.2.1.2 Integrated product development 
Integrated product development as a methods system is a composure of widely 
applicable techniques for problem solving, procedural organization and construction. 
Moreover, it integrates suitable soft- and hardware support tools. It can be seen as an 
advancement of simultaneous engineering’s basic principles, as it evolves 
simultaneous work efforts of different functions based on mutual consultations to a 
continuous exchange of information and intermediary work results (Lühring, 2006, p. 
80; Lindemann et al., 2001).  
Integrated product development was first conceived by Ehrlenspiel (Ehrlenspiel, 2017, 
1995) as a process model based on the fundamental topic-related thinking of 
Andreasen and Hein’s “Integrated product development” (1987). Lindemann and 
Kleedörfer (1997) built their own system based on Ehrlenspiel’s work, finding further 
development in the Munich procedural model (Lindemann, 2005, p. 40).  
Integrated product development’s objective is a comprehensive, process-overarching 
information flow across all stakeholders of NPD, such that product design would take 
into account customer feedback as well as inputs from production, sales or other 
downstream functions. Illustration 11 depicts these information streams following 
Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm (2013, p. 204).  
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Illustration 11: Information streams in integrated product development based on Ehrlenspiel and 
Meerkamm (2013, p. 204) 
A widely used technique within integrated product development is the TOTE (Test-
Operate-Test-Exit) scheme, describing the human problem solving process as an 
iterative loop system, a procedure cycle, suggesting a structured work procedure for 
an individual participant, and procedure planning, structuring tasks and work stages 
for larger projects. Besides further techniques and tools for specific problem tasks, 
integrated product development emphasizes the need for a comprehensive change of 
mindset supporting integrated learning and the abandonment of an exclusive focus on 
the own function (Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 329; Vajna, 2014).  
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Integrated product development is subject to further methodical development up to this 
day, with tools and techniques being added to its underlying tool box, see Gausemeier 
et al. (2012) and Bichlmaier (2000) as examples.  
2.2.1.3 Axiomatic design 
Axiomatic design, developed by Suh (2001) in the late 1970s, relies on the belief in 
two fundamental principles or axioms, which have been identified to characterize good 
designs after extensive examinations. The first one, called “independence axiom”, 
entails the independence of functional requirements. The second one, called 
“information axiom”, accounts for simplicity in the design, stating that the best design 
of all those fulfilling the first axiom is the one with the lowest information content 
(Gausemeier et al., 2012; Suh, 2001).  
Following the general perception of an axiom, all features of a good design can be 
derived from the independence and information axiom (Suh, 2001).  
 
 
Illustration 12: The procedure model of axiomatic design based on Gausemeier et al. (2012, p. 36) 
The design process is divided into four domains, see illustration 12 for a visual 
explanation. To begin with, customer needs are translated into functional requirements 
from an engineering point of view. The actual engineering design process concerns 
the translation of those functional requirements into design parameters, eventually 
leading to suitable process variables. The actual translation between the domains 
follows an iterative process of decomposing and allocating requirements, called the 
“zigzagging process”. It occurs between all four domains, mapping a set of variables 
of one domain to the set of variables to another domain, e.g. mapping customer needs, 
expressed by a list of attributes, into functional requirements. Notably, the outcome of 
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such a mapping procedure is not necessarily unique. There could be several design 
solutions that fulfil the functional requirements. In this case, the design axioms guide 
the choice which of the designs is to be chosen (Suh, 2001).  
 
While the mapping approach itself is applicable to all domains, the translation between 
the functional and the physical domain is the central task in the axiomatic design 
process (Gausemeier et al., 2012). Relations between functional requirements 
(functional domain) and design parameters (physical domain) are modelled in the 
design matrix, which can be mathematically modelled (Suh, 2001). Following the 
independence axiom, axiomatic design strives to find independent relations, denoted 
as “decoupled design”.  
2.2.1.4 Design for X 
Conventional design practice places the achievement of product-related functional 
objectives as first priority of their design efforts, with other design objectives being 
neglected at first. As shown by Dylla (1991) in examining design engineers’ patterns 
of thinking, a multivariate optimization that takes other requirements simultaneously 
into consideration is rare in common engineering design thinking. Design for X 
summarizes approaches to give priority to those other requirements beyond mere 
functionality within the design process. A multitude of possible requirements are 
mentioned in prevalent literature, most of them coming from aspects downstream the 
design process, such as production or usability concerns (Feldhusen and Grote, 2013, 
p. 366 ff.; Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 354; Bichlmaier, 2000). For a 
comprehensive overview of design guidelines to follow when engaging in design for X, 
see Feldhusen and Grote (2013, p. 366 ff.).  
 
Procedure models for design for X are closely related to approaches of integrated 
product development, as trade-offs between the main requirement and other 
requirements emerge with high likelihood and are best solved in a cross-functional 
team (Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm, 2013, p. 354 f.). A large number of tools to support 
design for X feature a rating or score that quantifies acceptable levels of requirement 
fulfilment (Ettlie and Stoll, 1990, p. 108 f.).   
2.2.1.5 Design for manufacturing/ Design for assembly 
Design for manufacturing is a method system that subsumes various approaches to 
design a product in a way that is optimized for manufacturing. It may be categorized 
as one of the approaches among design for X; due to its prominence in design theory 
and the focus on the design-manufacturing interface in this thesis, however, it is 
described in detail hereinafter.  
For Ettlie and Stoll (1990, p. 79), it is a philosophy that “may be defined very broadly 
as the full range of policies, techniques, practices, and attitudes that cause a product 
to be designed for the optimum manufacturing cost, the optimum achievement of 
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manufactured quality, and the optimum achievement of life-cycle support 
(serviceability, reliability, maintainability).” Following this perception, several 
approaches are included in the following, all of them optimizing for a specific aspect 
within a broader understanding of manufacturing, be it assembly, standardization, 
direct or indirect costs of manufacturing, e.g. design for assembly, design for 
producibility, design for life cycle or the house of producibility (Bichlmaier, 2000; Ettlie 
and Stoll, 1990, p. 111).  
 
The underlying principle of design for manufacturing is to apply production-induced 
guidelines to the design phase, either unidirectionally or as a parallel alignment of 
process and product design. Conceptual antecedents date back to the beginnings of 
mass production, with Henry Ford’s statement “buyers could have any colour as long 
as it is black” (Duncan, 2008, p. 11) being an early example for manufacturing’s 
increased self-confidence in the realm of product design, which later supported the 
development of design for manufacturing.  
For operationalization, Ettlie and Stoll (1990, p. 82) point towards an iterative design 
process, where production both contributes specifications before the start of the actual 
design process and decides for acceptability of the current design.  
 
Other approaches, such as Boothroyd’s design for assembly (Boothroyd, 1983), 
feature a quantitative evaluation scheme that seeks to minimize production costs by a 
rigid indicator-based assessment of different design stages, introduced as 
requirements into the design process. Boothroyd’s approach is largely based on 
industrial engineering methods and has been continuously developed since its first 
conception at the end of the 1980s. It has become one of the most widely used 
methods within the broader groups of design for manufacturing (Boothroyd et al., 2011; 
Kuo et al., 2001, 2001; Bichlmaier, 2000; Ettlie and Stoll, 1990, p. 108).  
The quantitative backbone of this method is the calculation of so-called design 
efficiency as the central assessment criterion, at its core a relation between the 
theoretically optimal assembly time and the design-specific assembly time.  
The practical implementation of Boothroyd’s approach is guided by a software tool 
along two stages. In the first stage, specifications of the part to be analysed are 
provided that support a more detailed analysis of the design efficiency, e.g. weight, 
handling requirements or design symmetry. During the second stage, the resulting 
assembly time and design efficiency serve as basis for design optimization 
suggestions, which may be used to improve the overall design in an iterative manner 
(Boothroyd et al., 2011; Huang, 1996).  
2.2.2 Methods in management theory 
Existing methods how to achieve integration in NPD from a management perspective 
build on a broad range of managerial and organizational concepts. In the following, a 
comprehensive collection of different integration mechanisms will be presented. 
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Subsequently, three integrated models for the employment of cross-functional 
integration in a NPD context will be discussed.  
They all build on managerial and organizational theory, with overlaps into social theory, 
and hence can be easily differentiated from pertinent engineering research. However, 
as with methods in engineering theory, the delineation between a real method and 
mere techniques and approaches is blurry.  
2.2.2.1 Integration mechanisms 
In the course of several decades, a large range of methodologically diverse studies 
has identified many different mechanisms that spur integration in cross-functional 
cooperation within organizations and teams. While not representing a coherent 
framework or comprehensive method, the mechanisms each represent a building 
block of what might work to achieve cross-functional integration.  
As groundworks for his qualitative research endeavour to discover integration 
mechanisms, Nihtilä (1999) summarizes all prior research, structuring integration 
mechanisms in a coherent way. Illustration 13 builds on Nihtilä’s work and 
complements it by adding results of related research efforts.  
Certainly, many of the identified mechanisms borrow from the general instruments of 
interface management. However, they are grounded in a context of NPD and emerge 
from a real empirical setting, as the employed methodology shows. Much of the 
compiled research efforts were performed as empirical case studies in an industrial 
context (Ettlie and Stoll, 1990, p. 56-57; Gupta and Wilemon, 1990; Trygg, 1991; Adler, 
1995; Nihtilä, 1999; Paashuis, 1998), while others are based on quantitative survey 
data (Kraut and Streeter, 1995; Van De Ven et al., 1976; Song et al., 1997), and some 
feature a theoretical conception (Hirunyawipada et al., 2010; Thompson, 1967; Dean 
and Susman, 1989).  
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Illustration 13: Integration mechanisms (own illustration building on Nihtilä, 1999, p. 59) 
Illustration 13 presents overlaps and differences in integration mechanisms suggested 
by the respective authors. Therefore, mechanisms where many nodes end are 
comparatively often mentioned, while others have only one or two authors promoting 
them. While most of the integration mechanisms are self-explanatory, some interesting 
connections and interdependencies shall be touched upon in the following. Standards 
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as well as schedules & plans, including design rules (Trygg, 1991), timeline planning 
and formalized coordination, constitute the backbone to support the emergence of 
cross-functional integration. Mutual adjustments, meaning responsiveness to other 
functions’ demands or wishes, e.g. design changes induced by manufacturing, are 
closely related to manufacturing sign-off. The latter simply represents a formalized 
point in time where manufacturing can ask for an adjustment without having to wait for 
R&D to come up with a consultation in a more mutual or spontaneous way. Integrators, 
personnel moves, teams and social interactions all focus on social mechanisms to 
generate cohesion between functional units. Integrators, i.e. particularly capable 
individuals with experience and credibility in all involved functions, appear to be 
particularly important in early integration phases to break the ice between the involved 
functions (Nihtilä, 1999). Personnel moves, e.g. through job rotation programs, may 
help to create integrators in the first place. Mutual knowledge & skills are identified to 
be important mechanisms as they help to spur discussion at eye level between cross-
functional counterparts and enable empathy for mutual requirements (Paashuis, 1998; 
Hirunyawipada et al., 2010). Albach (1994, p. 136) and Womack et al. (2006, p. 129) 
hint into the same direction, when they describe the advantages of many Japanese 
organizations over European and American ones: Because Japanese development 
engineers need to spend up to two years on the shopfloor, they do not only retain 
personal connections but likewise internalize the shopfloor’s requirements in their later 
design.  
2.2.2.2 Integrated models of NPD 
In the following, three integrated models of NPD will be presented. In contrast to the 
rather singular and unconnected integration mechanisms, they constitute coherent 
models to support cross-functional integration in a NPD context. Still, they borrow 
elements from management and organizational theory and partially even build up on 
each other, which is the case for Schmidt-Tiedemann’s (1988) triple helix model and 
Albach’s (1992, p. 15 ff.) rugby-team model.  
The rugby-team model  
Theoretically anchored in innovation interface management theory, Albach (1992, 
p.16) summarizes sequential models of NPD in an illustrative sports metaphor, the 
relay-race model of new product development (see illustration 14). Alluding to the 
baton of a relay-race, Albach describes how information is passed downstream to the 
next function. While these sequential models are cost efficient, their linear character 
limits efficiency and effectiveness.   
 
Illustration 14: The relay-race model according to Albach (1992, p. 16) 
Albach (1992, p. 15 ff.) introduces another model that is planar in nature and builds on 
central coordination, the committee model (illustration 15). Due to its many linkages 
Research Development Production Marketing
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and high coordination requirements, the committee model is likely not an empirically 
favoured model.  
 
Illustration 15: The committee model according to Albach (1992, p. 16) 
As a third generic model, Albach introduces a coupling model containing feedback 
loops to link functions. It is designated as rugby-team model, because information is 
not strictly passed forwards but thrown back and forth between players like a ball in a 
rugby match, with design taking place concurrently. Process speed is increased as 
well as greater consistency and integrity of the product is ensured; early concerns and 
requirements from all departments can easily be taken into consideration (von Stamm, 
2008, p. 52; Albach, 1992, p. 15 ff.) . 
 
 
Illustration 16: The rugby-team model according to Albach (1992, p. 16) 
All three models solve the integration problem very differently, with required linkages 
L being dependent on the number of functional units n involved:  
 
Relay-race model: 𝐿 = 𝑛 − 1 
Committee model: 𝐿 = 2𝑛 − 1 
Rugby-team model: 𝐿 =
𝑛
2
 (𝑛 − 1) 
 
Although Albach (1992, p. 15 ff.) does not recommend one model in particular, 
referring to their different advantages that may come into play depending on the 
respective context, the rugby-team model is considered as the only truly integrated 
model and as a generic blueprint for integration of new product development that is 
connected to approaches of concurrent engineering and integrated product 
development (Lühring, 2006, p. 2).  
The triple-helix model 
Schmidt-Tiedemann (1988) develops an approach for integration in NPD that blurs 
functional boundaries to a certain degree. While other models rely on separate 
functional units that are to be interlinked more or less closely, Schmidt-Tiedemann 
Research Development Production Marketing
New product 
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Research Development Production Marketing
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(1988) proposes so-called “concomitants”, specialized fields that are in a constant 
state of mutual exchange and information transfer. He distinguishes three 
concomitants that vaguely reflect tasks of R&D, marketing and production: the creative 
strand (research, pre-development, process development), the productive strand 
(product and operating resource development, production) and the distributive strand 
(marketing, distribution, logistics). As the naming suggests, the strands are to work 
more as strands of the same thread than as separate units. 
Accordingly, Schmidt-Tiedemann (1988) designates his model “concomitance-model”, 
using the illustration of a triple-helix to represent the concurrent cooperation of the 
three involved strands. Secondary literature addressing his model coins the general 
conception “triple-helix model”, which will be followed in the terminology of the study 
at hand.  
 
 
Illustration 17: Schmidt-Tiedemann’s (1988) triple-helix model based on Albach (1994, p. 207) 
Just as the nucleobases are central to the DNA double helix, communication bridges 
are essential in the triple-helix model of integrated NPD. They enable the constant 
interchange of information and influence between the strands and allow for reduced 
development time and enhanced efficiency. In an organizational setting, 
communication bridges may be represented by decision committees or working groups 
(Albach, 1994, p. 206).  
 
Albach (1994, p. 206) concludes that the triple-helix model integrates central features 
of his relay-race and rugby-team models. Similarities include in particular the 
communication bridges, which are to resemble the rugby-team model’s communication 
overlaps between different functional units, which is achieved through manifold 
feedback loops.  
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Heavy-weight project management structures 
In the 1980s, Japanese cars were introduced to Western markets and were received 
with astonishment for their high quality at low price levels, which European and 
American cars could not reproduce. Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 71 ff.) embarked on 
a research project comparing European, American and Japanese car manufacturers 
to find out how this was possible. According to their results, the Japanese companies 
were able to develop their products in significantly less time, saving engineering efforts 
while retaining high quality levels. Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 71 ff.) found that to 
large parts, this was made possible by virtue of a special kind of matrix project 
organization featuring heavy-weight project managers (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, 
p. 274 ff.; Grosse, 2009, p. 71).  
 
Illustration 18 shows the four types of development organizations that Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991, p. 254) encountered and analysed. In the functional structure (1), 
development efforts are performed within functions, each coordinated by their 
functional manager. The light-weight product manager (2) coordinates all functional 
units with the help of liaison people, though her impact is limited. In (3), a heavy-weight 
product manager has strong impact over all functions, using it to direct all work and to 
integrate functional efforts. Structure (4) resembles an autonomous product team, 
where a heavy-weight product manager coordinates a team whose members are 
outsourced from their respective functional units and spatially co-located (Fujimoto, 
2000; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, p. 274 ff.).  
 
Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 254 ff.) find that development organizations (3) and (4), 
both featuring a heavy-weight product manager setup, achieved the highest 
performance in all measured categories of NPD performance (lead time, productivity 
and product integrity). They explain this discovery with the special role of the heavy-
weight product manager, who unifies the roles of a powerful project coordinator and a 
concept creator (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, p. 285-287).  
 
Clark and Fujimoto’s (1991, p. 254 ff.) approach hence provides a suggestion for the 
organizational structure of NPD, which is bound to achieve optimal results through a 
both effective and efficient way of integrating functional units. In addition, they offer 
guidelines how a heavy-weight product manager should be selected, advising for 
certain professional experiences and individual traits that may be referred to in the 
pertinent literature.  
  34 
 
Illustration 18: Development organizations based on Fujimoto (2000, p. 31) 
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2.3 Overview of empirical research on effects and contingencies of cross-
functional integration in NPD  
There is an extensive empirical research body that examines cross-functional 
integration’s effects with regard to different contingency factors and constellations. The 
examined aspects range from different NPD phases and involved functions up to 
different industrial contexts and mediating or moderating factors. As will be outlined in 
the following chapter, empirical results show under which circumstances cross-
functional integration is fruitful, ineffective or even harmful to NPD success; depending 
on both examined circumstances and on researcher-dependent factors such as how 
the examined items are measured and conceptionalized. Consequently, the detailed 
analysis of existent studies is an important groundwork for this thesis in order to be 
able to carve out potential result ambiguity and resulting research gaps.  
 
Applicable studies have been systematically analysed with regard to their scope, 
methodology and sample, involved functional units, NPD success measurements, 
cross-functional integration measurements, existence of moderators or mediators and 
finally, results. All details of the structured analysis can be found in Appendix A, a short 
summary thereof is provided in tables 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Three groups seem to emerge from the entire set of applicable studies, with a first 
group broadly developing the research field (table 2), a second group deploying 
comprehensive empirical efforts to explore the effect of moderators and mediators 
(table 3), and a third group (table 4) specifying singular relationships or 
moderating/mediating effects. In all analysed studies, the impact of the independent 
variable cross-functional integration on the dependent variable NPD success was 
examined. The respective result is summarized by a “(+)”, i.e. a positive impact, “(-)”, 
i.e. a negative impact. If a moderating factor was found, it is summarized by “dep. on”. 
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Relationship between cross-functional integration and NPD success 
 
Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Result 
Olson et al., 
1995 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=45 
3 Product 
innovativeness 
Formalness of 
coordination 
(+) dep. on 
product 
innovativeness, 
formalness of 
coordination 
Kahn, 1996; 
Kahn and 
Mentzer, 
1998 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=514 
3  (+) dep. on 
integration 
manifestation 
Song et al., 
1997 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=598 
3  (+) 
Song and 
Parry, 1997 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=788 
3  (+) 
Langerak et 
al., 1997 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=103 
3 NPD phase 
Competitive 
environment 
(+) dep. on 
competitive 
environment 
Sherman et 
al., 2000 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=65 
3  (+) 
Lovelace et 
al., 2001 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=43 
Unspecified  (no impact 
found) 
Frishammar 
and Ake 
Horte, 2005 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=206 
Unspecified  (+) dep. on 
integration 
manifestation 
Key: Functional units “3” means R&D, Marketing and Production, “2” means R&D and Production 
Table 2: Empirical studies on the impact of cross-functional integration on NPD success (part 1) 
The first group (table 2) develops the research field of analysing the impact of cross-
functional integration on NPD success in a more general way, measuring the general 
impact and exploring central contingency factors such as NPD phase, product 
innovativeness (Olson et al., 1995; Langerak et al., 1997) and external environment 
(Langerak et al., 1997). Different forms of integration, be it different manifestations 
such as in Kahn (1996) or different functional pairings (see Sherman et al., 2000) are 
found to have very different impacts on NPD success. Song et al. (1997) examine 
organizational antecedents in addition to consequences, finding that internal 
antecedents influence the degree of cross-functional integration while external ones 
do not. Methodological shortcomings include the rather vague measurement of NPD 
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success by Kahn (1996), only comprising a single item, Sherman et al. (2000) 
excluding incremental innovations from their scope and Frishammar and Ake Horte 
(2005), who largely reconfirm Kahn’s (1996) result, but neglect a specification of 
involved functional units.  
 
Comprehensive exploration of moderators and mediators 
 
Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Result 
Song et al., 
1998 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=236 
3 NPD phase (+/-) dep. on 
NPD phase, 
functional unit 
Kahn, 2001 Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=156 
3 NPD phase (+) dep. on 
functional unit 
Olson et al., 
2001 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=34 
3 NPD phase 
Product 
innovativeness 
(+/-) dep. on 
product 
innovativeness, 
NPD phase, 
functional unit  
Vandevelde 
and van 
Dierdonck, 
2003 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=53 
2 Product 
complexity 
Product 
innovativeness 
(+) 
Troy et al., 
2008 
Meta-analysis 
of quantitative 
survey data 
Mixed 7 management-
controlled 
2 researcher-
controlled 
3 contextual 
(+) dep. on 
many 
moderators 
Brettel et al., 
2011 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=118 
3 NPD phase 
Product 
innovativeness 
(+) dep. on NPD 
success 
measure, 
functional unit, 
NPD phase 
Key: Functional units “3” means R&D, Marketing and Production, “2” means R&D and Production 
Table 3: Empirical studies on the impact of cross-functional integration on NPD success (part 2) 
Building on the majority of studies from the first group affirming a positive impact of 
cross-functional integration on NPD success (with the exemption of Lovelace et al. 
(2001) under very different conditions), a second group of researchers sets off to yield 
clarity through comprehensive research covering a large number of different aspects, 
largely between 1998 and 2011. They focus on differences of the relationship due to 
its dependence on the NPD phase (Song et al., 1998; Kahn, 2001; Olson et al., 2001; 
Brettel et al., 2011) and on product specifications such as innovativeness or complexity 
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(Olson et al., 2001; Vandevelde and van Dierdonck, 2003; Brettel et al., 2011). Most 
of this group’s studies examine specifically the different involved functional units and 
clearly specify them. However, none of the studies brings ultimate clarity about a 
positive, ineffective or even detrimental effect of integration on NPD success 
depending on very specific patterns regarding the NPD phase or the involved 
functional pairings. Naming just a few examples shows a certain level of ambiguity of 
the results: Kahn (2001) finds a positive impact for all phases, but also discovers that 
the interrogated R&D managers do not perceive any positive impact in any phase. 
Brettel et al. (2011) find the integration between marketing and R&D positive for NPD 
efficiency, but not for NPD effectiveness, both likewise depending on NPD phase and 
product innovativeness; for other functional pairings they receive again very different 
results. Olson et al. (2001) find higher NPD performance for manufacturing/marketing 
and R&D/manufacturing integration, but only for late stages and only for innovative 
products, while manufacturing/marketing integration in early stages is found even 
negative for innovative products but positive for non-innovative products.  
Troy et al. (2008, p. 132) “attempt to bring clarity“ to ambiguous results by performing 
a meta-analysis of 25 different quantitative studies with a total of 146 correlations 
including manifold mediators, moderators and contingency variables. Nevertheless, 
their study confirms just a general tendency of integration having a positive impact on 
NPD success, while all the aspects on which this impact is dependent “may be of 
greater importance” (Troy et al., 2008, p. 132). Their findings summary speaks for 
itself: “Findings from our study provide evidence that the relationship between cross-
functional integration and new product success is indeed complicated” (Troy et al., 
2008, p. 140).  
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Relationship specification 
 Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Result 
Nakata et 
al., 2006 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=259 
3 New product 
advantage 
(+) dep. on new 
product 
advantage 
Luca and 
Atuahene-
Gima, 2007 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=363 
Unspecified Knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms 
(+) dep. on 
knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms 
Engelen et 
al., 2012 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=619 
Unspecified National 
culture, 
Corporate 
culture 
(+) 
Graner and 
Mißler-Behr, 
2014 
Quantitative 
survey data 
/n=400 
Unspecified NPD method 
application 
(+) 
Tsai and 
Hsu, 2014 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=182 
3 Competitive 
intensity 
(+) dep. on 
competitive 
intensity 
Nafisi et al., 
2016 
Qualitative case 
study/n=1 
3  Involvement of 
manufacturing 
engineers in 
NPD difficult 
Cho et al., 
2017 
Quantitative 
survey 
data/n=189 
Unspecified International 
orientation 
(+) 
Key: Functional units “3” means R&D, Marketing and Production, “2” means R&D and Production 
Table 4: Empirical studies on the impact of cross-functional integration on NPD success (part 3) 
The third group of studies (table 4) includes rather recent studies from 2006 to 2017. 
They step away from a comprehensive approach and examine individual relationships 
or aspects that may impact the relationship between cross-functional integration and 
NPD success. The scholars in this group explore mediating roles of new product 
advantage (Nakata et al., 2006), defined as “a product’s perceived superiority relative 
to competitive products” (Song and Montoya-Weiss, 2001, p. 65), knowledge 
integration mechanisms (Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007), NPD method application 
(Graner and Mißler-Behr, 2014) or the moderating effects of national and corporate 
culture (Engelen et al., 2012), competitive intensity (Tsai and Hsu, 2014) and 
international orientation (Cho et al., 2017). This third set of studies likewise comprises 
the only qualitative study in all identified applicable empirical works (Nafisi et al., 2016). 
Some of the studies present results conflicting with earlier studies. For instance, 
Engelen et al. (2012) cannot confirm Kahn’s (1996) insufficient impact of interaction on 
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NPD success. Others attempt to explain potentially ambiguous earlier results with 
mediating factors that had been neglected previously. A large part of this third group 
of scholars does not distinguish between involved functional units, as they often do not 
even specify which units are covered in their surveys. Cross-functional integration is 
for the largest part only vaguely measured, often just covering three items on general 
cooperation in their survey.  
 
As a summary for all analysed studies, the following is valid: There seems to be a 
positive impact of cross-functional integration on NPD success, however, this is 
strongly dependent on a large number of aspects that include the environment, 
involved units, the NPD phase and other mediating or moderating factors. Large efforts 
have been made by the research community to analyse this relationship in great detail 
and comprehensiveness. However, results are partially conflicting and often 
ambiguous in their interpretation. This problem is aggravated by the fact that for many 
instances, theoretically derived hypotheses have been refuted by empirical results, 
with theoretical explanations for the results being scarce. There seems to be a lack of 
understanding for the deeper dynamics of how cross-functional integration impacts 
NPD performance.  
 
Methodically, the studies lean heavily towards quantitative survey data, with qualitative 
studies being underrepresented. Furthermore, although many authors confirm the 
complexity of measuring or even grasping cross-functional integration, the majority of 
the studies reduces its analysis to just a few survey items. Accordingly, Tsai and Hu’s 
(2014) 12 items are the exception of the typical three to four items. As no countercheck 
or rebasing has been performed to what survey respondents understand as cross-
functional integration, answers from different respondents may vary significantly, and 
overall results may be difficult to interpret in an objective way. Furthermore, the 
majority of studies let respondents allow for any NPD project to choose from for 
answering the survey, which again may distort results by implementing a selection 
bias. Lastly, although pertinent literature advices that “soft factors” such as 
organizational or human behaviours impact cross-functional integration to a large 
extent, only a few empirical studies have included such aspects in their research 
efforts.  
3 Theories on coopetition 
As a nascent field of research, coopetition, the simultaneous occurrence of cooperation 
and competition, has received much attention by academics and practitioners alike. 
Notably, as a preliminary remark on the expression, competition and cooperation as 
constituents of cross-functional coopetition have a different connotation than in 
common usage. Typically, coopetition or competition, respectively, characterize a 
relationship between separate organizational entities, e.g. individual companies. As 
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will be explained in the following, coopetition may occur at this inter-organizational 
level, but is not limited to it: Other levels in scope include coopetition between company 
networks, coopetition between individuals and lastly, coopetition between departments 
within an organization. The latter, coined intra-organizational coopetition, is in focus 
for the thesis at hand and thus will be explained in particular detail hereinafter.  
 
In the following, the term and its recent importance will be introduced by building on 
intuitive examples of coopetition in everyday business. Subsequently, a more detailed 
look into theoretical fundamentals is offered, before particularities of coopetition in a 
NPD context will be explained. Finally, a detailed perspective on coopetition is taken 
on a cross-functional level of analysis, such as coopetition between functional 
departments. This chapter closes with a detailed overview and critical 
acknowledgement of relevant research studies on cross-functional coopetition.  
3.1 Introduction to coopetition 
By definition, coopetition is built on a paradox: the “simultaneous existence of 
cooperation and competition” (Tidström, 2014, p. 261), with exactly this paradox being 
its key characteristic and certainly an important reason for the seminal academic 
interest it has received recently. At the core, coopetition is a “hybrid activity” (Walley, 
2007, p. 12) and its paradoxical nature makes tensions unavoidable, which allows for 
a resourceful area of academic pursuit (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Bouncken et al., 
2015).  
 
With regard to its practical relevance, countless examples make a point for coopetition 
and serve as explanation why popular management literature had discovered 
coopetition long before it aroused academic interest (Bouncken et al., 2015). For 
example, the automotive manufacturers Toyota and General Motors entered in a 
coopetitive agreement when they decided to jointly develop fuel cell powered cars 
while remaining rivals with regard to their cars’ sale and on other segments (Chin et 
al., 2008). Likewise, the electronics company Samsung cooperated with its competitor 
Panasonic to safeguard the supply of LCD (liquid crystal display panels) for its 
television sets (Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). While these examples occur 
on an inter-firm level, practical examples of coopetitive behaviour exist on the intra-
firm level alike. Strese et al. (2016) point towards two internal consulting departments 
within Shell which, though competing for business, were required to share knowledge 
and cooperate. Birkinshaw (2001) mentions the electronics manufacturer Ericsson, 
that had two independent teams develop high-bandwidth technologies in the 1990s. 
Though being encouraged to promote their own solution, the teams were obliged to 
share their knowledge for the company’s overall benefit. Tsai (2002) includes multiunit 
organizations as examples for intra-firm coopetition: to tap economies of scope, 
departments are obliged to cooperate and exchange knowledge, while they compete 
on their rate of return. Luo et al. (2006) provide examples, where unbalanced intra-firm 
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coopetition leads to business failure. Accordingly, food manufacturer Barilla SpA failed 
in installing a just-in-time distribution system, as their marketing and sales department 
obstructed knowledge transfer to the operations department.  
 
Commonly, three pieces of work are attributed to have launched coopetition as an 
academic topic: With the term coopetition having been raised by the former high-tech 
company Novell’s CEO Nadar, it was introduced into strategy research by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff in 1996. Subsequently, Lado et al. (1997) contributed the 
first academic analysis, without mentioning the term coopetition at first, but using game 
theory and the resource-based view to argue that competition and cooperation are not 
the two ends of a continuum, as which they had been considered for a long time. The 
third pioneering milestone was provided by Bengtsson and Kock (1999) in presenting 
four relational models of companies that are assigned depending on relative industry 
position and need for external resources. One of them was coined as coopetition, next 
to coexistence, competition and cooperation (Dagnino and Padula, 2011; Yami et al., 
2010b; Devece et al., 2017).  
Nonetheless, questions arise if coopetition was “just another fashionable concept” 
(Yami et al., 2010b, p. 1) or another strategic lens to look at well-known strategic 
phenomena at most, or if it rather represented a “really true revolution in strategic 
thinking” (Yami et al., 2010b, p. 1). With its theoretical constructs heavily based on 
existing concepts, coopetition could as well be just an extension of the competitive 
paradigm or the cooperative paradigm. However, many researchers stand up for 
coopetition as a stand-alone, and indeed resourceful academic field. They reason that 
its complex traits and consequences could not be explained by looking at competition 
or cooperation alone (Yami et al., 2010b).  
 
With the number of publications pertinent to coopetition being on a constant rise, this 
view seems to hold true. Today, the research field exhibits methodical broadness on a 
variety of levels of analysis. The authors of two comprehensive literature reviews 
(Bengtsson and Kock, 2014; Devece et al., 2017) add a notion that might substantiate 
the current hype on coopetition. According to them, the increase in today’s business 
dynamics, market uncertainty and complexity make coopetitive strategies attractive for 
firms. The former reliance on internal resources shifts increasingly towards a 
networking view, which also makes use of external resources and focusses on a 
company’s ability to integrate those. Eventually, intelligent use of available resources 
within and outside the own organization might be a successful strategy to cope with 
greater competitiveness, shorter product life cycles and higher innovation pressure 
(Gnyawali and Park, 2011).  
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3.2 Theories on coopetition theory 
3.2.1 Theoretical predecessors  
“Like any theoretical concept designed to capture a complex reality in the social 
sciences, coopetition has been interpreted in numerous ways within different 
theoretical frameworks” (Devece et al., 2017, p. 4). The lowest common denominator 
herein is always the simultaneous occurrence of competitive and cooperative 
structures. Quite unsurprisingly, phenomena that meet this approximate specification 
have existed and indeed been studied before the term coopetition was coined. 
Incidences, where two competitors have joined forces to withstand innovation pressure 
or reduce time-to-market, had been analysed from either a competitive or cooperative 
point of view, see for example Hamel et al. (1989). For a long time, these two views 
were firmly cemented in what is called the cooperative or the competitive paradigm - 
seldom, the dynamics of interaction of those views were given attention.  
 
The competitive view focusses on a firm’s interdependence both in their horizontal and 
vertical market relationships, suggesting an individual interest search that shuns away 
from cooperation, based on the belief that competitive success is a zero-sum game 
where one company’s gain is the other’s loss. Building on a strong neoclassical 
position, market relations are seen as discrete events of economic exchange. The 
competitive paradigm dominated the literature on strategic management almost 
unrivalled until the 1980s, emphasizing strategic behaviour against rivals to optimize 
the own relative market position (Bouncken et al., 2015; Dagnino and Padula, 2011).   
The cooperative view, on the other hand, focusses on the organization’s relational 
capability as its core competitive advantage. At the turn of the decade towards the 
1990s, the cooperative view increasingly drew attention in strategic management, 
likewise fuelling organization management, with its strong emphasize on relational 
networks between firms that pursue common interests and create a collaborative 
advantage (Yami et al., 2010b; Johansson, 2012). Within this paradigm, the market 
cedes to be an atomistic arrangement of instant exchange, but it can be conceptualized 
as a system of continuous relations where “the firms progressively strengthen their 
reciprocal commitments and realize a process of mutual adaptation and joint value 
creation” (Dagnino and Padula, 2011, p. 8).   
 
As mentioned above, a joint perspective of these two relational views emerged with 
the seminal works of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), Lado et al. (1997) and 
Bengtsson and Kock (1999). Illustration 19 pictures how Lado et al. (1997, p. 21) 
imagined the joint perspective of a cooperative and competitive rent-seeking behaviour 
as “syncretic behaviour”, coined as coopetition by other scholars in this emergent field.  
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Illustration 19: Syncretic model of rent-seeking strategic behaviour based on Lado et al. (1997, p. 119) 
To substantiate coopetition’s theoretical foundations, researchers draw on different 
theoretical viewpoints, with game theory, the resource-based view, social network 
theory and strategic alliances being the prevalent approaches. They will be introduced 
with regard to their explanatory power for coopetitive behaviour in the following.  
 
Game theory and the related strategic games emerged as one of the earliest 
explanations for coopetition, though not remaining the prevalent one (Devece et al., 
2017). It recognizes coopetition as a win-win relationship in a mixed strategy game 
where the players’ interests are neither absolutely congruent nor opposed. Game 
theory provides not only a conceptual framework to explain coopetitive behaviour, but 
also allows for mathematical modelling to calculate an optimal strategy. However, due 
to its limited explanatory power for interpersonal relationships, it remains with limited 
applicability for coopetition (Ghobadi, 2012; Bengtsson and Kock, 2014). For some 
applications, refer for example to Loebecke et al. (1999), Gnyawali et al. (2008) or 
Clarke‐Hill et al. (2003).  
The resource-based view argues that firms, to achieve a better competitive position, 
should develop and exploit unique and non-transferable resources in collaboration with 
others or gain access to complementary and otherwise non-accessible resources by 
joining forces with competitors. Applications of the resource-based view may be found 
in Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2004), Ritala and Sainio (2013) or 
Mention (2011).  
Social network theory emphasizes the importance of cooperative ties within a network, 
even if they occur between competitors, to explain coopetitive behaviour: Accordingly, 
advantages from cooperation outweigh disadvantages that may result from engaging 
in relation with competing actors. Learning and knowledge sharing as well as the joint 
development of a collaborative advantage are essential features. To explain 
cooperation on a cross-functional or intra-firm level of analysis, social network theory 
is helpful, in particular the strength-of-ties concept and social embeddedness (Strese 
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et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2006; Devece et al., 2017). For applications within coopetition, 
Luo et al. (2006), or Gnyawali and Madhavan (2001) serve as examples. 
3.2.2 Definitions of coopetition 
As it is the case with the theoretical approaches to explain coopetition, the definitions 
of coopetition likewise span a broad range of interpretations, with the most frequently 
noted theme being the simultaneous occurrence of competition and cooperation. In 
this vein, Tidström (2014, p. 261) summarizes: “Coopetition is defined as the 
simultaneous existence of cooperation and competition […] and it can be found at intra-
organizational […], inter-organizational […] or individual level”. Other authors insinuate 
the merging perspectives of the competitive and the cooperative paradigm, for 
example Dagnino and Padula (2002, p. 33), who hint at a coopetitive value system that 
emerges from joining the perspectives: “The coopetitive perspective stems from the 
acknowledgment that, within inter-firm interdependence, both processes of value 
creation and value sharing take place, giving rise to a partially convergent interest (and 
goal) structure where both competitive and cooperative issues are simultaneously 
present and strictly interconnected. They give rise to a new kind of strategic 
interdependence among firms that we term coopetitive system of value creation”.  
 
In their search for a suitable definition, many researchers admit that there cannot be a 
consensus on a common definition as long as the phenomena that are described as 
coopetition are so diverse in their individual dynamics and consequences. Bengtsson 
and Raza-Ullah (2016) hint at the various levels on which coopetitive behaviour 
materializes and on which it takes very distinctive but different shapes.  
There are a few definitions that handle this difficulty of finding consensus by limiting 
the applicability of their definition to a particular level of analysis. As an example, Peng 
et al. (2012, p. 532) confine their definition to the inter-firm level as “cooperation with 
competitors in which they compete in the same market and cooperate in other areas”. 
Bengtsson and Kock (2000) cover a similar scope when describing coopetition as a 
situation whereby two organizations cooperate in activities such as R&D or 
procurement while competing in activities such as sales. Other scholars take the 
opposite approach and enlarge or generalize their definitions to fit a broader scope of 
applications. For instance, Luo (2005, p. 72) notes: “Coopetition is a mindset, process, 
or phenomenon of combining cooperation and competition. It means cooperating to 
create a bigger business pie, while competing to divide it up”. In a similar manner, 
Bengtsson and Kock (2014, p. 180) suggest to widen up earlier definitions of 
coopetition by stating that “coopetition is a paradoxical relationship between two or 
more actors, regardless of whether they are in horizontal or vertical relationships, 
simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions”.  
 
 
  46 
3.2.3 Levels of analysis and conceptualization of coopetitive behaviour 
With both definitions and theoretical approaches differing so strongly with regard to the 
level of analysis, it is imperative to introduce and explain what those levels comprise. 
Furthermore, the thesis at hand refers to a particular level of analysis in its empirical 
part, namely the cross-functional or intra-firm level of analysis.  
 
Again, there are different ways of structuring the different levels that find acceptance 
in prevalent literature. This thesis follows Dagnino and Padula (2002), Strese et al. 
(2016) and Yami et al. (2010a) in distinguishing three interdependent levels: The 
macro level comprises relationships between countries or firm clusters and networks, 
the meso level covers interactions between individual organizations and the micro level 
deals with relationships within an organization, be it between departments or subunits 
(micro level I) or between individuals (micro level II). The latter is also designated intra-
organizational coopetition, while macro and meso levels together make up inter-
organizational coopetition. In this thesis, the intra-organizational level is likewise 
denominated cross-functional coopetition, with the terms being used interchangeably.  
 
 
Illustration 20: Levels of analysis in coopetition adapted from Dagnino and Padula (2002, p. 36) 
Another frequently quoted level structure is illustrated in Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 
(2016), who distinguish between an intra-firm level, different dyadic levels applying to 
two organizations either in a horizontal or vertical relationship, a triad level between 
three organizations, different network levels within firm clusters or eco-systems and 
finally an inter-network level between different networks of firms.  
 
According to a majority of researchers, the best researched level of analysis is the 
meso level, where cooperation between competing firms is explored. In particular, 
micro level I is frequently called underresearched.  
 
Besides the different levels of analysis, some scholars suggest different ways of how 
to conceptionalize the body of research in coopetition. The comprehensive literature 
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review of Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) suggests the division into two schools: An 
actor school of thought, defining coopetition in a broad sense as a value net of actors, 
and an activity school of thought, which concentrates on individual activities or 
relationships within the broader network context. However, the authors admit that the 
proposed division works best, if not only, for the inter-organizational level. For the intra-
organizational level, a value net, as it has been considered in the actor school of 
thought is unlikely to emerge within organizations as they are framed by their 
organization’s common guidelines. In addition to that, a singular consideration of 
specific activities or relationships as required by the activity school of thought is difficult 
to observe in organizations, as relevant studies mostly discuss multiple involved 
individuals or subunits and make (bi-)lateral relationship identification difficult 
(Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah, 2016).  
3.2.4 Antecedents, risks and benefits of coopetitive behaviour 
As coopetition is a relatively new research area, many fundamental questions around 
antecedents and consequences of coopetitive behaviour are still being analysed. In 
the following, current hypothesizing on organizational, external and psychological 
antecedents, as well as benefits and risks arising from coopetition will be presented.  
 
In their comprehensive DPO (drivers-process-outcomes) model of coopetition, 
Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) structure antecedents of coopetition as follows. A 
first group comprises external drivers that stem from market or industry characteristics, 
e.g. industrial characteristics, technological demands or influential stakeholders. A 
second group encompasses relational drivers, which cover partner characteristics and 
relationship characteristics and are therefore rooted in the relational specificities 
towards one or more coopetitive actors. A last group includes internal drivers, which 
emerge within the coopeting network, organization, unit or individual and comprise 
internal goals and capabilities, prospective strategies and perceived vulnerability.  
Strese et al. (2016) examine this last group in more detail: in an empirical study, they 
identify organizational antecedents of coopetition. According to their results, leadership 
styles that take care of participation or consideration both favour the emergence of 
coopetition. Regarding the organizational structure, they find that centralization has a 
negative impact on coopetition while formalization has a positive impact.  
Loch et al. (2006) take yet another perspective and analyse psychologic algorithms to 
show that the dynamics of coopetition are deeply entrenched in the human psyche due 
to evolutionary reasons. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, they find that two basic 
emotional algorithms decide over a fundamental dilemma of individual actors in human 
groups: taking care of “me” (competing) or taking care of “we” (cooperating). Finding 
that the analysis of the algorithms in isolation does not allow to understand its 
systematic properties, they take a comprehensive perspective: “a holistic account of 
competitive and cooperative algorithms suggests that the 'dilemma' of competition 
versus cooperation is not really a dilemma at all […] In general, balancing emotional 
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algorithms were favoured because competitive or cooperative algorithms working in 
isolation would have been disadvantageous“ (Loch et al., 2006, p. 229). As a 
consequence, there is an evolutionarily founded psychological incline to embrace 
coopetition: “[…] there is perhaps a common tendency to grasp and acknowledge that 
humans do better where striving and competitiveness are joined by cooperativeness” 
(Loch et al., 2006, p. 229).  
 
In the following, potential consequences, both positive and negative, are outlined. At 
first, its potential benefits are drawn on.  
In general, research suggests that coopetition leads to better knowledge sharing and 
quality of shared knowledge, as well as better financial, market and customer 
performance. In addition, relationship-related outcomes such as organizational 
learning, relationship maintenance and failure management and commitment are 
enhanced (Strese et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2006; Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 2012; Tsai, 
2002; Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah, 2016). However, the benefits of coopetition differ 
again with regard to the level of analysis that is taken. On the macro level, coopetition 
leads to an increase of knowledge and technological capabilities that come from 
increased communication and knowledge transfer. Economic benefits are attained 
through less aggressive rent-seeking behaviour that benefits all coopeting partners, 
e.g. through fund sharing agreements. At the meso level, that is to say between 
individual organizations, coopetition results in higher R&D investments and workforce 
training investments with their positive impact on innovation power. Furthermore, faster 
agreement on standards and reduced time-to-market may result from the cooperation 
with a competitor. In addition to that, coopetition on the meso level grants access to 
resources or capabilities that were inaccessible before. This allows to tap economies 
of scale and scope by combining similar or complementary activities and grants access 
to new markets. Heavy investments in R&D can be shared, as well as the resulting 
risks (Gnyawali and Park, 2011). Levy et al. (2003) add that in particular for small- and 
medium sized companies, these aspects make coopetition an attractive strategy, as it 
enables them to join forces to compete with larger actors. On the micro level, benefits 
include a better integration between functional areas, leading to efficiency within intra-
organizational processes, as well as a generally higher incentive and commitment to 
work through better internal knowledge creation and better organizational climate 
(Dagnino and Padula, 2011; Devece et al., 2017; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; 
Bouncken et al., 2015).  
 
Potential risks of engaging in coopetition come right as the reciprocal of the outlined 
benefits. Self-evidently, gaining access to other resources via coopetition means that 
the coopeting counterpart gains access to own resources equally. Sharing capabilities 
with a competitor also means forfeiting a competitive advantage over this competitor. 
In addition to that, managerial complexity and resulting costs are likely to increase 
when engaging in coopetition (Fernandez et al., 2014; Bengtsson and Kock, 2014). In 
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sum, these risks may result in “continuous risks of unbalanced interactions which in 
turn might reduce potential gains from coopetition” (Strese et al., 2016, p. 43). Careful 
management of the resulting tensions to ensure that benefits overweigh risks in 
coopetition becomes the evident imperative.  
 
Notably, literature on the advantages and disadvantages of coopetition gives priority 
to advantages from cooperation, while competition is perceived as some kind of 
necessary evil, which has to be accepted to take advantage of cooperation with 
competitors. However, a research stream has emerged that adopts a perspective of 
actively managing both cooperation and competition to draw advantages from both 
forces. Henceforth, the management of coopetition receives increasing attention from 
academics and practitioners alike. Often, this builds on a process perspective where 
cooperation should be intensive in the beginning of a coopetitive engagement, 
whereas competition should be dominant in later phases. The early phase of 
cooperative value creation (“making the cake bigger”) should therefore be managed 
differently than later phases of competitive value capture (“dividing the cake”) (Ritala 
and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Bouncken et al., 2015). Fernandez et al. (2014) 
outline two general strategies for the management of coopetition. The first, 
denominated as separation principle, aims at separating cooperation and competition 
in the best possible way. For inter-firm coopetition, this could be realized by a timely 
separation as mentioned above, or a personal separation where cooperating 
individuals differ from the ones that are instructed to deal with the competitive tasks. 
For intra-firm or individual levels, the separation principle naturally cannot find 
application. The other principle, the integration principle, strives to reach a maximum 
of harmony in cooperative relationships. Scholars criticize that integration alone will 
not solve emerging tensions and it is therefore coined as being insufficient. Fernandez 
et al. (2014, p. 225) argue for a combination of both principles. “[…] an approach 
combining both the separation and the integration principles would allow more effective 
management of co-opetitive tensions”.  
3.3 Coopetition in a NPD context 
“Innovation is one of the most frequently studied dependent outcome variables in 
coopetition” (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah, 2016, p. 31). It has to be noted in direct 
succession, however, that the large majority of research efforts trying to make sense 
of the relationship of coopetition on innovation or NPD performance take an inter-firm 
level of analysis. Micro levels I or II are considered in only few exceptions (e.g. Lin, 
2007), which will be analysed in more detail later.   
 
Generally, coopetition seems to be positively affecting innovation activities. It helps to 
overcome knowledge barriers that may refrain firms to engage in innovation. 
Knowledge sharing under coopetition strongly supports the generation of new 
knowledge and resulting new products. Furthermore, coopetition decreases risks and 
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investments related to NPD. Therefore, coopetition between firms in NPD may lead to 
win-win situations with increased sales, market penetration and an improved overall 
competitive stance (Bouncken et al., 2015; Rodrigues et al., 2011). For small- and 
medium sized companies in particular, engaging in coopetitive relations allows to 
overcome investment thresholds and risk-bearing barriers to innovation (Devece et al., 
2017). To sum it up, the competitive element within coopetition provides an incentive 
strong enough to engage in innovation, whereas the cooperative aspect supports 
innovative activities by facilitating the necessary build-up of knowledge and capabilities 
(Park et al., 2014).  
 
However, there is a series of studies that present conflicting findings, where coopetition 
is not as thriving to innovation as other empirical findings might suggest. For instance, 
Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2004) show that coopetitive relationships of 
large firms and direct competitors may impede innovation. For a comprehensive list of 
contradictory findings related to innovation performance, see Bengtsson and Raza-
Ullah (2016).  
 
Other seemingly conflicting empirical results can be found when examining whether 
coopetition favours incremental or radical innovations to a larger extent. Quintana-
García and Benavides-Velasco (2004) show that coopeting firms come up with more 
radical innovations than traditional strategic alliances between non-competitors. On 
the other side, Ritala and Sainio (2013) suggest that coopetition is rather negatively 
related to radical innovations. Other studies provide yet more ambiguous findings, see 
for example Mention (2011) or Bouncken and Fredrich (2012).  
 
Certainly, engaging in coopetition to increase innovation power entails certain risks. 
Opportunism and know-how leakages are evident possibilities when cooperating with 
competitors. Expectation of tensions on the long-term relationship between coopeting 
actors may obstruct their engagement in radical innovations project in the first place 
(Le Roy and Czakon, 2016; Bouncken et al., 2015).  
3.4 Cross-functional coopetition 
3.4.1 Definitions and conceptualizations  
As the empirical part of this thesis relates to cross-functional coopetition, i.e. 
coopetition between departments within a firm, its particularities, which may differ from 
the overall conception of coopetition, will be outlined in the following. The words cross-
functional, inter-unit and intra-organizational are used interchangeably.  
 
With regard to its differentiation against cross-functional integration as it is described 
in chapter 2, there is a row of aspects which distinguishes the two streams of research. 
First of all, coopetition evidently includes a competitive, rivalry-focused side, which 
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cross-functional integration only implicitly considers, for example as a barrier to 
integration, but without considering potential positive effects when looking at it in a 
holistic sense. As will be explained later in more detail, intra-firm coopetition is based 
on competition on tangible and intangible resources between departments, e.g. 
budgets, management attention or the enforcement of functional requirements. 
Secondly, the cooperative strand within coopetition would still not directly correspond 
to cross-functional integration, although it is of course related in subject. Coopetition 
takes a much broader view of collaboration then merely connecting functional partners 
for the greater good of an entrepreneurial endeavour. Nonetheless, the author is 
convinced of the explanatory power that coopetition may have for questions of cross-
functional integration, which is why the two topics are connected in the empirical part 
of the thesis at hand.  
 
Intuitive examples have proven the relevance of coopetition, likewise on an intra-firm 
level, long before the actual term had been coined. For instance, Walley (2007) points 
towards cross-functional cooperation between production, marketing and finance to 
manufacture a product, which at the same time compete for access to financial 
resources in their budgeting process. Literature has recognized this “double-edged 
sword nature of interdepartmental interaction” (Ghobadi, 2012, p. 34) long before 
coopetition as a research field came into existence. This translates into the same 
paradox that shapes other levels of coopetition as well: though they need to cooperate 
to be successful, business units as well as individuals on the same team are competing 
for resources, status or knowledge. Hence, the coopetitive paradox is likewise existent 
on micro levels I and II.  
Following the provided characterization, cross-functional coopetition may be 
considered as generic, as any given organization is likely competing for budgets and 
sharing knowledge in some form or another. However, relevant research has shown 
that analysing coopetitive behaviour indeed provides answers to yet unexplained 
phenomena (e.g. Chin et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2006; Yami et al., 2010b). Accordingly, 
coopetition’s explanatory power lies in its application to a specific question, and less in 
a high-level examination of an organizational entity: For the latter, coopetition is 
presumably present in one way or another. For a more specific question, the mere 
existence, manifestation or degree of coopetition can differ and can thus be insightful 
for research. Indeed, research on antecedents of cross-functional coopetition (as an 
example, see Strese et al., 2016) shows that the emergence of intra-firm coopetition 
depends on certain organizational and leadership aspects, thus refuting a purely 
generic existence of coopetition.  
 
Tsai (2002) postulates an according characterization, defining cross-functional 
coopetition as simultaneous cooperative and competitive behaviours across 
organizational units. Devece et al. (2017) complement this notion by adding coopetitive 
behaviour across teams and individual units to cover micro level I under the term of 
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cross-functional coopetition. Indeed, the interplay of several levels within cross-
functional coopetition is interesting. From a superior level, actors within an organization 
are obliged to follow goals and structures defined by the organization. On an individual 
level, however, things can turn out differently. Actors follow their own motivation and 
rules for interaction may change with regard to different organizational sub-cultures 
(Allal-Chérif and Bidan, 2017; Poulsen, 2001). This substantiates why a social network 
perspective and organizational aspects become particularly important explanatory 
approaches.  
 
Luo (2005) investigates intra-firm coopetition of departments that differ in their level of 
competition and cooperation (illustration 21). These forms allow to predict a 
department’s behaviour in a coopetitive situation. According to his study, four types of 
cooperation in inter-unit coopetition materialize: Technological, operational, 
organizational and financial coopetition, which are determined by three drivers: 
strategic interdependence, subunit form and technological linkage. Three forms of 
competition in inter-unit coopetition emerge: Competition for parent resources and 
support, competition for system position and competition for market expansion, which 
for their part are driven by local responsiveness, market overlap and capability 
retrogression.  
 
 
Illustration 21: Typology of inter-unit coopetition based on Luo (2005) 
3.4.2 Dimensions of cross-functional coopetition 
In their influential study of 2006, Luo et al. define three dimensions of cross-functional 
coopetition which recur in a large number of studies engaging in research on cross-
functional coopetition: cooperative ability, cooperative intensity and competition. 
Hereby, Luo et al. split up the cooperation side of coopetition in two strands, ability and 
intensity, which recalls a similar split up that Kahn (1996) executed on manifestations 
of cross-functional integration: He distinguished between integration, representing the 
mere frequency of interaction and collaboration, which comprises a more intangible 
side of integration that aims at the ability of understanding and adapting to the cross-
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functional counterpart. As is to be seen in the following, Luo et al. (2006) take a similar 
perspective. All three dimensions will be explained in more detail in the following.  
3.4.2.1 Cross-functional cooperative intensity 
Luo et al. (2006, p. 72) define cross-functional cooperative intensity as “the extent of 
the frequency and closeness of the lateral social interactions among functional areas 
within the firm”. As sources of the construct, they cite Antia and Frazier (2001) and 
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001). Frequency of interaction is able to enhance the 
transfer of complex knowledge as well as improve communication between functions. 
Cooperative intensity may likewise open the path to mutual recognition of market 
knowledge to help improve overall company outcomes. Furthermore, Strese et al. 
(2016) complement that cooperative intensity can be influenced relatively well by 
leadership behaviour and organizational structure, which makes it an important lever 
to create cross-functional cooperation within an organization. For instance, 
management could install better facilities for informal cross-functional interaction such 
as social events, or could similarly demand for formal cross-functional interaction by 
implementing cross-functional teams.  
3.4.2.2 Cross-functional cooperative ability 
Cross-functional cooperative ability is defined as “the ability to assimilate and deploy 
market knowledge in lateral interactions among functional areas” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 
72). As theoretical approaches serving as construct sources, Luo et al. (2006) refer to 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Szulanski (1996) and Zahra and George (2002).  
The strong reference to marketing within this definition is a consequence of Luo et al.’s 
academic bias towards marketing literature. For a more balanced inclusion of all 
functional areas, denying a particular focus on marketing, this thesis follows Strese et 
al. (2016, p. 44) and define cooperative ability as “[…] the skills of a department needed 
to recognize, assimilate, transform, and deploy valuable knowledge acquired from 
other departments and thus represents an absorptive capacity for lateral knowledge 
transfer”.  
Cooperative ability covers a skill set that enables reflecting on the own contribution in 
a cross-functional setting, recognizing valuable knowledge incumbent to other 
functional partners, and setting out to assimilate and transform it such that this 
knowledge can be internalized and deployed effectively.  
3.4.2.3 Cross-functional competition 
Cross-functional competition is defined as “the degree to which departments compete 
both for limited tangible and intangible resources and for strategic importance, power, 
and department charter” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 72). As construct sources, the following 
authors are cited: Levitt (1969), Houston et al. (2001), Maltz and Kohli (1996) and 
Ruekert and Walker (1987). Reasons to compete on an intra-organizational level 
despite of a common goal and process structure are manifold. As already mentioned, 
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these range from private gains on an individual level to outperform cross-functional 
counterparts, over tangible and intangible resources struggles, up to strategic agendas 
with mismatching sub-goals, for instance cannibalizing on peer units that offer similar 
products (Luo et al., 2006; Tsai, 2002). Fernandez et al. (2014) view the main source 
for cross-functional competition in the resource allocation process, which in many 
large-scale industrial organizations is a core process and very central to all activities. 
The yearly budget allocation has the power to give more or less priority to certain 
activities, with all related and semi-related activities following suit. Managers hence 
compete for human, technological, and financial resources with their cross-functional 
colleagues to ensure survival of their team ambitions and power status – mostly at the 
expense of others (Fernandez et al., 2014; Strese et al., 2016). 
3.4.3 Risks and benefits of cross-functional coopetitive behaviour 
Building on a more general view of positive and negative consequences of coopetitive 
behaviour, the following paragraph will outline particular risks and benefits of cross-
functional coopetition.  
While the need for cross-functional cooperation is quite solidly researched and remains 
uncontested at a high level, research on the effects of competition in cross-functional 
relationships is less prominent and deserves further analysis. A frequently cited benefit 
is increased efficiency, which results from competition on resources. It facilitates 
resource allocation to the most advantageous receiver and exerts pressure to 
economize resources (Tidström, 2008; Lin et al., 2010). From a psychological 
perspective, a good portion of competition is viewed positively as well, in particular 
when considering a NPD context. In their work on the psychology of innovations within 
organizations, Frey et al. (2006) explain that, in a state of persistent cohesion with a 
lack of conflicts, a phenomenon called “group thinking” emerges. Under group thinking, 
team members prize continuation of the group higher than the success of the company, 
even deliberately ignoring undeniable facts. For innovations in particular, conflicts and 
competition “are a necessary condition for success” (Frey et al., 2006, p. 25, translated 
from the German original). In practical applications, this relationship between conflict 
and innovation is well known. In their study on innovativeness of cross-functional 
product development teams, Sethi et al. (2001) reaffirm this notion. Likewise, Womack 
et al. (2006, p. 115) criticize Western-culture NPD teams where team members shy 
away from conflicts in the development process, resulting in conflicts being solved only 
very late (and correspondingly expensive) in the process. 
On the other hand, potential negative consequences of cross-functional competition 
include complications in the decision-making process with resulting loss of speed and 
agility (Strese et al., 2016), reduction in the quality of interaction (Clercq et al., 2009) 
and a decrease of job effectiveness (Lin et al., 2010).  
 
The second group of academic studies is concerned with consequences of the 
simultaneous occurrence of competition and coopetition on a cross-functional level of 
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analysis. Frequently cited advantages arising from this constellation are enhanced 
learning and knowledge sharing, exploiting economies of scope and scale even within 
organizations and the resulting beneficial results on firm performance, financial 
efficiency and technological advancement (Tsai, 2002; Luo et al., 2006; Lado et al., 
1997; Devece et al., 2017; Bengtsson and Kock, 2014).  
For multi-national enterprises in particular, coopetition can be helpful: While 
cooperation is required to share knowledge and to build up an effective global supply 
chain, competition is needed to secure mutual respect as well as the resulting 
resources and top-management support (Bouncken et al., 2015).  
 
Luo et al. (2006) examine the interplay of individual dimensions more closely. When 
cooperative intensity and competition come together, the mere frequency of interaction 
of competing departments ensures transfer of - otherwise tacit - knowledge. In 
particular when cross-functional departments engage in coopetition, as opposed to 
peer units that just do the same in another context, this will create market- and 
customer-relevant knowledge or increase a company’s efficiency. This is resulting from 
the fact that under this circumstance, knowledge is often complementary and not 
redundant, as it might be the case with peer units. “This access to nonredundant 
information fosters better problem solving and decision making […] and is essential for 
the creation of customer and financial value” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 70). On the other 
hand, when cooperative ability and competition come together, there are higher 
incentives to understand and absorb the shared knowledge, with an enhanced ability 
to reflect on it and deploy it effectively. Again, the incentive is to understand the cross-
functional counterparts’ strategic agenda, which entails a higher chance of exploiting 
valuable knowledge. Beneficial consequences include better problem solving to satisfy 
customer needs and enhanced performance (Luo et al., 2006; Hamel et al., 1989; Tsai, 
2002).  
 
Risks of cross-functional coopetition are predominantly rooted in an extreme form of 
one of the dimensions. As described above, excessive cohesion based on a lack of 
competition may lead to detrimental effects just as a lack of cooperation may hamper 
the functioning of the overall organization. In addition to that, risks related to 
opportunistic behaviour enabled by coopetition apply.  
3.4.4 Overview of empirical research on cross-functional coopetition 
While research on coopetition is a rapidly growing field of academic interest, empirical 
efforts on a cross-functional level of analysis remain scarce (Bengtsson and Raza-
Ullah, 2016). In the following, relevant studies and their results are presented. In 
contrast to similar compilations within this thesis, the scope that has been applied here 
is somewhat broader. No cohesive stream of research that would focus on testing the 
impact of coopetition on a certain dependent variable, for instance NPD success, has 
yet emerged. Therefore, a broad range of dependent variables, as well as coopetition 
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as a dependent variable itself or as a mediator is included henceforth. Similarly, the 
conceptions of how cross-functional coopetition is measured, differ in the studies 
(Ghobadi, 2012).  
 
Notably, a comprehensive overview of empirical studies on other levels of coopetition 
is not provided due to this thesis’ focus on the micro level I. In particular for the meso 
level, there is a large body of research with a large variety of methodological 
applications. For details and a holistic overview of these studies, see the literature 
overviews of Peng et al. (2012), Bengtsson and Kock (2014), Bouncken et al. (2015), 
Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) and Devece et al. (2017).  
 
Regarding the studies’ methodological scope, a lack of diversity is striking: All the 
studies rely on quantitative survey data and feature large conceptual parts; in the case 
of Luo (2005) even exclusively conceptual. This is surprising, as coopetition research 
on other levels of analysis relies on a broad methodological backbone, including case 
studies and qualitative research.  
Notwithstanding their cross-functional focus, the majority of studies leave the kind of 
cross-functional interface they study unspecified. This certainly constitutes a gap in 
research, as theory suggests that there might be differences in the impact of 
coopetition depending on whether peer units or cross-functional units are analysed. 
For the latter, experiences from research on cross-functional integration suggests that 
again, the result may differ significantly with regard to the exact interface that is being 
looked at between R&D, production or marketing.  
Studies of both micro levels I and II are represented in this overview of studies, 
although micro level I has a slight dominance.  
 
As already mentioned, conceptions of cross-functional coopetition differ. However, all 
empirical studies in the overview rely on survey data to portray their concept of cross-
functional coopetition, ranging from three to eleven items per dimension. For a 
construct as complex and still uncharted as cross-functional coopetition is, survey 
items are likely to provide an insufficient and potentially ambiguous conception, even 
if rather detailed survey data is employed, such as Strese et al. (2016) with their 23 
items across three dimensions.  
 
With regard to the studies‘ scope, a substantial inclination towards topics of knowledge 
sharing is observable, something that Bengtsson and Kock (2014) confirm in their 
comprehensive literature review. This includes Tsai (2002), Lin (2007), Baruch and Lin 
(2012) as well as Ghobadi and D'Ambra (2012). Another recurrently represented topic 
are organizational concerns, for instance in Tsai (2002), Luo (2005) or Strese et al. 
(2016). Although coopetition at a whole features many studies within an innovation or 
NPD context, on a cross-functional level only Lin (2007) focusses explicitly on a NPD 
context.  
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With respect to results, no reliable pattern is recognizable, though there is a slightly 
positive tendency of coopetition’s impact on several performance dimensions. Luo et 
al. (2006) examine cross-functional coopetition’s impact on financial and customer 
performance and find a positive relationship. Lin (2007) presents ambiguous results 
when analysing cross-functional coopetition’s impact on the NPD success. For the 
cooperative branch, positive results are yielded, whereas the competitive branch 
remains indistinctly positive or negative. In a similar manner, Lin et al. (2010) illustrate 
a positive relationship between micro level II cooperation and job effectiveness, 
whereas the same query with regard to micro level II competition remains with unclear 
results.  
 
In summary, it is difficult to derive clear statements or impact patterns in the field of 
cross-functional coopetition. Ambiguous results suggest that research still has a poor 
understanding of the underlying dynamics and mechanisms, and that 
conceptualizations and research designs are too heterogeneous to produce persisting 
and reliable results. Table 5 shows the state of research on cross-functional 
coopetition.   
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Research on cross-functional coopetition 
 Scope Methodology/ 
sample 
Level of 
Analysis 
Coopetition conception Result 
Tsai, 2002 Impact of centralization, 
social interaction and 
competition on Intra-
organizational 
knowledge sharing  
Survey data (1 
company,  
n unclear) 
Micro level I  Cooperation: Cross-functional 
social interaction  
 Competition: Internal resource 
competition, external market 
competition 
 Informal relations have a positive 
impact on knowledge sharing 
between units that compete for 
market share but not for units 
competing for internal resources 
 Centralization with negative impact 
on knowledge sharing 
 
Luo, 2005 Coopetition between 
geographically 
dispersed subunits 
Conceptual Micro level I  Cooperation: Technological, 
operational, organizational, financial  
 Competition: Parent resources 
and support, system position, 
market expansion 
 
 Depending on their levels of 
cooperation and competition, sub-
units belong to 4 types of coopetition 
 Configuration is contingent on 
determinant factors, which are neither 
prefixed nor predetermined 
Luo et al., 
2006 
Impact of coopetition on 
customer and financial 
performance 
Survey data 
(n=163) 
Micro level I  Cross-functional intensity: 6 items 
on frequency and closeness of 
lateral interactions 
 Cross-functional ability: 6 items on 
ability to evaluate, assimilate, 
exploit market knowledge from 
other departments 
 Cross-functional competition:10 
items on competition for tangible 
and intangible resources 
 Cross-functional coopetition 
enhances a firm's customer and 
financial performance 
 Market learning is mediating this 
relationship 
Lin, 2007  Impact of coopetition on 
NPD success (financial 
performance, 
development speed) 
and mediating role of 
knowledge management  
Survey data 
(n=139) 
Micro level I  Cooperation: 6 items on 
information sharing, integration in 
NPD 
 Competition: 8 items on 
competition for tangible and 
intangible resources 
 Cross-functional cooperation with 
positive impact on NPD success 
 Cross-functional competition with 
ambiguous impact on NPD success 
 Knowledge management processes 
are mediating this relationship 
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Lin et al., 
2010 
Impact of coopetition on 
perceived job 
effectiveness in virtual 
teams 
Survey data 
(n=312) 
Micro level II  Cooperation: 3 items on 
cooperative attitude within team 
 Competition: 3 items on 
competitive conflicts within team 
 Both cooperation and competition 
with positive impact on job 
effectiveness 
 However, competition with negative 
impact on knowledge sharing, which 
is one of the key mediators of job 
effectiveness 
Baruch and 
Lin, 2012 
Impact of coopetition on 
team performance and 
knowledge sharing in 
teams, mediated by 
team emotional 
intelligence and 
competence 
Survey data 
(n=759) 
Micro level II  Cooperation: 5 items on 
cooperative attitude within team 
 Competition: 3 items on 
competitive conflicts within team 
 Cooperation with positive impact on 
team performance 
 Competition with negative impact 
on knowledge sharing, but 
ambiguous impact on team 
performance 
Ghobadi 
and 
D'Ambra, 
2012 
Impact of coopetition on 
knowledge sharing in 
cross-functional teams 
Survey data 
(n=115) 
Micro level II  Cooperation: 8 items on 3 
dimensions of cooperative task 
orientation, communication, 
interpersonal relationship 
 Competition: 4 items on 2 
dimensions of tangible and 
intangible resource competition 
 Cooperation with positive impact on 
knowledge sharing behaviour 
 Competition with ambiguous impact 
on knowledge sharing: competition 
on tangible resources positive, on 
intangible resources negative  
Strese et 
al., 2016 
Organizational 
antecedents (leadership, 
centralization) of cross-
functional coopetition  
Survey data 
(n=234) 
Micro level I  Cooperation: 6 items on 
cooperative ability, 6 items on 
cooperative intensity 
 Competition: 11 items on tangible 
and intangible resource competition 
 Leadership antecedents 
(participation and consideration) both 
with positive impact on coopetition 
 Formalization with positive impact, 
centralization with negative impact on 
coopetition 
Table 5: Overview on research on cross-functional coopetition
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4 Theories on constraints in new product development 
4.1 Introduction to constraints in NPD 
There has been a widespread discussion on the role of constraints of all kinds and 
sorts as inhibitors or enablers of NPD. A few introductory remarks will facilitate access 
to this dichotomous topic in the following introduction. Subsequently, a detailed 
analysis of existent literature is presented as an overview of current applications and 
explanations of the impact of constraints on innovation and new product development. 
I will provide a psychological explanation on constraints’ particular impact on 
innovation processes and discuss a defining classification of different constraint types, 
with a clear differentiation being made with regard to requirements engineering. Finally, 
relevant empirical and theoretical studies are discussed.  
As the nascent field of research on the impact of constraints takes a rather broad 
perspective, the term innovation is more frequently employed than the term new 
product development. In the following, the author will stick with this denomination, but 
clearly mark or exclude research efforts that deviate considerably from the given 
definition of new product development.  
 
Constraints seem to shape every task of new product development as an inherent 
feature: “No matter the domain or the discipline, any creative endeavour will feature 
constraints” (Onarheim and Biskjær, 2013, p. 2). A chemist is naturally constrained to 
a fundamental set of 118 elements for the creation of new compounds; a designer at 
Lego is limited to a finite selection of components that she has to reuse to control the 
number of unique pieces and to balance required novelties (Sull, 2015). 
Popular wisdom has it that constraints can be both forestallers and enablers of such 
innovation: “Necessity is the mother of invention” points towards an encouraging, at 
most inspiring role of constraints. “You get what you pay for” indicates the restricting 
impact that constraints, e.g. in a financial way, might have (Weiss et al., 2011). Looking 
at definitions, the latter negative role seems to prevail. Rosso (2014, p. 553) delineates 
constraints to be a “state of being restricted, limited, or confined within prescribed 
bounds“.  
Success stories of NPD provide diverse counterexamples to this restricting 
understanding of constraints: A choreographer from Columbia was constrained to a 
tape of salsa music in his exercise class, leading him to the invention of Zumba. Start-
up companies are usually encouraged to develop a mobile application before other 
online applications, as restricted space on mobile screens forces developers to focus 
on the most essential product features (Mayer, 2006; Richardson, 2013). Large parts 
of the extensive research on bricolage and frugal innovation is attributable to the 
existence of constraints, that often lead to innovative new products by “making do with 
what is at hand” (Baker and Nelson, 2005, p. 329), see for example Baker (2007) or 
Garud and Karnøe (2003). Amazon founder Jeff Bezos stated "I think frugality drives 
  61 
innovation, just like other constraints do. One of the only ways to get out of a tight box 
is to invent your way out” (Unruh, 2010, p. 105). A French literary movement called 
“Oulipo” (“Ouvroir de littérature potentielle”) is representative for many artists, who use 
constraints deliberately to stimulate creativity. They introduce restrictions such as the 
avoidance of particular letters or the use of certain words to engage in a creative 
creation process (Arrighi et al., 2015).  
There are many examples to prove that, when organizations are simply forced to do 
more with less, they succeed in competing with better endowed rivals, with innovation 
often being the decisive factor. The Swiss pharmaceutical giant Roche invested heavily 
in Genentech, a Silicon-Valley based biotechnology start-up company, as the latter 
was capable of extracting significantly more return on their (limited) R&D budget than 
better endowed Roche (Lampel et al., 2014; Honig et al., 2013).  
 
Intuitive explanations for a possibly positive role of constraints in NPD are manifold: 
Mayer (2006) points towards speed as a possible explanation for a positive role that 
constraints may take in NPD: They support fast failing and limited investments, such 
that unsuccessful innovations are not carried forward for an extended period. 
Korhonen and Välikangas (2014, p. 254) emphasize that constraints may act as 
“focusing advices”, that „attract inventive attention to a specific problem“. Gibbert et al. 
(2007, p. 16) confirm this notion by expressing their belief that “the human mind is most 
productive when restricted. Limited — or better focused — by specific rules and 
constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea.” As early as in the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s, Giddens (1976, p. 169, 1981, p. 56) recognized the 
positive aspects of constraints in his structuration theory. His theorizing focusses on 
societally implicated rules and resources, so-called structures. Acknowledging 
possible positive aspects of those structures, he states that “structures must not be 
conceptualized as simply putting constraints on human agency, but as enabling” 
(Giddens, 1976, p. 161). Gibbert et al. (2014) point towards an interesting analogy from 
gaming research: Games are fun because of the very difficulties that they pose to fulfil 
a certain quest, not because they are easy. They conclude that “the very essence of 
games is that resources are intentionally and artificially made highly scarce” (Gibbert 
et al., 2014, p. 199).  
 
In the majority of literary or academic treatises, however, constraints are evaluated as 
something external and rather negative to the innovation process. “Approaches may 
lead us to overlook the possibility of viewing constraint handling as something inherent 
in creative action” (Lombardo and Kvalshaugen, 2014, p. 588). Indeed, creativity and 
psychology literature concludes on empirical and conceptual evidence which considers 
constraints to be a very part of the actual process of creative cognition, see for example 
Ward (2004) or Finke et al. (1992).  
Despite of significant research efforts that strive to explain the seemingly contradicting 
role of constraints in NPD, underlying reasons thereof remain unclear (Hatchuel and 
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Chen, 2017). In the following, an overview of current research streams on the 
psychological foundations to explain constraints’ impact on NPD and creativity is given.  
4.2 Psychological background 
The effects, which constraints are ascribed to have on cognitive design processes in 
NPD, can be segmented into two groups. The first group contributes to the notion of 
constraints that stimulate creativity in cognitive processes. In a second group, 
arguments are discussed where constraints serve as focusing devices to direct 
complex cognitive design processes into a purposeful, targeted direction.  
 
In psychology or cognition research, the element of analysis relating to NPD processes 
typically is the human design process. Therefore, design tasks and the associated 
cognitive processes on an individual level are in the focus of the following explanations.  
4.2.1 Stimulation of creativity 
While many techniques point towards unconstrained thinking to unleash creativity, e.g. 
brainstorming methods, empirical results of psychology and cognition literature 
“paradoxically suggest that placing constraints on the generative task may increase 
the amount of creative processing” (Moreau and Dahl, 2005, p. 18).  
In examining the cognitive problem solving process, Von der Werth and Weinert (2002) 
find that human problem solving efforts come about in a so-called “problem space”, 
which includes all theoretically possible solutions. However, all active cognitive 
activities for a certain problem take place in a frictional part thereof, denominated as 
“search space”. While usual analytical engineering design methods reduce the search 
space by systematically analysing options and eliminating illicit ones, stimuli may be 
conceived that extend it. Those stimuli include questions, analogies or incentives to 
take hitherto unnoticed aspects into consideration. The latter may likewise include 
different kinds of constraints, e.g. for certain product features, hereby dissolving the 
apparent paradox of constraints that extend, rather than limit, the search space. 
Furthermore, Von der Werth and Weinert (2002) find that the mentioned stimuli may 
likewise encourage designers to consider adjacent topics and potential consequences 
of their design, again inducing creativity by extending the search space.  
 
Another popular explanation for why constraints may enhance creativity is provided by 
the path-of-least-resistance strategy brought forward by Ward (2004). This refers to 
the effort-reducing default approach that is typically employed in solving creative tasks: 
The first solution that comes to mind is seized and realized. Often, this effort-
minimizing approach draws on previously existing or uncreative solutions as this 
requires less cognitive resources and avoids the uncertainty of novel solutions. The 
introduction of constraints, however, can force individuals to deviate from the path-of-
least-resistance and employ more creative processes (Moreau and Dahl, 2005).  
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Further explanatory approaches refer to different conceptions of the problem solving 
process. Schön (1983, p. 76 ff., 1990) conceptionalizes the design process as an 
iterative procedure of framing and reframing a problem. He disagrees with many 
design researchers that emphasize the emergence of creativity in the beginning of the 
design process, see for example Midler (1995) or Karniel and Reich (2011). Schön 
believes that creativity emerges during the framing-reframing process, and hence is 
inherently connected to the constraints that serve as some form of frame herein (Arrighi 
et al., 2015).  
Frey et al. (2006) suggest a psychologically founded approach, according to which 
innovations can only occur if the world is perceived as “changeable”. Consequently, 
innovations emerge when previously “unchangeable” worlds are entered and 
perceptions change towards the world being changeable, indeed. According to Frey et 
al. (2006), the introduction of constraints encourages attacks on unchangeable worlds, 
turning them into innovation-inspiring changeable worlds.  
Hauschildt (1999) complements this notion in stating that conflicts, which arise through 
the confrontation of problem solving with constraints, inspire creativity as they 
encourage new ways to overcome those.  
4.2.2 Purposeful focusing of design processes 
Many approaches within this stream of explanation stem from the recognition that 
human problem solving is not as structured and analytical as it may seem in a 
rationality-focused model of human cognition. In this notion, constraints may serve as 
an orientation aid to purposefully re-target the problem solving task. 
 
VDI 2221 (VDI, 1993) provides a specific guideline for a structured approach to 
engineering design processes, therefore representing a typical problem solving 
process in a NPD context. It postulates a procedure which has clearly delimited steps, 
following a structured iterative solution path, and is widely acknowledged as an 
industrial standard. However, Hacker (2002, p. 14) finds that the actual design process 
does not follow this systematic approach, but rather takes "opportunistic" shortcuts 
based on previous experiences. According to the principles of cognitive economics, 
this is perfectly reasonable: The designer reduces cognitive efforts by re-using prior 
knowledge. As this occurs at the expense of a systematic approach, there is a chance 
of neglecting adjacent aspects and henceforth missing the global optimum solution. In 
addition to that, Hacker (2002) points towards the limited human working memory, 
which requires the designer to focus on a partial aspect of the problem instead of 
having the entire solution space readily available (Hacker, 2002). Constraints may 
herein serve to put the right features into the designer’s focus and to help re-target 
essential aspects, even if the designer deviates from a linear, perfectly structured 
design process.  
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Schütze et al. (2002) conceive the problem solving process in design tasks as an 
iterative procedure with alternating steps of designing and calculating, hence 
combining a creative, opening element with an analytic, controlling element in each 
step. Constraints may help to guide the iterative development into the right direction, 
making sure that creative, opening phases do not go astray from essential product 
features. Likewise, Hacker (2002, p. 24) calls for “objectification phases”, where partial 
outcomes of the design task can be assessed. Hacker points towards some form of 
external discussion or measurement, against which the partial outcome can be hold 
up, be it any form of communication or comparison with an outcome illustration, gauge 
or formulated vision statement. Constraints may serve as a form of external gauge or 
measurement in this sense, and hence may help to steer the design process into the 
right direction.  
 
Fundamental research on design processes has shown that designers tend to follow 
a model of path dependency in their tasks, for reasons that have been acknowledged 
in cognitive economics as described earlier. As early as 1966, Allen (p. 83) concludes: 
“Once a technical approach becomes preferred over any other, it is not easily rejected. 
Furthermore, the longer it is in a dominant position, the more difficult it becomes to 
reject". With many design approaches starting right off and only assessing the (partial) 
design outcomes in retrospective, this can lead to a critical adherence to previous 
design solutions. The introduction of constraints may help to mitigate this development, 
as they provide guidance and enforce new design solutions right at the beginning of 
the problem solving process. Potentially, this encourages to breach the attested design 
path dependency.   
4.3 Classification and differentiation of constraints in NPD 
4.3.1 Classifying constraints in NPD 
In applicant research, classifications of constraints in a NPD context are manifold, and 
no generally accepted model has emerged yet. This may be due to the breadth of 
research fields in which constraints find application, be it the cognition and psychology 
research, team dynamics or financial econometrics. Researchers are negligent to 
integrate their constraint applications into previous work, in particular if relevant 
literature is outside of the own research field (Onarheim and Wiltschnig, 2010). In 
addition, the semantic expression constraint makes it difficult to conjoin efforts across 
research fields: Different disciplines typically refer to constraints in their own terms, for 
instance will engineers talk about requirements when artists talk about styles, rules or 
guidelines (Onarheim and Biskjær, 2013).  
 
In order to classify constraints for the applications in NPD that are relevant for the 
thesis at hand, an effort is made to combine existent typologies into a comprehensive 
model (see illustration 22).  
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Illustration 22: Classifications of constraints in new product development 
At the highest level, process and product constraints can be distinguished. While 
process constraints influence the way how a task is done, product constraints refer to 
the space of possible solutions and hence influence the outcome of a task (Rosso, 
2014). While prevalent literature provides several suggestions how to classify process 
constraints, it is less elaborate on possible classifications of product constraints. 
Therefore, this thesis follows scholars of requirements engineering and distinguish 
between characteristics and properties, see Weber (2007) or Weber and Deubel 
(2002). While characteristics refer to product features that can be directly influenced 
by the designer, e.g. dimensions or materials, properties describe product features that 
cannot be directly influenced, e.g. manufacturability or environmental friendliness.  
Regarding process constraints, the author follows Gibbert and Scranton (2009) and 
Giddens (1984, p. 15 ff.) in differentiating between resources and rules. This deviates 
from other possible classifications such as in Lampel et al. (2014), who distinguish 
structural, resource, and temporal constraints. Resources can be both human (e.g. 
knowledge or simply headcount) and allocative (e.g. monetary resources or time). 
Rules refer to “generalizable procedures applied to the enactment/reproduction of 
social life” (Giddens, 1984, p. 21), often evident as organizational routines. In contrast 
to resources, those rules are considered irrespective of their efficiency or contribution 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
Notably, there are other possibilities to illustrate different kinds or manifestations of 
constraints other than a structured classification. Onarheim and Wiltschnig (2010) see 
constraints as polarities on a continuum for different dimensions, for instance internal 
vs. external, abstract vs. concrete or absolute vs. negotiable. Lampel et al. (2014) 
Constraints in NPD
Product Constraints
(Weber 2007)
Process constraints
(Gibbert and Scranton 2009)
Characteristics
Can be directly 
influenced by the 
designer
Properties
Cannot be directly 
influenced by the 
designer
Human
Knowledge, 
expertise, prior 
experience
Allocative
Monetary 
resources, material 
resources, time
Rules
Procedures 
embedded in 
organizational 
routines
Resources
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complement two other dimensions, namely static vs. dynamic as well as explicit vs. 
implicit. These constraint dimensions are closely related to ways of embedding 
constraints in an organization effectively and will therefore be resumed in the empirical 
part of this document.  
4.3.2 Relating constraint research to requirements engineering 
The classification of product constraints in accordance to definitions in requirement 
engineering signals that there is a link between the two research fields. In the following, 
it will be explained how this study’s understanding of constraint research both builds 
on and is differentiated against requirements engineering.  
 
There is an entire field of research within engineering that is concerned with the 
definition, formulation and interplay of different product requirements. For a more 
detailed discussion of this field, the pertinent literature may be consulted, see for 
example Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm (2013, p. 391 ff., p. 402). According to Mayer-
Bachmann (2008), requirements engineering has a strong focus on technical product 
features, neglecting non-technical areas such marketing, manufacturing or financial 
requirements. In Weber’s (2007) definition, this is concretized: While characteristics 
refer to product features that can be directly influenced by the designer, properties 
describe product features that cannot be directly influenced. Within this definition, 
requirements engineering focusses on characteristics. Mayer-Bachmann (2008) and 
Weber and Deubel (2003) criticize that properties and characteristics are insufficiently 
interlinked, with existent requirement networks built primarily between different 
characteristics. Recent efforts to connect the characteristics side with the properties 
side strive to model interrelationships to enhance the predictability of characteristics’ 
impact on product properties, see for instance Weber (2007).  
 
As a conclusion, requirements engineering can be differentiated from constraint 
research by its narrower focus: With its strong focus on technical product features, 
requirements engineering excludes the entire branch of process constraints. Even 
more, it mainly works with product characteristics and neglects the constraining 
potential of product properties. Quite contrary to this focus, this thesis explicitly uses 
product properties as constraints, as will be explained in the empirical part of this 
thesis.  
4.4 Overview of empirical research on constraints in NPD 
As touched upon earlier, literature on application of constraints in a NPD context 
involves a broad range of different disciplines and deviating interpretations. The 
dichotomous nature of constraint application, which sees constraints both as 
forestallers or enablers of innovation, is a common research puzzle of a majority of 
studies. Regardless of all recent research efforts, this fundamental contradiction has 
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not yet been solved. In the following, an overview is provided of all current research 
streams that either support or reject a positive role of constraints in NPD.  
 
The pertinent literature is segmented into two major streams: research on the impact 
of constraints on innovation performance, closely related to this study’s focus on new 
product development, and research on the impact of constraints on creativity. As both 
are connected to a NPD context, results and explanations will be detailed for both 
streams and illuminate remaining gaps to develop the impact of constraints on NPD 
performance at the end of the chapter.  
 
Cyert and March (1963, p. 258 ff.) were the first ones to pose the question whether 
constraints inhibit or encourage innovation, limiting their analysis to constrained or 
slack resources. Up to this day, large parts of relevant research still focus on the 
constraining role of resources in general or financial resources in particular. While 
there is a widespread notion that acknowledges a negative impact of resource 
constraints on innovative activity, there is a series of cases which show that under 
certain conditions, constraints may encourage rather than forestall innovation (Gibbert 
et al., 2014; Weiss et al., 2011; Hoegl et al., 2008). Quite naturally, maximizing 
constraints cannot be the sufficient condition for innovation success; applied to 
financial constraints, this would mean that the organizations that dispose of the least 
resources would out innovate all others. There has to be a set of contingency factors 
or mediating forces to explain under which circumstances constraints have a positive 
or a negative role for innovation. Even an inverted u-shaped relationship would be 
conceivable intuitively. Gibbert et al. (2014, p. 198) frame a central question 
accordingly: “if necessity is the mother of innovation, who, then, is innovation’s father?” 
Though several suggestions for contingency factors have been brought into existence 
(e.g., bounded creativity, an engaging project objective, a skill-leveraging process, 
team cohesion and team potency, see Hoegl et al., 2008 for details), research has not 
yet succeeded in bringing about ultimate clarity.  
 
A nascent research stream that focusses on positive aspects of constraints in general 
and resource scarcity in particular on innovation performance is rooted in the bottom-
of-the-pyramid literature. As many of these studies do not specifically examine whether 
constraints have a positive or negative influence in general, but rather strive to 
understand what constitutes and enables innovative activity in resource-poor 
environments, it is not explicitly included in this study’s research overview. 
Nonetheless, a few explanations on its general aspects shall be outlined in the 
following to illustrate constraint’s innovation-inspiring nature. Cunha et al. (2014) 
distinguish three research streams within product innovation in resource-poor 
environments: Bricolage, improvisation and frugal innovation. Bricolage does not 
embrace scarcity as trigger for innovative activity per se, but focusses on the ability to 
recognize potentially dormant resources in what is rightly available: “making do by 
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applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities” 
(Baker 2007, p. 698). It therefore occurs when “bricoleurs” explore existing resources 
and develop novelty in combining those in a creative or practical manner. For 
improvisation, time constraints are the defining criterion. It occurs when the separation 
of planning and execution is not feasible. For examples of successful improvisation 
that led to NPD success, refer to Samra et al. (2008) or Day and Shoemaker (2008). 
Lastly, frugal innovation explores ways to respond to needs of non-affluent customers 
through enhanced efficiency and cost discipline. While many examples of its results 
have received large attention in media and society, e.g. around the development of the 
Grameen Bank or the Tata Nano car, the field still lacks theoretical sense-making 
(Cunha et al., 2014). For research examples on frugal innovation, see Prahalad and 
Mashelkar (2010) or Anderson and Markides (2007).  
 
Table 6 summarizes essential empirical research efforts and their results examining 
the impact of constraints on innovation performance, table 7 works accordingly for the 
impact of constraints on creativity. The underlying literature review spans several 
disciplines including creativity and cognition research, team performance research, 
econometrics and innovation management. Research that focuses on mathematical 
models of constraint networks, e.g. Abdalla (1998), Gayretli and Abdalla (1999), 
Minnaar and Reinecke (2012) or Fu and Pennington (1993) has been excluded from 
this overview for its limited applicability to this study’s scope.  
From a methodological perspective, a broad range of approaches have been found 
and included in this overview. Tables 6 and 7 list individual studies and specify the 
level of analysis (i.e. individual, organizational, intra-organizational or industry), the 
constraint type that is examined, the employed methodology and the result.  
 
Overall, the results are contradictory, exhibiting both positive and negative impacts of 
constraints for each category. Within the respective categories, different sub-fields of 
research can be identified which will be highlighted in the following.  
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Research on impact of constraints on innovation performance 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Constraint  
type 
Methodology Result 
Katila and 
Shane, 2005 
Organization 
 
Financial Secondary 
quantitative 
data 
(+)  
Canepa and 
Stoneman, 
2007 
Organization 
 
Financial Survey data (-) 
Mohnen et al., 
2008 
Organization 
 
Financial Survey data (-) 
Hoegl et al., 
2008 
Intra-
organizational 
  
Financial Conceptual 
paper 
(Dep. on 
contingency 
factors) 
Savignac, 
2008 
Organization 
 
Financial Survey data (-) 
Gibbert and 
Scranton, 
2009 
Organization 
 
Financial Case study 
 
(+) 
Weiss et al., 
2011 
Intra-
organizational 
 
Financial  Survey data (0) 
Gorodnich-
enko and 
Schnitzer, 
2013 
Organization 
 
Financial Survey data (-)  
Almeida et al., 
2013 
Organization 
 
Financial Secondary 
quantitative 
data 
(+) 
Honig et al., 
2013 
Organization 
 
Resource 
(general) 
Case study 
 
(+) 
Garriga et al., 
2013 
Organization 
 
Resource 
(general) 
Survey data (-) 
Troilo et al., 
2014 
Organization 
 
Slack 
resources 
(Lack of 
financial 
constraints) 
Survey data (-) 
 
Senyard et al., 
2014 
Organization 
 
Resource 
(general) 
Longitudinal 
data 
(qualitative 
interviews) 
(+) 
Rosenzweig 
and Mazursky, 
2014 
Industry Financial Secondary 
quantitative 
data 
(+) 
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Walker et al., 
2014 
Industry  Product 
(charac-
teristics) 
Case study 
 
(+) 
Korhonen and 
Välikangas, 
2014 
Organization 
 
Resource 
(general) 
Case study (+) 
Efthyvoulou 
and Vahter, 
2016 
Organization 
 
Financial  Secondary 
quantitative 
data 
(-) 
 
García-
Quevedo et 
al., 2017 
Organization 
 
Financial Secondary 
quantitative 
data 
(-) 
 
Pellegrino and 
Savona, 2017 
Organization 
 
 Financial 
 Market-
related 
 Demand-
related 
 
Panel data (-) 
Key: (+) means positive impact of constraints on innovation performance, (-) means negative impact 
of constraints on innovation performance, “Dep. on” means depending on 
Table 6: Research on impact of constraints on innovation performance 
Within research on the impact of constraints on innovation performance (table 6), the 
dominant research stream involves quantitative surveys, panel or secondary data 
analysing the impact of financial constraints on an organizational level. In some 
instances, not financial scarcity, but financial slack is the object of research; this 
provides the same analysis in just a reciprocal manner and is likewise included in the 
overview. Frequently, empirical efforts within this research stream deploy econometric 
methods to examine data for individual countries; often motivated by the question 
whether the lack of financial resources accompanying a financial crisis has negative 
impacts on the innovative capacities of an economy. Studies include Canepa and 
Stoneman (2007), Mohnen et al. (2008), Savignac (2008), Gorodnichenko and 
Schnitzer (2013), Efthyvoulou and Vahter (2016), García-Quevedo et al. (2017) and 
Pellegrino and Savona (2017), all reaffirming a negative impact of financial constraints 
on organizational innovation performance.  
For the few instances (e.g. Almeida et al., 2013), where research finds a positive 
impact of financial constraints within this stream of research, the underlying reason 
stems from the improved allocation and selection of financial resources: Financial 
scarcity enforces the prioritization of successful innovation projects and prevents the 
financing of unsuccessful ones; however the constraint is not seen as an enabler of 
innovation in its own sense (Gibbert et al., 2014).  
 
Another research stream within literature examining the impact on innovation 
performance is concerned with organizational ingenuity and assumes a more positive 
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role of constraints, see for instance Gibbert and Scranton (2009), Korhonen and 
Välikangas (2014), Walker et al. (2014) or Honig et al. (2013). The studies feature both 
resource and product constraints and often cite specific contexts, in which constraints 
had forced ingenious solutions. To cite the example of Gibbert and Scranton (2009), 
the development of jet propulsion at the end of world war II provided such a context. 
Competing teams from USA and Germany strived to dissolve the performance 
dilemma, that material fatigue occurred the more often the more powerful the engine 
was due to extensive heat development. While American teams where granted barely 
unlimited resources and experimented with costly heat resistant alloys, the constrained 
German teams had to come up with an innovative solution. They focused on 
developing better cooling for their inefficient alloys, eventually resulting in a successful 
technology which is still in use today (Gibbert and Scranton, 2009; Hoegl et al., 2008).  
 
Research on impact of constraints on creativity 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Constraint 
type 
Methodology Result 
Amabile, 1996 Individual  Product 
 Process 
Various (-) 
Moreau and 
Dahl, 2005 
Individual 
 
 Product 
(charac-
teristics) 
 Time 
Experimental 
study 
(+) for product 
constraints 
(-) for time 
constraints 
Baer and 
Oldham, 2006 
Individual  Time Experimental 
study 
(+) 
Dahl and 
Moreau, 2007 
Individual 
 
Product 
(charac-
teristics) 
Experimental 
study 
(+) 
Stokes, 2008 Individual  Product 
(charac-
teristics) 
Painting 
analysis 
(+)  
Rosso, 2014 Intra-
organizational 
 
Various 
product & 
process  
Case study 
 
(+) for product 
constraints 
(-) for process 
constraints 
Lombardo and 
Kvalshaugen, 
2014 
Intra-
organizational 
 
Unspecified Case study 
 
Neither 
hindrance nor 
enabler, 
constraints 
inextricably 
intertwined 
with creativity 
Key: (+) means positive impact of constraints on creativity, (-) means negative impact of constraints 
on creativity 
Table 7: Research on impact of constraints on creativity 
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With regard to research on the impact of constraints on creativity (see table 7), one 
predominant stream stands out. Often in the form of experimental research designs, 
an individual’s response to different kinds of constraints is examined. For example, 
Moreau and Dahl (2005) made study participants build children toys from a large set 
of different shapes. A first group was allowed to use whatever they liked from the entire 
set of shapes, resulting with uncreative solutions that were building on familiar 
conceptions of toys. By contrast, the second group, forced to stick to a subset of certain 
shapes, developed very creative solutions. Applying time constraints in addition to the 
input constraints in the same study, however, revealed a negative impact on creativity.  
In the same manner, different studies with different constraint types in this research 
stream yield different results. While product constraints tend to have a positive 
influence on creativity, and process constraints seem to have rather negative effects, 
overall results are ambiguous and no clear pattern evolves.  
 
Looking at the entire body of the analysed research, a series of observations can be 
made regarding scope and coverage. To begin with, there is astonishingly little 
empirical research on an intra-organizational level. The author agrees with Hoegl et al. 
(2008) in marking this as a clear gap, as most innovative endeavours are executed on 
a team or department level, with the intra-organizational level therefore deserving a 
stronger academic focus.  
With regard to analysed constraints, there is a strong propensity towards financial or, 
more generally, resource constraints. Product constraints, though seemingly favoured 
as triggers for creativity, are underrepresented; product properties do not even occur 
once as the object of research.  
Furthermore, comparing the mode of action of studies in tables 6 and 7, an interesting 
observation can be made. Whereas studies on the impact of constraints on innovation 
performance see constraints as an externally given factor, researchers on the impact 
of constraints on creativity actively embrace constraints and use them intentionally as 
instruments to influence behaviour. Although existent research on the impact of 
innovation performance has identified a series of effective cause-effect relationships 
of constraints as well, the potential of constraints for purposefully influencing a certain 
behaviour for innovation performance has not yet been explored. 
 
Considering overall results, no clear tendency or explanation pattern evolves under 
which circumstances, with which constraints and with which methodology the impact 
of constraints is negative or positive. However, there seems to be a tendency towards 
a unified notion of financial constraints negatively influencing innovation performance. 
The pieces of evidence for a positive influence that exist for a broad range of contexts 
do not coagulate in a common research theme or theoretical underpinning.  
As mentioned above, existing research efforts analyse constraints’ impact on either 
innovation performance or creativity, both quite abstract themes within the greater field 
of innovation research. It would be interesting to analyse constraints’ impact on more 
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concrete measures for innovation performance. For their apparent relevance in 
innovation research (see chapter 2), NPD success and some of its antecedents, e.g. 
cross-functional integration, could be interesting measures. As existent constraint 
research reaches into topics of how it influences team climate and cooperation (see 
for example Weiss et al., 2011), the leap into researching the impact of constraints on 
cross-functional integration would be both feasible and interesting.  
5 Research need and topic discussion 
In the preceding chapters, three streams of literature were presented which can be 
considered to be substantially independent from each other in existing research. In 
their different fields of application, however, overlaps exist. Cross-functional integration 
and cross-functional coopetition both deal with the interplay of intra-firm actors whilst 
building on different theoretical predecessors and taking a different perspective. Both 
have been applied to a NPD context which for both is a particularly prominent area of 
application. The third literature stream, constraints in innovation research, comprises 
a different object of analysis than the other two streams, but likewise finds application 
in a NPD context.  
Integrating the three literature streams and thus making use of advantages of one 
stream to solve unexplained areas of another one is at the core of the topic discussion 
in the subsequent section. A coopetition perspective will be applied to shed light on 
underlying dynamics of cross-functional integration in NPD; constraints will be applied 
to improve coopetition at the design-manufacturing interface.  
5.1 Shortcomings of existing theoretical and empirical research 
5.1.1 Gaps in research on cross functional integration in NPD 
5.1.1.1 In-depth dynamics are insufficiently understood 
The importance of cross-functional integration for different dimensions of NPD success 
finds broad affirmation in both theory and empiricism. Another finding is widely 
accepted and confirmed in different research efforts: “The relationships between 
various facets of cross-functional integration and performance measures are highly 
complex” (Brettel et al., 2011, p. 251). Indeed, empirical results are partially conflicting 
and often ambiguous in their interpretation, even after repeated attempts to bring clarity 
into this complex matter have been made. The examined relationship seems to depend 
on a large number of mediating, moderating or context-related factors. Furthermore, 
preceding theoretical hypotheses are frequently disproved in empirical results and 
consecutive theoretical explanations remain thin. This inevitably suggests that the 
deeper dynamics of how cross-functional integration actually takes impact in a NPD 
context are still insufficiently comprehended.  
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Several aspects of the existent research body may be held responsible for this deficient 
understanding despite of considerable research efforts. To begin with, all but one of 
the relevant studies are quantitative in nature, examining an issue as complex and 
multi-layered as cross-functional integration based purely on survey data. Although the 
majority of scholars affirms the complexity and difficulty of fully conceiving the issue, 
cross-functional integration is reduced to typically three to four survey items. Further 
aggravated by contextual differences in the understanding of cross-functional 
integration, this alone might explain ambiguity in existent empirical studies.  
In addition to that, scholars such as Gerpott (2005, p. 120) and Dekkers et al. (2013) 
criticize a “partial analytic character” of prevalent studies which can easily be explained 
by limitations of their quantitative methodology, only taking a limited number of issues 
into consideration while many others remain neglected: “None of these strands of 
literature has explored in detail the interaction between product design and engineering 
management from an integral perspective” (Dekkers et al., 2013, p. 317). Furthermore, 
survey data is naturally limited to respondents that are easily accessible and willing to 
answer; potentially more revealing cases that allow to explore in-depth dynamics are 
mostly only accessible via qualitative case study methodologies.  
The disregard of other aspects essential to cross-functional integration sheds more 
light on why study results may be ambiguous and reveals further shortcomings. First 
of all, there has been a constructive discussion in research on the manifestations of 
cross-functional integration. One common denominator hereof is that mere interaction 
between functions does not suffice, some more intangible and deeper-going construct 
such as collaboration (see for example Kahn, 1996) is necessary to generate effective 
cross-functional integration. When comparing measurements of cross-functional 
integration in pertinent studies, it is striking that the entire aspect of collaboration is 
often ignored and interaction is typically reduced to frequency of communication and 
interaction.  
Another aspect that is widely ignored despite of better knowledge in the state of 
research are contextual organizational and social factors, e.g. different subcultural 
thought worlds or functional career paths. There is wide acceptance of their uttermost 
importance for cross-functional integration, e.g. as prominent barriers to integration. 
Nonetheless, their influence is rarely examined in empirical studies, albeit other 
contextual factors such as industry or product innovativeness find consideration. 
Again, this might be attributable to the quantitative methodology, for which it is difficult 
to capture such influences; in any case it constitutes a significant shortcoming of 
existing empirical research.  
A last shortcoming to explain why in-depth dynamics might not yet be fully understood 
is existing studies’ consideration of involved interfaces. Many of the studies leave 
involved interfaces in their measurements unspecified and do not distinguish between 
different interface combinations in their results. This is in so far critical, as a few 
comprehensive studies that do specify and distinguish interfaces find that dynamics 
and outcome of cross-functional integration indeed differ depending on the interface 
  75 
combination that is examined, i.e. between R&D and marketing, marketing and 
production or R&D and production.  
Furthermore, a widespread call for inclusion of the often neglected interface to 
manufacturing remains largely unanswered; the largest part of the research body is 
still focusing on the interface between R&D and marketing. In addition to that, barriers 
to integration are prone to make the integration of manufacturing particularly difficult, 
as those barriers often leave manufacturing in a maverick position. Calls for the 
inclusion of the manufacturing interface due to its assumed and partially confirmed 
importance in NPD are repeated throughout the years, see for example Ettlie (1995), 
Song et al. (1997), Olson et al. (2001), Neubauer (2008), Brettel et al. (2011), Dekkers 
et al. (2013) or Nafisi et al. (2016).  
 
In summary, while existing research emphasizes the crucial importance of cross-
functional integration for NPD success, it has insufficiently understood its in-depth 
dynamics. In large parts, this stems from the heavy methodological focus on 
quantitative survey data, insufficiently capable of capturing important aspects of cross-
functional integration, and a common negligence of the production interface.  
5.1.1.2 Existing methods are insufficiently accepted 
Empirical evidence for a lack of industrial application 
 
There is a large range of empirical studies analysing the industrial application of 
existing methods to enhance cross-functional integration in NPD. Their respective 
scopes differ slightly from study to study, with some research efforts concentrating 
more on the engineering methods such as Concurrent Engineering or Design for X, 
and others taking a more holistic approach on methods of integrated NPD or integrated 
design science. Notwithstanding their broadness in scope, they all come to a similar 
inference, which can be summarized by Lorenz’ (2008, p. 11) conclusion of a study 
investigating integrated product development models in industrial practice: “In spite of 
the high degree of acceptance the degree of implementation of such methods is still 
unsatisfactorily low”. This is reconfirmed by many authors, finding in their empirical 
studies that existing methods find only hesitant and incomplete industrial application, 
although their benefit is scientifically postulated and proven, see for example Cratzius 
(2003, p. 96), Bullinger et al. (1995), Kessler and Chakrabarti (1999), Lindemann et al. 
(2001), Jahn et al. (2002), Björk and Ottosson (2007), Steimer et al. (2016) or Schuh 
et al. (2013). This lack of acceptance by practitioners even holds true for well-known 
methods such as Quality Function Deployment (QFD) or Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FEMA) (Grabowski, 1997; Lindemann et al., 2001). In their recent 
comprehensive research effort on the application of different methods in product 
development, spanning likewise medium-sized companies, Gust et al. (2017, p. 154) 
conclude with a discouraging view that “many companies use methods comparatively 
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rarely or completely dispense with their application” and hereby confirm earlier results 
of Graner (2015), Gausemeier (2000) and Lindemann (2016).  
 
In addition to this general lack of industrial application, the situation at the R&D-
production interface seems to be even more pronounced. Several studies prove that 
the integration at this interface remains even lower than at other interfaces, see for 
example Jürgens (2000), Cratzius (2003, p. 82), Olson et al. (2001) or Nafisi et al. 
(2016). In summary, it must therefore be noted that in spite of promising scientific 
arguments, the industrial application of methods to enhance cross-functional 
integration in NPD remains scarce and unsatisfactorily low. Building on this finding, the 
thesis at hand aims at identifying reasons for this lack of industrial application, as well 
as proposing an alternative method which finds better acceptance by practitioners.  
 
Insufficient recognition of organizational and social factors 
 
Although theory has widely recognized the critical importance of organizational and 
social factors for cross-functional integration, existing methods to enhance cross-
functional integration continue to neglect them. Even methods that are supposed to 
enhance cross-functional integration frequently disregard socio-organizational factors.  
Presumably, this critical observation might be in part owing to the fact that the topic of 
cross-functional integration is interdisciplinary in nature. Often, it is in the management 
fields of research, in which social and organizational factors find their strongest 
consideration. Many of the methods which are technically specific enough to foster 
cross-functional integration in practice, however, are rooted in the engineering field of 
research, with the latter often disregarding these “soft” factors. Hence, management 
research postulates the importance of socio-organizational factors, but its methods to 
enhance cross-functional integration are too high-level and unspecific to find practical 
resonance. On the other hand, engineering research formulates methods that are 
technically specific enough for industrial application, but which neglect important socio-
economic factors. Indeed, a series of studies analysing reasons for the low industrial 
application of existing methods finds that these reasons are less technical, but more 
social and organizational in nature. As examples thereof, resistance to change, 
communication, organization or human factors are provided (Abdalla, 1999; 
Grabowski, 1997; Haque et al., 2003). 
 
Secondly, the disregard of socio-emotional factors in existing methods on cross-
functional integration is criticized. In her seminal work of 1992, Dougherty (p. 195) 
recognizes early that for successful product innovation in large firms “the advocation 
of rational tools and processes, the infusion of market research information, and the 
redesign of structures, while important, are not enough”. Negele (1998) and Womack 
et al. (2006, p. 112) reconfirm that the non-formalizable part of engineering, namely 
the creative human and her soft skills, is even more important for integrated NPD than 
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all technical formalizable parts. Similarly, based on an empirical study of NPD projects, 
Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm (2013, p. 131) concede in their handbook on integrated 
product development that “the previous opinion, that problems of practitioners lie 
mainly within technology, has to be corrected, since the human-organizational area is 
very decisive” (translated from the German original).  
 
The importance of cultural aspects in cross-functional integration was already 
emphasized by pioneers of pertinent research fields. Burns and Stalker suggest to 
adopt a perspective of anthropologists to describe cultural differences between R&D 
and manufacturing as early as 1961 (p. 12-13). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, p. 11) 
emphasize differences in the cognitive and emotional orientation between different 
functions. Griffin and Hauser (1992, p. 362) state that "one explanation of the 
difficulties of achieving cross-functional integration is that each function resides in its 
own "thought world"”. Likewise, the difficulty to capture those receives early attention. 
Brockhoff (1994, p. 11) views cross-functional interfaces as borders of subcultures, 
which are so complex and granular that “they are barely accessible for the typical 
empirical methods” (translated from the German original), with function-specific 
cultures between different companies even more similar than the subcultures of 
different functions within one company. Empirical studies confirm this importance of 
cultural differences as barriers for cross-functional integration – and that existing 
methods do not sufficiently consider those, see for example Song et al. (1997), 
Vandevelde and van Dierdonck (2003) or Lühring (2006, p. 56 ff.). In particular, 
differences in language as well as a “we vs. they” mentality stemming from a lower 
status of production as compared to R&D is observed. Technical specialization, which 
is constantly increasing, is widely regarded as the root cause why such cultural 
entrenchments will further deepen in the future.  
 
Lastly, scholars note that the recognized importance of communication is insufficiently 
represented in existing methods for cross-functional integration. Certainly, many 
methods emphasize the importance of communication, however many fail to recognize 
that in a cross-functional context with all of its cultural barriers, this may be easier said 
than done. Teece (1999) confirms this tacitness of knowledge developed in functional 
organizations, building on von Hippel’s (1994) influential works on the stickiness of 
information. The proverbial “druids knowledge” of highly specialized functions or 
persons in large corporations represents an example thereof.  
 
Over-emphasized complexity for industrial application 
 
Empirical surveys to examine the acceptance of NPD methods in industrial 
applications of both Lindemann et al. (2001) and Grabowski (1997) state high 
theoretical burden and high implementation effort as important reasons for low 
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implementation. These two critical arguments are reinforced in a broad variety of 
studies, which are outlined in the following.  
To begin with, complexity and theoretical requirements of existing methods may be 
justified scientifically, however they encounter refusal in practice: “often the methods 
which can be found in literature are described much too complicate and fussy" 
(Lindemann et al., 2001, p. 49). Minnaar (2012, p. 7) evaluates Concurrent 
Engineering, as one of the prominent methods enhancing integration at the design-
manufacturing interface, to be "hugely complex", complementing that “large-scale 
concurrent design […] will call for computer power and capacity not yet available”. High 
coordination efforts, that result from such complexity, are further cited as important 
hurdles for industrial application (Kessler, 2000). Lindemann et al. (2001) and 
Bichlmaier (2000) therefore call for pragmatic and less abstract methods to optimize 
NPD. 
High implementation efforts are repeatedly mentioned as another important hurdle for 
application, see for example Grabowski (1997), Prasad et al. (1993), Lindemann et al. 
(2001), Bullinger et al. (1995) or Gust et al. (2017). Furthermore, even after a 
successful implementation, time and resource efforts to provide continuously required 
input data prove to be high for many of the existing methods, further impeding industrial 
application. Indeed, the integration of CAD/CAM into NPD projects has shown to rather 
enhance complexity than reduce it. Additionally, different CAD/CAM systems for 
different functions, which are in most cases not compatible to each other, constitute 
further barriers to integration (Claus et al., 2015, p. 131; Teece, 1999; Davenport, 
1997, p. 227).  
These arguments are likewise alarming for the future: Pressure to reduce both 
development costs and time will create further rejection of existing methods that are 
prone for high implementation efforts and high complexity (Gust et al., 2017).  
 
Insufficient recognition of situational and contextual factors 
 
As a last stream of argumentation, existing methods are criticized to obscure or ignore 
important aspects of the reality in industrial corporate contexts, which might also cause 
their slow and insufficient adaptation.  
To begin with, methods to enhance cross-functional integration are never implemented 
in a greenfield approach; they always encounter existing practices of organizing NPD, 
“which may have worked adequately and successfully, can generate a certain 
"stickiness" to the old mechanism” (Lorenz, 2008, p. 58). In particular, organizational 
barriers that sustain functional practices, such as functional reward systems or career 
paths, may undermine new approaches to NPD and therefore hinder industrial 
application (Vandevelde and van Dierdonck, 2003; Song et al., 1997). Ettlie and Stoll 
(1990, p. 43) go as far as to claim that the core challenge of the integration at the R&D-
manufacturing interface is “improving the coordination between groups that seem to 
have developed a largely independent, and in some respects, win-lose relationship 
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with each other". For instance, organizational goal-setting often represents such a win-
lose relationship: while R&D may have the technological breakthrough of a certain 
technology as a goal, production strives to minimize production costs, which often 
means exploiting old technologies to re-use production investments and exploit 
economies of scale. As other examples, careers are usually made within a functional 
chimney (Womack et al., 2006, p. 114), and R&D is often organizationally structured 
by product lines, while production is structured by functions or plant locations 
(Calabrese, 2000). New methods for cross-functional integration should be aware of 
such mechanisms and actively address them; otherwise they risk to stumble upon 
them and be denied industrial adaptation.  
 
In addition to that, corporate reality is often less rational than scholars may assume in 
plotting down academic methods to enhance cross-functional integration. For instance, 
corporate dynamics of leadership visibility and rewards may incentivize a culture of 
“firefighting” more than a stable process that anticipates potential problems with 
downstream functions, e.g. marketing or production, and integrates them in due time 
into the NPD process. Weinreich (2005, p. 208) mentions “territory egoisms” 
(translated from the German original). He describes that past conflicts in cross-
functional collaboration may have represented “shocks” in the collective memory of a 
function that justify a blockade against any cross-functional integration for years ahead 
– even if this works against own objectives.  
Another frequent accusation that is made against existing methods is that they lack 
situational and contextual adaptability: “[...] it became more and more apparent that 
the main problem is not that the necessary methods are lacking. The main problem is 
very often that, during their introduction, methods are not adapted to the given situation 
[…]” (Lindemann et al., 2001, p. 42). Cratzius (2003, p. 83) and Lühring (2006, p. 13) 
confirm this notion and complement that in particular for NPD, success or failure is 
significantly determined by contextual factors which often are ignored by existing 
methods.  
Some scholars hold methodological shortcomings and researchers’ distance to 
practice accountable for practical deficiencies of existing methods: “Unfortunately 
much research into design is undertaken by researchers who don't have real insights 
into or knowledge of its practice” (Gill, 2007, p. 291). In a similar manner, Dougherty 
(1992, p. 195) obtains her influential findings on interpretive barriers between functions 
by grounding her research in practice, criticizing purely academic endeavours: “An 
extensive literature tells managers how they ought to develop new products, and how 
they ought to design their organizations for innovation. This study has examined 
product innovation in practice in order to understand why these prescriptions are not 
often achieved”. In their work on aspects of consideration in product development 
research, Björk and Ottosson (2007, p. 195) make a strong point towards the use of 
qualitative research, reasoning that “bad usability and/or low acceptability” of existing 
methods is the cause for insufficient industrial adaptation. They claim: “We have found 
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that, to grasp what really happens on a daily basis in a development project, to get the 
opportunity to reflect upon it, and to understand the complex nature of a development 
process, it is necessary to conduct insider action research (IAR), which is a qualitative 
approach”.  
 
In summary, shortcomings of existing methods to enhance cross-functional integration 
include the negligence of socio-organizational factors, the over-emphasized 
complexity and theoretical burden for industrial application, as well as the insufficient 
recognition of situational and contextual factors of practitioners’ reality.  
5.1.2 Gaps in research on cross-functional coopetition 
The newly emerged research topic of coopetition has experienced much popularity for 
a broad range of phenomena that exhibit both cooperative and competitive features. 
In particular for today’s business environment, which steps back from the previously 
dominant competitive paradigm and turns towards a more balanced view that 
integrates cooperation, coopetition finds abundant resonance. Coopetition has proven 
its ability to shed light and provide theoretical backing on phenomena that seemed 
ambiguous and were unexplainable in the traditional categories of cooperation and 
competition. The research field has demonstrated its explanatory power on many 
levels of analysis ranging from the individual-focused micro level II up to the inter-
network macro level. 
 
Unsurprisingly, a research field this young exhibits blank spaces in its academic 
coverage; evident gaps relevant for the thesis at hand are summarized in the following.  
Scholars in the field of coopetition agree that the majority of research concentrates on 
the meso (inter-firm) level, while research on micro levels I and II (intra-firm) is very 
limited: “Only few studies focus on coopetition on the intra-firm level, i.e., coopetition 
between departments within a firm” (Strese et al., 2016, p. 42). This notion is confirmed 
by five recent comprehensive literature reviews of Peng et al. (2012), Bengtsson and 
Kock (2014), Bouncken et al. (2015), Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) and Devece 
et al. (2017), concluding that only approximately 5% of articles examine the inter-firm 
level of coopetition. Nonetheless, many scholars point towards the importance and 
attractiveness of this level of analysis, see for instance Yami et al. (2010b) or Strese 
et al. (2016).  
 
Furthermore, there remains a lot of ambiguity in existing studies on the impact of 
coopetition on several performance dimensions. No clear statement of impact patterns 
can be derived, as conceptions and research designs are still heterogeneous and 
selective with regard to their context or scope. Environmental and organizational 
contingencies are still largely unknown: Under which circumstances and in which 
contexts is coopetition effective? (Bouncken et al., 2015) 
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In addition to that, the current state of research is characterized by methodological 
monotony. Relevant empirical studies on cross-functional coopetition build exclusively 
on quantitative survey data, with a resulting flatness of explanations and theoretical 
derivations. Ghobadi (2012) even finds statistical bias in prevalent studies within the 
field of cross-functional coopetition. More precisely, she accuses the empirical efforts 
of Luo et al. (2006) and Lin (2007) to build on biased interpretations in their results. 
Cross-functional coopetition researchers’ incline on survey data is surprising, as other 
levels of analysis in coopetition research build strongly on evidence from case studies 
and qualitative research. Explicit calls for in-depth qualitative case study research are 
frequent, e.g. by Gnyawali and Park (2009) and Bengtsson and Kock (2014). Strese 
et al. (2016) mention the inherent complexity of coopetitive phenomena that forbid 
reduction to just a single factor; while qualitative research would be capable to cover 
a large variety of different aspects and factors in an iterative manner. In addition to 
that, several authors call for an in-depth analysis of the core dynamics of coopetition, 
on an operational level that looks at coopetitive behaviour going well beyond a mere 
question of whether there is coopetition and what its impact is (Ghobadi, 2012; 
Tidström, 2008; Fernandez et al., 2014). Lastly, a process perspective of coopetition 
is often called for (see for example Yami et al., 2010b), which would require a 
longitudinal analysis of a single case. Again, this suggests the use of qualitative 
research in a case study approach.  
 
Cross-functional coopetition has rarely been applied to an NPD context, with the mere 
exemption of Lin (2007). This is in so far surprising as on other levels of analysis, in 
particular the meso level, NPD is one of the most prominent fields of applications of 
coopetition. Here, coopetition is generally judged to have a positive impact on 
innovation, as it facilitates knowledge sharing and capability build-up, and 
simultaneously encourages to engage in creational activities by its competitive 
element. On the meso level, potential contrary effects such as opportunistic behaviour 
leading to intellectual property leaks can mitigate these positive effects; on the micro 
level, this might naturally be less harmful. Hence, there is reason to presume that 
coopetition on a cross-functional level of analysis may positively spur innovation. 
Several scholars support this call to look into cross-functional coopetition in a NPD 
context, see for example Bouncken et al. (2015), Strese et al. (2016) or Meuer (2015), 
who suggests that studies on the context between cross-functional coopetition and 
NPD performance are rare although the correlation is existent and possibly has a huge 
influence at innovative departments within corporations. Lin’s (2007) results hint into 
the same direction.   
 
As another point, it is interesting to note that solid bridges between the two research 
areas of cross-functional integration and cross-functional coopetition have not yet been 
established. Research generally takes a different level of perspective in each 
respective topic and hence treats them as rather separate fields of research. However, 
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the explanatory power which lies in coopetition to elucidate controversial aspects of 
cross-functional integration has not gone unnoticed; several scholars point towards 
fruitful results that may be expected from this connection.  
Lin (2007) describes how existent studies examine either cooperative or competitive 
interactions between functions, with the cooperative side being covered by many 
studies in the realm of cross-functional integration, and the competitive side often 
focusing on conflicts with a positive or negative relationship on new product 
performance. Lin (2007, p. 3), closes with a call “to understand how these seemingly 
conflicting relationships interplay”. Luo et al. (2006) set out from a similar perspective, 
reaffirming that knowledge transfer in a cooperative manner is essential to achieve 
cross-functional integration, while on the other side it is corporate reality that functions 
likewise compete for resources and power. Luo et al. (2006, p. 67) conclude that these 
seemingly conflicting aspects are simply features of corporate reality, and research 
should be encouraged to dissolve or at least describe this issue: "Thus, the question 
is whether competing departments can effectively cooperate with one another to 
enhance organizational learning and performance. More generally, how should firms 
strategically manage cross-functional competition and cooperation to achieve 
competitive advantage?” Likewise, Luo et al. (2006) recognize that in cross-functional 
coopetition, the whole may be more than the sum of its parts. Cross-functional 
coopetition may well offer deeper explanations and encourage better performance 
than cooperation and competition alone would be able to: “[…] cross-functional 
coopetition recognizes that interdepartmental conflict is not always unfavourable and 
can even produce specific benefits” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 69). Indeed, Dagnino and 
Padula (2002) provide a precise example thereof. They refer to Clark and Fujimoto’s 
(1991, p. 71 ff.) influential research on Japanese car makers, which were able to win 
over Western carmakers in terms of new product performance by means of better 
cross-functional integration. Whereas this has been attributed to “traditional” cross-
functional integration by researchers in this field, Dagnino and Padula make clear that 
cross-functional coopetition may have contributed significantly: Japanese carmakers 
assigned car development projects to cooperating teams, which were often competing 
on the same project, with several teams simultaneously cooperating-competing for one 
car project. Dagnino and Padula (2002) conclude that, while a Western perspective 
may consider this as redundancies, this approach enabled to speed up the process 
and smooth the transition from a functional department to another, with positive 
consequences on NPD success.  
5.1.3 Gaps in research on constraints in NPD 
Constraints of all kinds and sorts seem to shape every task of new product 
development. This alone constitutes an intuitive interest in their impact as a research 
field. Scholars from very different disciplines fulfil this endeavour, leading to a 
heterogeneous and non-uniform patchwork that leaves many gaps and connections 
as blanks, many of them promising as new fields for research activity. In the following, 
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evident gaps are identified, and specifically interesting spaces for further research are 
highlighted. 
 
A common, and maybe the most prominent question discussed in this field of research 
is whether constraints have a positive or negative impact on innovation. Despite of all 
efforts, this central question is yet left unanswered. The ambiguity of existing results 
and a resulting call for enhanced in-depth research to understand dynamics and 
contextual factors that may influence them is uttered by many scholars from various 
disciplines, see for example Weiss et al. (2011), Hoegl et al. (2008) or Hatchuel and 
Chen (2017). Qualitative research, until now somewhat a rarity within constraint 
research, might help to shed light on missing links and provide a deeper understanding 
of the topic.  
 
Another evident gap is the scarcity of empirical research on an intra-organizational 
level of analysis. This is particularly critical, as most innovative endeavours are 
executed on a team or department level (Hoegl et al., 2008). Therefore, the intra-
organizational level deserves a stronger academic focus (Rosso, 2014) which is 
currently left unanswered.  
 
A further blank space within existent research refers to the type of constraints that is 
being analysed. Financial, or more general resource constraints or process 
constraints, make up the largest part of current empirical research. On the other hand, 
product constraints, and product properties in particular, are underrepresented, even 
though a few existing data points suggest that those have a positive impact on 
innovation performance. This strongly suggests to examine both product and process 
constraints in a comparative research effort.  
 
Lastly, existing research that tries to grasp a deeper understanding of constraints’ 
impact in the absence of large panel data focusses in large parts on particular 
circumstances, often involving start-up companies or bottom-of-the-pyramid situations. 
By contrast, comparable studies on incumbent corporate settings are rare. 
 
As explained above, the role of constraints in an innovation context is intuitively 
interesting through their omnipresent, even proverbial existence in creative tasks. In 
this respect, it is surprising to note that research has not yet gone beyond a superficial 
level of analysis in the innovation space: Until now, most research efforts concentrate 
on the role of constraints on either innovation performance or creativity; both being 
quite abstract terms that are difficult to seize or measure. The author follows Hoegl et 
al. (2008) in stating that there must be mediating aspects that explain the wide and 
abstract relationship between constraints and innovation performance in more detail: 
Perhaps, constraints affect an antecedent rather than innovation performance itself. 
Such an analysis could likewise have explanatory potential for result ambiguity as 
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explained above, and would likewise help to make the relationship between constraints 
and innovation performance easier to capture and understand in-depth. To the author’s 
best knowledge, up to now Weiss et al. (2011) made the only research effort in this 
direction when examining constraints’ impact on team climate and cooperation. 
Continuing on this path by analysing other potential antecedents of innovation 
performance as dependent variables on constraints’ impact, seems both feasible and 
interesting.  
 
Regarding the broader scope of research on constraints’ impact on innovation 
performance, it can be observed that they mostly study constraints as a given feature 
of a certain setting. This involves questions of whether, and to what degree, constraints 
are existent, as well as analyses on what impact these constraints have.  
On the other side, research on constraints’ impact on creativity takes another 
approach: Here, scholars often intentionally employ constraints as instruments to 
enhance creativity. A large part of results herein confirms constraints’ positive impact 
on creativity; hence scholars have understood how to make use of constraints as 
deliberate instruments to foster creative problem solving.  
 
Bridging this gap by an intentional employment of constraints to trigger a certain 
purpose within an innovation context would likely reveal insightful findings. Not only 
might this constitute a method how behaviour in NPD can be steered into a desired 
direction, but it might also be a method of uttermost simplicity (Bix, 2017).  
5.2 Topic discussion 
In the following, the identified gaps in research are taken as a starting point and 
integrated into a study design that guides the empirical part of the thesis at hand. 
Illustration 23 offers a (significantly reduced) summary of the argumentation in this 
chapter. 
 
To begin with, the widely accepted opinion of researchers from different disciplines is 
reaffirmed: Cross-functional integration is an important antecedent of NPD success. 
This is broadly reaffirmed for different measures of NPD performance and different 
conceptions of cross-functional integration.  
 
Building on identified shortcomings calling for a better and deeper understanding of 
cross-functional integration in a NPD context, a qualitative case study design is 
suggested, which is able to capture cross-functional integration in its entire complexity 
and includes an explicit consideration of contextual, social and organizational factors. 
Furthermore it is suggested to focus on the often ignored interface between R&D and 
production, as this has the potential to reveal new insights which might help 
complement missing links in this field of research.  
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Moreover, to encounter deficient industrial application of existing methods and 
identified reasons thereof, a new approach is to be developed in the course of this 
thesis, striving for simplicity in industrial application and allowing for consideration of 
socio-organizational and contextual adaptations, otherwise it would fail to create an 
added value for both academia and practice.  
 
The application of coopetition on an intra-organizational level in an NPD context seems 
promising, albeit barely researched hitherto. Likewise, the connection between the two 
fields of cross-functional coopetition and cross-functional integration has not been 
thoroughly explored. These research gaps suggest to benefit from coopetition’s 
explanatory power to examine remaining gaps of cross-functional integration in NPD. 
Existing empirical applications show that coopetition is more than the sum of its parts, 
cooperation and competition, which might allow for insightful results in deploying it to 
a setting of cross-functional integration.  
 
So far, different research streams within the research field on constraints in innovation 
make up a patchwork of promising results and interesting academic gaps, with a 
comparative application of different constraint types in an intra-organizational context 
being one of those gaps. In the emergent, yet non-unified field of research on 
constraints’ impact on innovation performance, a logical next step would be to 
substantiate this wide and abstract relationship, perhaps by examining constraints’ 
impact on one of the antecedents of innovation performance, e.g. cross-functional 
integration. Most important, empirical studies on constraints’ impact on creativity 
suggest that constraints may be utilized as purposeful instruments to trigger a certain 
behaviour in an innovative activity. Therefore, an attempt could likely be made to 
introduce constraints to foster cross-functional integration. Due to its presumable 
simplicity and adaptability to contextual aspects, this may be the basis for a new 
approach to enhance cross-functional integration as postulated above.  
 
 
Illustration 23: Summary of research-based topic discussion 
Gaps in existing research Consequences for research topic
In-depth dynamics insufficiently 
understood
Low industrial application of existing 
methods due to deficiencies
In-depth understanding through qualita-
tive approach & coopetition perspective
New method that is less complex and 
considers socio-organizational aspects
Confirmed explanatory power, but gaps 
in cross-functional level of analysis
Application of explanatory power in 
cross-functional setting
Promising as instrument to impact NPD, 
but gaps in theoretical understanding
Exploration as suitable new method with 
simultaneous exploration of theory
Con-
straints
Coo-
petition
Cross-
funct. 
integ. 
in NPD
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In summary, evident shortcomings are integrated to form a research topic as follows: 
A first part of the research topic aims at elucidating remaining gaps in the in-depth 
understanding of cross-functional integration in NPD, in particular at the design-
manufacturing interface. The explanatory power of cross-functional coopetition is 
applied to this end; likewise, a qualitative research methodology is proposed. A second 
part of the research topic follows the call to develop a new, simplified method that is 
able to consider situational and socio-organizational aspects. For this purpose, the 
introduction of constraints shall be explored. 
In the following, details of the topic and the study design will be outlined.  
The research topic can be divided in two parts: The first part engages in an in-depth 
analysis of cross-functional integration in NPD from a coopetitive perspective. The 
second part explores a new approach to enhance cross-functional integration in NPD 
through the introduction of constraints.  
 
For both parts, the explicit inclusion of contextual, social and organization factors is 
important. This requires a strong empirical grounding as an essential feature of the 
research approach, because situational aspects of the empirical setting have to be 
captured in detail. Likewise, the exploratory nature inherent to the development of 
theory for a new method is calling for qualitative research as well. In the light of those 
considerations, a qualitative case study approach is a favourable option. Further 
methodological details are discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis. 
Secondly, a large-scale industrial environment is suggested as empirical setting.  
 
For both parts of the research topic, cross-functional integration at the interface 
between design and manufacturing in a NPD context is the main object of analysis.  
 
For the first part, the in-depth analysis, a cross-functional coopetitive perspective is 
taken to illuminate the dynamics. For this purpose, the connection between cross-
functional integration and cross-functional coopetition is analysed. Cross-functional 
coopetition is conceptionalized according to Luo et al. (2006), which covers dimensions 
of cooperative intensity, cooperative ability and competition and constitutes a reliable 
and empirically tested continuation of existing research. Naturally, the original survey 
items are translated into questions suitable for qualitative research; details are 
provided in a later part of this document.  
 
In the second part of the empirical study, the introduction of constraints to enhance 
cross-functional integration in NPD is explored. To be more concrete, its feasibility to 
serve as a theoretical grounding for a new method shall be analysed. This basic idea 
needs translation into the empirical setting at the design-manufacturing interface of 
NPD which can be described as follows: In NPD, production activities occur 
downstream of R&D activities. Consequently, constraints are formulated from a 
manufacturing perspective and therefore express concerns of manufacturability. For 
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illustrative purposes, if the interface between R&D and marketing would be in the 
focus, constraints could express concerns such as customer usability or brand 
suitability. In this study’s case, manufacturability constraints may cover diverse aspects 
that differ in their respective constraint type. For example, a constraint on a maximum 
number of fastener elements is a product constraint, whereas a constraint on maximum 
costs of assembly is a financial constraint.  
 
This generic design of constraints builds on findings from research: First, they have to 
be easily understandable and reproducible, and second, they have to be introduced in 
early stages of the NPD process and therefore be integrated in an upstream activity. 
To begin with, the simplicity requirement is supported by psychological mechanisms in 
the design process. Opposed to a rational and systematic conception of the design 
process which is widely acknowledged as an industrial standard (e.g. by VDI 2221), 
the actual design process follows opportunistic shortcuts and a path-of-least-
resistance strategy to reduce cognitive efforts. In addition to that, the limited human 
working memory forces designers to focus on a partial aspect of a problem solving 
task. Constraints, when formulated simple and understandable enough, help to put the 
right features into the designer’s focus and to help re-target essential aspects; they 
may likewise serve as objectification gauge. Minnaar and Reinecke (2012), Römer and 
Pache (2002) and Ehrlenspiel and Meerkamm (2013, p. 156) offer further insight, why 
simplicity of information provision in the engineering design process is essential.  
Second, the imperative for early integration of constraints is grounded in the fact that 
the lion’s share of costs occurring over the entire product life cycle is determined in 
early phases of NPD. Therefore, design, which is typically an early phase NPD activity, 
determines costs that downstream functional areas such as manufacturing are bound 
to bear. Furthermore, constraints may help to dissolve the related central paradox in 
NPD: Consequences on downstream stakeholders are the easiest to impact when they 
are the hardest to assess. Introducing constraints in a very early phase of NPD 
discharges the difficult requirement of early assessment by downstream functions, 
while benefitting from the ease of impact in early phases: Concerns of downstream 
functions are simply introduced as constraints for the design phase.  
 
Two aspects of constraints are of interest when examining their impact on the cross-
functional integration at the design-manufacturing interface: constraint type and 
organizational embedding.  
Illustrative constraint types of manufacturability constraints have been described 
above. From the research on the impact of constraints on innovation performance, the 
author has substantial reason to assume that the impact will differ in dependence of 
the type of constraint that is applied.  
The term organizational embedding shall include all relevant factors of social and 
organizational nature that accompany the introduction of constraints. This ranges from 
an incentivization connected to the fulfilment of the constraint to the level of leadership 
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which is made responsible for the fulfilment of the constraint, with details being 
provided at a later part of this thesis. Prevalent theory on cross-functional integration 
suggests that these socio-organizational factors are of uttermost importance and 
hence are likely to influence the impact of constraints on cross-functional integration.  
 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to examine the impact of the introduced 
manufacturability constraints on creativity. Therefore, the question whether 
manufacturability constraints foster or impede creativity in R&D’s design tasks is 
suggested as part of the research topic, likewise in which constraint type and under 
which organizational embedding this occurs. While this is not related to cross-
functional integration itself, creativity is an unquestioned antecedent of NPD 
performance just as cross-functional integration is. As the impact of constraints on 
creativity is unmistakably interesting, it is included into the research topic.  
5.3 Research model and research questions 
The proposed topic can be illustrated in a research model, which depicts essential 
relationships that are to be analysed and the respective dependent and independent 
variables. While this is not as typical for qualitative research efforts as it is for 
quantitative models, case study methodology experts support such an illustration to 
foster rigidity in the research approach (George and Bennett, 2005). Nonetheless, the 
interpretation of a qualitative research model is somewhat different. While relationships 
and variables that are in the centre of the empirical analysis can be depicted, no 
measurements for the variables can be provided up-front. Whereas questionnaires for 
semi-guided interviews, as they will be discussed later in this thesis, contour a variable 
in a wide circle, concrete measurements emerge iteratively in the research process. 
Indeed, this is one of the strengths of qualitative research and will be argued in detail 
in the methodology chapter of this thesis.   
 
 
Illustration 24: Research model with research questions 1-5 
Scope of the analysis
Introduction 
of manu-
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5
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There are five research questions to guide the empirical study. They are listed below 
and will be explained in the following. In addition, research questions are marked at 
corresponding places in the research model, depicted with a number. While research 
question 1 covers the first part of the research topic, the in-depth analysis as described 
above, research questions 2-5 all have to do with the second part on the introduction 
of constraints.  
 
1. How does cross-functional coopetition impact cross-functional integration at the 
design-manufacturing interface of NPD? 
2. How does the introduction of manufacturability constraints impact coopetitive 
behaviour at the manufacturing-design interface? 
3. What is the moderating impact of the constraint type on this relationship? 
4. What is the moderating impact of the organizational embedding on this 
relationship? 
5. How does the introduction of manufacturability constraints impact creativity? 
 
Research question 1 guides the in-depth analysis of cross-functional integration at the 
design-manufacturing interface of NPD. The relationship to cross-functional 
coopetition is expected to shed new light on the in-depth dynamics of cross-functional 
integration. Therefore, cross-functional coopetition at the same interface is analysed 
likewise, captured along the three dimensions laid out by Luo et al. (2006), cooperative 
intensity, cooperative ability and competition. The author assumes that there are many 
interlinkages between cross-functional integration and cross-functional coopetition, 
and likewise a few differences. Both are expected to elucidate the in-depth dynamics 
at the design-manufacturing interface. “How”, and not “what is the impact” is being 
asked, because it is the underlying dynamics at the core, expressed by “how”, which 
lies in this study’s interest.  
 
Research question 2 investigates the introduction of manufacturability constraints: 
How will the introduction of these constraints impact coopetitive behaviour at the same 
interface that has been analysed in-depth in research question 1? New scientific 
territory is explored here, therefore no substantial predictions can be made with regard 
to the outcome of research question 2. Again, this study strives to understand the 
underlying mechanics, therefore asking “how”.  
 
Research questions 3 and 4 cover moderating effects, that constraint type and 
organizational embedding are likely to have on the dynamics examined in research 
question 2. Its specific dynamics and direction are the subject to be explored. Striving 
for rigidity in the explorative qualitative research approach means that measurements 
describing the vague variables constraint type and organizational embedding will only 
emerge grounded in the empirical setting and hence will be described later in this 
document.  
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Research question 5 is not related to the questions around the main subject of 
analysis, which is cross-functional integration. However, when examining effects and 
mechanics that emerge from the introduction of constraints within NPD, questions on 
a potential impact on the creativity of problem solving at this interface arise almost 
intuitively. Furthermore, just as cross-functional integration is not regarded as an end 
in itself, but in the broader context of its importance for NPD success, creativity can 
equally be considered as an aspect certainly important for NPD success.  
 
To summarize it, the thesis at hand aspires to make four major contributions to 
research by engaging in the outlined empirical effort. They are described in the 
following.  
 
1. In-depth understanding of the dynamics of cross-functional integration in NPD: 
The employed qualitative research method herein is a major contributor, 
allowing to capture contextual and socio-organizational factors as well as to 
seize a holistic understanding of all involved dynamics in the absence of 
limitations from a finite number of survey items. Besides, taking a coopetitive 
perspective on the cross-functional integration offers further explanatory power. 
In addition, the outlined research effort brings light to the underresearched 
design-manufacturing interface.  
 
2. Theory on a new method to enhance cross-functional integration: A new 
approach based on the introduction of constraints is explored that mitigates 
identified deficiencies of existing methods: less complex in industrial application 
and conducive to socio-organizational and contextual adaptations. Likely 
moderating factors, constraint types and organizational embedding, are 
simultaneously examined to give substance to theory development. This new 
approach may as well serve as a theoretical basis to explore other purposes 
than cross-functional integration at the design-manufacturing interface. Other 
interfaces, e.g. design-customer or design-environmental stakeholder, could 
potentially make use of a similar method and introduce their respective 
constraints to enhance their integration in the NPD process.  
 
3. Bridging gaps of coopetition research: The thesis at hand helps to bridge two 
evident gaps in coopetition research. First, empirical research on the cross-
functional level of analysis (micro level I) is scarce; with qualitative research 
being non-existent and the NPD context only considered in one exemption. 
Therefore, this thesis constitutes an important contribution on this field. Second, 
the relationship between cross-functional integration and cross-functional 
coopetition is for the first time systematically explored in the research project at 
hand.  
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4. Bridging gaps of constraints in innovation research: For the nascent research 
fields of constraints in innovation, several contributions can be made. To begin 
with, a qualitative research effort on the core dynamics is likely to shed new light 
on the unsolved conflict whether constraints have a positive or negative impact, 
and under which contextual circumstances this becomes effective. The 
comparative analysis of the impact of different constraint types will help to 
explain this conflict and will bridge another gap evident in the existing research. 
Subsequently, a contribution can be made to the intra-organizational level of 
analysis, which yet remains barely researched, yet essential for innovation. In 
addition to that, empirical research on the impact of constraints on innovation in 
an incumbent company setting, as opposed to the more often analysed start-up 
or bottom-of-the-pyramid settings, constitutes another contribution. Lastly, the 
still abstract relationship between constraints and innovation performance is 
explored to create a more tangible and reliable understanding by analysing two 
important antecedents of innovation performance: cross-functional integration 
and creativity. 
6 Design of the empirical study 
6.1 Research methodology 
6.1.1 Choosing the appropriate methodology 
Setting out from discussed shortcomings of extant research and the formulated 
research questions, the choice of qualitative research as a suitable methodology needs 
to be discussed in further detail. To begin with, characteristics of qualitative research 
will be discussed that allow to make up for identified shortcomings. Subsequently, 
features of qualitative research will be outlined that support answering the designated 
research questions.  
 
„No cleavage has been as persistent or as vociferous as the qualitative versus 
quantitative debate“ (Gerring, 2012, p. 362). Quantitative research methods that focus 
on inferences made from large numbers of empirical data dominate text books. On the 
other hand, qualitative methods, drawing inferences from few data observations by 
means of causal-process observations, have experienced growing recognition from 
academic research in recent decades. While qualitative research is often still accused 
to be only of preliminary nature and less scientifically relevant due to the small sample 
size, quantitative methodology does not remain undisputable either: “Thankfully, 
however, the formal logical approach to scientific method has lost a good deal of its 
former luster” (Weinberg, 2002b, p. 2). Quantitative approaches are held responsible 
for decoupling research from practice: Utilization research has demonstrated that 
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findings of mainstream research often lack practical application due to required 
abstraction levels and the resulting distance from the original object of analysis. For 
the analysis of social, managerial and organizational phenomena, where the object of 
analysis is human, this constitutes a particularly significant shortcoming (Gerring, 
2012, p. 362 ff.).  
 
Social and organizational aspects that have been found essential for the research 
study at hand, strongly suggest taking a qualitative approach. Undoubtedly, interface 
integration of large-scale industrial departments in technically sophisticated innovation 
projects in itself is a complex matter. Additionally, as highlighted in section 5.1, a 
central shortcoming of existing research is strongly interrelated with contextual factors 
of the real-life work surrounding. In particular, complex relations between situational 
characteristics, organizational mechanisms and the social interplay at the interfaces 
are considered as central aspects for research success. While quantitative research 
methods have difficulties in dealing with such complexity and resulting ambiguity of 
data, qualitative research offers explanations of complex phenomena that cannot be 
reduced to a certain set of variables (Gephart, 2004). Björk and Ottosson (2007, p. 
195) explicitly recommend engaging in qualitative research to generate an in-depth 
understanding of the complexity of NPD processes: “The transfer of research findings 
over to industry has been shown to be slow and incremental, which could be seen as 
a result of bad usability and/or low acceptability in research findings from studies on 
industrial product development processes. According to our research and practice 
experience, we have found that, to grasp what really happens on a daily basis in a 
development project, to get the opportunity to reflect upon it, and to understand the 
complex nature of a development process, it is necessary to conduct insider action 
research (IAR), which is a qualitative approach.”  
 
The author believes that ambiguous and even partially contradictory results of large-
scale quantitative surveys studying cross-functional integration in a NPD context may 
be explained by the insufficient capability of the chosen methodology to illuminate 
complexity. Surveys that scale down complex phenomena to indicators may entail too 
many presuppositions and hence open the door for diverging interpretations by survey 
respondents, such as in the following example from a survey questionnaire from Brettel 
et al. (2011, p. 266): “In the development phase R&D and manufacturing exchanged 
large amounts of information”. By generating an in-depth understanding of 
contextualized subjective perceptions and making use of “richness” of raw qualitative 
data, qualitative research is better positioned to succeed in explaining complex 
phenomena (Weick, 2007).  
 
Additionally, the study at hand goes beyond analysing the mere existence and form of 
cross-functional integration; underlying social mechanisms as well as organizational 
and situational antecedents shall be explored. Reflectivity regarding unexpected 
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insights from the field, openness to unanticipated events and the ability to adapt 
diverging subjective perspectives are inherent features of qualitative research methods 
that are believed to support this research goal. In particular, when it is supported by an 
interpretative theoretical view, as will be explained in the subsequent chapter, 
qualitative research is able to explain how social experience is constructed and to 
identify preunderstandings as well as language constructs. Participants in qualitative 
research are free to emphasize what is relevant to them and can present it in their own 
context, rather than being restricted to a presupposed conception framework or study 
design. All of the mentioned will help to “dig deeper” and find the underlying 
mechanisms behind the occurrence or non-occurrence of cross-functional integration.  
 
Research questions 1, 2 and 5 as developed in chapter 5.3 strive towards generating 
an in-depth understanding of integration mechanisms, hence employing “how” 
questions. Following Flick (2014, p. 153) and Pratt (2009), qualitative research is well 
suited to answer such questions. Research questions 2, 3 and 4 aim at acting out the 
new and fairly unformed idea of introducing constraints to enhance integration, and, if 
possible, develop a theory to substantiate the idea. Accordingly, the central objective 
of the thesis at hand is theory development. Yin (2013, p. 9 ff.) suggests explorative 
qualitative research for such studies that lack pre-existing prepositions, yet state a 
clear purpose. Most applications of qualitative research abstain from tacit and implicit 
assumptions, thus making theory less a starting point to be tested but an end to be 
developed, hence encouraging exploratory research. This entails that any 
generalization, which can be made from the empirical data, is theoretical in nature, and 
not statistical. A statistical generalization, typical for large-scale quantitative research 
methodologies, aims at generalizing empirical results to the entire population by 
ensuring the empirical data’s representativeness. Naturally, a case study with its low 
n, cannot strive for statistical representativeness, instead it aims at theoretical 
generalizability. This means that the dynamics that emerge from the empirical data can 
be generalized in theory, therefore substantiating the central claim for theory 
development.  
 
To attain necessary analytical and explanatory depth, the researcher needs to have 
profound access to the examined phenomenon going well beyond a superficial insight 
from an outside perspective. Following Paashuis (1998, p. 78), complex subjects 
whose boundaries to the context are not clearly evident and for which the context might 
play a constitutive role, should encourage an “empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context". Likewise, Gerpott (2005, p. 
120) criticizes existing empirical research in integrated new product development to be 
of “partial analytic nature”, only analysing a narrow set of influence factors and lacking 
an in-depth holistic understanding that would require exclusive access to real-life 
mechanics of new product development, which only a qualitative case study is able to 
offer.   
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In conclusion, the above listed requirements strongly suggest a qualitative case study 
design featuring participative observation. Therefore, this research design is chosen 
as the research methodology to guide the empirical study in this thesis.  
6.1.2 Underlying epistemological program 
According to Silverman (2010, p.332), any methodological choice is inextricably linked 
to epistemological and ontological issues. The epistemological program provides the 
theoretical fundament for any research concept and guides decisions regarding the 
research design, validity criteria and research goal (Flick 2015, p.80). While the 
present subchapter is not aimed at delivering a complete account of various 
epistemological notions, it strives to explain underlying epistemological assumptions 
that guide the chosen qualitative research approach of the thesis at hand. Following 
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 13), it is particularly important for qualitative researchers 
to understand the very basics of what they are doing, as qualitative approaches tend 
to lack the rigid “boilerplate” (Pratt, 2009, p. 856) structure that other methodologies 
can offer.  
 
Most researchers would probably agree with (Weinberg, 2002b, p. 3) that science’s 
ultimate goal should be “to grasp the true nature of our surroundings and ourselves.” 
Positivism and constructivism are two opposing epistemological programs that provide 
guidelines how this can be achieved.  
Positivism goes back to August Comte (Comte and Dupouey, 1989 (1830-1842)), who 
encouraged scientists to use inductive inference to detect generalizable patterns from 
empirical observations. After becoming one of science philosophy central’s question, 
it excited a discussion whether empirical observations, as predictable as they may 
occur, can possibly be developed to become universal law. Karl Popper’s 
falsificationism (Popper, 1971) utters substantial doubts regarding any universal truth 
derived from empirical facts and limits generalizations to mere scientifically probable 
statements, but nevertheless abides to a scientific principle of inferring generalizable 
outcomes from empirical observations. For the majority of researchers to follow, this 
view remains the general guidepost (Flick, 2005, 2015; Weinberg, 2002b, p. 5).  
Constructivism, by contrast, is an opposing epistemological view subsuming several 
ideas that question science’s ability to find a true, generalizable nature, even 
questioning the existence of such a truth altogether. The most pronounced forms of 
social constructivism suggest focusing research primarily on the process of concept 
development at both sides, participant and scientist. They regard language to be a 
constitutive, rather than a representative, aspect of reality (Kuhn, 1970; Flick, 2015, p. 
246). 
 
With their opposing epistemological principles, both sides seem irreconcilable and 
leave it to the respective researcher’s judgement, which one is to guide his or her 
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research. However, Flick (2015, p. 190) suggests that both programs may work well 
side by side for different empirical purposes.  
 
The author of the thesis at hand takes a moderate constructivist perspective adhering 
to Wilson’s interpretative paradigm, that postulates to reflect participants’ background 
assumptions and gives room to their respective subjective perspectives (Flick, 2015, 
p. 90; Wilson, 1970). The adherence to this epistemological program is reflected in the 
overall design striving for a subjective in-depth understanding, the semi-structured 
interview procedure, large subjective accounts of participative observation and the 
research goal of theoretical, rather than statistical generalization.  
6.2 Case study design  
6.2.1 Design approach: Connecting theory and empirical data 
Following the argumentation of chapter 6.1, it can be concluded that a qualitative case 
study design with participative observation is the appropriate methodology for the 
empirical questions of the study at hand. Further details of this research design need 
to be discussed in the following, as existing methodological examples offer several 
design approaches of how theory and empirical data are connected within the frame 
of such a research design.  
 
At its core, the scope for this discussion is limited by the two extremes of a purely 
deductive or purely inductive design: Is theory developed exclusively from the empirical 
data without any previous theoretical propositions or does theory serve as a starting 
point for the empirical endeavour? A strict deductive design is frequently followed in 
quantitative research approaches to test existing theory through empirical data. 
Clearly, research that aims at theory development, as opposed to theory testing, is 
recommended taking a rather inductive approach. However, different perspectives 
exist to which degree an inductive research strategy has to avoid theoretical premises 
to start off. Within qualitative research, the most uncompromising representatives 
herein are scholars of grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) originally 
developed grounded theory, heavily arguing against what they call armchair theorizing: 
They reproach traditionally working scholars to develop theory that is detached from 
its empirical context, and to only rely on empiricism when looking for data to 
substantiate what is already developed. Quite contrary, the use of grounded theory 
obliges to build theory exclusively from empirical data. Accordingly, even a prior 
literature review is suspected to distort a pure perspective (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
p. 13 ff.)). Other scholars within qualitative research criticize this extreme view and 
argue for a more compromising attitude towards prior theorizing, e.g. Corbin and 
Strauss (1990, p. 49 ff.) in a later representation of grounded theory. Alvesson and 
Karreman (2007, p. 1265) deny that a strict separation between theory and empirical 
data is possible in the first place: “Data are inextricably fused with theory”. Yin (2013, 
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p. 37) sees this debate as a defining criterion, where case study theory differs from 
related qualitative approaches such as ethnography or grounded theory. While he 
allows for a broad spectrum of research strategies within case study design, a purely 
inductive strategy is not recommended. Instead, Yin (2013, p. 29 ff.) explicitly suggests 
to pre-develop theoretical propositions before going into data collection.  
 
This research study follows Yin (2013, p. 29 ff.) to connect theory and data. While 
engaging in an inductive research strategy in the empirical work, the author has 
discussed relevant theory in detail (chapters 2-4) and developed preliminary 
theoretical constructs (chapter 5). With regard to the inductive research strategy, Gioia 
et al. (2013) is followed. Gioia et al. (2013) unify an inductive focus with scientific rigor, 
while suggesting some prior theory consultation. Details on this research strategy are 
provided in subsequent chapters on the data analysis.  
6.2.2 Case study design 
Case studies are defined as “rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a 
phenomenon that are typically based on a variety of data sources” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25). As a fundamental difference to scientific experiments, which 
aim at eliminating all contextual interfering factors, case study evidence explicitly 
embraces contextual factors and includes them as part of the object of analysis. Case 
studies represent well-suited research designs for theory development, as theory 
emerging from them is likely to be highly relevant for practitioners due to their empirical 
roots: “Indeed, papers that build theory from cases are often regarded as the most 
interesting research” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Additionally, they tend 
to complement quantitative research well, as theory that is inductively developed 
through case studies can be tested deductively in quantitative studies (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Several case study designs may be distinguished, with each applying for a different 
context. Stake (2010, p. 16) differentiates between intrinsic, instrumental and collective 
case studies. Under his definition, intrinsic case studies are purely descriptive 
comprehensive accounts of a certain incident with no ambition to generalize beyond 
this case. Instrumental case studies, again, deal with one single case, but aim at 
generating deep insights on a particular issue and develop theory from it. Lastly, 
collective case studies compare several cases to elucidate a known problem in more 
detail.  
Yin (2013, p. 49 ff.) distinguishes four basic designs, applying less focus on the 
respective purpose. Generally, he differentiates between single-case designs and 
multiple-case designs. For both categories, holistic and embedded designs exist, 
depending on whether one holistic perspective on the unit of analysis is taken or 
several perspectives are screened. Whereas multiple cases allow to shed more light 
on a known problem by comparing outcomes and dynamics in different settings, Yin 
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(2013, p. 51 ff.) emphasizes different legitimate rationales for single designs. This 
includes a single-case design’s unique ability to study a particular setting in-depth and 
with a longitudinal focus. Therefore, it is particularly well-suited to develop or extend 
theory from it and to justify exclusive access, which researchers might not be granted 
if involved in several comparable settings for a shorter period of time. Siggelkow (2007) 
and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) counter potential doubts with regard to a single-
case designs’ persuasiveness: They point towards the aim of theoretical 
generalization, and not statistical generalization, and emphasize that indeed, theory 
building from case studies is quite objective due to its close adherence to the original 
data.  
 
With regard to the different case study designs, this thesis corresponds to the following: 
Due to my ambition to shed light on in-depth dynamics and to take a detailed 
consideration of contextual, organizational and social factors, I engage in a single-case 
design. In its purpose, it is instrumental in nature, and aims at covering a “typical” 
setting in a large-scale industrial environment of NPD to be able to develop theory 
relevant to a broad range of applications. As will be explained in more detail in chapter 
7, the case concerns the NPD of electrified powertrains at the premises of a large-
scale German automotive manufacturer. I was granted exclusive access to dynamics 
of all levels and on a longitudinal scale. Besides a single-case design, I engage in an 
embedded design, as research questions 2-5 cover a comparative analysis of different 
constraint types.  
 
Regarding the overall structure for the case study report, a linear-analytic structure is 
chosen with elements of theory-building. This choice is justified on grounds of Yin 
(2013, p. 187 f.), who suggests this structure as the preferable guideline to support a 
single-case study’s exploratory nature.  
 
As a conclusion, the case in the thesis at hand follows an instrumental single-case 
embedded design with exclusive access. The next chapter on participant observation 
illustrates how the exclusive access is best used to generate the aspired in-depth 
understanding of the case at hand.  
6.2.3 Participant observation 
In the previous chapter, benefits from the envisaged case study design were outlined, 
which take advantage from an exclusive research site access to understand underlying 
dynamics of the considered case. To exploit these benefits, the researcher needs to 
engage with the case context in an active way, featuring both observant and 
participative traits. Within this spectrum, different forms of participant observation can 
be characterized with respective applications for certain purposes and settings. As 
different roles with varying closeness to the field context require different 
safeguardings to maintain objectivity, the researcher’s role in the field must be reflected 
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upon. In the following, different roles are discussed with respect to their suitability for 
the case study at hand.  
 
Participant observation can be defined as “a field strategy that simultaneously 
combines document analysis, interviewing of respondents and informants, direct 
participation and observation, and introspection” (Denzin, 1989, p. 157-158). Gold’s 
(1958) typology of participant roles in qualitative research comprises four 
manifestations: complete participant, participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, 
and complete observer. Each of the roles has specific advantages and disadvantages, 
with a dominant observant role fostering objectivity, while a dominant participative role 
grants access to otherwise unreachable undistorted data. The latter requires 
relationship building and is time intensive, as study-unrelated tasks need to be 
assumed by the researcher (Flick, 2014, p. 296). According to this study’s focus on 
generating an in-depth understanding including all involved contextual, social and 
organizational factors, a participant-as-observer role is taken.  
 
While this role enables the exploitation of the mentioned benefits and suits the 
epistemological standpoint, actions have to be taken to ensure distance and objectivity 
for empirical sense-making. “Going native” is a term borrowed from ethnography 
research and designates the extreme form of a researcher immersing into a study 
context and identifying completely with the object of analysis. Whereas this allows to 
fathom the object of analysis to a maximum depth, it bears the risk of losing the 
distance required to reflect upon the empirical data and to derive objective theory from 
it. Qualitative research methodology offers different measures to counteract these 
risks, such as taking field notes in frequent intervals and discussing observations with 
other researchers. Both actions force the researcher to take a reflective meta level and 
discuss observations from an objective viewpoint. In the empirical study of this thesis, 
both actions were taken. Field notes were jotted on a daily basis and also used as 
input material for the data analysis (Flick, 2014, p. 323; Yin, 2013, p. 124). Co-
researchers included a team of two graduate students, with whom observations were 
discussed as soon as possible after the incident to compare different perceptions 
thereof.   
6.3 Data collection 
The data collection phase of the study at hand encompasses 1.5 years and includes 
several sources of data, namely semi-structured interviews, direct observation and 
participant-observation. According to Yin (2013, p. 121), the use of multiple sources of 
evidence is neither typical for many research methodologies (see for example 
quantitative research design solely relying on survey data) nor is it necessary for 
qualitative research. However, the use of several data sources strengthens the case 
study’s rigidity, as triangulation between the data sources can be employed to solidify 
result interpretation. All data sources have been integrated in a case study data base. 
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When data points from this base are mentioned throughout this thesis, their index in 
the case study data base is subsequently specified as a reference to the original data.  
In the following, details on each type of data source that is being used for the thesis at 
hand are specified.  
6.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews are frequently applied data sources in qualitative research. It is important to 
note that interviews in qualitative research typically work different to those in survey 
research, following a more liquid stream of conversation as opposed to a more rigid 
answer-and-question discourse in survey research. This enables iterative adaptation 
of the interview to a certain focus that may emerge during the interview, overcoming 
limitations of survey research, but the procedure imposes high requirements on 
preparation and execution on the part of the researcher (Yin, 2013, p. 110 ff.; Flick, 
2014, p. 217 ff.). To this end, the interview approach should be adapted to suit the 
underlying epistemological standpoint. For the research project at hand, following a 
moderate constructivist perspective, the interviewee is expected to have subjective 
knowledge on the object of analysis. This knowledge is subject to certain implicit 
assumptions that need to be discovered and interpreted in context. Thus, it is essential 
to give room to the interviewee’s subjective perspective and individual focus in the 
interview setting. Moreover, situational and social aspects of the interview situation are 
captured likewise, therefore the interview constitutes a complex social setting that 
provides data on many levels besides the verbal statements being made (Alvesson, 
2003).  
 
A semi-structured interview approach, leaving ample room for subjective perspectives 
while adhering to the line of inquiry defined by the central research questions, is 
therefore chosen. For this purpose, a five-page long questionnaire guideline was 
prepared which contains different questions along the central line of inquire based on 
the research questions outlined in chapter 5.3. The questionnaire is composed in 
German language. It translates abstract research topics into language and abstraction 
levels that can be understood by interviewees, who comprise shopfloor workers and 
senior management alike. The questionnaire consists mainly of open questions, 
complemented by a few hypothesis-directed questions, with confrontational questions 
being used throughout the interview where suitable.  
 
In total, 52 interviews were conducted, each lasting between 45 minutes and two 
hours. In the course of the research period, the content focus of the interview evolved. 
While interviews at the beginning of the project feature a dominant focus on research 
question 1, later interviews predominantly focus on research questions 2, 3, 4 and 5, 
albeit always also touching upon fundamental aspects of research question 1. 
Interviews covering research questions 4 in particular encompass a morphological 
analysis performed by the interviewees on the issue of organizational embedding, with 
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details being provided in chapter 7.4.2. Interviews focusing on research questions 2, 3 
and 5 cover different constraint types, respectively. Depending on the professional 
background of the interviewee, one constraint type or several constraint types were 
examined, details of this procedure are provided in chapter 7.4.1.  
In qualitative interviewing, the sampling approach is quite different to statistical 
sampling conducted in quantitative research. While the latter strives for 
representativeness of the total population, sampling in qualitative data collection is 
more theoretical in nature. Theoretical sampling, as it is widely acknowledged in 
pertinent literature, is purposive, critically evaluating parameters to be studied and 
choosing a sample where these are likely to occur (Silverman, 2010, p.144). 
Theoretical sampling applies for the choice of both the case and the interviewees within 
a case and is consistent with the research objective: With theoretical generalization as 
its aim, qualitative research is supposed to follow theoretical sampling. Moreover, it 
supports objectivity: Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) emphasize that a rigid theoretical 
sampling that covers different perspectives by choosing interviewees on different 
functional and hierarchical levels refutes potential accusations of retrospective sense-
making through the researcher.  
 
For the study at hand, due to excellent access to the research site, I was able to 
conduct interviews with participants from six different functions: product design, 
process design, production planning, shopfloor manufacturing, production 
management, purchasing and strategy (details on tasks and responsibilities of these 
roles are provided in chapter 7.1). I was cautious to have different perspectives based 
on periods of employment and hierarchy levels. For the latter, I distinguish between 
low hierarchy with no leadership function, medium hierarchy with group or project 
leader positions, and high hierarchy for senior management levels. Theoretical 
sampling was deliberately extended during the investigation since participants would 
suggest employees that they thought I should talk to. A comprehensive list of all 
interview participants is offered in table 8. 
 
Interviews were anonymously recorded and comprehensively transcribed, if individual 
permission was granted, to ensure accurateness in the representation of participants’ 
statements and narratives. As interviews were held in German language, quotes that 
are represented as data evidence in the thesis at hand had to be translated. The author 
strived to stay as close to the original sentence structure as possible, which may 
account for a rough English language in respective passages.  
 
Qualitative researchers typically also include informal interviews, which occur as 
spontaneous discussions during the researchers’ presence on the field site, as part of 
their interview data. For the study at hand, comparable instances of insightful 
unscheduled discussions are not included among the interviews, but noted as 
participant or direct observation.  
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Table 8: Overview of interview participants 
6.3.2 Direct observation and participant observation 
As mentioned before, I had exclusive access to the field site by participating in a 
doctorate program of the automotive manufacturer in question. This entailed a 
longitudinal presence on the company’s premises, allowing to experience the 
dynamics at the object of research from within. This particular research access made 
both participant and direct observation possible on an extensive scale during the data 
collection phase of 1.5 years, of which 80% was spent on the OEM’s premises. In 
addition to that, two graduate students supported the data collection phase, each 
Overview of interview data
Department Quantity Hierarchy
Period of
employment
(years)
Product design 3 employees
3 employees
1 employee
1 employee
Low
Low
Low
High
0 – 3 
4 – 10 
10+ 
10+ 
Process design 3 employees
2 employees
2 employees
Low 
Medium
High
0 – 3 
0 – 3 
4 – 10
Production
planning
1 employee
5 employees
3 employees
1 employee
Low
Low
Medium
Low
0 – 3 
4 – 10 
4 – 10 
10+
Shop floor
manufacturing
2 employees
3 employees
Low
Medium
4 – 10 
10+
Production
management
2 employees
5 employees
2 employees
5 employees
5 employees
1 employee
Low
Low
Medium
Low
Medium
High
0 – 3
4 – 10   
4 – 10 
4 – 10
10+
10+
Other 1 employee
1 employee
Low
Medium
10+ 
10+ 
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spending 6 months on the research site and contributing likewise to both direct and 
participant observation. 
 
With regard to participant observation, I assumed tasks of industrial engineering for 
NPD of electrified engines and high-voltage batteries, which allowed for work contacts 
and relationship building with product and process design, production planning and 
management as well as shopfloor manufacturing. Insightful observations that were 
made during meetings, workshops or informal discussions related to this work, were 
jotted down on field notes as soon as possible after they occurred, with formats 
varying, including paper sheet scribbles and electronic notes. During the roughly 20% 
of days that were not spent on the field site, these field notes were transformed to short 
anonymous reports as preparation for data analysis. In total, 129 such reports were 
collected over data collection.  
 
Whereas data from participant observation emerged from occurrences related to the 
participative tasks of the author, data from direct observation was generated when an 
insightful observation could be made from discussions where the author was not 
actively involved. This includes a broad range of different situations, ranging from 
observations of office sites and floor talk up to work clothing. Similarly to participant 
observations, these direct observations were written down as soon as possible after 
their occurrence and later transferred to processible reports. In total, reports were 
generated for 47 instances.  
6.4 Data analysis 
For qualitative researchers, the analysis and interpretation of data is at the core of the 
empirical procedure and cannot be separated from the data collection phase. Instead, 
a recursive approach is followed where theory pieces emerging from the data analysis 
are reintroduced into data collection to be further developed or discarded. The actual 
process of qualitative data analysis can be described as an iterative building of 
categorizations, from which theory eventually emerges (Flick, 2014, p. 373).  
 
The analysis of data from all above mentioned sources followed established 
techniques and procedures for qualitative research. From a methodological viewpoint, 
the approach of Gioia et al. (2013) is followed for data analysis. From a technical 
viewpoint, Atlas.ti was employed, a renowned qualitative research software, to 
document data coding and support data analysis. In the following, both viewpoints will 
be elaborated in more detail.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Gioia et al. (2013) provide a qualitative research strategy that 
combines an inductive approach, well-suited for exploration and theory development, 
with scientific rigor. First conceived in Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), the method was 
refined through subsequent studies. Albeit building on methodological fundamentals 
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of Corbin and Strauss (1990) and Glaser and Strauss (1967), both seminal 
groundworks for grounded theory, Gioia et al. (2013) do not outrightly reject a prior 
consultation of literature. Instead, they recommend to use existent theory to bring to 
light potential gaps and invalidities. From an epistemological perspective, Gioia et al. 
(2013) see the organizational world as socially constructed and the people that 
construct it from within as knowledgeable agents, who can explain their actions and 
motives. Consequently, the role of the researchers is to excavate and describe these 
constructs by staying close to the informants and follow their terms and perspectives. 
Their research style of “getting in there and getting your hands dirty” (Gioia et al., 2013, 
p. 19) suits the research objective of this study very well, as it supports the ambition 
for a deep understanding of underlying dynamics and a careful consideration of 
situational aspects.  
Gioia et al. (2013) explicitly discourage from using their approach as a “cook book“ 
method. Instead, the individual researcher is advised to apply recursivity to adapt and 
innovate the methodology according to the research context. This includes a flexible 
interview style with continuous focus readjustments during the data collection phase 
as well as a release from the typical qualitative data structure box-and-arrow form, as 
long as this can be justified by the research context.  
 
For data analysis, Gioia et al. (2013) follow Corbin and Strauss’ (1990, p. 153 ff.) 
staged coding process which represents an established technique for qualitative 
inquiry. In a first review of data, topics and motives, called first order concepts or codes, 
are attached to sentences, statements or words. This first review is called open coding, 
as the list of applied codes is continuously enlarged by new concepts, sticking relatively 
closely to the original wording in the data. In a second review of the data and the 
attached first order concepts (axial coding), categories and initial cause-effect 
relationships are formed, called second-order themes. A third review (selective coding) 
raises the abstraction level from a descriptive to an interpretative level. Herein, 
aggregate dimensions are formed from different categories that epitomize central lines 
of interpretation and serve as basis for the development of a theory model (Gioia et 
al., 2013; Dacin et al., 2010).  
 
For the empirical study at hand, the comprehensive set of data from interviews, 
participant observation and direct observation is available in written form through the 
transcription of interviews and preparation of field notes as described above. These 
written accounts were loaded into Atlas.ti for the analysis. As a first step, groups were 
built to assign data points based on source, constraint type, research questions and 
involved interfaces. Data, be it interview transcriptions or field note reports, underwent 
continuous open coding, simultaneously with ongoing data collection. The evolving 
code system was reworked and sorted on a regular basis to avoid duplications and to 
adjust for new lines of inquiry in the data collection. This was supported by regular 
discussions of the code system in the research team. To this end, parts of the data 
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were cross-coded individually by different researchers to ensure best possible 
objectivity of the coding process.  
In the first step of the analysis, collected data was coded on the basis of first order 
concepts, which included, for instance, prejudices of one functional area on another 
one, conflict topics between certain interfaces or success factors for cross-functional 
integration. In addition to these content-related concepts, support codes were attached 
to mark a certain interface, a research question that is discussed in the coded passage 
or a constraint type or constraint scenario, to name a few examples. In total, 524 first 
order concepts were applied to 2244 coded passages in the entire data set. Compared 
to other qualitative research efforts, this forms an extensive data set. 
In a second step of the analysis, I looked for codes across the data that could be 
grouped into higher-level nodes. As an example, first order concepts like “Bridging 
functions don’t live challenging role”, “Downstream functions react with cynicism” and 
“Only targets force downstream functions to the table” were aggregated in the second-
order theme of “Downstream functions avoid conflicts”. The third step of my analysis 
focused on organizing second-order themes into distinct clusters that represent 
aggregate dimensions underpinning theory building. As alluded to above, this was a 
recursive rather than a linear process. In memos, I noted potential interpretation 
patterns that would be a basis for an aggregated dimension, with subsequently 
changing or eliminating such a pattern when I asked informants during ongoing data 
collection about it and they would refute my interpretation. In addition to that, I learned 
that informants at the research site tend to have a specific linguistic use of certain 
expressions, with meanings that are different from or have different connotations than 
in normal usage. It took some time to fully understand this codified language, and in a 
recursive way I had to rework a number of codified passages.  
6.5 Quality criteria 
Quantitative research methodologies have agreed-upon and easily measurable criteria 
to determine their quality and reliability, for instance the calculated significance level. 
For qualitative researchers it is more difficult to prove the significance or quality of an 
empirical study: It is in the nature of things that qualitative data does not easily allow 
for quantitative measures. Even more so, the interpretation of data requires to take 
subjective perspectives to be able to reflect upon the individual participants’ 
perspective and to account for social aspects; proving the objectivity of results is 
accordingly challenging. Moreover, due to recursivity requirements inherent in 
qualitative methodology, there is no “boilerplate” for how qualitative research is done 
correctly to generate reliable results.  
Nevertheless, research agrees that it is essential to find and apply criteria for 
qualitative rigor. Gibbert et al. (2008) complement that indeed, methodological rigor 
might be even more important for qualitative research, as it is often used to develop 
theory which is subsequently affirmed quantitatively.  
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While researchers agree on the need for such criteria, they often disagree about which 
criteria are the right ones. Naturally, different epistemological backgrounds would 
suggest different criteria, criteria that follow an empiricist tradition are therefore highly 
debated (see for example Tracy, 2010). Even so, criteria sets building on traditionally 
empiricist indicators find broad acceptance in qualitative research. Yin (2013, p. 45 ff.) 
adapts construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability to fit qualitative 
research. As another example, Flick (2014; p. 479 ff.) proposes selective 
plausibilization, reliability, procedural reliability and validity. For their wide acceptance, 
this thesis follows Yin’s (2013, p. 45 ff.) criteria and discusses them subsequently.  
 
To begin with, construct validity considers the correctness of operational measures for 
the studied concepts. It tests if the study indeed investigates what it claims to 
investigate. Naturally, this is particularly challenging for qualitative research, as one of 
the explicit advantages is openness towards a broad range of measures and aspects 
of the concept being studied (Gibbert et al., 2008). According to Yin (2013, p. 46), 
construct validity is mostly determined during data collection and can be ensured by 
corresponding to design principles as follows: Using multiple sources of evidence and 
establishing a clear chain of evidence from research questions over questionnaires 
and citations up to result interpretations.  
The empirical study at hand strives for construct validity by using three different data 
sources that feature a broad range of functional and hierarchical perspectives of 
involved participants. Furthermore, transparency in the chain of evidence is fostered 
by providing relevant citations for each result interpretation and connecting them to 
initial research questions and lines of inquiry from the interviews.  
 
Internal validity tests the logical validity of the relationship between results and 
variables, inquiring the plausibility of the argument and eliminating spurious 
explanations. Internal validity is of highest concern during data analysis, as cause-
effect relationships are built and substantiated during this phase. To account for 
matters of internal validity, several research tactics may be applied. Rigorous pattern 
matching and explanation building make emerging relationships visible and 
comprehensible. Logic models are a suitable graphic representation to enhance this 
visibility. In addition to that, proactively addressing rival explanations helps solidifying 
internal validity. The research study at hand strives for a comprehensible derivation of 
interpretation and theory, which helps to achieve internal validity. For example, 
dynamics of cross-functional integration that are integrated in a theory model are 
deduced from the emerging data structure which can be traced back to the citation 
level. Logic models are employed when cause-effect relationships are derived. Finally, 
the limitations chapter at the end of this thesis offers a range of alternative explanations 
to the observations that have been made in the course of the case study. 
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External validity takes account for the generalizability of results and has to be ensured 
in the initial research design. As explained above, for qualitative case studies this does 
not refer to statistical generalizability in an empiricist sense. Instead, it focusses on 
whether expected results are interesting and insightful enough to provide a basis for 
analytic generalization, hence as a basis for the development of theory. While research 
questions that point towards purely descriptive results are less suitable for analytic 
generalization, how- and why-questions on a certain occurrence or relationship are 
well-suited to this end. According to Yin (2013, p. 48), a rigorous review of existent 
literature to find gaps or invalidities is a suitable research tactic to ensure external 
validity.  
In the empirical study at hand, the author followed the latter by providing a detailed 
discussion of related theory and pertinent shortcomings. Second, this study’s research 
objective, represented in the research questions, is focused on revealing dynamics 
and building theory for a new method.  
 
Lastly, reliability analyses whether subsequent researchers would achieve the same 
result when repeating the study. Therefore, it is concerned with issues of operational 
transparency and replicability, minimizing errors and biases in the empirical study. For 
Yin (2013, p. 48), reliability is, at its core, an issue of documentation during data 
collection: If the circumstances of data collection, the data itself and the inferences that 
are drawn from it are seamlessly documented, reliability is well ensured.  
Therefore, the case study at hand strives to demonstrate reliability by a rigorous 
documentation of its data, with interviews being transcribed and field notes being jotted 
down right after the occurrence of insightful situations. An extensive amount of original 
data is presented interwoven with interpretations in the case study.  
6.6 Suitability of the empirical setting for case study research 
The empirical field site for the study at hand is a large-scale industrial automotive 
manufacturer, which is designated by the pseudonym CarCo henceforth. The choice 
of not disclosing the identity of the case study subjects, neither the company nor names 
of individuals, has been weighed out based on guidelines provided by Yin (2013, p. 
197): As treated topics include sensitive opinions on the corporate climate as well as 
individual departments’ or managers’ behaviour, disclosure may affect future actions 
of the participants. Therefore, anonymity is necessary for reporting the case study. 
Second, as the study strives to present evidence on a “typical” case, disclosure of 
identity is not essential for readers’ comprehension of the matter, as the case is chosen 
to be representative for similar cases. Third, ensuring anonymity towards participants 
of interviews is likely to increase the revelatory power and validity of the provided data, 
as participants can openly present their opinion without dreading consequences 
thereof (Yin, 2013, p. 197).  
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The CarCo case of new product development of electrified powertrains is suitable for 
the research project at hand for two major reasons that are elaborated upon as follows: 
It represents a typical case for large-scale industrial cross-functional NPD, and likewise 
it includes a series of challenges that are both interesting and typical for this kind of 
corporate setting.  
 
To begin with, CarCo’s corporate setting is representative for other large-scale 
industrial organizations: The functional orientation in process and hierarchical 
organization, covering research & development, production, sales, procurement and 
support functions, is likely to be encountered in a majority of large-scale industrial 
settings. In addition to that, CarCo utilizes a typical stage-gated NPD process 
comparable to other corporate settings. Further challenges for cross-functional 
integration, such as spatial distance between some functions due to the existence of 
multiple sites, and significant involvement of suppliers due to low value-added depth 
are common features of most large-scale industrial settings, too. Lastly, CarCo is 
neither a border case for its innovativeness nor for its lack of innovativeness: While 
participating in many innovative activities, CarCo is a mature company with stable 
processes, thus offering a typical large-scale industrial NPD setting.  
 
On the other hand, CarCo faces significant challenges for future success: Whereas 
many of its innovations of the last decades were more incremental in nature, the 
development and industrialization of large-volume electrified powertrain car concepts 
requires a higher ambition level with regard to product disruptiveness. Furthermore, 
volumes for electrified cars are less easy to predict and more volatile than combustion 
powertrains, posing additional flexibility requirements to the slow-moving and 
formalized NPD process. In addition to that, the NPD process is under pressure to be 
reduced in length due to external market pressure from customers, regulation and 
newly emerged competitors. With product complexity already being high today, rising 
customer requirements on saturated markets and shorter product life cycles are likely 
to make the product even more complex and multi-variant in the near future.   
While these challenges might have an interesting impact on cross-functional 
integration, they are likely to be similar for all large-scale industrial settings. Therefore, 
CarCo represents a typical company with typical challenges for manufacturing 
companies at the edge of the digitization age.  
 
As already mentioned above, the exclusive access to the research site further 
increases attractiveness for case study research with the mentioned research 
objectives. For innovative products in particular, large-scale mature companies are 
naturally reluctant to give deep insights into their corporate dynamics. The author’s 
membership in CarCo’s doctorate program thus provides an outstanding opportunity 
for research. Granting anonymity to CarCo and all involved participants is expected to 
further increase truthfulness and reliability of the empirical data.  
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7 Results of the empirical study 
7.1 The empirical setting 
7.1.1 A challenging environment  
Headquartered in Germany, CarCo operates on a global scale covering development, 
production, sales and aftersales of cars to a worldwide customer base. The company 
is an incumbent representative of its industry, looking back on several decades of 
operations. Consequently, both the hierarchical and the process organization is 
characterized by maturity, while undergoing constant incremental change to adapt to 
market circumstances. CarCo covers large parts of the automotive value chain, 
engaging in all functional areas from pre-development to aftersales at several sites 
worldwide. Similar to other large-scale industrial companies, CarCo has a strong 
functional organization, with board members representing their functional domain and 
all subordinated hierarchical levels sticking to this strict functional separation. Cross-
functional organizations, e.g. to represent a product perspective, exist as an additional 
organizational layer, but are restricted to dotted-line responsibilities without disciplinary 
lead.  
The product portfolio is dominated by cars in premium market segments and focused 
on combustion engines. CarCo participated in several technological advancements in 
the automotive industry throughout the years, often assuming a leadership role for both 
product and process innovation within the industry.  
 
Global macro trends in the realm of environmental protection, resulting regulatory 
requirements and urbanization exert pressure on automotive manufacturers to 
increase the share of electrified cars in their product portfolio. The emerging market 
for electrified mobility gives rise to new entrants, partially due to lower barriers of entry 
for electrified powertrains as compared to combustion powertrains. This increases 
innovation pressure for incumbents to reduce development time and to augment the 
customer benefit with inventive product features. With product and process complexity 
experiencing an ongoing rise, the mature new product development organization faces 
growing challenges.  
 
Electrified powertrains consist of two major components: electrified engines and high-
voltage batteries. While the fundamental technological concepts of both components 
have been known and employed for decades, their adaptation for powerful automotive 
applications with corresponding durability and range requires NPD efforts on a 
significant scale, with both product and process innovation necessary to allow for 
series production.  
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For CarCo’s electrified powertrain NPD, the time period during which the author 
engaged in research on the field site is particularly critical. A first generation of 
electrified powertrains has been developed a few years ago and is currently still 
manufactured in small volume production. However, both product concept and process 
concept are not suitable for expected high volumes in the near future. Therefore, an 
entirely new product concept has to be developed, with all resulting consequences on 
manufacturing, such as the build-up of entire new plants with new production concepts. 
The research period covers the time before and after target agreement for this 
generation, which is one of the most critical phases in NPD as will be explained in the 
next subchapter.  
7.1.2 New product development of electrified powertrains 
The new product development process of CarCo follows a complex stage-gated 
structure typical for large-scale industrial corporations. Details on involved 
stakeholders and actions taken in each stage are described in the following.  
 
The product development process consists of four phases with intermittent stage-gates 
stretched along a total duration of roughly five years. The first phase, called strategy 
phase, is concerned with feasibility concerns and provides as output an operational 
framework from a strategic perspective. Stakeholders of this phase are mostly 
corporate and product strategy representatives, with high-level representatives from 
product design, procurement, production and sales involved for feasibility inquiries. In 
addition to that, an approximate product design concept and financial target area is 
developed.  
When a project reaches confirmation after strategy phase, the subsequent initial phase 
is commenced. During this phase, product design develops the objective framework 
and requirements for product design are formulated. In addition to that, concerns of 
modular product design are taken account of: Quite typically for large-scale industrial 
environments, complex products with innumerable components are developed as 
product families with a maximum share of communal parts to increase design 
efficiency and reduce the number of variants. In the initial phase, it is decided on which 
product platform the new product may be established and which communal parts may 
be shared. Involved stakeholders consist of strategy representatives and product 
design specialists.  
With the beginning of the next phase, denominated product concept phase, the 
operational development process begins. Product designers launch the actual design 
process by creating first CAD models and formulating technological requirements that 
may or may not require further innovation activities. Product costs are projected based 
on material costs and estimations for purchased parts on side of the procurement 
function. Likewise, process designers join the development activities to derive process 
innovation requirements and reflect process feasibility for envisaged innovative 
product features. Towards the end of the product development phase, when the first 
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CAD models and bills of material are compiled, production planning comes on board. 
Their main task is to estimate projective production costs based on the developed 
product design. This is necessary, as the end of the product concept phase entails one 
of the most important stage-gates, the target agreement (three to four years before 
start of production). During target agreement, projected costs for the serial product are 
summarized, including material costs, purchase part costs and production costs. In 
accordance with a catalogue of product design features, these costs are fixed. This 
means, that after the start of serial production, functional partners will only receive 
compensation for costs in the amount that had been settled during target agreement. 
For instance, production plants responsible for serial production will receive a fixed 
amount of money for each produced product, which is fixed the in target agreement. If 
production cost projections are insufficient, production plants will have to bear financial 
losses during serial production. As a consequence, changes in product design are 
difficult to attain after target agreement, as cost impacts of such design changes are 
required to undergo a complicated approval process after the target agreement.  
The last phase of new product development is also the longest one: From target 
agreement to start of production, series development takes place with intermittent 
stage-gate milestones for different maturity levels of series development. All details of 
product and process design are developed and tested, with hardware prototypes being 
produced and virtual feasibility assessments taking place. Product design still takes 
the lead in series development, but functional stakeholders from production planning 
become increasingly involved to plan the manufacturing process and to buy required 
production equipment. One year before start of production, manufacturing is assigned 
to the NPD process, as the production facilities are built and ramped-up. As 
manufacturing formally takes over the production facilities from production planning 
around the start of production, this leads to an intensified phase of coordination and 
adjustments at the end of series development.  
The NPD process is formally concluded with start of production.  
7.1.3 Involved stakeholders during new product development of electrified 
powertrains 
A detailed overview of all stakeholders from involved functional areas in the new 
product development process as described above is provided in the following.  
Figure 25 offers a graphical illustration of the most important interfaces as well as how 
they are connected in CarCo’s hierarchical organization. This is in so far interesting, 
as CarCo’s hierarchical organization of functional areas deviates from the typical 
structure offered in mainstream literature (see for example Albach’s (1994, p. 206) 
division of process and product development from production functions). Similar to the 
NPD process itself, however, the division of functions and their respective roles 
correspond to other large-scale automotive manufacturers, reaffirming the typicality of 
the case to be examined. 
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Product design, as the formally dominating stakeholder within NPD and as an essential 
part of the R&D department, takes care of technological conception, product 
innovation, construction and functional design testing. The overall product design 
process is performed in-house, albeit formal design of subcomponents is frequently 
outsourced to design service providers after having been drafted as technological 
concept in-house. Product designers are required to fulfil product requirements from 
an extensive specification sheet that is defined by the product strategy team (formally 
part of the R&D department as well). These requirements sheets contain mostly 
product-related specifications, as well as requirements to ensure communality with 
related products and processes on the same vehicle platform. Due to typically high 
shares of purchase parts (~80% of all parts in the car), product design also needs to 
consider inputs from procurement. They are incentivized to do so, as product design 
assumes formal responsibility for material costs which include procurement costs of 
purchase parts. In later phases of the design process, production planning and process 
design likewise interact with product design to demand process-related requirements. 
 
Illustration 25: Involved interfaces in CarCo's new product development 
Process design is accountable for process-related innovations, trials of new production 
technologies and the building of product prototypes. To the largest part, process design 
reacts to requirements emerging from product design; proposing process innovations 
independent from product requirements would be an exception. Consequently, product 
design is their most important input provider. During series development, interactions 
with production planning are manifold. At CarCo, process design’s different tasks are 
divided between different functions, with prototyping and process innovations assigned 
to one functional unit and the early conception of the process design being integrated 
with production planning. Organizationally, all process design units belong to CarCo’s 
production department, which differs from the functional division taken in literature. 
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Production planning, entering the NPD process shortly before target agreement, is 
responsible for the realization of the manufacturing facility. This includes in parts tasks 
of process design, but mostly is concerned with defining specifications for plant 
engineering suppliers, calling those for tender and accompanying construction and 
ramp-up of the production facility. Production planning likewise includes process 
technology specialists, who establish and adjust production facilities’ control 
engineering. Production planning is held responsible for manufacturing costs that are 
agreed upon in target agreement. Consequently, large parts of their daily business 
consists of projecting and detail-planning plant and labour costs related to 
manufacturing. In early phases of their engagement in NPD, production planning has 
its most important interfaces to product design and process design, while later phases 
require frequent interactions with manufacturing. Throughout their engagement, 
production planning works together with different stakeholders from production 
management as well.  
 
Manufacturing operates the production facilities from start of production onwards and 
is held responsible for all production matters, be it quality or costs. For each produced 
part they receive the financial amount that has been agreed upon in target agreement 
and they administer, expense or cover those in their own responsibility. Production 
management provides several supporting functions for them, be it controlling, quality 
management or industrial engineering. In principle, they are the operators of 
production facilities, but for larger changes or disruptions in the production process 
manufacturing may call on production planning for support. Formally, they enter the 
NPD process at the last stage to prepare take-over of production facilities from 
production planning.  
 
Production Management offers support functions with the production department for 
series manufacturing and activities in NPD. They are endowed with a checks-and-
balances-role within manufacturing and supervise controlling, quality management, 
industrial engineering and lean production consulting matters.  
 
Procurement takes accountability for all purchase parts during NPD and series 
production. This includes supplier selection, price negotiations, supplier administration 
and the purchase-related quality and supply management. As purchase prices 
determine large parts of material costs, product design is the most important interface 
to procurement during NPD. Likewise, procurement has a role during process 
enablement and therefore maintains interactions with process design as well.  
Procurement is part of neither design nor manufacturing, which are interface functions 
central to this study. Therefore, the interface of procurement to design and 
manufacturing functional areas is not explicitly analysed. Nevertheless, procurement 
as a functional division is included in the broader scope of the case setting description. 
This is because procurement’s influence on the design-manufacturing interfaces 
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appears repeatedly in the case study data, and thus cannot be excluded in the study’s 
analytic scope.   
 
With regard to spatial distance between the different functions of electrified powertrain 
NPD, three major locations are relevant. At the headquarters, product design, process 
design, procurement and large parts of production management and production 
planning are located. In total, there are two manufacturing plants, both located roughly 
an hour drive from the headquarters. Parts of production planning and production 
management are situated at the manufacturing plants as well. 
 
At CarCo, employees that are actively involved in the manufacturing process on the 
shopfloor are denominated direct functions, whereas others are summarized as 
indirect functions. Following this classification, manufacturing as described above is a 
direct function, with all others being counted as indirect functions.  
 
The description of functional divisions in the empirical case shows that there are many 
more functional representatives of both manufacturing and design than just these two. 
With context sensitivity being of particular importance for the study at hand, the author 
chooses to embrace this complexity in the empirical analysis.  
Therefore, interfaces between the mentioned functions are analysed in the fanned out 
structure provided by the empirical case, instead of summarizing them to reflect 
literature’s simpler division into design and manufacturing. In order to be able to derive 
theory from the empirical findings, the manifold empirical interfaces will be transferred 
to the single design-manufacturing interface in the respective final parts of this study. 
Illustration 26 provides an outline of all empirically analysed interfaces, and how they 
will be allocated to the literature-based design-manufacturing interface. For this 
purpose, two interface types are distinguished. The first type refers to interfaces 
between design and manufacturing, the second type refers to interfaces that are 
between functional areas within design or within manufacturing. While not being in 
focus for the study at hand, the latter type is nevertheless integrated within the 
analytical scope to account for any impacts that those might have on neighbouring 
manufacturing-design interfaces. In total, ten interfaces are in scope of the analysis; 
four of them being within design or manufacturing, respectively.  
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Illustration 26: Design-Manufacturing interfaces in empirical case and literature 
7.2 Coopetition at the design-manufacturing interface  
The current state of integration at the design-manufacturing interface of NPD at the 
empirical case was analysed by applying a coopetition perspective at the respective 
interface. Illustrations 27, 32 and 35 depict the data structure of the findings for each 
coopetition dimension, namely cooperative intensity, cooperative ability and 
competition. Eight aggregate dimensions have emerged in total for all three coopetition 
dimensions. Likewise, their constituent second-order themes are presented, as well as 
the first-order concepts that led to the themes’ formation.  
 
Tables 13, 14, and 15 (in the appendix) provide representative data from interviews 
and participative observation. The findings are discussed in a descriptive narrative 
covering all first-order concepts along coopetition dimensions and their respective 
main dimensions, including additional original data in the following.  
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7.2.1 Cooperative intensity 
 
Illustration 27: Data structure - Cooperative intensity 
7.2.1.1 Informal and formal relations 
High communication intensity at adjacent interfaces 
At CarCo, communication plays a vital role. Lively omnipresent open-plan offices, in 
which private and professional discussions are hosted and a ritualized coffee-drinking 
culture are visual signs thereof. Spatial closeness between all functions except 
manufacturing facilitates personal communication, the general rule is to pursue a 
meeting in person, rather than a phone call, rather than an email. In almost all meeting 
invitations, a Skype conference invitation is attached, such that the invitee may 
participate at least via telephone if personal attendance is not possible. All of these 
may cater to a cross-functionally open cooperative intensity. When looking in depth at 
1st order concepts
Cooperative intensity
2nd order themes Aggregate dimensions
1.Communication intensity at bilateral interfaces
2.Strong informal relations at bilateral interfaces
3.Manufacturing involvement only via interface cascade
(a) High 
communication 
intensity at adjacent 
interfaces
4. Individual effectiveness dependent on informal relations
5. Informal relations as success factor for integrated NPD
6.Reciprocity of relations and actions
(b) Importance of 
informal relations
7.Bureaucracy and formal alignment hinder integration
8.Homemade structural complexity
9.Little trust in own formal committees
(c) Perceived 
inefficiency of formal 
relations
10.Late involvement of manufacturing and representatives
11.Manufacturability inputs rejected due to late raising
12.Manufacturing involvement either too late or too early
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of manufacturing
13.Confusion on cross-functional channels and contacts 
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14.Ideas for manufacturability improvements get lost in 
the process of addressing them 
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contents
15.Discussion topics focused on series problems
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17.Unpleasant topics in upstream communication
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focused on series 
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communication patterns at CarCo, however, the data reveals that cooperative intensity 
is indeed high, but mostly focused on adjacent functional interfaces. Illustration 28 plots 
communication relationships based on their mentioning in interview and participant 
observation data.  
 
Illustration 28: Cross-functional communication patterns 
Communication intensity is the highest between adjacent functions in NPD, such as 
between product design and process design, while overarching communication 
between distant functions such as production management and product design is rare. 
A production management employee reported on his relations with product design: 
“They didn’t know anything from me, they didn’t even know I was there” (156:6), and a 
manufacturing employee stating “Actually, the process designer should be on the 
shopfloor for one day every week, just to be close and effective. I never see him here 
at the plant, I did not see him once” (178:9). Between adjacent functions, cooperative 
intensity is high, for example between product design and process design: “I think 
people look with jealousy on us, how well cooperation works” (170:2).  
 
With regard to informal relations, a similar picture evolves: “I don’t think there’s any 
product designer who knows someone from manufacturing” (168:2). Likewise, informal 
relations at adjacent interfaces are strongest. A production planner who had previously 
been part of the process design team, explained: “Between process design and 
product design, the connection is closer. When I was in process design, we often 
watched football together or went to the product designers’ barbecues” (82:66). An 
incidence at the lunch break of an integration workshop between different functions 
involved in NPD suggests a similar conclusion. While having discussed and interacted 
for four hours before, product designers, representatives of production planning and 
manufacturing did not eat together but separate from each other (7:2). In addition to 
that, there are few cross-functional workshops similar to the described one. Most of 
the team events or workshops take place with a function-internal participant group, 
Process
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Design
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indeed not even with functionally related groups, but mostly within the smallest 
organizational unit.  
As a visual representation of this interaction, illustration 29 sketches informal 
relationships based on their mentioning frequency in the case study data base. Clearly, 
the appearance of an interface cascade, leading down- and upstream via adjacent 
interfaces, is restated.  
 
Illustration 29: Cross-functional informal relationships 
In this nexus of informal relationships, manufacturing is to a certain extent decoupled 
from the functions most profoundly involved in the NPD process, namely product 
design, process design and production planning: “That’s what I meant with the cascade 
product design – process design - production planning – manufacturing. Production 
planning and process planning are really close. But process planning to manufacturing, 
there is a step in between” (82:69). Manufacturing seems to be only indirectly involved 
via the - often quite long – interface cascade: “No, that’s the production planners, not 
the manufacturing guys, with them it’s only indirect, it’s always via the planners. Here, 
the chain from the foreman or worker to the product designer is really long. Really, 
really long” (141:17). A representative from manufacturing put his view of 
consequences thereof in a Chinese-whispers-game analogy, with different information 
getting lost in the process of transmitting: “There are so many filters in between, and 
now and then they filter away some things” (154:42).  
Importance of informal relations 
“You bring this to work via processes. CarCo is simply built as a networking 
association, everything works via people” (160:10). Informal relations are of essential 
importance at CarCo: This is valid in particular for innovative products such as the new 
product generation of electrified powertrains, because confidentiality levels are high 
and information transfer across functions is restrictive. Furthermore, “network is much 
more important [in NPD than in series production, author’s note], because much in the 
early development phase works by acclamation and the work is divided among few 
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people […]. The first thing my predecessor did to train me on this job was to meet up 
with all the people he knew, and that was the best thing you could do” (148:4).  
 
Individual effectiveness is highly dependent on the individual asset base of informal 
relationships. On the question, which function would typically emerge as the winner of 
a discussion, a production manager answered: “On one hand, the person with the best 
competence. On the other hand, it’s rather going to be the person with the best 
network. In the optimum case, he has both” (126:34). This is valid especially for a 
cross-functional context. A process analysis, on how manufacturing requirements go 
into product design, revealed corresponding insights: Depending on how well an 
individual knows the product designer, his/her requirement goes directly into the 
product design team or has to take several detours on the official channel via other 
functions, e.g. production planning or the management hierarchy of the own function 
(108:1). Informal relations seem to form the glue on which cross-functional integration 
works or doesn’t work. A manufacturing manager explained difficulties in integration 
between product design and manufacturing: “Because the group leaders don’t know 
each other […]. This is simply a networking issue. If I don’t know you, I don’t call you. 
And I need faces with it. We are humans, we work by network” (145:10). Reciprocity 
is an evident aspect that comes with the strong focus on informal relations: “The 
principle of one hand washes the other is valid” (147:57). 
 
Ties created by informal relations go beyond the ease of integration that spatial 
distance offers. In CarCo’s shared office building, common rooms between production 
management and product design are not used together, presumably based on few 
informal relations between the two functions. They are always someone’s “terrain”. For 
example, there is a spacious roof top balcony in the shared building of production 
management and product design, but production management would not use it 
because it’s next to a product design office. 
Perceived inefficiency of formal relations 
The typical work week at CarCo is structured around formal meetings. A weekly 
committee scheme is followed closely, with information cascading hierarchically 
downwards from the beginning to the end of the week. However, strict adherence to 
this schedule entails employees’ perception of inefficiency. Formal corporate 
structures are perceived as homemade, as other corporate examples show that less 
bureaucracy could be possible. “We have a problem with bureaucracy at CarCo” 
(159:6). “Somehow, the focus on what’s important is totally concealed here. I don’t 
know why that is, but that focus on what’s important - I don’t know, it’s because we are 
in such corporate structures. I was an intern in 2013, and back then [the CarCo CEO, 
author’s note] wrote an email where he said, we have to improve our interfaces. Back 
then, in my department, assembly production planning, no one understood that. Which 
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interfaces does he mean, they asked, but probably exactly those interfaces that make 
everything so complex. But I actually don’t think it’s so complex” (181:8). 
 
Decision-making at CarCo is performed in committees and strongly consensus-driven. 
As a result, the progress of NPD projects is dependent on formal committee agendas. 
“Without having understood the entire committee landscape to any extent, what we 
have as committee, and preparing committee, and another preparing committee […] 
Until the run through the committees is finished, half a year is over. I think there’s too 
much time frittered away here.” (178:31). Trust in the decision-making competence of 
these formal committees is limited, one comment on project leadership committee is 
insightful to this respect. “They don’t know the real topics, maybe know the status, 
green, yellow or red, for which you could perhaps as well just roll the dice, it would 
maybe be closer to reality than what is reported. In my opinion, there’s much politics 
in all of that.” (181:15). Furthermore, decision-making authority of formal committees 
is questioned: “Our steering committees are a bit too weak, they don’t succeed in what 
they’re supposed to do, namely to make decisions that are valid. And on the other hand 
[…], we notice every now and then that decisions, when they are finally taken, are just 
not accepted” (127:7).  
 
Indeed, complex formal committee structures are seemingly taken ad absurdum 
through the parallel existence of “shadow committees”. If formal committees don’t 
reach consensus, the opinion of such shadow committees is followed to allow projects 
to continue their work. “There is the [names a committee, author’s note], that’s in fact 
a discussion platform. All of these do not actually have decision-making authority, 
nevertheless things are discussed there and directions of impact are determined there, 
and thus the corporation in fact follows these results” (148:9). 
 
Illustration 30 depicts the perceived efficiency of formal committees, both functional 
and cross-functional ones, based on their mentioning frequency in the case study data 
base. Astonishingly, cross-functional committees are perceived as inefficient less often 
and more decisive than their functional representatives. Cross-functional committees, 
however, are perceived to be conflict-avoiding, which is a point that will find further 
confirmation in the discussion of the competition dimension of cross-functional 
coopetition at a later point in this thesis.  
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Illustration 30: Perceived efficiency of formal committees 
Late involvement of manufacturing 
When examining each function’s coopetitive intensity in dependence of different NPD, 
one evidence is strikingly prevailing: Manufacturing is involved late in the process. “At 
the beginning, in the initial phase, manufacturing is very far away, at most they know 
that there is a project at all - if they’re lucky” (155:1). Naturally, this entails difficulties 
of voicing manufacturability requirements: “It’s crazy what we do, we have our time line 
and manufacturing representatives get on around 38 months before SOP - although 
the entire phase takes 72 months. So, the ship to take impact has already departed, 
and only then we get on with the entire team” (158:43). The result is that functions 
more upstream in the NPD process have profound freedom without contradiction from 
manufacturing, who eventually has to live with the result. “I think we can almost say 
that at the moment, we could pass on to manufacturing whatever we design. Whatever 
we happen to come up with […]. The manufacturer doesn’t have anything to say in 
NPD” (181:10). 
 
Several aspects account for a late involvement of manufacturing remaining without 
significant levers to impact product or process design. First, retrospective 
consideration of downstream functions’ requirements would require large efforts from 
designing functions for a design project that, in their eyes, they have already finished 
and done. Second, “the responsibility for the product validation, as well regarding 
product liability, lies with the product design. And as soon as the product is validated, 
nothing will be changed anymore” (125:30). For security-relevant products with lengthy 
and regulated authorization and homologation processes, which powertrain designs 
have to undergo as well, this carries even more weight. “It’s all due to the fact that the 
voice of production is not existent. The product designer has to write a change request, 
he has to do a new product validation, he has to take the responsibility for a new 
development draft. Why would he support that? It always leads to the same. The 
product designer says, beautiful, that’s a nice idea. But that would need a new product 
validation, and this draft is already agreed upon. That’s all because today, we start 
much too late, after target agreement. I talk against a wall if I start this late” (145:24). 
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In addition to that, a late integration of manufacturing requires the latter to join a 
discussion where the other participants have great knowledge, while manufacturing 
itself starts from zero. “We would have greatly needed the input from manufacturing 
for our [names a product component, author’s note] system, but because they didn’t 
know the framework conditions they rather held back and didn’t say anything” (143:6). 
A manufacturer narrated his experience of an integration workshop: “But then, the 
discussion was on a part that I didn’t even know, and then they used very strange 
abbreviations. And then they discussed, and then I didn’t want to interfere and ask 
stupid questions” (159:9). 
 
Alas, involving manufacturing from the earliest point in NPD onwards seems to be no 
straightforward solution either. When no product or process has yet been 
conceptualized, downstream functions will have difficulties to provide valuable 
feedback. “The product designer is dealing with the product many months or even 
years before production planning […], it doesn’t make sense for him to talk with the 
production planner because he doesn’t even know what he wants for himself. But when 
this point in time comes, then the concept is already quite determined in his mind, such 
that he doesn’t want anyone to interfere anymore” (177:26). 
Compartmentalized nexus of contact persons 
For cooperative intensity to emerge between functions, awareness of channels and 
contacts to the cross-functional counterpart is a necessary precondition. In a large-
scale industrial setting such as CarCo, this transparency may be difficult to achieve. 
“We divide everything up to steering functions, and as a result, we have a completely 
- well not completely, that’s exaggerated - but at least a responsibility model that is 
very difficult to understand and to see through. Generally, this matrix organization is 
so broadly diversified that everyone just says it’s not my responsibility” (158:7). Finding 
contact persons as well as the right channel or tool among many to convey inputs to 
cross-functional partners seems difficult, particularly for downstream functions striving 
to direct information upstream. “To begin with, it’s not too easy to find the right product 
designer, I had to search for a while at first. The allocation of who does what is not 
totally clear or transparent” (153:4). A manager, who has already been in his position 
for two years, adds: “I still don’t know, who of the contact persons I have is from 
production planning and who isn’t” (174:10). An anecdote provides further insight 
thereof; the setting commemorates of a kafkaesque scene: A process specialist from 
manufacturing did not know who the responsible process designer for a problematic 
process is, but he didn’t dare to ask them directly due to hierarchical differences. 
Instead, he asked someone from production management, who didn’t know either but 
asked the process designers’ manager for the responsible person. The manager didn’t 
want to provide the actual names, but sent him to ask another person for permission 
to provide the names (154:43). Besides, structural complexity seems to be on a 
constant rise, further decreasing cross-functional transparency on effective channels 
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and contacts. When asked why he perceives cross-functional cooperation as difficult, 
an interview participant answered “simply because it’s extremely complex […]. I think 
because, if you look at the formulated stage-gate process here, it’s huge. And to 
integrate processes into that, it’s not that easy. And afterwards, to understand, well the 
process, you’ll need an interim result of it for some kind of virtual product validation. 
And of that, the result again goes into something else, that was just not easy” (184:6). 
 
Given the complex nexus of channels and contacts, ideas to improve manufacturability 
are reported to get lost somewhere in the process of addressing them. “As it is so often 
the case, lessons learned disappear on some kind of server or in some kind of drawer, 
and at the end of the day it doesn’t reach the person that it should reach. Or the 
requirements are always reset, and that’s a rotten Sisyphus process” (173:13). A 
production planner’s experience provides further insights: When looking for a suitable 
fastening concept for a certain use case, she proposed a new concept. Talking to the 
inventor of this concept, it becomes clear that the concept had already been presented 
to the relevant product designers. Still, the concept is presented to the product 
designers finding positive feedback. 2.5 months later, no assessment of the concept 
has been performed, and the concept is again introduced to product design, again with 
no outright rejection (12:1).  
7.2.1.2 Cooperation contents 
Discussion topics focused on series issues and coordination 
Illustration 31 provides an impression of interaction topics, recurring in informal 
discussions or formal communication, along the examined functional interfaces based 
on their mentioning frequency in the case study data base. Notably, transactional 
information and coordination play a significant role: “At the interface towards product 
design, the distribution is rather mutual sign-offs, information exchange. Here I need 
this info from you, there you have to give me that info, and saying that’s okay, we’ll go 
on like that. Things like a creative workshop are rare” (151:21). Indeed, the analysis 
across the case study data base shows that creative ideas or problem solving are 
mentioned only occasionally as topics.  
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Illustration 31: Discussion topics of different functional interfaces 
When disregarding the prevalent mere transactional alignment and focussing on the 
controversial discussions that take place, the following can be concluded: A strong 
focus on series production becomes visible, whereas products in the development 
stage are discussed less frequently. Various topics on series production, in particular 
if there is a reference towards quality, are brought to the table. “The only platform that 
we have where I’d say we are in a discussion mode is the quality steering circle” 
(173:28). At the product design-manufacturing interface, this restricted topic focus is 
particularly evident. The answer of a production representative on the question which 
discussion topics exist between manufacturing and product design is representative 
thereof: “In the series at first, always if there are quality problems” (145:27). This 
reflects the earlier observation of manufacturing being involved only in later NPD 
phases approaching the start of series production.  
Notably, production feasibility, meaning a dichotomous assessment whether a product 
is producible or not, is more often discussed than the more delicate weighing up of 
manufacturing costs versus material costs. For the latter, production representatives 
(although not manufacturing themselves, as noted above) may simply lack the 
argumentative power, whereas a new product which is indeed impossible to produce 
constitutes an incontestable argument.  
 
There is an interesting notion from several informants regarding the unpleasant nature 
of most discussion topics that are brought to surface in the upstream communication, 
i.e. from manufacturing to process design or from production management to product 
design. Two production management employees articulate it as follows: “We have the 
rather unpleasant job of - I usually say it like that: you have a carnival party, and we 
are the cleaning wagon, party is over, and then we clean up the garbage and then we 
have to say to the people [to product design, author’s note], by the way, you’ve 
forgotten something there” (130:5). Another informant described upstream 
communication content as follows: “It was actually only about escalation topics, there 
was never something like I have a content question. […] That means that you’ve 
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always talked about problems. It’s always, we are either not allowed to or not able to” 
(130:24). 
Communication tone patterns 
Another focus of analysis within cooperative intensity is the discussion tone or 
atmosphere in cross-functional interaction. As a first observation, there seem to be 
inherent differences in communication tone patterns that prevail in early phases of 
NPD contrasted against those of later phases: “That’s depending on the phase, so in 
an early phase it drags on, it’s only heating up when you slowly approach calls for 
tender [during series development phase, author’s note], and when you’re at SOP it 
becomes heated” (82:47). With reference to early phases, the discussion tone is 
described as “more passive, rather listening and receiving” (82:14), with the discussion 
heating up the closer the NPD process approaches its finalization.  
 
This phase-related pattern seems to be valid for all interfaces that are actively involved 
in NPD, with the exemption of manufacturing. For them, one communication attitude 
seems to persist throughout different NPD phases: The case study data base contains 
manifold instances that suggest a blocking or wall-building communication pattern 
between manufacturing and other functions involved in NPD, no matter if they belong 
to the production or the design department. Markedly, these blocking tendencies are 
perceived by both sides of the interface. For example, a process designer described 
the following: “There was a bit the topic that the manufacturers - that was a bit the 
problem in plant [names plant location, author’s note], we had quite some problems to 
build up contacts. Look, we don’t work against you – but it’s not that easy to make all 
of that work. What was a bit the case is that, their expectation was, maybe not 
arrogance, but it definitely is like ok, process design, you have looked through all of 
that and when I get this now it all has to work” (170:15). Quite similarly, a manufacturing 
representative perceives a similar arrogance on side of the production planner in this 
quote: “Those in the plant, they are the stupid ones. The production planners from the 
headquarters, they look at you from above, look at you as a manufacturer, just asking 
dumb questions. That is quite a certain arrogance. For example, if I ask the product 
designer something, he wouldn’t say simply that’s not possible because of this and 
that. Instead, they start discussing, and then he just says no. That is quite a certain 
arrogance.” (159:17). 
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7.2.2 Cooperative ability 
 
Illustration 32: Data structure - Cooperative ability 
Manufacturing 
not at eye level
1st order concepts
Cooperative ability
2nd order themes Aggregate dimensions
Differences in 
functional 
predispositions
20.Awareness of cultural differences between functions
21.Diametrical mindsets of design and manufacturing
(h) Different mindsets 
of design and 
manufacturing
24.Clothing and language as means of differentiation
25.Manufacturer walling off towards indirect functions
26.Perceived distance of manufacturing
(j) Social 
differentiation of 
manufacturing
22.Availability of precise specifications and hardware
23.No advocacy of production topics without detail 
knowledge
(i) Manufacturing 
demands reliable 
specifications
35.Manufacturability as frequently deprioritized topic
36.Manufacturer without incentive to intervene in NPD
37.Manufacturing costs have no advocate
38.Time lag in NPD distorts responsibilities
(m) Low advocacy for 
manufacturability
31.Manufacturability difficult to define
32.Manufacturing-ready design as production’s obligation
33.Downstream requirements not binding
34.NPD process as unidirectional sequence
(l) Manufacturability 
requirements difficult 
to place
27.Limited cross-functional insights
28.Unawareness of downstream consequences
29.Perceived supremacy of indirect functions
30.Aura of artistry around development functions
(k) Upstream 
functions over-
valued, downstream 
under-valued
Inhibitors of 
cooperative 
ability
45.Corporate steering mechanisms work functionally
46.Power considerations entrench functional orientation
(p) Functional 
structures are self-
sustaining
42.Supplier relationship as another difficult interface
43.Required experience lies with supplier
44.Supplier distorts importance of manufacturability
(o) Supplier 
relationships inhibit 
cooperative ability
39.Lack of cross-functional experience and contributions
40.Formal NPD process unsuited for innovative products
41.Liaison people lacking due to small size
(n) Innovativeness 
inhib its cooperative 
ability
49.Formal process/agreements necessary for cooperation
50.Push-off mentality / no voluntary extra efforts made
51.Dependency on formal process detrimental for 
innovative NPD
(r) Cooperation 
dependent on formal 
process
47.Trust as success factor for cross-functional integration
48.Lack of trust and openness across functions
(q) Lack of cross-
functional 
transparency and  
trust
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7.2.2.1. Differences in functional predispositions 
Different mindsets of design and manufacturing 
Functional delineations are visible and tangible in daily interactions at CarCo. This 
includes not only organizationally cultivated differences such as vertical structures or 
functionally oriented processes, but passes through to differences in mindset and 
attitudes. CarCo employees are aware of profound dissimilarities between different 
functions, though emphasizing their intangible nature: “Worlds lie in between, but it’s 
difficult to put into words” (183:5). Aside from that, mastery of this cultural diversity is 
acknowledged as an essential precondition for success at CarCo: “If you master the 
cultural aspects here, then you’ll get by fine” (82:95). Differences in mindset between 
functional units identified at CarCo confirm existing theory, which emphasizes 
delineations in culture and belief systems. 
Between manufacturing and product design in particular, differences are described as 
touching upon a multitude of aspects of organizational life. “The cultures are totally 
different. During the first half year, I noticed it extremely, how different the production 
department is, the KPI orientation, let alone this strict hierarchy – that’s quite a bit more 
easy-going in product design, or you could as well say chaotic” (130:29).  
Indeed, looking into the depth of different functional predispositions in mindset and 
attitude, an almost diametrical breakdown can be observed for product design and 
manufacturing, respectively. Illustration 33 pictures different mindset traits, which 
found mentioning during data collection. The different traits were not provided, but 
emerged from their unprompted naming in interviews and participant observation. 
Product design and manufacturing seem to be at two sides of a spectrum for large 
parts of the mentioned traits, except from a few categories which can be attributed to 
both, for example technology-loving.  
With regard to product design, traits such as free-thinking, openness towards new 
things are most pronounced, reaching out to the other side of the very same medal like 
a chaotic or naïve mindset. “The product designers love to discuss freestyle, they don’t 
like to be tied down” (125:35), “They want to let off steam, they want to play around” 
(179:4). Manufacturing, on the other side, is described as displaying a more collective 
attitude, building on mutual trust and loyalty. “In the case of manufacturing, it’s quite a 
bit different, as I said, they are much more hands on, they’re wired differently. It’s more 
about finding a personal access to someone, to a foreman or a worker at the assembly 
line, you have to act a bit more pragmatic” (127:27). Being pressed for time and having 
a low abstraction capability are other frequently mentioned characteristics for 
manufacturing. “Abstracting things, and imagining how something might look like just 
roughly, picturing something hypothetically, they are not able to do that” (124:7). As 
another ascribed trait, manufacturing’s consciousness in tradition and experience 
stands opposed to product design’s innovation affinity.  
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Illustration 33: Mindset traits of functions 
Interestingly, bridging functions in between the two poles of product design and 
manufacturing, such as process design, production planning or production 
management, find themselves with less clear trait manifestations and rather blurred 
delineations. Product design and manufacturing seem to be perceived as distinct, 
clear-cut cultures, which informants find easy to describe and differentiate. Bridging 
functions, on the other side, are less palpable as a standalone culture, bearing traits 
from both sides of the manufacturing-product design spectrum.  
Manufacturing demands reliable specifications 
Another way to look at functional predispositions is to analyse function-specific 
preferences which functional representatives may demand from their cross-functional 
counterparts. The degree to which these preferences are compatible can provide 
information on how difficult cooperative ability is to achieve. Illustration 34 provides an 
overview of such demands that were mentioned in an unprompted way in interviews 
and participant observation.  
Notably, the largest part of these preferences stems from a series production 
background, such as reliable processes, maintainability or reliable technology. Only a 
                                            Functions
Mindset
Product 
design
Process 
design
Production 
planning
Production 
management Manufacturing
Collective, loyal, mutual trust important
Pressed for time
Low abstraction capability
Operationally driven/today-focused
Pragmatic/casual
Structured
Conscious in tradition and experience
Obstructive, pessimistic
Conscious in own benefit
Direct
Hierarchical
Process-/standards- driven
Decisive
Problems in handling uncertainty
Cost-driven
Political, intransparent
Shy to speak up
Easy-going, unhierachical
Expertise-focused
Problem-solving mentality
Naive/living in a bubble
Open for new things
Chaotic
Technology-loving
Freethinker
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
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few topics with relatively few mentionings, such as mature product or manufacturing-
ready product design, constitute inherent NPD-related topics. This tendency follows 
earlier results from the analysis of discussion topics within the cooperative intensity 
dimension. Remarkably, the availability of precise specifications and hardware is of 
high importance for several functions representing the production voice, in particular 
manufacturing and production planning. “A production guy is normally a very very 
[pauses, author’s note] – a product designer can easily deal with free solution spaces, 
a manufacturer cannot […]. Production always needs clear specifications. He’s just not 
able of abstracting and saying I construct my system for an amount of X parts, and it’s 
good, just for example. Instead, he needs a statement such as I must produce 324.543 
machines. And he doesn’t question if this number makes sense or doesn’t. Then this 
is the famous premise, what do we have premises around here in the first place, it’s a 
word I’ve never heard as often as here. So this is absolutely sick around here, with the 
premises.” (82:96). Presumably, this demand is closely connected to low abstraction 
capabilities that have been identified in the last paragraph. “A production planner, as 
a man, has incredible difficulties to abstract things, and thus he can’t just say “I 
assume”, really the word “I assume” is a taboo” (82:96).  
 
 
Illustration 34: Function-specific preferences 
Naturally, this demand for precise specifications impedes production’s cooperative 
ability towards product design. “In the early phase everything works only on a virtual 
basis. Manufacturing, however, they are rather relying on hardware, they have 
incredible difficulties with CAD models” (141:3). At CarCo, this prevents manufacturing 
functions from engaging into discussions with product or process design in earlier 
phases of the NPD process, or as a production planner put it: “Sure, CAD data means 
something to me. But to really make a methods-time-measurement analysis in all of its 
accuracy, you at least need a finished and construed product, or some version of it. 
And to get in even earlier, you’d need at least some kind of database” (176:1). 
 
 
                                                   Functions
Demands Product design Process design
Production 
planning
Production 
management Manufacturing
Reliable processes
Maintainability
Precise specifications and hardware available
Reliable technology
Sufficient target agreed manufacturing costs
Mature product
Manufacturing-ready product design
Ensured product liability
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
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Social differentiation of manufacturing 
Several observations in the case study data base indicate that manufacturing occupies 
a more outwards position compared to other involved functions. In this regard, clothing 
assumes an important role, pointing towards a common identity of production and 
thereby simultaneously differentiating against other functions. At CarCo, employees of 
production department, even if not working directly on the shopfloor, like to dress in 
shopfloor clothing. Managers in the production department all have their official photos 
in the company social network taken when dressed in shopfloor clothing (4:1). On the 
shopfloor, other attire is looked at with disdain: “I’d never go into production, for 
example, with a suit and tie and stuff like that, then you’d directly be labelled as a 
headquarters snot” (178:26). Similarly to clothing, language assumes another 
differentiating role. In particular, the local dialect that is spoken in large parts of the 
production plants outside of the headquarters is perceived as a door-opener by many. 
“If you’re at the production plant, if you talk dialect then they’ll be your best friends.” 
(124:16). 
 
Some informants suggested a further reaching form of differentiation exerted by 
manufacturing, with walls being built towards the indirect functions, including design 
functions as well as indirect production representatives such as production planning. 
“The product designer always says against the manufacturer I can’t do it, it’s not 
possible, my robot can’t do it […]. That’s how clear front lines have built up. These are 
front lines that exist” (158:33). An indirect production management employee explains 
his experience on the shopfloor: “When you get there, they certainly think you’re not 
capable of anything […]. And I had myself trained there, and I assembled there, and I 
was the object of great amusement, the workers that stood there thinking “well, now 
we’ll see how he’ll assemble the things, how he holds the wrench” and so on. […] But 
at the very beginning, when you get there, you didn’t see them before, they do feel like, 
I don’t want to say this so hard, but they do feel like something better, something above 
you” (124:129). Conceivably, this tendency of walling off might stem from a perceived 
lack of appreciation of indirect functions towards manufacturing, which will be analysed 
in more detail in a subsequent chapter. A manufacturer’s statement is insightful for this 
respect: “They always say that the big head (verbally: water head) in the headquarters 
gets bigger and bigger, and they don’t talk the same language. That’s precisely why 
they, the oh-so highly studied doctors or studied somethings should for once come and 
see how it is produced” (159:18). 
 
The discussed aspects of social differentiation result in a perceived distance of 
manufacturing in manifold forms of social interaction, which certainly detract from 
building up cooperative ability at the design-manufacturing interface. “The 
manufacturer is the furthest away of all functions, he might be invited to one FMEA or 
to one assessment, but apart from that the manufacturers are the furthest away” 
(151:37). Likewise for informal social events, such as a fair that comes to headquarters’ 
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town in spring, manufacturer employees did not participate although all other functions 
of product design and production were present (191:1). Indirect functions tend to act 
with cautiousness when approaching manufacturing employees: “My interns, so far I 
only took them to process designers […]. Those guys are easy and that wasn’t a 
problem at all. If we’d go to a manufacturer, I’d sensitize them a bit more” (129:12). 
7.2.2.2 Manufacturing not at eye level 
Upstream functions over-valued, downstream under-valued 
When a manufacturer was asked how cooperation between the functions in NPD 
works, he gave an insightful answer: “An important reason why it does not yet work is 
because we don’t know one another’s processes. Product design should come down 
to production regularly, and the other way round as well. It would be important that 
manufacturing and production planning know product design’s objectives, but it’s not 
the case today. In the end, it all boils down to the fact that we don’t know each other, 
we don’t know what drives the other one” (145:1). Many informants at CarCo reaffirm 
the importance of mutual insight into actions and motives of the cross-functional 
counterparts. Likewise, there is broad consensus that mutual insight remains 
insufficient. A manufacturer utters his view on product design: “They have no idea how 
things go around here, and what the difficulties are. They have zero insight” (147:55). 
Illustration 35 displays cross-functional insights that were described for all examined 
interfaces based on their mentioning frequency. While black arrows signal 
predominant mentioning of high cross-functional insight into the function they are 
directed at, red arrows indicate low cross-functional insight. Arrows have been omitted 
between interfaces where informants provided mixed statements without a clear 
tendency. Overall, there is great dominance of low insights, except for the production 
management – manufacturing interface. Notably, product design seems to be the most 
“unknown” function, with frequent mentioning of lacking insight into it from all other 
functions. “I have absolutely no clue at all, what exactly they do in product design. 
Seriously, I neither have any clue how things work internally for them” (156:4).  
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Illustration 35: Insight into cross-functional counterparts 
When asked for the impact of own activities on their cross-functional counterparts, 
informants repeatedly identified one shortcoming: Upstream functions tend to be 
insufficiently knowledgeable on the consequences of their activities on downstream 
functions. “It’s also a lack of understanding of the production planner, sometimes he 
just doesn’t know that there’s a customer out there that he has to satisfy, namely the 
manufacturer. That happens to other functions that are downstream the process, as 
well” (131:16). Manufacturing, as the furthest downstream function among the inquired 
interfaces in this study, was evidently named a frequent victim of this situation. “I don’t 
want to say that they [product designers, author’s note] live in another world. But they 
totally lack a comprehension of assembly, they cannot even imagine what happens 
there” (152:18). Markedly, the accused upstream functions reaffirm this view: “We [in 
product design, author’s note] have a very limited view on what the consequences [on 
production, author's note] are of what we commit here” (30:3). 
 
Limited cross-functional insights, in particular with regard to downstream 
consequences, are indicators for an overarching motive that emerges repeatedly 
throughout the case study data base: Downstream functions, for instance 
manufacturing, tend to be considered inferior or less attractive, while upstream 
functions, such as product design, are often circumcised by an artistic, admired aura. 
A CarCo employee, who was part of product design, changing over to production 
management, said: “It took a while until I was respected at the design department with 
a production department symbol. They think, the production department builds the 
cars, but apart from that they don’t know anything at all” (134:4). Sovereignty over 
innovative technology is attributed to upstream functions, and openly demonstrated. 
“With regard to the people from the production department, the product designers only 
say they don’t know anything. They can produce it, but with regard to technical 
High cross-functional insight 
Low cross-functional insight 
Arrow width: Citation frequency
Process
Design
Production 
Planning
Manu-
facturing
Product 
Design
Production 
Mgmt.
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competence they have no idea. Technical knowledge, background knowledge, rather 
like umm, they should just do whatever, and they should let us do our job. They can 
produce, yes, but they shouldn’t interfere in the technology, they have no clue” (179:6). 
Downstream functions are perceived as less attractive with regard to work contents, 
even by production representatives themselves: “Of course it’s much sexier to talk 
about products and functionalities, how fast is the engine, what is the torque, how 
smooth it is to steer, than about, well, how can I assemble this the quickest or the 
cheapest way” (151:5).  
By contrast, development functions and their daily activities are surrounded by an 
artistic aura. Expressions of arts and mastery are indeed utilized by informants when 
discussing these topics. While processes and outcomes at CarCo are closely 
managed, with production volumes and even sales figures neatly projected and called 
for, the product design process is allowed a less directed, almost nebulous working 
style. A product designer describes the construction process as to large parts taking 
place subconsciously, during an “engineering flow”, with a strong shift of 
consciousness away from the outside and little taking-up of external requirements 
(28:2).On occasion, this culminates in product designers enforcing their original “piece” 
in acceptance of disadvantages for downstream stakeholders such as manufacturing 
or marketing. “There is a topic of setting an example. There are always some [product 
designers, author’s note], who want to leave something behind, with some kind of 
technical solution or development or whatsoever. There are many that are a bit too 
artsy-fartsy there” (178:40).  
Manufacturability requirements difficult to place 
Informants recurrently named one circumstance as the prevailing factor impeding 
manufacturing to encounter its upstream cross-functional counterparts at eye level: 
Simply, manufacturability requirements are difficult to place, to find appropriate 
attention in the first place, in the NPD process. Several reasons hereof are provided. 
First of all, manufacturability requirements are difficult to define such that they could 
be rigidly called for during design phase. “The problem is that I don’t have a structure 
or something like that, something like the assemble space, how you can define it. That 
makes the topic so difficult, there’s nothing I can say that I can just tick off, simply four 
or five criteria, and if they’re fulfilled it’s producible” (141:16). A product designer added 
to this notion that the innovative nature of a projects makes this even more difficult: 
“It’s important that manufacturing provides a precise problem statement. It has to be 
well described and quantified. In our project, this is still insufficient, because the 
technologies are new” (145:30).  
 
In addition to the inherent difficulty to define manufacturability in the first place, it is 
also perceived to be in the sole responsibility of production, and not product or process 
design. “Manufacturability is seen as a subordinate topic for most product designers. 
They see it also like, oh our manufacturing will do that, they’ll take care of it. But that it 
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likewise belongs to their tasks, to design the product such that it is manufacturing-
optimal, maybe it’s due to their academic education, that this is subordinate” (151:4). 
Given the late integration of production representatives, this almost inevitably leads to 
a negligence of manufacturability topics. “At the moment, when a manufacturer says 
that this and that is something we could optimize [regarding product design, author’s 
note], we first have to tear down massive walls before anyone would only hear us” 
(159:2).  
 
Besides, downstream functional requirements such as manufacturability are not 
perceived as of binding nature by designers. “Process requirements? We don’t really 
pay attention to them, and we wouldn’t write those down in the specification sheet, 
because they’re not real requirements” (104:1). Again, this suggests a perceived 
inferiority of downstream functions’ requirements as described above.  
 
In general, CarCo’s NPD process seems to be bound to follow only one direction, 
namely a strict sequence from up- to downstream. Flexibility to embrace downstream 
inputs into upstream activities is restricted, be it from manufacturing or other 
downstream functions. “The rule is that product design predefines everything, and 
manufacturing is left with the realization and production. For the other way round – 
well, we try to have an impact regarding product design, but it’s much more difficult” 
(155:21). Evidently, this has an impact on interfaces in NPD other than design-
manufacturing as well, such as the design-marketing interaction. “In my opinion, we 
develop a technology, because we want to develop a technology, and then we try to 
sell it to the customer, and then we begin to understand what the customer actually 
wants (162:20).  
Low advocacy for manufacturability 
Manufacturability of a new product, i.e. how easy, fast and cheap the product can be 
produced or assembled, may serve as an approximation for the cooperative ability 
pervading the design-manufacturing interface. After all, manufacturability is expected 
to find acceptance when design is able to empathize with their cross-functional 
counterparts and incorporates their requirements. With regard to manufacturability at 
CarCo, the case study data base features many instances of criticism: “People always 
say that the product design people, that they are nuts, no one could be able to 
manufacture something like this. And it is like that. Often, the designs that are delivered 
from those product designers is - not only does it take a long time to assemble it, but 
it is also often poorly construed.” (182:16).  
When continuing the analysis why cooperative ability at the design-manufacturing 
interface is difficult to achieve, informants’ statements suggest an unexpected 
explanation. While the author assumed that the manufacturer would be 
manufacturability’s natural advocate, it appears as if this holds true to a limited extent 
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only. Indeed, there seems to be not a single reliable spokesperson for 
manufacturability, with several aspects of CarCo’s NPD bearing responsibility thereof.  
 
To begin with, manufacturability as a topic is often deprioritized against other, more 
urgent topics on the NPD functions’ tables. For most cases, manufacturability is not a 
prohibitive factor in a way that quality problems or acute external deadlines would be. 
“If you’re having acute quality problems, it’s very urgent and often pops up in the 
escalation circle. On the other side, design questions, generally speaking, do not have 
to be solved in the week XYZ […] that’s why it doesn’t pop up at my place” (173:2). 
Notably, many involved functions follow this scheme, including manufacturing 
themselves: “We have an operational problem, and everyone takes a deep breath 
when the operational problem is solved. Then you wipe of your mouth and continue 
your work. But taking the last step in saying, what is it that I can pick up of this for the 
future product generation, and how can I place that rightly, that’s what we don’t do 
anymore […]. In midst of all of the “yes, we’ve managed the problem”, this is forgotten. 
Because the next topic already superposes itself” (173:14). For product design or other 
upstream functions, it is similar: “The product designer has always 1000 other 
problems, for him this one [manufacturability, author’s note] is the last one of all.“ 
 
As indicated above, manufacturing at CarCo lacks an incentive to assume advocacy 
of manufacturability in NPD: “Sure, the manufacturer is wired differently, he rather says 
why should I care about what comes in 5 years, if my line stands still today” (145:32). 
Even if manufacturing representatives would engage in a discussion with product 
design, they would likely lack the incentive to rigidly enforce their functional 
requirements. “There is a tendency that they talk about it [manufacturability, author’s 
note], but for lack of time it’s just led through on the nod in the end” (154:31).  
 
Even more so, the manufacturer has no advantage if manufacturing costs for a certain 
product design are kept low. “If I ask who has the benefit, then everyone is happy to 
have higher manufacturing costs. And most of all the plant, then they have more 
budget to play around with” (176:13). Because of large-scale corporations’ logic of 
internal transfer pricing, with manufacturing costs being determined during the target 
agreement phase at CarCo, low manufacturing costs have no advocate. “We’ve never 
seen this, that the plant manager holds a product line manager to account, telling him 
to reduce manufacturing costs. He gets into NPD much too late for that. At a maximum, 
during launch phase, he takes care of assembly defect risks, maintainability, things 
like that. But if manufacturing costs are really too low or too high, doesn’t help the plant 
at all, as long as he receives the money for it, he just doesn’t have any interest. And 
neither does the production planner. There is no one, who would actively call for that.” 
(176:4). Notably, production controlling does not assume advocacy, either: “The role 
of our production controlling is rather to take care that manufacturing gets enough 
money. Such that they can work. And of course, from this perspective you don’t cut 
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yourself saying something like, clearly two Euros lower is possible, we’ll get them 
easily. Instead it’s all about building up a bit of a buffer here” (156:19). Indeed, only 
corporate controlling would be incentivized to assume advocacy for low manufacturing 
costs, which will be analysed later in this case study.  
 
Lastly, as a problem inherent to all empirical settings with a long NPD process, 
responsibilities are distorted by the massive time lag between design phase and series 
production. A process designer of CarCo expressed this aspect as follows: “If we 
[process design, author’s note] really screw something up, then the manufacturer is of 
course typically the one who suffers. At that point, it indeed is like that, that we’re out 
of responsibility already” (82:74). This time lag may likewise be partially blamed for 
manufacturing’s’ lack of motivation to fight for manufacturability. “Manufacturing is only 
hurt when in series production, there is a problem, he can’t deliver parts or his supplier 
can’t deliver parts. But what is in 2019 with the new product generation, he has no pain 
at all regarding this in his current business” (125:6). Any implementation of an incentive 
scheme that provides sufficient long-term orientation to cope with this challenge will 
come into conflict with a large-scale company’s business processes. “Actually, you 
would have to set a target for product design and production planning in a way that, 
after 5 years, you take another look and really assess their work. But retrospectively, 
it would be of course difficult in the company processes, it’s not possible” (141:38).  
7.2.2.3 Inhibitors of cooperative ability 
Innovativeness inhibits cooperative ability 
As a recurring theme, informants mention that CarCo’s formal NPD process and the 
cross-functional interaction model is sufficiently well working for products with 
incremental extents of innovation, but unsuited for innovative products. Several 
reasons thereof are provided. To begin with, cross-functional experience, undeniably 
important to develop cooperative ability, is insufficiently available in a young innovative 
organization. “It’s an experience that you just have to make as a young organization. 
People have to learn to work together, and for points where you had problems and 
conflicts in the first projects, often you learn from them and become wiser, such that 
you won’t make these mistakes again in succeeding projects. But we’re not there yet. 
If I take the combustion powertrain colleagues, for example, a product designer there, 
he knows pretty well without someone from production having to tell him what the 
manufacturing requirements behind that product are, and what he has to expect when 
he neglects those” (148:24). 
When dealing with innovation, a young and inexperienced organization can hardly be 
mitigated by bringing in more practiced colleagues: “Often, you have young people 
recruited. In particular in innovative fields […]. These are fields that have not been 
taught for 40, 50 years at university, which means that the specialists that have learned 
it somewhere, are mostly below 30 or 40, and extremely many come directly from 
university. In between, they maybe have worked at an institute, and that’s why it’s 
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much like Jugend forscht [German youth science competition, author’s note]. They all 
have a bit of a disturbed relationship to processes, likewise a disturbed relationship to 
tight schedules, and they don’t like to be restricted” (167:14).  
Another problem resulting from innovative projects with long NPD processes is that 
downstream functions might not even exist at the time when product design starts off. 
Therefore, there simply is no production representative available, who could intervene 
or provide her knowledge. “For the new product generation we have to start all over 
again, it’s a whole new product concept, that’s why the manufacturer can’t really take 
part in this discussion in an early phase” (147:48). For CarCo, this seems to be a 
challenge not only for the design-manufacturing interface, but likewise to the design-
marketing interface: “We extrapolate from the past, so you try to describe a CarCo 
BEV [battery electric vehicle, author’s note] in a way that it is able to do the same things 
just as a CarCo combustion car, no matter what it costs. To be more concrete, an 
example: You have to be able to give a kick-down at any given time, and as many 
times as possible. A Tesla can do it three times in a row, it hits your head against the 
seat, that’s absolutely sufficient, no one would want that even more often. But we 
require our cars to be able to repeat this much more often, because for the combustion 
car it works as well, and that’s just nonsense” (160:27). 
 
Large-scale corporations such as CarCo, with long NPD processes and many 
stakeholders to involve, have developed complex and granular process descriptions. 
Often, in their complexity, these are difficult to comprehend as a whole for a NPD 
participant. Therefore, these processes own a certain self-dynamic because 
participants are unable to scrutinize smaller parts of the entire process. Participants 
are taught to stick to the process, because consequences of not doing so are 
incalculable. For innovative products, however, “playing it like all other components, 
that everyone does one’s bit and then it’s integrated in the regular process, this doesn’t 
work for completely new innovative topics” (173:16). Requirements of innovation 
dynamics are in conflict with the formal process: “The requirements, be it product or 
volume, change quicker than the process would allow them to” (171:2). An example 
thereof was observed during the critical target agreement phase: The final cost 
estimation loop, which usually is prepared meticulously because it provides the basis 
for the target agreement, was entirely re-calculated overnight, because an essential 
product feature was decided to be changed two weeks before the deadline (171:2, 
198:1). Another example was described by one of CarCo’s production planners: “For 
example the product modification process, this really cannot work. If you would go 
through it just as it is required at the moment, you’d be dead before […]. We start it 
only when the result is already there. Depending on the complexity, such a process 
could easily take a year, and officially you wouldn’t be allowed to make any 
modification” (171:16). Another example involves the formal tendering process, which 
is essential for companies with a relatively low depth of value creation. At CarCo, the 
formal NPD process sets the call for tender around 3 years before SOP. Because the 
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innovative high-voltage battery product still changes its concept due to new 
technological discoveries, this process can hardly be met. As decision processes are 
bound to the formal process, CarCo has difficulties to access supplier capacity: “This 
will become correspondingly expensive, it’s already more expensive than it was 
planned, because naturally, in one year, which is how long it took until it was decided 
at our house, many others say also that they want to do it. If now we come as well, 
doing a call for tender, not even having awarded it to someone, and the product itself 
is already outdated… That is quite a bit of a frenzy” (164:8). 
Naturally, the obligation to stick with entrenched corporate processes while trying to 
embrace innovation creates pressure for all participants. A neat integration, building 
on extensive cooperative ability and aligned interaction, is at risk to fall off the table. 
When asked for the consequences of frequent product modifications on the 
cooperation with product design and manufacturing, a production planner provided the 
following insight: “This evidently makes it more difficult to integrate all interfaces, 
because most of them are preoccupied with theirselves. It’s difficult to manage that 
you synchronize the result which you have worked out with all interface partners, be it 
logistics, manufacturing, product design. Therefore, when you’ve worked your result 
out, the whole thing is already outdated again because you have new requirements 
and that’s why everyone stews in their own juice. You never have the chance to align 
with the others” (171:3).  
 
In large-scale industrial setups, integration often is helped by introducing liaison people 
into the NPD process, who specifically take care of cross-functional needs. For 
innovative products, where volumes are still small and budget is restricted, these 
liaison functions often do not exist. An example at CarCo is the inexistent 
manufacturing equipment designer, as a representative of a liaison role that small 
projects are not able to afford, although they would be important for seamless 
integration: “We’d really need a manufacturing equipment designer, but that bears 
costs for a position. All of these functions are passed on and on like a hot potato, no 
one wants to have them on his cost centre. And as they sit naturally in between the 
functions, you push them around” (153:15). A member of production management 
attributed problems at the design-manufacturing interface to this lack of liaison people: 
“This goes pretty wrong I would say. If you compare it to the vehicle projects […], they 
have some kind of interface function between production planning and product design, 
who exactly cares about these manufacturability topics, [names a person, author’s 
note] is doing this there. This role is too weak at our project, or doesn’t exist at all” 
(157:18).  
Supplier relationships inhibit cooperative ability 
“Another problem is the high share of purchased parts, which is often a matter of fact 
for OEMs. There, the cooperation becomes even more difficult because, when the 
company Bosch comes, you don’t know if that’s their manufacturer of the two people 
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that are there, it’s just the company Bosch. So at the end, I don’t know if I talked to the 
manufacturer or to whom I talked. And even the product designers don’t do much by 
themselves any more, they outsource much to service providers, and there I don’t 
know which cooperation or which alignment took place” (131:12). This product 
designer’s statement introduces an important reality of most large-scale corporations: 
cross-functional integration within the company is just one issue; integrating external 
interfaces is even more challenging, and – in consideration of the often low depth of 
value creation – often even more important. To begin with, cooperation with suppliers 
simply constitutes another interface, with all the entailed complexity in interaction. 
Second, supplier interfaces are often more difficult to interact with than internal 
interfaces, be it due to unclear functional responsibilities as quoted above, or due to 
restrictions for interference based on legal conditions particular to service contracts, 
which forbid any close cooperation similar to an employment. With regard to the 
design-manufacturing interface, a gap becomes evident: ”At the moment it is like that, 
if a part is produced inhouse, the CarCo process [to ensure manufacturability, author’s 
note] is started, but for purchased parts, there is nothing” (141:11). Naturally, the 
supplier has little incentive to engage in discussions with the OEM’s product design to 
improve overall manufacturability. Due to CarCo’s low value-added-depth, it is likely 
that a manufacturability-improved component will be sourced from a supplier, therefore 
reducing the suppliers’ sales.  
 
As explained above, experience in cross-functional activities is important to develop 
cooperative ability. With its high share of purchased parts and services, large parts of 
CarCo’s essential knowledge lies with suppliers. Alike other large-scale 
manufacturers, CarCo purchases development and design services in significant 
amounts from suppliers. A production management team member complained about 
the missed opportunity for experience build-up: “What is really sad, is that we really 
build up so much new, create new production lines, that we are really able to follow a 
greenfield approach. But in fact, that’s just the suppliers that do all that, all the know-
how lies with them” (142:28). In addition to that, cross-functional discussions, 
necessary for a better cross-functional outcome, are at stake of going into the void. 
“That the product designer is able to say something without directly having to ask the 
supplier. There’s almost nothing they are able to do themselves any more today” 
(145:29). For production planning alike, this constitutes a problem for effective cross-
functional interaction, as the following observation shows: A member of production 
management comes with suggestions to improve manufacturability to production 
planning, asking them for corresponding details and timelines. The production planner 
is barely capable of answering, apologizing for their ignorance and referring to the call 
for tender for suppliers, which had to be prioritized (99:2). 
 
Lastly, case study informants provide an interesting notion of supplier involvement 
distorting the importance of manufacturability. At CarCo, this goes back to the trade-
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off between manufacturing costs and material costs, the latter including costs for 
purchased parts. With its high share of purchased parts, material costs at CarCo 
usually outweigh manufacturing costs by a significant factor. Naturally, and 
economically reasonable, manufacturing costs play “a tangential role. Regarding the 
battery, manufacturing costs may be XX€ [names financial amount, author’s note], 
material costs XX€ [names higher financial amount, author’s note]. They [product 
design, author’s note] wouldn’t even engage in such a discussion” (126:37). As a 
result, manufacturability isn’t in focus for product design teams: “Just look at the 
agendas of product design teams, manufacturability is nowhere on that. They have the 
topic procurability, namely if there is a supplier of whom I can buy this from, but if it’s 
manufacturable for CarCo itself later, this is subordinate” (151:9)  
However, having understood how complex and large NPD processes at large-scale 
companies work, suppliers may be encouraged to take advantage of this scheme. A 
production planner explained, when being asked about the dominance of material 
costs compared to manufacturing costs: “But that’s certainly a problem that we have 
created ourselves through our good [ironical, author’s note] procurement. The 
suppliers get the money of course through product modifications, that’s why it always 
comes out so expensive” (142:10). Another production planner provided a more 
detailed explanation on the dominance of material costs over manufacturing costs: 
“We are often just the second winner in this discussion [laughing] […]. But often, there 
is a problem in this calculation. Material costs are based on the suppliers’ offers, and 
of course the supplier gives a favourable price at the beginning, which doesn’t cover 
his costs. He just waits for a product modification, and then holds up his hand, and all 
of a sudden the offer is becoming much more expensive” (151:12). Additional costs for 
product modifications, however, appear during a phase after target agreement, when 
larger product design changes or changes in the supplier network are out of reach. 
Weighing up material costs against manufacturing costs in a later phase of NPD would 
probably yield a different result than in the early phase, with manufacturability making 
a point more often. The point in time for effective action, however, would have long 
been passed in this phase. 
Functional structures are self-sustaining 
To large parts, the strong functional orientation at CarCo seems determined by long-
standing organizational structures. “Just think about it, all product design teams are 
led by product designers. In fact, all rounds are led by product designers. The e-drive 
process chain, a product designer. Sure, someone from production is sitting in there 
sometimes, but they just sit in there. If you would ask the other way round, why is no 
one from production ever leading such a round […]. That’s definitely organizationally 
induced” (179:14). However, employees at CarCo seem to be well aware of the 
circumstance that a functional organization impedes cross-functional integration, as 
the following quote shows: “From my past I know that cross-functional integration 
across product design, production and procurement doesn’t work as it should, simply 
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because the organizational structures don’t match […]. These are typical inputs I got 
from my old boss, coming from a product design perspective, why production has 
relatively little to say in NPD” (158:1). Despite of this acknowledgement, functional 
structures continue to be forceful shapers of corporate reality within CarCo. Evidently, 
these structures have a strong self-sustaining power, therefore re-imposing 
themselves on a continuous basis and blocking stronger cross-functional moves: 
“There’s much of potential there, but we don’t dare addressing this, we’re prisoners 
there, also with the cost centre structure, because much is decided by money and 
budget, and as long as this is functional you will go on with this power and trench 
warfare forever, because everyone first sees that he’s clean. In particular, when money 
is involved - and the higher you come in hierarchy, the more money is involved” 
(125:46). The mentioned “imprisonment” does not only refer to the cost centre structure 
and the referring budgeting process, but comprises a broad range of fundamental 
business processes: “All our steering mechanisms at CarCo are functionally oriented. 
So for departments, or groups, for example, cost centres and personnel planning, 
follow departments. And the objective management process follows departments, and 
therefore all our steering and organization mechanisms” (125:16). Taking the 
functional budgeting processes as an example, an informant explains why these 
structures have such a large self-sustaining power. “With the cost centres that are 
structured functionally, the financial controlling works both in crisis and in successful 
times. We know this from the crisis in 2008 […] it works, he [financial controlling, 
author’s note] brought us safely through the crisis, and certainly we got some bruises 
but overall we came through it well. So, these mechanisms work, and that’s why there’s 
no discussion to change. Saying now let’s run the cost centre structure horizontally, 
and not vertically any more - he [financial controlling, author’s note] just doesn’t have 
this pain, he knows that his current system works no matter what” (125:18). 
 
In addition to the self-imposing power inherent to functional steering processes, 
informants frequently point out to power considerations that management levels 
cultivate, which help sustain functional structures since more integrated structures 
would require giving up hierarchical power. “The thinking in the hierarchies, as you 
have created them, there are just too many well-beloved features that you maybe do 
not want to give off […]. Because that could mean as well that I’d have flat hierarchies, 
and therefore possibly not so many hierarchies anymore” (162:12). Naturally, powerful 
functional features within an organization are hardly able to encourage pursuit of the 
cross-functional optimum: “That’s how the show-offs [verbally: braces-snappers, 
author’s note] just look after themselves instead of the total optimum. But if they’d set 
back their egos for the good of the company, that would be something very great” 
(158:54). Indeed, the author was able to observe this tendency to sustain functional 
power positions during a re-organization effort, according to which some plant 
managers would end up with reduced power through a lead-plant approach that would 
strengthen cross-functional power. Soon, the initiative led to political conflicts within 
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the organization, bringing about operative problems to obstruct the restructuring effort 
(232:1). 
Lack of cross-functional transparency and trust 
When asked for elaboration on his assessment that cross-functional integration had 
improved during the last year, a manufacturer of CarCo answered as follows: “The 
trust has grown, yes, and I think that the trust is there now, that it is said, we have 
skills, they have skills, now it is even said that the manufacturer has skills – the trust 
has grown strongly” (179:3). Many informants at CarCo share his opinion. 
Unmistakably, mutual trust is perceived as an important success factor to build a basis 
for effective cooperation with the cross-functional counterpart.  
 
Despite of the above quoted individual opinion, mutual trust and transparency overall 
seems to be hardly prevailing in cross-functional relations at CarCo. For NPD activities 
in particular, however, this would be essential, as one informant describes: “At the 
moment, we don’t even know how the product looks like […], therefore it is all the more 
important that cooperation is open and close. And we do have room for improvement 
for it around here” (149:2). Another interview participant complemented: “I experience 
all the time, that on a working level, there’s not the whole transparency provided in 
some places” (173:6). This seems to be a valid observation for overall corporate 
processes in general and cross-functional activities in particular: “There’s not enough 
trust in the whole company given to the individual deciders […]. The first one has to be 
aligned, and then the second one, and then you have three other decision committees 
where important decisions are taken […]. It simply takes too long, instead of simply 
trusting each other. I can’t say that a decision would be that much better simply 
because more people are looking at it” (184:8). The following statement sheds light on 
a certain distrust with regard to the cross-functional counterpart: “It was said by product 
design that this has advantages concerning the assembly space – heaven knows if 
that’s really the case” (82:88). A lack of cross-functional trust and transparency is 
criticized most significantly by downstream functions. They feel to be the ones who 
most frequently suffer from it, as naturally information asymmetry between down- and 
upstream functions comes into play. Manufacturing in particular feels somewhat left 
alone to pay for mistakes that were not solved or brought to light during NPD: “He 
doesn’t care in the end, if the manufacturer has to pay after seven years. In the end, 
it’s always the manufacturer who pays the bill for everything that went wrong in the 
entire NPD process” (147:52).  
Cooperation dependent on formal process 
When talking with case study informants about their experiences with cross-functional 
cooperation, it is striking to note that a majority starts with formal interface agreements 
or process descriptions they share with cross-functional process partners. It seems 
that in large parts of CarCo, cross-functional cooperation is understood to be of formal 
nature, and only working when a contract-like agreement is signed with a cross-
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functional partner. “I first asked where is your process- or project description […]? I 
didn’t get an answer, just a few process sheets, here and there a few things, here some 
kind of maturity level, there some stage-gates. All of that wasn’t harmonized to each 
other, there was no guideline […]. It astonished me a bit, and I have a strong conviction 
that […] with a certain size of a business, you’d need that” (163:24). In fact, informants 
at CarCo also recognize the described dependency on formal processes in cross-
functional cooperation: “I’d say that here, in the e-drive process chain you have people 
that strongly hold on to the defined process, and they also do this because they’re not 
skilled and able enough to do differently” (171:9). In particular at the design-
manufacturing interface, any cooperation seems to depend on a basis of formal 
specifications: “Because the standard product designer is not wired to care for process 
times, this will be the last thing that interests him. Unless you write it at the top of his 
work order” (167:33). 
 
Taking a broader view, a certain push-off mentality appears common in cross-
functional cooperation. This becomes apparent through a widely perceived low 
willingness to perform additional efforts apart from the formally agreed service level. 
“It’s exactly the CarCo approach, at first I try to find out how it does not work. I try to 
find out how to get the topic off my desk. That’s really a problem here, it makes 
cooperation more difficult” (149:28). This behaviour recurs with regard to all examined 
functional representatives, be it production, “that’s so extreme in the production 
business, that people really say, this is my field and I simply won’t go any extra mile” 
(165:22), or designing functions: “Everyone looks after his own business, taking care 
that it is done. So the production planner ensures that his job is done at first, and the 
product designer ensures that his job is done at first. And beyond that – well, you’d 
have to talk with each other, and some people are having difficulties to do that” 
(152:25).  
 
For innovative projects, such as the electrified powertrain development of the case 
study at hand, the dependence on formal processes entails unfavourable 
consequences. Since additional efforts, new ways or shortcuts would be quite 
necessary to succeed in innovative endeavours, this behaviour is perceived as being 
obstructive. An interview participant explained how dependency on formal processes 
results in cooperative processes collapsing like a house of cards when imposed on an 
innovative project: “We handicap ourselves structurally, I think the NPD process is very 
well structured and well described, but we can’t live these processes, I don’t know any 
generic schedule that has been adhered to” (162:9). Formal processes for cross-
functional checks and balances at the design-manufacturing interface are difficult to 
be kept alive when innovation requires quicker and more frequent modifications: 
“Production has started to notice that these quick modification loops bring many 
problems with them […], because we get a more and more rapid pace, and we never 
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really know what to expect as modifications and what is important to look at there” 
(130:22). 
7.2.3 Competition 
 
Illustration 36: Data structure - Competition 
1st order concepts
Competition
2nd order themes Aggregate dimensions
59.Upstream functions sit out conflicts playing for time
60.Upstream functions play out information asymmetry
61.Path dependency from preceding products impedes 
competition
(u) Upstream 
functions wait out 
conflicts
52.Few conflicts on the cross-functional optimum
53.Design requirements with predetermined hierarchy
54.Functional orientation deters cross-functional optimum
55.Call for more competition on cross -functional optimum
56.Cross-functional structures create no competition
(s) Little competition 
on the cross-
functional optimum
57.Sparsity of conflicts at bilateral interfaces
58.Informal relations inhibit competition
(t) Informal relations 
inhib it competition
Leadership-related 
situational factors
(w) Cross-functional 
conflicts are 
escalated away
65.Cross-functional conflicts are escalated quickly
66.Management avoids conflicts for political reasons
67.Instances of weak decisiveness in NPD
68.Time pressure impedes competition
(x) Low decisiveness 
holds up competition
Complexity-related 
situational factors
(y) Complexity allows 
for smokescreening
(z) Governance 
functions unable to 
challenge
69.Financial steering logic induces buffers
70.Border walk of handling complexity
71.Governance functions with insufficient insights
72.Steering functions versus operational functions
73.Acceptance of target setting process
74.More interface conflicts for brown field projects
75.Path dependency pitfall for succeeding projects
(ab) Competition 
scarcity around 
innovative projects
Competition at the 
interfaces
62.Bridging functions don’t live challenging role
63.Downstream functions react with cynicism 
64.Targets bring downstream functions to the table
(v) Downstream 
functions avoid 
conflicts
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7.2.3.1 Competition at the interfaces 
When analysing competition in the case study setup, the author had to deviate from 
the original wording because competition at CarCo has a strict external connotation, 
referring to external competitors and markets. During the interviews, inquiries were 
made based on a verbal context of conflicts or frictions in order to stay close to Luo et 
al.’s (2006) definition of competition, which entails rivalry and contesting on both 
tangible and intangible resources between functions within a company. Henceforth, 
conflicts and friction are used interchangeably with competition.  
 
Illustration 37 depicts the intensity of competition at all examined interfaces based on 
their mentioning frequency in the case study database. The categories “existing 
competition” and “no competition” illustrate how often informants described 
occurrences of friction or conflicts on tangible or intangible resources, respectively 
explicitly mentioned the absence of friction or conflicts, both in an unprompted manner.  
 
 
Illustration 37: Competition occurrence of examined interfaces 
It is striking to note that overall, informants talked more often about the absence of 
competition (69 mentionings overall) than of experiences with competition (46 
mentionings overall). With regard to the individual interfaces, conflicts between 
production planning and manufacturing were most frequently mentioned, followed by 
a few mentionings of conflicts at the product design – production management and at 
the product design – manufacturing interface. Other interfaces that would have been 
assumed as important competing functions during NPD, such as the interface between 
product design and production planning, with the latter one being the production 
representative that has the largest insight in early phases of NPD, are described as 
astonishingly harmonious.  
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
Existing competition No competition
All interfaces
Product Design - Process Design
Product Design - Production Planning
Product Design - Production Management
Product Design - Manufacturing
Production Planning - Process Design
Production Planning - Production Management
Production Planning - Manufacturing
Process Design - Production Management
Process Design - Manufacturing
Production Management - Manufacturing
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Besides the mere occurrence of conflicts or tension, topics and reasons were likewise 
inquired. Illustration 38 shows their relative importance, with topics being named in an 
unprompted manner by participants and shadings in the illustration reflecting their 
mentioning frequency.  
 
 
Illustration 38: Topics for cross-functional competition 
Notably, topics affirm previous results from the analyses of cooperative intensity and 
cooperative ability. Quality topics of series production and other series-related topics 
dominate the discussion between design and production representative functions and 
account for the occurrence of most conflicts between product design and 
manufacturing. While process-related topics, such as conflicts around the reliability of 
processes, are mentioned relatively often, production-ready product design is rarely 
discussed. Production feasibility, as a dichotomous expression of whether a design is 
producible or not, is the only representative of this category. This is in so far 
astonishing, as this could be assumed to be a production representative’s most 
important task in the NPD process. The occurrence of conflicts on sufficient target-
agreed manufacturing costs reflects the low advocacy of manufacturability that has 
been analysed before. Remarkably, conflicts on management attention as a 
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
Quality 
(series 
production)
Reliable 
processes
Precise 
specifications 
and hardware 
available
Various on 
series 
production
Capacity 
issues
Management 
attention
All interfaces
Product Design - Process Design
Product Design - Production Planning
Product Design - Production Management
Product Design - Manufacturing
Production Planning - Process Design
Production Planning - Production Management
Production Planning - Manufacturing
Process Design - Production Management
Process Design - Manufacturing
Production Management - Manufacturing
Sufficient 
target agreed 
manufacturing 
costs
Production 
feasibility
Reliable 
technology
Maturity of 
development 
stage
Production 
plants mal-
functioning
All interfaces
Product Design - Process Design
Product Design - Production Planning
Product Design - Production Management
Product Design - Manufacturing
Production Planning - Process Design
Production Planning - Production Management
Production Planning - Manufacturing
Process Design - Production Management
Process Design - Manufacturing
Production Management - Manufacturing
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representative for competition on intangible resources finds recurrent mentioning. This 
may serve as an indication for a political, power-based environment.  
Little competition on the cross-functional optimum 
The analyses on occurrence and topics of cross-functional competition at CarCo show 
that there is relatively little conflict between design and manufacturing representatives 
on what the outcome of the NPD process should be in an overall optimum. There are 
conflicts that concern interaction on a meta level, such as capacity issues or the 
availability of precise specifications, as well as conflicts that concern individual 
functions’ preferences, such as reliable processes or sufficient target-agreed 
manufacturing costs. However, there are few conflicts on the overall optimum for the 
company, during which design and manufacturing would outweigh their individual 
preferences to achieve a NPD result that is optimal for the company. An example 
thereof within the case study context would be a conflict on manufacturing-optimized 
product design, in which production representatives would urge product design to 
construe their product in way that does not only satisfy the dichotomous production 
feasibility, but strives for a quicker, easier and cheaper production than a comparable 
design.  
 
Another indicator for a shortage of competition on the cross-functional optimum can be 
found when analysing priority and importance of design requirements in NPD. As in 
other large-scale industrial NPD processes, several types of design requirements exist 
at CarCo. For instance, this includes requirements for function, performance, design, 
weight, safety, producibility, sustainability, and so on. At CarCo, there seems to be a 
strict prioritization of these requirements, with product-related requirements being top 
priority, and other requirements finding themselves neglected on occasion: “They take 
care that their product fulfils all functions and fits into the assembly space, and the rest 
actually doesn’t matter” (176:18). Another informant explained in more detail: “I don’t 
believe that we [production, author’s note] are the first one he [product designer, 
author’s note] thinks of, he couldn’t care less, he has to bring a product to fly. He throws 
it over the edge to us, and actually asks us for things that are so expensive that it 
almost topples a requirement. But CarCo is wired like that, that if it gets extreme, in 
doubt they decide in favour of the product. And with manufacturing it’s similar: As a 
production planner, you think of unburdening the manufacturer somehow, setting up a 
lean process, clearly, it’s one of your main tasks, as little manufacturing costs as 
possible, as little indirect staff as possible. But if you’re really after something, exactly 
the same approach [as described above, author’s note] is valid for us” (82:72). The 
sheer amount and complexity of design requirements might also contribute to product 
designers neglecting requirements of other functional counterparts. “The product 
designer has 1000 boundary conditions, therefore production topics are rather a nice-
to-have thing than anything else” (146:16).  
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Unsurprisingly, functional structures are identified as one of the main reasons why the 
cross-functional optimum is deprioritized against the own functional optimum. “Missing 
my own objectives, in favour of my neighbour or for the success of the entire company 
- even if it would be better for the cross-functional optimum – no one would do that” 
(125:15). Of course, this does not necessarily mean that a cross-functional optimum is 
impossible - with every function contesting for their own respective functional 
requirements, the cross-functional optimum could as well emerge at some point. At 
CarCo, however, this competition seems to be suspended, because upstream 
functions would likely win all such contests. As a consequence, downstream functions 
do not seem to engage in such contests in the first place. When asked for the power 
structure in CarCo’s NPD process, a production management employee described it 
as follows: “In any case, it’s product design [with the strongest power, author’s note]. 
The production department is less esteemed, and manufacturing indeed even less so” 
(156:11). An overwhelming majority of informants confirms this impression when asked 
for the power structure, with product design perceived as the most powerful function, 
and manufacturing seen as the weakest one.  
 
Notably, informants acknowledge that the identified lack of competition on the cross-
functional optimum is unfavourable, and express their wish for more such competition. 
The following statement of a product designer, who reflects on design’s obligation to 
check for manufacturability, is insightful thereof: “Actually it’s wrong to have that 
together in one organization, after all you lack a system of checks and balances. The 
danger is, that you get some kind of cuddle-solution, but not the overall optimum. For 
this, it would have to be possible that they can crash at some point, and are not 
organizationally bound” (141:10). Another informant phrased his desire for more 
competition on the cross-functional optimum as follows: “The overall optimum has to 
be the focus, and for this you have to talk to each other. It doesn’t help if we only 
optimize manufacturing costs. Product design has its focus, production planning has 
its focus, but it needs to be the overall optimum, and for this we have to talk to each 
other" (152:24). Even more so, a chance for a win-win situation for both sides of the 
interface seems achievable, as long as a discussion takes place: “There are some 
things that we could get indeed at zero cost, there are some win-win-situations that 
both the production planner and product design would benefit from. But you have to 
talk to each other to reach that” (152:23).  
 
Furthermore, informants recognize that competition on the cross-functional optimum 
is insufficient, although required cross-functional structures for discussion and 
argumentation are in fact existent in many instances. “That’s exactly the point, where 
I say, I now sit here, having my project work, having this theoretically cross-functional 
topic, having this cross-functional team with selected people from manufacturing, with 
a production planner, a process specialist… all of these people that should in fact be 
key figures for manufacturing, having the big overview and also the expertise. But 
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nevertheless [pauses, author’s note] - that’s what I say, that’s where it suffers” (163:8). 
It seems that it’s all there - CarCo disposes of many structures to encourage cross-
functional discourse to pursue the overall optimum – nevertheless competition seems 
to be rarely emerging from it. One prominent example for these structures within the 
case study setting is represented by the hardware concept workshops. They constitute 
a core element of cross-functional integration, allowing for competition on the cross-
functional optimum, but appear to remain below their potential. Typically, product 
designers let the workshop roll off their back, and production representatives have 
either insufficient knowledge or insufficient incentives to really challenge their design 
counterparts (66:1). An interview participant described the same dilemma in reference 
to another existent structure that ought to encourage cross-functional cooperation: “So 
these walls and borders, actually we’ve invented the simultaneous engineering for it, 
that you do not just throw things over, but these walls still stand strong. That’s why they 
introduced the simultaneous engineering teams, to make the functions sit together. But 
only product designers are sitting in there” (181:23).  
Informal relations inhibit competition 
When searching for patterns in competition occurrence in dependence of the examined 
interface (see illustration 37), it becomes evident that adjacent functions experience 
relatively less friction than others. For example, the adjacent interface between product 
design and process design has a high share of mentioning for “no competition”, while 
the non-adjacent interface of process design – manufacturing has barely any informant 
arguing for “no competition”. Exemptions to this pattern include non-adjacent interface 
of product design – production planning, which receives high shares of mentioning for 
“no competition”, and the interface of production planning – manufacturing, for which 
“existing competition” is mentioned relatively frequently. Overall, competition seems to 
be on the rise, the more downstream functions are involved. This might help explain 
the two mentioned exemptions.  
 
Notably, adjacent interfaces were found to have the strongest informal relationships in 
earlier analyses and exhibited the most pronounced cooperative intensity. Possibly, 
informal relationships and resulting mutual sympathetic feelings impede the 
emergence of conflicts, frictions and therefore competition in the sense of the study at 
hand. Indeed, informants at CarCo described a similar behaviour from their own 
experience: “The production planner is only product design’s attorney in the end. That’s 
because the two of them discuss, against each other, but at some point they have to 
find an agreement. When the planner discusses with the manufacturer later, then of 
course the planner has to defend the result he achieved, and that’s how he 
automatically defends the product designer’s opinion […]. On a hardware concept 
workshop they are aligned to the point that also the process designer defends the 
product designer’s concept just like an attorney. And certainly, the planner also takes 
the product designer’s position. You see the sequence here” (131:33). Also, from the 
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author’s own experience, such a tendency is comprehensible. In her participant role in 
production management highlighting potentials for manufacturing cost optimization, 
the author engaged in discussions with all functions in NPD. While in the beginning, it 
felt easy to raise evident potentials and critically address designers, it became more 
difficult in the course of time, when informal relations had been established (200:1). 
This potential dilemma of a possibly detrimental consequence arising from strong 
informal relations is well represented by an interview participant’s quote: “You do a lot 
of networking, and I notice that I learn more for myself, but the product is not 
necessarily becoming better through that” (154:36). 
Upstream functions wait out conflicts 
A production representative, being asked how conflicts are handled with product 
design, provided the following insight: “There are often cases, where I sometimes have 
the feeling that people play for time. Then the design freeze is over, and it is what it is 
then. That’s a sentence which we hear from time to time, the “it is what it is now”, and 
regarding that, you’re often given quite a lot of rope from product design, and then they 
say well, now there’s nothing I can change anymore. Instead, only with much pressure 
and escalation and back and forth, you get into it, actually a bit is always possible, it’s 
just quite tedious” (170:22). Indeed, many case study informants share this impression 
of upstream functions defensively sitting out potential conflicts with downstream 
functions, or ignoring downstream requirements until the NPD process requires 
moving on and the resulting design freeze makes further design changes impossible. 
Notably, upstream functions themselves appear to be aware of this tendency, as this 
product designer’s quote indicates: “I don’t want to say that I’d wait this out, that I 
discuss a bit longer and let time play for me, but if things are time-critical [pauses, 
author’s note] […] - you always have to weigh it up” (163:33). Several observations 
make an affirmative contribution to this assumption. In different rounds of hardware 
and virtual concept workshops in the course of a year, the same points regarding 
manufacturability were discussed all over again. Although for each workshop, a to-do 
list was derived and measures were being tracked, these measures did not seem to 
be worked off by product design (65:2). Another scenery from a several hours long 
hardware concept workshop sheds more insight. Different functions discussed a high 
voltage battery hardware draft, with participants ranging from product design, process 
design, production management and production planning, and no manufacturer being 
present. During the workshop, product designers were rather defensive, rarely actively 
raising critical or arguable points, waiting for production representatives to notice any 
process-critical aspects. Product designers mostly stood in groups a bit behind the 
product, while production representatives went around to examine the product for any 
aspects critizable from a manufacturing, quality or service perspective. Comments like 
“Oh, I hoped this would go unnoticed” (63:1) by the product designers show that they 
rather saw the hardware concept day as a gauntlet running, where they hoped that this 
cup passed from them, instead of using the workshop to receive feedback and 
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sparring, or at least pro-actively explaining and promoting their design (7:7, 63:1). 
Other representative answers from product design on critical feedback from production 
representatives included the following statements: “This will look different in the end 
anyway”, “This is going to change until the next prototype phase”, “This won’t stay like 
that, we’ll take the cable harness from a different supplier anyways”. As a consequence 
to these statements, any discussion finds an end. Naturally, production representatives 
can’t say anything against these answers, but have to wait for the indicated product 
change (66:2), after which the design freeze may already have suffocated any room 
for discussion.  
 
Naturally, compared with functions more downstream the NPD process, upstream 
functions such as product and process design dispose of more information on a certain 
design stage, its strengths and weaknesses, as well as its consequences for other 
functional stakeholders in the company. Case study informants shared their 
impression that upstream functions make use of this information asymmetry to block 
away potentially uncomfortable inputs from other functional stakeholders. “There are 
always discussions that we wouldn’t achieve our development or production goals [by 
implementing a manufacturability optimization, author’s note], but I don’t always 
believe that. Then it shows through, that it would be indeed achievable, it would just 
be a new way” (162:5). A respective participant observation was also made during 
discussions in a product design team, when optimization potentials for 
manufacturability were discussed. Several of the optimization potentials were rejected 
on a technical basis without further explanation. As an example, an alternative 
mounting concept was precluded because it would not correspond to stability 
requirements. Present production representatives were unable to technically challenge 
this statement, therefore accepting the explanation and ending the discussion (2:2). A 
similar observation was made during a hardware concept workshop, where product 
design rejected criticism by insisting that the part is required for product performance, 
which neither could be refuted nor challenged by the present production 
representatives (17:3). At times, playing out information asymmetry might even be 
perceived as a kind of admired skill in a large-scale industrial setting, as this 
informant’s quote suggests: “I’ve heard from employees from different functions, that 
in the NPD business, you simply have to learn how to throw around bones. […]. Then 
the internal controller comes, then you throw him a bone, go and hunt that, and that’s 
how I got myself a bit of free air to get the work done. I’ve heard it from a rather high-
ranking product designer. It’s his greatest art, that’s what a product design team 
manager said. As a product design team manager, you simply have to know how to 
throw around bones, such that your men can work.” (158:36). An employee who started 
in product design and later changed to the manufacturing department, described the 
following experience: “Product design still acts in a way which makes them the most 
important ones, and that’s the problem, clearly. For me, it was a meltdown at the time 
when I came from product design to production planning and then to manufacturing. 
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Before I brought my employees to the point where we’d set the tone, not dancing to 
the bidding of product design anymore. One example was about [names product name, 
author’s note]: I always flatly contradicted the product designer, and then he, by 
purpose, invited me to a meeting on a Friday at 9am, of which he knew exactly that I’d 
be having a meeting by that time, but of course I nevertheless appeared there. By that 
time, my people had already fell over and had themselves dictated another variant, but 
I did not fall over. Then the product designer just grinned, saying well yes, in the 
background we’ll change that” (131:22).  
 
Another aspect that appears to be impeding competition at CarCo’s design – 
manufacturing interface is rooted in modular product design concepts, building on 
product platform architectures, as they are often utilized for complex products such as 
cars or airplanes. Within modular product design, individual products are not construed 
from scratch in every NPD effort, but strive to share as many common components 
with preceding products on the same platform as possible. Evidently, this limits 
downstream functions’ voice to change a certain product design, e.g. to improve 
manufacturability. “What you’ve seen in product design is that […], manufacturing tries 
to optimize, for understandable reasons, as much as possible in the new product 
generation, what they didn’t like in the old one, what was inconvenient. However, on 
part of product design, there is the statement that we’ve got order to design a technical 
overhaul of the old generation, in which some things are changed but the rest is take 
it or leave it” (167:20). Of course, being aware of an occasionally opportunistic usage 
of information asymmetry by design functions, production representatives may be 
unsure if their improvement ideas are rejected due to a well-reasoned platform 
argument, or rejected on this ground because it is the easiest way to go for product 
design. A pertinent observation was made during a discussion between product 
management and the product design team on manufacturability optimization 
potentials. Little feedback was provided regarding the ideas, few conflict or discussion 
arose. Frequently, the only comment was “Well, that’s a carry-over part from the 
preceding product generation”, put forward as an indisputable argument suffocating 
any further discussion (33:1). 
As a result, so-called lead derivatives, which are developed as the first innovation-
leading product on a platform architecture and which determine large parts of 
succeeding derivatives, should be granted particular attention by downstream 
functions to ensure their requirements are considered there. However, in the light of 
the analysis of innovative products as potential inhibitors of cooperative ability, this 
might be difficult to achieve.  
Downstream functions avoid conflicts 
As described above, the functional distribution at the design – manufacturing interface 
of CarCo includes so-called bridging functions. These are functional representatives 
of design or production, who are situated closer to their cross-functional counterpart 
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with regard to the temporal sequence of involvement in NPD. For example, production 
planning clearly is a production representative, but engages quite early in the NPD 
process, interacting with product and process design counterparts quite closely. As 
another example, process design, as a design representative, interacts closely with 
production representatives to develop reliable production technologies. Presumptively, 
such a bridging role entails a responsibility to challenge upstream functions as 
spokesmen for their downstream functional relative. However, bridging functions at 
CarCo appear to avoid the alleged challenging function: “Process design does it just 
the other way round, so he doesn’t live the role but even rather backs off, and, as you 
say, rather takes sides with product design instead of manufacturing” (157:18). 
Bridging functions sometimes seem to be engaged to create an atmosphere of 
harmony in the discussion, as the following experience at a hardware concept 
workshop suggests. Production representatives repeatedly emphasized gratitude 
towards product design, for them taking part in the workshop and being available for 
discussion. A process designer stated: “We illustrate so many problems here, and this 
all seems so negative, but in fact so much works really nicely between us” as well as 
“We don’t have problems here, we have challenges” (63:2). The author later asked the 
process designer about his intention for these statements. His answer emphasizes that 
production feels that such cross-functional cooperation is quite a concession on the 
part of product design: “After the last workshop, we got the feedback that so much 
negative things came up, and product design felt a lot like being under attack. That’s 
why it’s important to praise, in the end it’s great that product design participates at all” 
(63:3). Possibly, this might be related to the above analysis of strong informal relations 
between adjacent functions that encumber competition. An informant provided insight 
on such a potential inner conflict: “And that’s where process design with its prototype 
factory is caught in the middle between two stools. On one hand, they are close to the 
headquarters, close to the product designers, knowing them much better than the 
manufacturer which is simply due to the spatial closeness, and due to the closeness 
to the decision committees around here they know how it looks like. So they just can’t 
stab in the back of the product design teams, where they sit in themselves. 
Simultaneously, they also can’t stab the back from the manufacturer. So they sit in 
some kind of hermaphrodite role, that’s true” (167:18).  
 
Interestingly, instead of engaging in discussions with upstream functions to challenge 
designs for their suitability to be manufactured, production representatives appear to 
react with sarcasm to designs that are unfavourable for them in some instances. At 
hardware concept workshops, there was an ironic, sometimes even cynical 
atmosphere prevailing, when manufacturability problems appeared. Notably, 
production representatives contribute to this atmosphere. “That’s certainly poka-yoke”, 
was an ironical statement of a process designer to an evidently not poka-yoke cable 
harness, while no measure was derived to address the topic. Another example was an 
ironical statement of a prototype worker to a seemingly not well thought-through plug: 
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“That is all well thought-through”, without any further call to the present product 
designer to change it. “Oh man, I hoped no one would notice this”, was another process 
designer’s comment on additional manual activity that could have been avoided by 
manufacturing-ready product design (68:1).  
 
While downstream functions appear to be deterred from engaging into intense 
competition with product design to speak up for their functional requirements, 
compulsory targets may be able to bring them to the table. One example in the case 
study context were service representatives involved in NPD to take care of service 
requirements, for example ease of disassembly in garages. At CarCo, service 
representatives have strict quantitative objectives regarding the amount of time and 
effort a service employee needs to dissemble a component. As a result, they are 
permanent members of hardware concept workshops, and service requirements are 
as well quite present with product designers, even in product design team discussions 
where the service representative is not present in person. A production planner 
commented on the topic: “We know exactly what it costs to insert a screw here that 
might have to be disassembled in service. And that under no circumstances may it 
happen that something more or less has to be done there. But with regard to 
production, I’ve never seen a similar discussion” (161:25).  
Similarly, downstream functions at the design-manufacturing interface may be 
engaged by compulsory objectives alike, as their increased engagement with target 
agreement coming closer suggests. “The closer we come to target agreement, where 
it’s all about agreeing targets long-term and irreversibly, the higher is the own incentive 
to join the discussion (155:6). 
7.2.3.2 Leadership-related situational factors 
Cross-functional conflicts are escalated away 
As already described, CarCo cultivates a consensus-driven corporate environment. If 
conflicts emerge, they are typically handled and solved on an operational level. With 
regard to cross-functional conflicts, which have been found to be rare anyhow, this 
does not appear to hold true, though. “I’m not involved in any conflicts between the 
product design and the production department at the moment. I have the feeling that 
these are relatively quickly handed over to the management hierarchy, maybe because 
the interlinking on the operational level is not the closest” (127:38). Cross-functional 
conflicts seem to be escalated towards the management level rapidly. This appears to 
be true for all involved functions at the design-manufacturing interface of CarCo. A 
product designer described his experiences on conflict handling: “I wasn’t dealing with 
the manufacturer himself, instead it was always already a project leader or plant project 
leader that I had to deal with, who were putting on the pressure” (130:26). A 
manufacturer pronounces what he thinks helps in handling conflicts with product 
design: “Being penetrant. Escalating” (159:4).  
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Management levels at CarCo tend to be similarly conflict-avoiding as operational 
levels, though potentially for other reasons, as informants suggest: “What I notice are 
topics that are discussed on a management level – well it’s political there, [...] and 
many conflicts are avoided […]. On the working level, or the group leader level, I didn’t 
notice any real clashes with product design” (127:29). The experience of a production 
planner, who escalated manufacturability concerns, which, however, were not brought 
to discussion with product design, is insightful in this respect: “Regarding 
manufacturability, there was one example for the battery, [names production planning 
person, author’s note], he had quite some ideas, where they always said yeah yeah, 
it’s alright. Who was quite ignored, in fact. And then, at the SOP of this battery, we 
really had these problems […]. So [names production planning person, author’s note], 
he could tell you quite some things. But in the end he was made a victim of all that.” 
(179:11).  
Low decisiveness holds up competition 
“We are a bit weak in decision-making. But that’s not because the facts are not on the 
table, it’s because we don’t dare to decide” (160:14). During data analysis at the case 
study’s empirical setting, similar statements were perceived repeatedly. Informants 
explained weak decisiveness in some cases with CarCo’s consensus-based decision-
making culture: “We have a remarkable committee culture here, the committees 
decide, no individual person decides. That’s quite nice if you can hide behind a 
committee decision” (162:15), allegedly often connected with a negative perception. 
“We divide up responsibility as long as nobody is responsible anymore, and only then 
we decide” (126:17). The existence of shadow committees in itself, as it has been 
identified in the analysis of cooperative intensity, is a strong indicator for low 
decisiveness. At times, formal committees are insufficiently decisive, but nevertheless 
the organizations needs guidance and therefore follows unofficial decisions taken by 
shadow committees. 
Remarkably, this seems to be less an issue of cross-functional nature, but more within 
functions: “The department interfaces, you need them, and they’re not super-efficient, 
but internally we go around in circles more often […] but that’s related to the 
decisiveness around here. Because we analyse the same topic 100.000 times” (82:35). 
Time pressure from throwing over already-made decisions, or waiting out decisions 
until a last possible point in time, is perceived as a detrimental consequence. “In a later 
NPD phase, we start throwing over everything that we’ve defined in an early phase, 
we’re incredibly bad at this” (82:45). 
 
What makes this observation interesting in relation to this study’s central research 
questions, however, is low decisiveness’ impact on cross-functional integration. 
Indeed, the case study data permits the conclusion that time pressure resulting from 
weak decisiveness impedes cross-functional competition. A production planner’s 
statement on time pressure’s consequences on cross-functional interaction is 
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representative thereof: “This evidently makes it more difficult to integrate all interfaces, 
because most of them are preoccupied with themselves. It’s difficult to manage to 
synchronize the result that you have worked out with all interface partners, be it 
logistics, manufacturing, product design. Therefore, when you’ve worked out your 
result, the whole thing is already outdated again because you have new requirements 
and that’s why everyone stews in their own juice. You never have the chance to align 
with the others” (171:3). On competition in particular, time pressure appears to have a 
paralyzing effect, as two quotes from production representatives suggest: “At the 
beginning, they did it really well [to discuss manufacturability concerns with product 
design, author’s note] but since we came into this rush mode, all they say is, the main 
thing is that the product’s okay” (82:103). “By now, there’s not much you can change 
anymore, anyways. If you now start to run at each other [at the cross-functional 
counterpart, author’s note], you’ll get your stuff done even less so” (128:18).  
7.2.3.3 Complexity-related situational factors 
Complexity allows for smokescreening 
Insufficient transparency towards cross-functional counterparts has already been 
identified in the course of this analysis. When looking for underlying reasons, the case 
study database suggests that complexity inherent in large-scale industrial settings with 
multi-composite products and multi-layered corporate processes provides a setting 
that makes transparency harder at most, and potentially nurtures deliberate 
smokescreening, i.e. hiding certain information under a veil of complexity.  
 
Financial steering processes at CarCo represent a frequently mentioned field of non-
transparency. “Somehow, we always reach our objectives, however this works 
[laughing, author’s note]. And just in case, there is a bit of turning or discussing until 
we arrive there” (153:34). During budgeting processes, non-transparency translates 
into buffers. An interview participant describes how the logic of financial steering 
processes in large-scale industrial settings educates stakeholders to use complexity 
for their own benefit: “The largest problem that production planners have is, that in 
large companies as CarCo, you’re always praised when you give back budget. And 
you always get hit at the head if you calculate your product very sharply, hoping if it’s 
really on the edge you’ll receive another few millions. If we would manage to introduce 
a shift in this thinking, I’m sure that cost-efficiency would raise by 10% in the next years. 
I’m a 100% sure, because we hide 10% and we are educated by top management to 
hide this 10%. […]. It’s a two-sided medal, I’m aware of that, but sadly it’s steered like 
that, that every, and really every reasonable project leader relies on buffers. And for 
the manufacturer it is the same (158:15). Another quote sheds further insight on the 
topic: “We’ve made ourselves naked once, saying we plan really sharply this year. But 
everyone saw what happened to this colleague, he came on the hit list […]. Because 
he made himself naked, he got really into trouble, because he couldn’t give any more 
[savings, author’s note]. This watering can principle of controlling kills us. Every year, 
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you bring your 2.5% and the other side brings it, because you’re already wired like it. 
If, as a vehicle project leader, I get a new vehicle into the plant, he splits his ratio topics 
up for the next six years, because he knows exactly he has to deliver them, and keeps 
them in respective drawers. That’s a core problem, that’s why a planner cannot act as 
he likes, and why a manufacturer cannot act as he likes, because he has to keep in 
mind that if I do that, I’ll be naked next year, then I’ll get into trouble when the watering 
can comes” (158:16).  
 
Indeed, handling inherent complexity at environments such as CarCo is challenging 
for all involved functional counterparts. In order to be able to comprehend, and 
potentially challenge, a cross-functional counterparts’ statement, a stakeholder would 
be required to dive deep into the factual background and permeate the attached 
complexity. Naturally, this contradicts work-economic possibilities, as full 
comprehension would require an extensive effort and time. However, giving up on full 
comprehension risks to bring the cross-functional counterpart into a position where he 
has to accept potential smokescreening and risks to overlook consequences on his 
own function. “In an early phase, you need a certain abstraction level, where in the 
past it was said that you shouldn’t simplify it to the point where it becomes wrong. And 
here we are at a point, where you can’t give a generic answer. It’s a border walk, a 
certain simplification is necessary, such that things stay manageable, but on the other 
hand, the things you simplify can lead to large problems, and we’ve experienced 
masses of them ourselves” (148:42).  
And with all the inherent complexity at all involved functions, in all involved processes, 
blurs from resulting non-transparency add up and dilute the overall analysis. “You have 
a huge problem in such a large company, you have to ensure economic profitability. 
Now you have multi-projects, meaning you have one development platform […]. Now 
the board looks at it when it is said that we want to have a new derivative, and is this 
derivative profitable. Now there are so many factors that influence this product [….]. 
From my gut feeling, I’d say until today we don’t manage to calculate a true business 
case […]. We make the best of the given facts, and build up a huge catalogue of 
premises and assumptions, saying assembly times are such and such, the plant is 
such and such, and further assumptions are such and such. And we go from one 
assumption to the next one. And in reality, it all comes differently” (158:14). Informants 
are convinced that achieving transparency in the light of a large-scale industrial 
environment’s complexity is an essential challenge for all similar organizations. “That’s 
a bit the crux of the entire matter. We stand in our own way with that way of calculating 
[the business case of our products, author’s note]. I discussed with the other OEMs, 
and they all have the same problem. Although the solution is so close. It’s damn 
complicated, you barely get to achieve any transparency” (158:37).  
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Governance functions unable to challenge 
As has been been analysed above, complexity makes full comprehension and a 
resulting ability to challenge statements of cross-functional counterparts difficult, even 
for stakeholders that are involved in the NPD process of a certain product. For 
governance functions, such as central financial controlling, it is clearly even more 
difficult. “The controllers have a completely different focus on it than someone from 
product design or from production, and it’s just not possible to clear up all questions to 
100% […]. It’s quite complex, and quite cumbersome across so many hierarchical 
levels” (143:23). 
In the light of the above analysis at the design-manufacturing interface, which indicated 
that involved stakeholders, even from manufacturing, have low advocacy of the cross-
functional optimum in general and manufacturability in particular, this becomes 
important for the analysis of cross-functional competition. Namely, according to the 
analysis, central governance functions may be the only spokesperson for these topics. 
“Controlling, as the guardian of the entire product-related costs, has a large interest in 
minimizing them, and with them we have most discussions around manufacturing 
costs. They’re always too high in their view, in general, and likewise the calculation 
methodology. We had a discussion with one of the controlling colleagues earlier this 
year, and they have not a clue of an idea how we calculate that” (155:8). Indeed, this 
responsibility of governance functions is acknowledged within the organization: “The 
controller is of essential importance, around all of these product areas […] because 
they’re wired very differently than the product areas, they’re very different from these 
people, who usually just want to have fun with their robots, products, or whatever” 
(158:28).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the inability to challenge functions on a factual basis creates 
discontent, as challenge approaches are perceived as arbitrary. “Procurement 
controlling for example, they countercheck our planning. But we have production 
processes at the new product, which they just don’t have […]. What came out at the 
end, we talked about it, and they just took our values minus 5%. Well, thank you. 
Because they just don’t know any better” (163:22). In the case study database, 
repeated evidence for such discontent can be found, with operational functions 
differentiating themselves from governance functions. “The designer himself does 
barely arrive to do his job, because he’s permanently externally steered and controlled, 
because we pack on a product design team, with two to three designers on board, we 
pack seven to eight controllers on it” (158:2). “Sadly, we had more hand-raising 
functions than people that actually do the job” (158:2). Furthermore, a vicious circle 
that slows down and further increases complexity of NPD appears to emerge: 
Governance functions may start to distrust operational functions, as they cannot 
challenge their statements. In an effort to grasp potential pitfalls, they take more time 
to analyse statements. Consequently, as operational functions need to provide 
explanations to their governance colleagues, they have less time to work on their 
  158 
statements and need to take assumptions, which further increase blurs and non-
transparency. “There are departments that take more time for themselves than you as 
a value-creating department have. For example controlling, It’s really like that, they 
sometimes have four weeks of time to evaluate and you yourself have only two weeks 
to do the work” (171:12).  
 
As a direct consequence thereof, discontent and the mentioned consequences are 
translated to the target-setting process, which is a representative of a process steered 
by central governance functions and takes uttermost importance in CarCo’s NPD 
process. “Controlling derives a target for product-related costs from different 
methodologies. Implicitly, a target for manufacturing costs is included in there, mostly 
via preceding products, profitability ambitions and so on. Controlling derives that out 
of the blue, just as it likes” (126:36). In particular, it was criticized that targets are not 
set early enough on a sufficiently granular level, such that any building up of buffers 
would be prevented. “Before target agreement, they [targets, author’s note] are rather 
spongy, but as soon as the product steering committee gives its okay to the overall 
sum, then the whole thing is through and the target is set. They’re measured hard 
against this target, but before, they have the chance to build up endless buffers” 
(143:64). “The target guideline, actually it’s there relatively early on the vehicle project 
level and on the platform level, but just not as granular as it would be of relevance for 
us” (155:25).  
Competition scarcity around innovative projects 
The analysis of cooperative ability revealed that for innovative projects, it is more 
difficult to develop effective cross-functional structures at the design-manufacturing 
interface. A similar tendency seems to hold true for the analysis of cross-functional 
competition. For innovative projects, there seems to be less cross-functional conflict 
when building on a green field, both for product and process design, than in a brown 
field project, where product design has to integrate with an existent platform or known 
technology, and process design has to work with existing plant structures and 
production technologies. Several reasons thereof are provided. To begin with, cross-
functional counterparts may not be sufficiently familiar with new technologies to provide 
critical feedback, or do not yet exist at all. “When I started here, there wasn’t anything, 
there was no manufacturer who could have intervened in product design […]. And 
likewise production planning, they had never planned an electrified engine before, they 
just had no clue” (147:2). Second, manufacturing’s involvement is naturally higher 
when the newly developed product has to be integrated into plant structures and 
production technology which they already operate. For green field developments, this 
simply is not the case. In this respect, the analysed innovative, green field case of 
electrified powertrain development contrasts strongly with brown field development 
projects in CarCo’s combustion engine departments. “I know that my colleagues from 
the combustion engine, they have conflicts [between manufacturing and production 
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planning, author’s note], but there the starting point is a different one. You have a 
grown structure there […]. For us, at the end of the day, everything we plan is on a 
green field and therefore there are less conflicts” (148:35).  
 
Evidently, this tendency has the potential to become a pitfall for succeeding projects. 
If as a green field project, competition had been scarce and design functions had their 
will with no significant feedback from downstream functions, the project outcome 
stands at risk of being suboptimal with regard to downstream requirements. With 
production volumes being still small, the green field project is likely to receive not the 
same scrutiny and rigor as larger projects. “I think what is very important are the 
volumes. In the case where we start a new project and are in the early phase, volumes 
are still quite manageable when compared with other projects at CarCo […]. And I think 
that product design still has that perspective, that those few high voltage batteries, we’ll 
get them manufactured somehow” (170:36). In the aftermath of the smaller innovation 
project, however, when the innovation project was successful and succeeding 
products are decided to be built on the same product platform or within the same plant 
structures, the design space is limited to accommodate downstream functions’ 
requirements, which now come to light due to more intense involvement and increased 
pressure due to higher production volumes. Product designs are required to share 
communal components with the first product, process designs have to cope with 
existing technologies and production lines. The possible pitfall is evident, as the 
following statement expresses: “Actually, at the beginning, you should invest a lot more 
of thinking into it, I have the chance to make it right for once – because when an idea 
has been established at some point we’re in the same situation as all are, that you say 
I’ve created a solution somehow, which emerged from out of my guts or on short term, 
then it’s perhaps not the optimal solution, but nevertheless I have to live with it in the 
long run” (148:36).  
7.3 Summary and theoretical model 
7.3.1 Summary of analysis 
In the previous chapters, coopetitive behaviour at CarCo’s design-manufacturing 
interface was analysed in order to be able to draw conclusions on cross-functional 
integration. In the course of the in-depth analysis of all coopetition dimensions, social 
dynamics were discovered that continuously shape integration at the examined 
interface. The coopetitive perspective enabled a deeper and more comprehensive 
view, than an analysis following typical empirical measurements of cross-functional 
integration would have allowed for. While cooperative intensity and cooperative ability 
seamlessly cover behavioural structured facets of integration as well as the more 
attitudinal, intangible aspects, the competition dimension allows to conceive conflicting 
aspects inherent to integration, which find mentioning in Kahn’s (1996) two-pillar model 
but seldom are operationalized in measurements of existing studies. Critically weighing 
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up different functional requirements is undoubtedly part of any effective cross-
functional integration and seldom remains frictionless. Coopetitive behaviour therefore 
allows to analyse integration from a more extensive angle, and therefore helps to 
explain inconsistencies inherent to cross-functional integration research.  
 
From the analysis of coopetitive behaviour at CarCo’s design-manufacturing interface, 
the following conclusions on cross-functional integration may be summarized that 
reflect the identified second-order themes.  
Communication and informal interaction are strong, but mostly focused on adjacent 
interfaces (a). The simultaneous occurrence of perceived inefficiency of formal 
relations (c) and importance of informal relations (b) cause a particular reliance on 
informally closely integrated adjacent interfaces. Manufacturing, connected to design 
across a long chain of adjacent interfaces, is therefore on the sidelines during the 
design process, which is shown by its late integration (d), causing frequent rejections 
of manufacturing inputs. Based on intensive efforts to foster cross-functional 
integration, channels, contacts and processes to that end are manifold. Indeed, their 
abundancy tends to lead to confusion, with manufacturing inputs sometimes getting 
lost in the multi-layered processes to address them (e). When analysing those contents 
that eventually are discussed and addressed between design and manufacturing, 
relevant findings suggest that these are focused on series topics and information 
purposes, with little controversial discussion on development projects (f). 
Communication patterns at the design-manufacturing interface accumulate mostly at 
two ends of the spectrum: Either, communication is transactional and passive, or 
conflict has risen to a point where walls have built up. Content-focused, constructive 
discussions appear to be the minority (g).  
 
With regard to cooperative ability, cultural differences between design and production 
representatives, which are broadly assumed in existing literature, can be confirmed. 
Between product design and manufacturing in particular, mindsets seem almost 
diametrical for a broad range of aspects (h). A particular mindset trait from 
manufacturing is brought to light, which particularly contradicts design’s requirements: 
the former demands reliable specifications and hardware, having difficulties to work 
with assumptions or abstract models (i). Mechanisms that seek to establish a social 
differentiation against indirect functions can be observed strongly with manufacturing 
representatives, with a resulting perceived distance of manufacturing (j).  
Overall, manufacturing does not seem to be recognized at full eye level for matters 
concerning NPD. Limited interest and estimation for manufacturing activities is 
accompanied by the admiration of design activities (k). Manufacturability requirements 
are difficult to place in NPD, due to their elusive nature and due to a perceived 
obligation of manufacturing to ensure manufacturability, not design (l). Notably, 
however, manufacturability has low advocacy also with production representatives for 
different reasons that range from the manufacturer not benefitting from low 
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manufacturing costs in the transfer-price-based system of large corporations, up to the 
time lag distorting responsibilities in long-term NPD projects (m).  
A series of dynamics was identified which impede cooperative ability at the CarCo 
interface with its particular situational conditions. Astonishingly, innovation appears to 
make integration more difficult, inter alia because cross-functional experience and 
contributions often are yet absent for innovative projects (n). Extensive supplier 
involvement, as it is typical for large-scale industrial endeavours, constitutes a further 
hindrance factor (o). Functional structures, which are known impeding factors for 
cross-functional integration, are found to be strongly self-sustaining based on 
corporate steering and management power considerations typical for large-scale 
corporations (p). In a similar manner, a lack of cross-functional transparency and trust 
continuously undermines efforts for enhanced integration (q). Likewise typical for 
large-scale industrial operations, cooperation is dependent on formally defined 
agreements and processes, which often cannot be sustained for innovative projects, 
hence impeding integration (r).  
 
Concerning competition, little conflicts or controversial discussions on the cross-
functional optimum of different design requirements is found, be they driven by 
manufacturability or design. Informants are well aware of this circumstance, calling for 
more competition, but seem caught in a functional orientation with a predetermined 
requirement hierarchy. Cross-functional structures do exist, but they do rarely succeed 
in creating critical competition, thus remaining coordination and information exchanges 
(s). A lack of cross-functional competition can be explained by strong informal relations 
at adjacent interfaces, building on reciprocity and avoiding conflict (t). Moreover, there 
appears to be a tendency of design functions defensively waiting out conflicts with 
downstream functions, as they benefit from information asymmetry and have time on 
their side (u). Furthermore, downstream functions tend to avoid conflicts as well; often 
only brought to the table when organizational targets enforce them to (v).  
Further, leadership-related aspects deter competition from more frequent occurrence. 
For power consideration reasons, management levels tend to avoid conflict, which is 
disadvantageous in so far as cross-functional conflicts, if they emerge, are often 
escalated to management levels and not solved at the operational level (w). 
Furthermore, repeated instances of sluggish decisiveness, typical for mature large-
scale companies, impede competition because of the time pressure that results on 
NPD when eventually a decision is taken (x).  
The complexity inherent to large-scale NPD projects makes it difficult for involved 
individuals to critically challenge their cross-functional counterparts (z), allowing for 
smokescreening (y) at the interface. Lastly, innovative projects find less competition at 
the design-manufacturing interface as manufacturing representatives often are not yet 
existent to utter controversial inputs (ab).  
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7.3.2 Theoretical model 
The analysis of cross-functional integration by taking a coopetitive perspective allowed 
for an in-depth understanding of underlying dynamics at the design-manufacturing 
interface. While the manifestation of cross-functional integration analysed from the 
empirical setting of the case study is naturally case-specific, identified dynamics that 
shape and produce cross-functional integration allow for theoretical generalization. 
Aiming at a higher-level theoretical reflection of the analysis at hand, the three 
categories of coopetition are abandoned and second-order themes that emerged from 
the data are built upon. When looking at those free from prior categorization, interesting 
conclusions may be derived from combinations of content-wise related themes. Eight 
overarching dynamics emerge, which are believed to be valid for other cases beyond 
the examined empirical context. They can be classified into three broader categories, 
as they are specific to a certain functional interface (interface-specific dynamics), 
specific to a certain context or situational setting (contextual dynamics), or inherent in 
the social nature of involved participants (social dynamics). Together, they form a 
model of cross-functional interface dynamics at the design-manufacturing interface, 
which will be described at the end of this chapter. In the following, every identified 
dynamic will be described as part of their respective category. 
7.3.2.1 Social dynamics 
At its core, cross-functional integration is a bundle of social activities, with human 
beings interacting, cooperating and even competing. A series of identified second-
order themes assumes expression thereof, describing social conditions and motives 
for action, which essentially seem valid for all cross-functional integration dynamics 
independent from involved functions or the situational context. In the following, 
respective overarching themes are described that may be derived from combinations 
of second-order themes.  
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Illustration 39: Social dynamics at cross-functional interfaces 
Adjacent interfaces determine integration 
In the empirical reality of cross-functional integration, many more functional units are 
existent and participating than the often discussed triad of marketing, design and 
manufacturing. Certainly, additional functions may be grouped into one of these three 
categories; however, they empirically act as separate functions with their own 
respective interface dynamics. The research at hand has shown that these dynamics 
are of high relevance for the empirical reality, as integration occurs mostly on adjacent 
interfaces of small-cut functional units, such as between process design and 
production planning.  
Many of the important preconditions for cross-functional integration identified by 
research, e.g. (formal) interaction and (informal) collaboration, seem strongest on 
adjacent interfaces and significantly less so for non-adjacent interfaces. Informal 
relationships, which build on these cooperation schemes, have been identified to be 
essential for individual effectiveness. Cross-functional integration has been confirmed 
to be a social activity at its core, with reciprocity in cross-functional relationships as a 
central motive for action.  
On the other hand, building on coopetition research, the study at hand also identified 
that close social relationships between adjacent functions stand at risk to impede 
effective integration. Identified social dynamics to explain this are as follows: Strong 
Social dynamics
Adjacent 
interfaces 
determine 
integration
Wall building 
precedes throwing 
over walls
(t) Informal relations inhibit competition
(a) High intensity at adjacent interfaces
(b) Importance of informal relations
(g) Communication tone patterns
(j) Social differentiation of manufacturing
(h) Different mindsets of design and manufacturing
(q) Lack of cross-functional transparency and trust
(p) Functional structures are self-sustaining
(k) Upstream functions over-valued, downstream under-valued
Committing on the 
cross-functional 
optimum is 
not easy
(s) Little competition on the cross-functional optimum
(v) Downstream functions avoid conflicts
(w) Cross-functional conflicts are escalated away
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social relationships discourage from conflicts that would be required to shape the 
product in development such that it respects all functional requirements. Instead, a 
“cuddling” culture, coined by reciprocity and relationship harmony, is emerging. 
Requirements of non-adjacent interfaces tend to go by the board. By the time that 
these non-adjacent interfaces become active in NPD, it could be too late to still 
integrate their requirements. In addition to that, if interaction is high with adjacent 
interfaces but not with non-adjacent interfaces, information transfer from e.g. design to 
manufacturing is slow and insufficient, similar to the dynamics of a game of Chinese 
Whispers. For the case analysed during this study, it could be shown that indeed, 
knowledge on consequences of own actions to functions downstream of NPD tends to 
be low. 
 
As a conclusion, informal relationships are able to undermine required cross-functional 
competition under certain circumstances. In this case, cross-functional interaction is 
given, but it risks to remain ineffective, and the dynamics at adjacent interfaces are 
essential root causes for this.  
Wall building precedes throwing over walls 
The typical allegory to describe a lack of cross-functional integration are functional 
units sitting between high walls, who work at their individual tasks without interaction 
or feedback from others, and throw their result over to the next function as soon as it 
is finished. The existence of these walls has been proven repeatedly by academia and 
practice, but few academic efforts have analysed the factors that lead to their 
emergence. Social dynamics identified from the study at hand contribute to explain 
why these walls keep on building up.  
 
The existence of differences in mindsets and cultures between functions are an 
unquestioned feature of corporate reality, again reconfirmed in the study at hand. Such 
differences naturally lead to group building dynamics, as it is deeply entrenched in 
human nature to strive for identification in being part of a group and to differentiate 
against others. As in all social collective phenomena, status and prestige thinking exist, 
and some groups will be perceived as being more attractive and valued higher than 
others. Findings suggests that these differences in status may occur between different 
functional groups, further enforcing group building. In particular, functions who 
perceive themselves as undervalued, may increase their efforts to differentiate from 
others, building up walls that block cross-functional integration and that are difficult to 
tear down. The resulting lack of cross-functional trust and non-transparency may lead 
to a vicious circle, as it contributes to building up the allegorical walls between 
functions. 
 
Another social dynamic occurs at management level: Upper hierarchies in organization 
tend to benefit from functional structures, as these strengthen their individual power 
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base and maintain evolved hierarchical structures. Therefore, power-conscious 
managers may deliberately contribute to entrenching functional structures within their 
organization. 
Committing on the cross-functional optimum is not easy 
Overall, social dynamics at cross-functional interfaces do not necessarily encourage 
the pursuit of the cross-functional optimum. Even if structures to support discussions 
on the overall optimum are given, functional incentivization to engage in such 
discussions remains low. Functional units which are involved in NPD from early phases 
onwards, such as product design, are in a default position to impose their functional 
requirements, therefore functions more downstream need to be called for to speak up 
for their functional requirements in order to reach a cross-functional optimum. 
Downstream functions, however, tend to avoid conflicts with their upstream 
counterparts and lack personal incentivization due to factors that are presumably given 
in all NPD environments: the time lag between early NPD phases and the point in time 
where downstream functions would benefit from their engagement. Indeed, in the case 
analysed in this study, conflicts appeared to be more frequent for later phases in NPD 
when this time lag is shrinking. In late phases, however, leeway for integrating 
downstream requirements into product design is small; discussions would need to 
occur in early phases to be effective for the cross-functional optimum. 
If at some point cross-functional conflict yet arises, it may be escalated to management 
levels. For organization-political reasons though, management avoids open friction 
with their cross-functional counterparts. Cross-functional competition for power 
considerations on a management level is rather handled covertly; the cross-functional 
optimum for a certain product in development, however, cannot benefit from such 
covert power competition. As power considerations are undeniably an inherent part of 
corporate reality, a similar mechanism can be expected for other organizations as well. 
There may well be industry- or culture-specific reasons for a power imbalance for one 
function to another; the outcome on integrated NPD, however, is always negative.  
7.3.2.2 Contextual dynamics 
The findings suggest that there are contextual factors which impact cross-functional 
integration independent from involved functional partners, but dependent on the 
context-related features. Based on the empirical circumstances of the study at hand, 
two essential context features were identified: Innovativeness of the NPD project, and 
scale of the industrial environment in which NPD takes place, i.e. large organizations 
with multifaceted processes. Other contextual factors may well be impactful alike; the 
scope of the study at hand, however, allows only for demonstration of these two. 
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Illustration 40: Contextual dynamics at cross-functional interfaces 
Innovation complicates integration 
Several aspects of innovativeness of NPD projects were identified which make cross-
functional integration more difficult and are likely to be valid in similar innovative 
contexts. To begin with, required preconditions for interaction and collaboration are 
available only with limitations in innovative contexts. Cross-functional counterparts, in 
particular those downstream from functions that are involved already early in NPD, 
may not be existent yet, making interaction and reception of their inputs simply 
impossible. Second, innovative teams are often young and unexperienced in what 
cross-functional requirements might be and how to prioritize those. Due to the small 
organizational size and volumes that are typical for early innovative projects, liaison 
people who support cross-functional integration may not available and general 
attention by functional partners may be less pronounced. Furthermore, as could be 
observed in the case at hand, green field projects, typical for innovative endeavours, 
experience less cross-functional conflict and critical feedback from cross-functional 
counterparts than incrementally innovative brown field projects, thus risking to be 
offside the cross-functional optimum.  
 
Innovative projects usually undergo quick product modifications, sometimes they are 
even required to pivot entirely. Proper alignment with cross-functional counterparts 
under these conditions is naturally more difficult, in particular given the identified need 
(n) Innovativeness inhibits cooperative ability
(ab) Competition scarcity around innovative projects
(x) Low decisiveness holds up competition
(i) Manufacturing demands reliable specifications
(r) Cooperation dependent on formal process
(c) Perceived inefficiency of formal relations
(e) Compartmentalized nexus of contacts and channels
(o) Supplier relationships inhibit cooperative ability
(y) Complexity allows for smokescreening
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for downstream functions to work with reliable specifications instead of handling 
assumptions and abstract concepts.  
Time-to-market is critical in NPD, for innovative projects even more so. Resulting time 
pressure may discourage stakeholders from extensive alignment with their cross-
functional counterparts, and might also force the latter to swallow critical feedback from 
their functional angle to avoid hold-ups. Insecure technological and market dynamics 
may postpone decision-making as it could be observed in the case analysed during 
this study, which further increases time pressure with the mentioned negative 
consequences on cross-functional integration. A potential pitfall resulting from this 
dynamic is that, if cross-functional requirements have been neglected to the extent that 
NPD fails at some point, time-consuming correction loops are particularly detrimental 
in the light of time-to-market pressure and high development investments. If marketing 
requirements, representing another essential cross-functional partner, has been 
insufficiently considered, the product may fail entirely.  
  
Besides these dynamics complicating cross-functional integration at innovative 
projects, they also have consequences on cross-functional integration of succeeding, 
less innovative projects. Path dependency of these projects from their innovative 
antecedents, e.g. from modular platform architectures or existing production plants, 
limits the possibilities to improve these projects’ cross-functional suitability.  
Formal integration as a “house of cards” 
In large-scale industrial environments, cross-functional integration tends to be based 
on formal processes and contract-similar agreements. Based on the complex and 
multi-layered nature of large-scale NPD, this is an inevitable consequence of 
governance mechanisms in large organizations: For enterprises and NPD efforts of a 
certain size, formal integration is a reasonable necessity, as processes and structures 
in their entirety exceed the level of complexity that individual stakeholders would be 
able to see through themselves. Therefore, employees acting in large-scale structures 
are obliged to follow formal processes - and only formal processes, otherwise the entire 
system risks to break down in chaos. Educated in such structures, employees are 
unwilling to take additional efforts apart from their agreed-upon performance schedule. 
Cross-functional integration, by nature requiring to integrate requirements from 
functions other than the own one, therefore depends largely on these formal processes 
to occur in large-scale industrial settings. 
 
These formal processes tend to work reliably for the rather incremental innovations 
that dominate large-scale enterprises. For innovative projects, however, several 
aspects identified from the case study at hand may lead to a sudden collapse of formal 
integration, which the author therefore denominates allegorically as a house of cards. 
To begin with, decision structures in large-scale industrial contexts often are driven by 
committee structures, in which boards or steering circles take important NPD-related 
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decisions rather than individual persons. Innovative endeavours, often more 
controversial and hazardous, therefore require more time-consuming discussions to 
reach consensus. This may result in ongoing time delays, which are particularly 
detrimental in the described contextual environment as bullwhip effects to downstream 
functions are enormous: As stakeholders stick to the formal processes, unable to 
compensate for time delays with own additional efforts or taking deliberate shortcuts, 
the entire system comes under significant time pressure. In this case, it is likely that 
pursuance of formal integration processes will be given up. Rapid and frequent product 
modifications, which are likely to occur for innovative products, may have the same 
effect, first creating time pressure and then leading to a collapse of formal integration. 
Eventually, when breaking away from formal integration under time pressure, it is likely 
that stakeholders educated in large-scale structures neglect alignment efforts with their 
cross-functional counterparts. 
Integration is “lost in complexity” 
In large-scale industrial environments, with their multifaceted processes and 
compartmentalized nexus of responsibilities, finding cross-functional contact persons 
or effective tools and channels to transfer functional requirements is not trivial. The 
study’s findings suggest that the sheer multitude of channels and contacts is well able 
to keep the organization in general and cross-functional efforts in particular busy, but 
potentially without any effective outcome. Inputs from cross-functional counterparts 
may easily be lost in endless lists and systems. Allegorical comparisons with Kafka’s 
piece The Trial or Gallic Asterix’ search for permit A38 do not seem entirely unjustified.  
 
Besides complexity in processes and contact nexus, product complexity and resulting 
consequences on its stakeholders complicates integration in a similar manner. In this 
sense, observations made from the case study at hand seem transferable to other 
large-scale contexts featuring complex products. Managing complexity is challenging, 
as gaining transparency on the validity of statements of the cross-functional 
counterpart requires an in-depth understanding of their work. While this full 
comprehension would require significant efforts, insufficient comprehension would let 
other functions benefit at own costs. Managing this border walk of too much and not 
enough comprehension of complexity is challenging, in particular for central 
governance functions, whose overarching activity scope makes it more difficult for 
them to challenge functions’ results. Leaving this narrow path of managing complexity 
can easily result in a vicious circle, as it could be observed in the study at hand. 
Controlling functions may require closer steering to get a better comprehension of 
operation functions’ statements. Consequently, the latter have less time to perform 
their operational work and have to rely on assumptions, which again decreases 
transparency and may distort the overall picture to a significant extent. As a potential 
consequence, formal processes steered by central governance become undermined 
with the risk of buffers emerging in operational functions’ statements.  
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Integrating suppliers into this already complex network is an empirical reality for most 
large-scale industrial enterprises with their high share of purchased parts and services. 
Complexity rises further and relative shares of steering functions increase, as the 
operational work is outsourced to suppliers and needs steering. The underlying 
antagonism between operational and steering functions, which blurs transparency and 
complicates integration, is thereby exacerbated. It is therefore likely, that the desire for 
control and the amount of bureaucratic tasks in such context will rise continuously.  
7.3.2.3 Interface-specific dynamics 
From the data at hand, there seem to be some dynamics emerging which are closely 
related to functional peculiarities of design and manufacturing, as well as their 
interplay, respectively. Those dynamics are believed to be valid for other instances of 
the design-manufacturing interface and will be described in detail in the following. 
 
Illustration 41: Function-specific dynamics at cross-functional interfaces 
“The avocado game” 
For avocados, there is a popular saying that they remain unripe for a long time, but in 
the second they turn ripe, they become overripe and brownish. Just as it is almost 
impossible to find the right moment in time to eat an avocado, findings from this study 
suggest that it is almost impossible to find the right point in time where manufacturing 
should be involved in the product design phase.  
In early phases of NPD, when it would be most easy for product design to integrate 
manufacturing’s requirements, the latter is typically unable to provide them. 
Manufacturing requires drawings and specifications or even hardware to be able to 
provide feedback. In early phases, however, abstract concepts and assumptions are 
the only available basis. As soon as product design comes up with a draft construction, 
Function-specific 
dynamics
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(d) Late involvement of manufacturing
(i) Manufacturing demands reliable specifications
(u) Upstream functions wait out conflicts
Low advocacy for 
manufacturability
(f) Topics focused on series issues and coordination
(k) Upstream functions over-valued, downstream under-valued
(m) Low advocacy for manufacturability
(l) Manufacturability requirements difficult to place
(o) Supplier relationships inhibit cooperative ability
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a CAD model or possibly even a hardware prototype, however, the scope to integrate 
manufacturing requirements is already limited. Not only would changes mean 
significant efforts on the part of product design, but also are product validation 
requirements a prohibitive factor to retrospective changes. Complex products in 
particular, such as typical large-scale industrial goods as cars or airplanes, have tight 
schedules in which point in time product validation has to be performed. As soon as a 
product is validated, changes are even more cumbersome to impose.  
 
Furthermore, design functions seem to know quite well how these dynamics work. The 
case study data provides manifold instances that at times, designers deliberately wait 
out conflicts with their cross-functional counterparts and act defensively, as they know 
that they have time on their side. They seem as versed players of a game with time, 
which provides the denomination for the described dynamic.  
Given the complexity of many products and processes during NPD and the 
circumstance that manufacturing becomes involved only in later phases of NPD, it can 
be easily understood that manufacturing employees are likely to have difficulties to get 
to know all relevant details to join the discussion with their cross-functional 
counterparts at eye level. As a consequence, they remain quiet for fear of saying 
something embarrassing, or are rebuked for any such. The study’s findings suggest 
that design functions are well aware of the information asymmetry and able to utilize 
it, rejecting cross-functional counterparts’ proposals for reasons untraceable for the 
latter.  
 
While the mechanics of this social game have been discovered in the CarCo case 
study and a generalizability to other cases cannot be conclusively proven, the author 
believes that relevance is given for many other cases where the design-manufacturing 
pairing is involved: Required preconditions of information asymmetry, time lag and 
responsibility distribution between design and manufacturing are necessarily recurring 
for all NPD activities between design and manufacturing; likewise, inherent mindset 
differences that trigger the identified dynamic have been recognized widely in theory 
and empiricism.  
Low advocacy for manufacturability 
Findings from the case study at hand suggest that there is little competition or even 
talk about manufacturability, however, pertinent social factors do not explicate the 
entire picture. Indeed, some factors seem to contribute which are specific to the 
functional pairing of the design-manufacturing interface and may likely be transferable 
to other contexts beyond the considered case study.  
To begin with, manufacturing across industries is broadly perceived as a less 
prestigious field of engagement, with its narrow allowances for creative work, high 
portions of standardized repetitive work, and its high share of less educated 
manufacturing personnel. By contrast, the cross-functional counterpart at the 
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examined interface at CarCo is granted an almost artistic aura. Assembly in particular, 
often is not of uttermost interest for technologically skilled professionals. With it comes 
less interest in manufacturability, but likewise, and more impactful also, a 
presumptuous belief of manufacturing topics being easily solvable and thus not being 
granted much attention. Furthermore, due to the absence of urgency in the nature of 
their issues, considerations of manufacturability during NPD are at risk of 
deprioritization. In contrast, as an example, material costs tend to be determined by 
external suppliers, and considerations thereof are required to fulfil certain deadlines. 
Manufacturing costs, however, are determined by internal, less contractual dynamics, 
with less strict deadlines to break. Difficulty to place manufacturability requirements, 
as they are less easy to quantify than other design requirements represents another 
hindrance.  
Notably, not even manufacturing representatives themselves take advocacy of 
manufacturing costs in the CarCo case for two identified reasons, which seem 
transferable to other cases: First, based on the inherent nature of controlling processes 
within organizations, there will be some form of transfer pricing to remunerate a 
company-internal manufacturing department for its production performance in most 
companies. As it was learned from the case study at hand, as long as the transfer 
pricing covers required costs, manufacturing has little incentive to reduce those already 
during NPD. Involved suppliers share this thinking; to improve manufacturability their 
feedback to product design would need to be stated long before supplier prices would 
be negotiated, so they would not be able to benefit from their engagement. Therefore, 
this seems plausible for large-scale companies as well as for smaller companies, with 
the former producing themselves based on a transfer price system and the latter 
relying on suppliers.  
Lastly, due to the long time period between product design phase and start of 
production, a production representative engaged in NPD discussions would quite 
certainly not be able to benefit herself from any discussion success. This responsibility-
distorting time lag certainly constitutes a major root cause for low advocacy.  
Eventually, central controlling functions are likely to be the only possible advocate for 
the cross-functional optimum and therefore manufacturing costs alike. However, as 
was discussed before, they are often unable to assume a challenging role. 
7.3.2.4 A model of cross-functional interface dynamics 
The in-depth analysis of dynamics at the design-manufacturing interface of the 
incumbent, successful CarCo has shown that even in well-established organizations, 
there is more than rational information and resource transactions occurring in the daily 
work environment at cross-functional interfaces. A significant share of what was 
observed at CarCo can neither be explained by rational decision-making behaviour, 
nor be directly impacted by management directions or organizational processes. By 
and large, actions were observed, which are to large parts impacted by socio-
organizational or contextual dynamics. Setting out from identified shortcomings of the 
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existing research on cross-functional integration in an NPD context, underlying hidden 
dynamics were exposed, that have not yet been captured in existing theory, but which 
may help to explain inconsistencies and contradicting results of existing empirical 
efforts. While individual dynamics have been explained in the previous chapter, an 
aggregated model, depicted in illustration 42, will be presented in the following.  
 
 
Illustration 42: Model of cross-functional interface dynamics at the design-manufacturing interface 
Observed dynamics have been grouped in respective categories that reflect their 
origin, be it social, contextual or function-specific. To begin with, there is reason to 
assume that the identified function-specific dynamics will only occur at the design-
manufacturing interface. For other functional pairings, the dynamics will likely be of no 
relevance. For a functional pairing of design and manufacturing in another case in 
whatever context, however, the dynamic is expected to be observable.  
With regard to contextual features, identified dynamics reflect the two context features 
that were observable and therefore analysed in the empirical setting at CarCo: The 
context of an innovative project, as well as the context of a large-scale industrial 
setting. The dynamic innovation complicates integration can be attributed to the 
innovation context, whereas integration is “lost in complexity” is driven by a large-scale 
industrial context. Formal integration as a “house of cards” has its origin in both 
contexts. The author believes that identified contextual dynamics are valid for different 
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interface pairings apart from design-manufacturing, as long as they share contextual 
frame conditions. 
Social dynamics are independent of a certain contextual background or functional 
pairing. Cross-functional integration at its core is a social activity; it is therefore 
believed that social dynamics may be observable in any cross-functional context.  
 
Evidently, the model presents dynamics that influence individual actors’ actions and 
motives, but it does not claim to fully predict these actions. Of course, rational decision-
making, organizational targets and managerial directions will guide actors at the 
interface as well. However, there is an “error term” of significant size whenever the 
object of analysis is subject to socio-organizational and contextual behaviour, as it is 
the case for cross-functional integration. Presumably, this causes some of the 
inconsistencies in existing research on the topic. The suggested model of cross-
functional interface dynamics is able to explain this “error term” in a structured way. It 
reveals typical dynamics that shape actors’ behaviour, which may appear under the 
specified preconditions. In this sense, the model contributes to existing literature by 
being the first in-depth structured analysis of social and situational aspects, which 
existing research so far has, though conceding their importance, handled in an 
unspecific way which would neither allow to understand their mechanism of action nor 
to categorize their impact based on defined preconditions. In addition to that, the model 
identifies function-specific differences to barriers or supporters of integration, shedding 
light on the often neglected interface between design and manufacturing. 
 
Of course, the model does not provide specific directions on whether a certain dynamic 
influences cross-functional integration in a positive or negative impact. This can only 
be concluded by analysing the manifestation of identified preconditions in a certain 
setting. For example, looking at the adjacent interfaces determine integration dynamic, 
it could have a negative impact on cross-functional integration between design and 
manufacturing for companies with widespread functional structures such as CarCo, 
because the chain from manufacturing over many intermittent bridging structures to 
design is long. For plainly structured companies, for instance where design and 
manufacturing are represented by one respective individual in the same team, the 
dynamic would have a positive impact on cross-functional integration: In this case, 
design and manufacturing are adjacent interfaces, and are therefore likely to share 
strong attitudinal ties with a resulting close integration.  
In this sense, the model can find application with both academics and practitioners, as 
it allows them to identify dynamics that may impact the cross-functional interface they 
are looking at depending on its preconditions in the social, contextual or function-
specific setting.  
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The model summarizes and categorizes identified individual dynamics according to 
their role in the CarCo case study, but each of these provides a profound impact pattern 
which certainly allows for transfer and potentially enhancement in other case settings.  
To begin with, function-specific dynamics have been derived for the pairing of design 
and manufacturing within this study. Certainly, other dynamics for other functional 
pairings can and should be identified. Moreover, innovation and large-scale industrial 
contexts are part of this model because the case study context allowed to analyse 
these. Other contextual dynamics which might be observable for start-up or different 
cultural context would of course be interesting to analyse and integrate into this model. 
In the “avocado game” dynamic, the interplay of time lag, information asymmetry and 
responsibility creates an interesting social game, which potentially is transferable to 
other settings where these forces come to play.  
With regard to contextual dynamics, innovation complicates integration is an 
interesting hypothesis that has not been identified so far. Whereas the inversed 
question, how integration impacts innovation, has long been a central research issue, 
potential counter effects which also might have an impact on NPD success have gone 
unnoticed. The new findings can potentially provide a research impulse.  
Formal integration as a “house of cards” may represent an important challenge for both 
researcher and practitioners, namely how cooperative structures can be 
institutionalized in large companies that are resilient and flexible enough to support 
innovative projects. 
The dynamic suggesting that integration is “lost in complexity” certainly is an interesting 
insight for managers, promoting transparency in cross-functional relationships and 
advocating for a less is more attitude when it comes to integration-supporting 
structures and governance control. For research, this may represent empirical 
evidence for complexity research.  
In consideration of social dynamics, the important role of adjacent interfaces has been 
neglected in existing research, which typically focused on aggregated functional 
structures of marketing, design or production. The fact that empirically existent bridging 
functions, standing somewhere between these high-level functional delineations, are 
important actors in cross-functional integration, could be insightful for other matters in 
organization or innovation research.  
Wall building precedes throwing over walls attaches importance to the mechanisms 
that build the functional walls, which cross-functional integration approaches are keen 
to remove. It may encourage further research efforts and create practitioners’ 
awareness to take a profound look into this topic in order to create a sustainable 
approach of removing walls without new ones being built simultaneously.  
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7.4 Introduction of manufacturability constraints  
After having analysed the underlying dynamics of cross-functional integration at the 
design-manufacturing interface by taking a coopetition perspective, the following part 
of the case study is concerned with the theoretical grounding of a new approach: 
introducing manufacturability constraints to enhance cross-functional integration in 
NPD. According to the qualitative methodical foundations of this case study, this is 
explored in close engagement with social and contextual aspects of the empirical 
setting. For this purpose, the initial idea as described in chapter 5.2.2 needs to be 
translated into the empirical setting of CarCo’s design-manufacturing interface, which 
is to be described in the following chapter.  
 
Furthermore, the author is interested in exploring moderating effects, that different 
constraint types and different constraints’ organizational embedding may have on the 
examined relationship. To this end, categorizations of these two moderating effects will 
be developed in the following chapter that suit CarCo’s empirical context and maximize 
empirical insights for the research effort at hand.  
7.4.1 Defining suitable constraint types 
As discussed above, constraints are formulated from a manufacturing perspective to 
be integrated with different stakeholders involved in NPD, e.g. product design, process 
design or production planning. This presupposes the use of constraint types that refer 
to manufacturability. Going back to the classification of constraints used in applicant 
studies of constraint research, manufacturability belongs to the group of product 
constraints. To be more concrete, it can be categorized among product properties, as 
manufacturability cannot be directly influenced by the designer as opposed to product 
characteristics, which would allow for direct influence.  
 
So as to excite insightful distinguished feedback from the case study informants, three 
different manufacturability constraints are deployed, all of them quantifiable measures. 
While all represent a proxy for manufacturability, they differ with regard to their 
abstraction level from the product itself. First, number of fasteners is chosen as a 
manufacturability constraint staying at close range to the product. Second, as a 
succeeding abstraction level, assembly time epitomizes a manufacturability concern 
that can be directly attributed to product specifications, as it is fully determined by 
design decisions, yet abstract enough to express a measurement that product design 
usually is not concerned with. Third, variable manufacturing costs take another step 
away from a direct relation to the product. While still being largely determined by design 
decisions, other factors, such as wage levels or shift models enter the calculation.  
Building on iteratively increasing abstraction levels from the product to distinguish 
different constraint types allows for generalizability to other interfaces alike. For 
  176 
functional constellations other than design and manufacturing, the same logic could be 
applied.  
 
 
Illustration 43: Types of manufacturability constraints and measurement units 
According to the qualitative research methodology, contextual and social factors 
constitute essential parts of the analysis, which is valid for this part of the case study 
alike. Therefore, the introduction of manufacturability constraints has to be explored 
as closely to empirical reality as possible. Consequently, designated manufacturability 
constraints are to be calculated based on CarCo’s usual conventions. To assess 
potential difficulties that might be related to the establishment or visualization of the 
manufacturability constraint, fully functional tools are designed and programmed to 
deliver real time quantification of the examined constraint type. In the following, 
respective tools and calculations of the individual manufacturability constraint types 
are provided.  
7.4.1.1 Number of fasteners 
The choice of fasteners that product designers make for the functional design has a 
significant impact on manufacturability. Overall, they account for the largest part of the 
assembly time for a given product. While certain fastener types are easier to assemble 
than others (e.g. clips as compared to screws), the total number of fasteners should 
simply be minimized from a manufacturability perspective.  
The fundamental idea of the constraint is to limit the number of certain fastener types 
that are incorporated into the design of a specific product. Minimizing the number of 
fasteners would require implementing many manufacturability-optimizing design 
alternatives, e.g. combining several components into one to decrease assembly 
operations overall or finding alternative joining mechanisms that do without 
cumbersome manual operations. Naturally, simply omitting fasteners without a 
constructive alternative is no acceptable solution, as stability requirements have to be 
complied with.   
 
The calculation of the measurement is of uttermost simplicity, as it is simply a count of 
different fastener types. A tool, which is able to derive and visualize these in real time 
from a drawing or CAD model is not trivial, though. Simply taking a drawing and 
manually counting different fasteners or combing through bills of materials, often not 
yet existent in early NPD phases, is not feasible. Any of CarCo’s products certainly 
comprises up to 1,000 components, thus any manual metering would be no satisfying 
solution for the research application at hand. Such a manual constraint calculation risks 
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to undermine empirical credibility of the approach and may distort informants’ actual 
feedback.  
For these reasons, the author developed a tool able to analyse type and respective 
number of fasteners from the CAD model itself. It works as an add-in in the toolbar of 
CarCo’s CAD program, which is not mentioned herein due to confidentiality reasons. 
The tool is based on the CAD program’s specific programming language, allowing for 
seamless integration within the product designer’s daily work environment.  
7.4.1.2 Assembly time 
Assembly time at CarCo is a strictly defined measurement which is used in different 
corporate processes, such as calculating production pace at a manufacturing line and 
deriving production schedules and shift planning. It is measured in time units of 
minutes, seconds and TMU (time measurement unit), with the latter being the 
equivalent of 0,036 seconds. Overall assembly time covers three categories, 
construction-related assembly times, handling-related assembly times and quality-
related assembly times. Construction-related assembly times account for the largest 
part of overall assembly time. They are the measurement for assembly time which is 
caused by the actual product design. It will thus be used as manufacturability 
constraint. 
 
Assembly time calculations at CarCo follow a strict standard based on motion-time 
systems used in industrial engineering, which allow assessing the required assembly 
time for a certain product design in a standardized and reproducible way. CarCo 
follows the approach of the methods-time measurement analysis (MTM analysis), 
which is an industry standard also used at other automotive OEMs. At its core, MTM 
is a system of standardized assembly time building blocks that may be attributed to 
standardized component types and assembly processes. Based on the high 
granularity of these building blocks, which allows for taking into consideration different 
reach distances, screw types, plug types and similar features, MTM analyses enable 
detailed estimations of assembly time.  
 
To allow for real time estimates of the construction-related assembly times, the 
fastener analysis tool described above is complemented with a matching algorithm that 
attributes MTM building blocks to the identified components. Naturally, this covers not 
only fasteners, but all add-on parts, cables or plugs that require manual assembly. To 
countercheck plausibility of the matching algorithm’s results, they are compared to 
MTM analyses of four of the same respective product designs that have been analysed 
manually by one of CarCo’s industrial engineering specialists. In the course of several 
optimization loops, in which the underlying matching algorithm and MTM building block 
data base are readjusted, accuracy increases to a corridor of +/- 10% deviation from 
the manual analysis.  
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7.4.1.3 Variable manufacturing costs 
Alike assembly time, variable manufacturing costs are a strictly defined measurement 
used for manifold corporate processes at CarCo, including the target agreement 
process as an essential element of NPD.  
Calculation according to CarCo’s conventions involves several steps and a series of 
input measurements with dependencies on product design and process specifications. 
Obtaining a real time multivariate approximation of variable manufacturing costs 
depending on the chosen product design requires a tool able to combine calculation 
steps and account for input dependencies. The author developed a VBA-based script 
to render quantification requirements with automated interfaces to external input 
sources. Illustration 44 shows the generic program sequence and essential input 
measurements. Assembly time estimates based on the MTM method are sequenced 
based on input production process parameters, such as production volumes, relative 
variant distribution or overall equipment efficiency. An automated line balancing allows 
allocating tasks to individual assembly workers, thereby deriving the required number 
of workers. Adding controlling parameters, such as wage levels or shift parameters, 
allows the calculation of variable manufacturing costs. To enhance plausibility, these 
estimates undergo a sensitivity analysis. Together with sensitivity measurements, the 
most plausible variable manufacturing cost estimate is displayed on a user form.   
 
 
Illustration 44: Program flow of variable manufacturing cost estimation tool 
Together with production planners and controlling representatives of CarCo, the tool 
was tested and optimized to increase accuracy and real time capability. 
7.4.2 Defining suitable dimensions for organizational embedding 
Organizational embedding spans a wide field of empirical inquiry, with its broad array 
of potentially relevant factors for the introduction of constraints within management, 
incentivization, process-related aspects and organizational frame conditions. 
Following this case study’s explorative intention, however, the goal cannot be to derive 
all possible dimensions from pertinent theory and to test them in a rigorous order. 
Instead, the author sets out to adopt an approach that allows case study informants to 
shape the analysis by naming and prioritizing aspects that they find to be important 
grounded in CarCo’s empirical setting.  
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A methodological approach which allows and even explicitly asks for this way of social 
interaction and which represents a well-proven format for modelling complex social, 
organizational and political systems is the general morphological analysis (GMA). 
Originally conceived by Fritz Zwicky, a Swiss astrophysicist and aerospace scientist at 
the California Institute of Technology, GMA allows to model not meaningfully 
quantifiable factors that are interlinked in non-linear systems, which is true for many 
social systems. It therefore represents an alternative to formal or causal modelling 
relying on judgmental processes and internal consistency rather than causality 
(Ritchey, 2011; Romeike, 2018).  
Facilitated group interaction in form of a moderated discussion, similar to what is 
applied in semi-structured interviews of the study at hand, constitutes a central pillar 
of the GMA modelling process. Based on participants’ inputs, the problem to be 
investigated is structured into its most important dimensions. With regard to 
organizational embedding, an exemplary dimension could be incentivization. 
Subsequently, for each of the dimensions, relevant values, called parameters in GMA, 
are assigned. As an example, for the incentivization dimension, one parameter could 
be monetary incentivization. A morphological field is the visual representation of this 
problem analysis. Essentially, it is a table of all parameters along their respective 
dimensions (Ritchey, 2011). As a structured illustration, the morphological field is 
known to foster creativity for further problem exploration in moderated interaction, as 
dimensions and parameters can be complemented and combined at will (Romeike, 
2018).   
 
During this study‘s exploration at CarCo, facilitated interaction with interview 
participants is employed to build up and evaluate a morphological field of 
organizational embedding of manufacturability constraint introduction. Starting with an 
initial draft of possible dimensions, the morphological field is developed based on 
participants’ inputs in an iterative manner. To support spontaneous complementation 
of dimensions and values, participants are handed a print-out of the current state of 
the morphological field and are encouraged to mark their opinions on it, making it 
possible to combine or complement existing fields. 
7.5 Manufacturability constraints’ impact on coopetitive behaviour 
Having translated the manufacturability constraints as explained above, their impact 
was explored in extensive discussions with respective functional representatives from 
design and manufacturing. In order to understand the full bandwidth of this impact, 
different scenarios were consulted, in which different functions upstream of 
manufacturing in the NPD process would be recipients of the constraints. This includes 
product design, process design, production planning and production management, 
with resulting insights on constraints’ impacts on the respective interfaces up- and 
downstream to the functional recipient. Moreover, it is believed that all examined 
functions should be involved to provide their reflection, as the idea of introducing 
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constraints may well be perceived differently by a production representative as 
compared to a design representative. Therefore, manufacturing representatives were 
likewise inquired, who would not be considered natural constraint recipients, to explore 
the idea in different scenarios and provide their input.  
 
Notably, the English expression constraint would not be understood by the German-
speaking interview participants. Therefore, the German word “Vorgabe” was used, 
often repeated as requirement, value or goal by the participants. Henceforth, these 
expressions are followed and reproduced in the translated quotes.  
 
In accordance with this study’s second research question, the impact of 
manufacturability constraint introduction on coopetitive behaviour at the design-
manufacturing interface of the empirical setting at CarCo is examined. For the resulting 
codified data, as displayed in illustration 45, a structure emerges which largely follows 
the coopetition dimensions. Representative data for the dimensions and their 
respective second-order themes is provided in table 16 in the appendix.  
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Illustration 45: Data structure - Impact of constraint introduction on coopetitive behaviour 
7.5.1 Impact on cooperative intensity 
Increased interaction 
With regard to both formal and informal interaction, the introduction of constraints 
appears to have a noteworthy impact. Summarizing all different functional scenarios 
as described above, there largely seems to be consensus that interaction increases: 
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Overall, 31 mentionings state an increase of interaction, opposed to 5 mentionings 
denying an increase of interaction. Illustration 46 condenses all answers with regard 
to their mentioning frequency based on participants’ subjective estimates. 
  
 
Illustration 46: Impact on cross-functional interaction 
Accordingly, downstream interaction in particular is on the rise, for example 
communication initiated by product design to their downstream functional counterparts 
in production planning or manufacturing, as the following designer’s statement shows: 
“Definitely more, after all I’d first have to find out how I can win the highest amount of 
time [assembly time, author’s note]. So I’d call them [manufacturing, author’s note] 
surely, and in this moment that would already be more than I ever had to do with 
manufacturing before” (161:1). In another scenario, where a production planner was 
the constraint recipient, a similar notion emerged: “I, as a production planner, would 
have to sit on the manufacturer’s lap […]. I’d go to manufacturing to get my own 
impression, how does it look like, do you have enough workers, where does the shoe 
pinch, where doesn’t it, let’s be clear here […]. Transparency, as early as possible, 
that’s the first step towards optimization, but so far we often don’t have it” (158:45). 
Although representing a minority, some informants did not project any increase in 
interaction. “I think I would have talked to them as much as without the constraint. But 
what I might have done more, is the transparency. I would clearly bring to the table, 
that it’s not only my goal, it’s our common goal. And I’d try to reinforce the whole topic 
with that” (163:38).  
 
With regard to upstream interaction, interview participants seem to agree on an 
increase of interaction, though confirmed less frequently in the case study data base 
than downstream interaction. As an example, this category would include cases of 
production planning receiving the constraint, and being encouraged to talk with their 
upstream counterparts from product or process design more often, as the following 
reaction to the constraint introduction advocates: “I’d talk to product design in any case 
latest by that point in time, when I do not get any further by talking with production 
planning or industrial engineering, who know the process well. When we say, we just 
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don’t manage to make this leap. With all the optimization we can do, we just come 
down to 17.50€, and that’s simply because we have a screw here […]. And then you 
have to talk with product design. Or you even say from the beginning, dear product 
designer, it has to be like that” (156:37). Similarly, a production representative 
described how he would start working when given a constraint on manufacturing time: 
“If I’d see already in the benchmarks with others, 85 minutes is the goal, no one else 
builds it below 110 minutes, then I’d get the product designer on board, saying I’m your 
counterpart from production, I’ll be having a huge problem if we don’t work together 
from early on” (158:42).  
 
Notably, interaction between non-adjacent interfaces, which has been identified to be 
rare in earlier parts of this study, seems to be explicitly on the rise when introducing 
manufacturability constraints. The following answer of a product designer, when asked 
for his actions when confronted with a manufacturability constraint and having 
problems of fulfilling it, is insightful in this respect. “I’d ask manufacturing, what they 
would do” (182:7). Similarly, a product designer confirms: “I’d talk with them 
[manufacturer, author’s note] more often, in any case at the beginning. I’d start with 
something like, how do you say in new German, a brainstorming, or a kick-off. Sure, 
the guys from production don’t have to sit side by side with me when I do my lines in 
the CAD. But as a first input, I’d sit together with them in a workshop. And 
subsequently, I’d align with them regularly in any case, we’ll see if that would be 
monthly or weekly. But the guys from production would have to sit in there from the 
beginning on, quality also. That would really be a good thing. And I don’t try to kiss 
your feet here, I really mean it” (149:29).  
Interaction required to be effective 
Remarkably, increased interaction may not only be a desirable consequence of 
constraint introduction. Pertinent data suggests that it may be a necessary precondition 
for the constraint to be effective, meaning that manufacturability would indeed be 
enhanced by the constraints. “If I had a constraint, I’d always rail, are they too stupid 
to manufacture or what… I don’t care. I think you’d have to explain the big picture to 
them first, saying, if that takes 75 minutes longer to assemble, it’s gonna cost us that 
much money. But you have to know that first” (179:35). Trust in one single constraint 
value, calculated by a tool, is judged as being insufficient to create effective integration: 
“I don’t trust just modelling everything into one big simulation, it’s not going to be 
enough to get it into the heads. More than anything else, it’s a mindset topic, that I 
manage to arouse the product designer’s interest for manufacturing requirements” 
(138:1). For some informants, the value of the constraint itself lies more in serving as 
a trigger for discussion at the design-manufacturing interface. “Probably a platform, to 
convince the two departments to talk with each other, to bring them together” (141:35).  
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In a similar manner, interview participants emphasize that during their introduction, 
constraints should necessarily be accompanied by explanations and instructions. 
Simply “throwing them over the wall”, quoting the common accusation with regard to 
missing cross-functional integration, should be avoided for this potential method for 
enhanced integration as well. “If you show them the manufacturer’s view, then it has 
the potential to be really effective. Sure, if you only execute it in a hard way, if you just 
hold the gun against their heads… but if you don’t, it has the potential to bring them 
together” (179:40). On the question if he would be in favour of introducing constraints 
overall, after having been explained the general idea, an informant pointed towards 
the risk of constraints being perceived as just another hardly effective KPI: “I’d say we 
should do it. Maybe starting it initially in a project, but you should accompany it in way 
that ensures it doesn’t end in a KPI fetishism. Because often, you simply look at the 
KPI, it’s green, and if it’s green everything’s fine. But the problem is in between. If two 
departments show they’re green, the problem isn’t solved” (162:42).  
Manufacturing encouraged to get involved 
From the analysis of current coopetitive behaviour at the design-manufacturing 
interface, I learned that manufacturing is involved to a limited extent only in CarCo’s 
NPD. Reasons thereof are manifold, ranging from a lack of incentivization to become 
involved, up to other functions excluding them from respective activities. According to 
this study’s empirical findings, the introduction of constraints seems to bear the 
potential to enforce a stronger manufacturing involvement.  
Informants indicated that focused discussions on manufacturability-related values and 
expressions such as MTM-based assembly time, which are part of the daily thought 
world of manufacturing, might encourage their involvement more as abstract product 
design models might be able to do. “I think it’s a fundamental thing that you try to 
assess it [the current product design, author’s note] from a realistic assembly time 
perspective, and try to cover the worker perspective. I believe it’s a good thing. And 
what’s good is that the manufacturer, he’s well acquainted with MTM and the line 
balancing, and with this method he might be more open to approach future processes 
from early onwards” (150:16). In addition to that, involving manufacturing from early on 
might encourage their engagement as well, as the following quote indicates: “In an 
early phase, manufacturing is still relatively open […], the people from production 
become angry quite quickly if it’s only about the question whether we can or cannot 
manufacture it, then they say we can’t do it, because the process is very error-prone. 
But if it’s about minimizing assembly time, I don’t see a problem, I think they’d be open 
and would cooperate here” (150:12).  
 
Besides, the introduction of manufacturability constraints seems to enforce a certain 
degree of pressure on manufacturing to become involved; which some informants see 
as necessary for manufacturing to engage in NPD. “And it’s quite important, that 
manufacturing is not able to say that they haven’t been asked” (147:21). When asked 
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for his opinion on who should define height and unit of the manufacturability constraint 
value, an interview participant stated the following: “It would be the right approach that 
production determines the value. And of course, then they’d be forced to cooperate, 
because they know it best” (149:24). 
Focus is set to interaction  
“Normally, a planner should know something like that [what the discussed constraint 
value consists of, author’s note], but of course he can’t know everything” (165:23). This 
quote expresses a common issue for cross-functional integration which had been 
identified in the first part of the study already. Due to the sheer complexity and 
multitude of topics that are dealt with in NPD, effective integration has to hit a narrow 
ridge. Being involved too little, such that cross-functional counterparts’ statements 
cannot be assessed or challenged, or being involved too much, in a way that consumes 
large parts of own time and effort. With regard to manufacturing’s involvement in this 
respect, the following statement describes this dilemma. “The manufacturer is very 
much focused on today, it’s in the nature of his work, and he has to take care of the 
parts that he has to deliver tomorrow. And there, it’s not about what’s happening in 
2025. But he mustn’t close his eyes, saying he doesn’t care about that, because it 
won’t work like that either. But it’s very much depending on the topic, where [his 
involvement, author’s note] is worth it” (156:16).  
The introduction of constraints might be able to serve as a focusing device to decide 
for which topics their involvement indeed might be worth it – the case study data is 
indicative hereof. As an example, when asked how he would start working if given a 
manufacturability constraint, an informant answered: “In the first moment, seeing which 
topics are present, and maybe then, clustering them. These topics, we’ll examine them 
correspondingly faster and deeper, going down to an operational level here, and 
screen it in much detail” (163:15). Pressure exerted by the constraint introduction is 
undoubtedly one of the underlying forces of such a prioritization. “If I don’t have 
pressure here, I’ll invest my time differently, where I’d maybe have more pressure. And 
I also invest less thinking effort, and move less” (157:47).  
7.5.2 Impact on cooperative ability 
Increased understanding and interest 
After having run through the exploration of the constraint method, the author asked the 
informants if they would be in favour of introducing manufacturability constraints into 
their daily work at CarCo. One of them said: “I’d use it for sure. It’s one of the problems 
that we have today, that we have to look beyond our own nose. The product designer 
should know what happens in the assembly, if he designs something, and today, that 
doesn’t happen enough. What are the volumes we’re talking about with the new 
product generation, it’s 60 pieces in 60 minutes, so takt time has to be one minute. 
And this has to be the reference […], the stuff that I design has to be able to satisfy 
that” (149:17).  
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His statement is representative for one of the key strengths of the approach of 
constraint introduction that emerged from the empirical analysis: causing an increased 
interest for and understanding of the cross-functional counterpart.  
As a frequently mentioned example of this notion, the scenario where an assembly 
time constraint is applied to a product designer’s work and increases the designer’s 
understanding of production may be referred to. Being asked how his understanding 
of the production would change with the constraint introduction, a product designer 
answered as follows: “Better, definitely. I assume, if I wouldn’t have this value, I would 
maybe have over-engineered the design, I simply would not have cared for assembly 
time at all. So I would have taken more screws than clips fasteners, I wouldn’t have 
had that in mind” (182:4).  
Besides an increased understanding of the functional counterpart’s requirements, 
mere transparency on their individual goals may contribute a lot to cross-functional 
understanding, as an interview participant’s experience suggests: “So, if the two of us 
have two different goals, you want to go left, I want to go right. Together, we approach 
a crossing, but I don’t know that you want to go left, and you don’t know that I want to 
go right. Then we both will pull on the thing as if we were nuts. And in the case where, 
let’s say, on the left side, 500€ lie on the floor, and on the right side 100€ […] Sure, in 
this case I’d say you give me 250€ and we both go your way, but I simply wouldn’t be 
aware of it. These target agreements, they are – we’re not talking of the personal 
targets, but the product targets – for me they’re not transparent” (166:38). 
 
Besides, the introduction of manufacturability constraints arouses interest in 
manufacturing by functions upstream in the NPD process. This is in so far interesting, 
as manufacturing was partially deemed as a less attractive, less interesting function in 
the first part of the analysis, potentially contributing to their requirements being less 
considered in NPD. Talking about the impact of constraint introduction on the 
cooperation with manufacturing, an informant articulated his opinion as follows: “I think 
that it would indeed raise interest [in manufacturing topics, author’s note]. And that you 
would take care of it a bit – sure, everyone would, even if it’s not his target constraint, 
see how his targets can be achieved […]. But if it’s in there as a constraint, the interest 
would naturally grow” (161:7). Even beyond mere interaction with manufacturing, 
cross-functional counterparts might be encouraged to go to the shopfloor to assess 
manufacturing requirements with their own eyes. On the question how he would start 
working if given a manufacturability constraint, a designer stated: “I’d have a look at 
previous projects, and then I’d go to the manufacturer, and, with the help of time 
observations, have a look at how long something like that takes” (181:26).  
 
Other informants believe that increased understanding and interest on the cross-
functional counterpart might even grow into mutual respect: “I think they’d had a bit 
more respect of each other, such that, you think, well, the other one had quite a few 
thoughts on the matter, and now we’ll just have the details optimized […]. That will 
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simplify the whole work” (182:15). Transparency, and potentially resulting trust from 
this enhanced insight, are suggested as root causes. Being asked if the introduction of 
manufacturability constraints would weld product design together with production or 
rather infuriate them against each other, an informant answered: “Welds them 
together. And that’s the interesting point. Because transparency, when the department 
really says, have a look at it, I know it’s annoying. And if you really show them the 
manufacturer’s perspective on it, then it can weld you together […]. It has the potential 
to make them weld together, saying that, well, the other one is an expert, too” (179:40).  
Internalization of manufacturability 
A foreseeable impact of constraint introduction is confirmed from the empirical analysis 
at CarCo: Upstream functions would take manufacturability requirements into 
consideration, when constraints enforce them to do so. However, case study 
informants suggest that consideration might even go one step further: Upstream 
functions may start to internalize manufacturability requirements. Internalization is 
likely to be more sustainable and deeper than mere consideration, which would 
probably cede as soon as the constraint is removed. According to case study 
informants, upstream functions’ mindset may be altered, removing existing cross-
functional barriers: “But that brings the two worlds [of production and design, author’s 
note] together. I believe the mindset would change completely. If I’d not only have the 
product design task, but would have to always bear in mind that this thing also has to 
be manufactured - Because like that, you’ll always have it presented right in front of 
your eyes” (182:24). Proactivity in considering manufacturability is mentioned as 
another sign of internalization: “I believe that he [product designer, author’s note] would 
notice from early on, ok, what do I have to pay attention to, or what will production 
condemn me for, what do I have to take care of when handing the design over to 
production, what would they ask me first”. 
Other statements suggest that alignment efforts at the interface could be reduced in 
the long run, because stakeholders would learn to anticipate their cross-functional 
counterpart’s concerns. “I think it would be reduced […]. If I’ve worked with my 
counterpart on an operational level in beforehand, then communication will be easier. 
Simply because I’ll know, what I have to pay attention to” (182:11).  
 
As part of the internalization process, case study informants seem to exhibit a risen 
interest in the consequences of upstream functions’ actions on manufacturing. A 
product designer’s statement sheds light on this presumption: “It would be useful if I 
had some guidance, some kind of sensitivity analysis, which product design or which 
component needs the most assembly time in manufacturing. At the moment I wouldn’t 
know, how complex these differences are […]. Because actually, without that, I 
wouldn’t be able to construe. At the beginning, some big rubbish would come out of 
my design, which I would have to entirely discard again. Because I wouldn’t know that 
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a clip takes longer than a plug. Thus, actually, I’d need an info how long takes what. 
At first, I’d need to gather that” (182:6).  
Immediate feedback on constraint fulfilment important 
Pounding as a prerequisite to achieve the improvements of cooperative ability from 
above, immediate feedback on constraint fulfilment seems to be an essential feature 
for constraints to become effective. Receiving an instantaneous notification on how 
constraint fulfilment changes for a modification in product or process design seems to 
be important for both constraint consideration and optimization. Being inquired on the 
suitability of pathways to bring manufacturability requirements to product design, a 
product design representative stated the following “It’s all about the channel. If it’s a 
PDF file, then of course it would be the worst conceivable solution. Then no one would 
react to that. But if there would be some tool to calculate the fulfilment of these 
assembly requirements automatically… It would have to be intuitive and playful, then 
you could introduce as many [constraints, author’s note] as you like. Only, controlling 
and tracing these values should not produce any additional effort for the designer” 
(141:41). Non-immediate, ex-post feedback seems to be a source of discontent for the 
product designer, and risks not being considered when it is received only after the 
design is finished: “At the moment, it’s like that, the product designer construes and 
only when he has finished the design, he gets feedback. Weight, manufacturing costs, 
eHPV [engineered hours per vehicle, a measure for production-ready design, author’s 
note]. And that’s only after his construction is finished. But what it actually should be, 
is that you have to get improvement suggestions all the time, such that feedback 
accompanies design. In a sense, you have to co-develop” (176:16). 
 
Besides immediate feedback’s importance for constraint consideration, it appears to 
have particular weight for constraint optimization. “It would be important, well, option 
1, that’s x minutes and y €, and it has a function of this and that. Then it would be 
interesting to see where the real pain threshold is […]. Generating options, you can do 
that super easily with that thing, and see how much you can get down, you’ll try out an 
extreme option. So, generating quick options, that would be the solution” (166:17). 
Being able to compare and quickly alter options seems to be an important precondition 
for optimization with regard to a certain requirement. “The cool thing is that you can 
easily try things out. At some point, you’ll start to optimize the thing yourself. You 
construe it, and I can’t imagine that there’s only one solution in the end, and then you 
think you’re at a point where you could go left or right. And until now, you would have 
always gone left, because as a product designer, you’ll follow the function. But now, if 
no big differences with regard to the function are there, and you don’t see cost 
differences in your view, then you might more easily try the other path” (166:15). 
Possibly, this response has been triggered by the empirical exploration conditions, 
which include a tool that is able to deliver this immediate feedback. Potential limitations 
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of data validity based on distortions from empirical exploration conditions will be 
discussed at a later point in the thesis at hand.  
7.5.3 Impact on competition 
Discussion on cross-functional optimum encouraged 
In the first part of the case study analysis, a lack of competition on the cross-functional 
optimum was identified, induced by a dominance of upstream functions, surrounding 
conditions and avoidance of potentially conflicting discussions on the part of 
downstream functions. For the latter, the introduction of manufacturability constraints 
may provide a solution. When introducing manufacturability constraints to production 
planning or process design, they appear to be more encouraged to engage in 
discussions with their product design counterpart. “First, I’d look at the product. For 
example, maybe I could come down from five to four screws, I could set a clip instead 
of a screw, I could design a positioning assistance tool. Second, I’d discuss the degree 
of vertical integration, discussing with procurement […]. That’s the topic of product 
influencing, discussing with design and procurement. Then, I’d look at the process” 
(155:21). At its core, the motivation to engage in discussions with cross-functional 
counterparts may not only stem from the pressure, which is naturally exerted by a 
constraint. Instead, the existence of the constraint itself and its quantifiable nature 
seem to serve as legitimation to speak up and discuss with them. “I’d have the values 
earlier, and with them sound arguments to influence something [at product design, 
author’s note]. Not taking away from him the development function, but helping him to 
modify his design. It’s not that much more power for me […], but I can help him to 
reach his targets and I can also discuss his targets” (166:29).  
 
Nevertheless, production planners or process designers at CarCo, both part of the 
production department from an organizational view, will first pull all levers that are 
accessible to them within their own department, before approaching product design. “I 
would first see where I can - which lever I can draw, without having to change 
something in the product design. Because if I had to fight in the product design teams 
with product design, and they would have to alter the entire design to make me save 
20 minutes... Then, I would have to prepare a presentation, why do I want that, and I’d 
have to take care that the developers jump on that train, and if it’s not working, I’d have 
the same struggle again. Thus […] my first step would be to look for the quick wins” 
(168:12). In the case study data base, few statements mention this sequencing order 
as explicitly. For many, their tendency to optimize production-inherent levers first can 
be derived from the order of action that informants describe to engage in when dealing 
with a constraint: “I’d draw a value stream analysis, from the broad view to the details. 
Then I’d look at processes which are existent already, asking for expertise from the 
plants, asking other planners, and I’d get the assembly times out of the plants, of the 
processes that really match. It has to be detailed, it has to be an exact match, because 
just a little bit of a different technology has different, very different assembly times. 
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Then I’d jump into the value stream to identify exactly where I’m too slow […].” “And if 
you’ve asked everyone there, if you’ve taken out everything, and still wouldn’t reach 
the value? If everyone says to you, with that product, it’s not gonna be possible to get 
anything more out of it?” “Then I’d address the product and ask the product designer” 
(159:36). Alike the participant above, a significant number of informants begin 
discussing levers of process and production optimization before addressing product-
related potentials. 
Transparency on cross-functional optimum increased 
As already alluded to above, the quantified nature of the explored constraints might 
serve as an argument in a discussion on the cross-functional optimum. Evidently, 
attributing numbers to the elusive notion of manufacturability fortifies its strength as an 
argument. “From a production planning point of view, you could underpin requirements 
significantly better, saying, look, you have 48 screws and 15 module connectors here. 
If we’d do it like this, we’d save 5 module connectors and 24 screws, so on hand we’d 
have savings in the material costs, and we’d have savings in the assembly time. I don’t 
see the material costs here yet, but in the end I’d have a starting point where you can 
say, from an entrepreneurial, overall perspective, this is the right way to go. Here we 
should try to find a solution” (162:32). Comparability with other requirements, e.g. 
material cost minimization, allows weighing up manufacturability against other 
requirements to reach a cross-functional optimum. “When discussing with product 
design, get your numbers, data, facts. They prove that, what we are asking for, is the 
best offer for the overall optimum. With facts, you can convince them. If the topic overall 
optimum is not visible somehow, you have poor prospects to realize it in product 
design” (151:29).  
 
Transparency on manufacturability might likewise be supportive of a systematic 
approach for its optimization. When asked for their actions and thinking, how they 
would deal with a constraint on assembly time or variable manufacturing costs, many 
interview participants described a structured approach based on the quantified basis 
of the constraint. “You’d probably have to allocate the 125 minutes to their respective 
components based on their complexity […]. In this manner, I’d distribute and in 
principle, I’d then start to think, which one of these costs me the most” (172:1). 
Unsurprisingly, pressure exerted from the constraint supports a systematic 
optimization effort by putting it higher up on the designer’s priority list: “If I wouldn’t 
have the constraint target, of course I’d put much less effort in to reduce these times. 
For me, the effort is increasing, as well as the alignment effort, naturally. But the 
constraint target would be quite useful, because otherwise, you’ll always find 
something else to do, and it would remain 240 minutes of assembly time or maybe go 
down to 230, but certainly not to 180” (157:37).  
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Moreover, transparency and pressure together may also discourage from introducing 
buffers into design or planning. Relevant quotes suggest such behaviour for several 
functions. To begin with, a product designer described his experience and a possible 
behaviour change induced by constraints: “Why do I put the screws, what’s their 
design-related value-add, and how much security buffer did I maybe plan in. So now, 
I’d maybe have a factor of three, and it’ll be fine and it will hold - it’s like that pretty 
much. Because for design, screws are a simple thing, but they didn’t have the 
assembly aspect in focus. And now I’d look at that, seeing, well, the screws have the 
highest impact, then I would of course […] now try to reduce the screws to a minimum” 
(164:20). For production representatives, a similar tendency was observable. The 
following production planner’s statement is indicative hereof: “It’s all dependent on the 
kind of analysis that you do, do you grant a longer way time [time designated for 
walking distances on the shopfloor, author’s note] or an additional walk – of course as 
a planner, you can eliminate all of that, because you have to achieve the 20 minutes 
target, which means that you plan to the edge” (168:15).  
Risk of overemphasizing constraint  
As discussed above, constraints may place requirements, which tended to be 
neglected by product design, more into their focus. However, there is a risk of this 
movement overshooting its goal: If the requirement which is introduced as a constraint 
overshadows all other requirements, the cross-functional optimum is in menace. When 
asked which drawbacks he sees from the constraint introduction, an informant 
provided the following description of this potential problem: “Well, that he comes into 
a target conflict at some point, because he can’t do it all. It’s always a question of what 
I put first. What do you want to achieve, if you say you want to save construction space, 
it’s gonna be smaller, then it’s gonna be more complex with regard to the geometry, 
and then variable manufacturing costs are going to rise. The wider you pull apart the 
target range, the more difficult it will be to land in the middle of it. And then you’d have 
to think about what the second priority is instead.” (156:27). Typical trade-offs to 
requirements, which might be neglected by imposing manufacturability as a constraint, 
are product quality, material costs, investment levels and even flexibility, due to 
potential violations of platform requirements: “Looking at the assembly time 
permanently […], it could be that, because of that, I lose flexibility. It could be, if I only 
take the cheapest fasteners, that I cut down the platform architecture. That [will 
happen, author’s note] if I only trim towards time. If, from the start, I take care to only 
design it simply, but maybe not extendable to succeeding models and so on, there I 
could lose flexibility” (182:25).  
 
Employees confronted with the task to fulfil a manufacturability constraint might be 
seduced to work around the constraint in a way that certainly does not contribute to 
the overall optimum, as the following quote suggests: “If I only look at variable 
manufacturing costs, it’s absolutely absurd because it’s just a shift of value creation, 
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because I’d produce more externally, because that reduces my variable manufacturing 
costs. If I’d only consider variable manufacturing costs, I’ll simply increase 
automatization endlessly, whatever the costs, but we’ll have manufacturing costs 
reduced. This means, looking at the variable manufacturing costs alone makes little 
sense” (160:22). 
Certainly, for the cross-functional optimum to be increased, other parameters relevant 
to it have to be transparent, as well. Only then can manufacturability be weighed up 
against these to find the cross-functional optimum. At CarCo, other parameters, such 
as functionality or security concerns, are transparently laid out, therefore an increase 
of transparency of manufacturability will increase transparency on the cross-functional 
optimum. For other cases, this may be different. 
7.5.4 Increased design effort 
While the analysis of the impact of constraint introduction on coopetitive behaviour 
hitherto followed the coopetition dimensions, there is one empirically observed second-
order theme that the introduction of constraints leads to which does not fit into this 
structure. The case study data base suggests increased efforts on the part of product 
design, with empirical details provided in the following. 
Additional effort for design functions 
“At first, this is an additional effort for product design” (149:39). This product designer’s 
spontaneous reaction to the introduction of manufacturability constraints is repeated 
by several informants. The enlargement of design’s usual requirement target range by 
manufacturability-related topics is perceived as an additional effort. “For the product 
designer, it’s principally an additional effort, because actually he has reached his goals, 
because assembly time is usually not a goal for product design. Indirectly maybe, 
because it causes production costs. But now it would be, and of course, an additional 
target value is always annoying” (171:33). Some designers are likely to react with 
discontent: “I know some product designers who would be 100% against it. Because 
they say, I do the design, and the rest is production planning’s task” (162:27).  
 
A possible result of additional design efforts caused by constraint introduction is a 
prolongation of the overall NPD process, as described by the following informant: “It 
would be critical if it would force it up too much, if people would need too much time to 
design, and wouldn’t simply hand out the component design. That’s a general problem, 
because before [constraint introduction, author’s note] you didn’t have it. Then, the 
component was done when it was done. But if I see it now, it’s just like a bachelor or 
master thesis which you want to adjust more and more, and you’re unable to stop. And 
there’s the enormous risk that you only optimize for assembly time minutes without 
looking how long it has taken you to design” (182:22). Indisputably, any prolongation 
of the NPD process constitutes a critical risk, as a short time-to-market is a well-proven 
NPD success factor. 
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7.6 The moderating impact of constraint types 
During the exploration of manufacturability constraints case study informants at CarCo 
provided detailed insight on whether and why they liked some constraint types better 
than others. With some of them, the author was able to explore all three types in 
comparison in different scenarios, while others, due to their functional background, 
were focused on one or two types. Overall, every constraint was empirically explored 
equally often, using the same qualitative methodology as in other parts of this case 
study and building on the tool-centered translation of theoretical constraint types into 
CarCo’s empirical environment. The examined constraint type for all empirical 
explorations was tracked simultaneously with every attributed first order concept. 
Hence, the author is able to draw conclusions on the constraint type’s moderating 
impact on the relationship between constraint introduction and coopetitive behaviour. 
In the following, respective qualities of each examined constraint type will be outlined. 
Underlying dynamics that have been described by interview participants to account for 
the respective moderating impact will likewise be presented.  
 
Before diving into individual dynamics, a summary of the overall assessment of the 
three constraint types is provided: number of fasteners (number/unit), assembly time 
(minutes/unit), variable manufacturing costs (€/unit). Illustration 47 provides the 
respective mentioning frequency of central second-order themes for coopetition 
dimensions as described above. The results suggest that assembly time receives 
informants’ highest affirmation, strengthening all three dimensions of coopetition. The 
constraint variable manufacturing costs likewise obtains positive feedback for all 
dimensions, although increased understanding and interest is less pronounced. 
Apparently, constraining variable manufacturing costs fosters cooperative ability to a 
lesser extent than assembly time. Number of fasteners, as the constraint type with the 
closest relation to the product, is attributed with a slight increase of transparency on 
the cross-functional optimum only, while it receives only few mentionings of increased 
cooperative intensity or ability.  
Notably, informants seem to reflect this overall assessment of coopetition dimensions 
when being explicitly asked for their preferred constraint type. The overall appeal 
(displayed in the right column of illustration 47) is strongest for the constraint assembly 
time, which likewise experiences highest affirmation of fostering coopetition 
dimensions. Similarly, number of fasteners is declared rarely as the most appealing 
constraint type; neither has it been repeatedly attributed to enhance coopetitive 
behaviour.  
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Illustration 47: Overview of constraint type-related differences in impact on coopetitive behaviour 
Possible explanations for the overall assessment will be discussed by assessing 
informants’ respective statements in the following. Relevant data is analysed based on 
the emergent structure shown in illustration 48.  
 
 
Illustration 48: Moderating impact of constraint types 
7.6.1 External contextual applicability 
Two emerging second-order themes that relate to the external contextual applicability 
seem to be important aspects of constraint types. In this respect, external contextual 
applicability means that advantageousness of a certain constraint type may differ 
depending on the external context in which the constraint finds application.  
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
Cooperative intensity
(A) Increased 
interaction
Cooperative ability
(E) Increased 
understanding and 
interest 
Competition
(I) Transparency on 
cross-functional 
optimum increased 
Overall appeal
Number of fasteners
Assembly time
Variable 
manufacturing costs
1st order concepts
Moderating impact of constraint types
2nd order themes Aggregate dimensions
External contextual 
applicability
(L) Presupposition-
less tangib ility at the 
interfaces
24.Tangibility and easy calculation important
25.Meaningfulness for involved interfaces 
26.Quantifiability required for constraint acceptance
27.Assessable contribution to cross-functional optimum 
(M) Comparability to 
other design 
requirements
Internal 
dimensioning
(N) Allowing for 
actionability
28.Achievability by the constraint recipient
29.Granting flexibility how to fulfill constraint
30.No arbitrary determination
31.Calculation of constraint needs to be accurate
32.Absolute value to avoid tricking with transitions
(O) Accuracy of 
constraint calculation
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As one of the second-order themes, presuppositionless tangibility of introduced 
constraints (L) has emerged. Logically, it is dependent on the background of the 
respective interface partners. Manufacturing representatives may judge other 
measures to be tangible than marketing representatives may do. Second, the 
comparability to other design requirements (M) certainly differs from product to 
product. While monetary constraints might often be a feasible option when looking for 
comparable constraints, other industrial conditions may require other constraints that 
satisfy this aspect.  
Presuppositionless tangibility at the interfaces 
When asked why he prefers variable manufacturing costs as a constraint, an informant 
provided the following explanation: “Personally, I find it more tangible. The value with 
a € at the end” (157:39). Apparently, it is important that involved employees are able 
to relate to a constraint measure and to cognitively comprehend it. As the following 
quote suggests, this may be valid for both constraint recipients and their cross-
functional counterparts: “That’s why I like the € goal, it makes it tangible. Everyone can 
easily conceive €. I can give a € target, saying here’s the deal, variable manufacturing 
costs are well known in the company, everyone knows what’s in there. There are these 
[names committees on variable manufacturing costs, author’s note], everyone knows 
it. That’s why in principle I’d consider it as the right value, quantify it in € and the 
consequences will be clear to everyone” (172:27). Other interview participants opt in 
favour for the assembly time constraint for similar reasons. From their perspective, 
calculation of variable manufacturing costs, as it is done at CarCo, is complicated and 
difficult to see through, as the following dialogue shows: “I think that time is a good 
factor. It’s the plain assembly time, and I believe that assembly time gives you a good 
sense […]. With a time factor, you know more quickly what to do with it than with a 
money factor. Because with a money factor, you first have to convert, what does it 
mean in minutes, then you have to know the hourly wage and all of that by heart… 
With minutes, you have a real value that everyone knows how to handle. That’s why, 
my feeling is, minutes would therefore be more valuable” (154:21).  
 
Notably, tangibility may be evaluated differently by individuals with different functional 
backgrounds. As an example, while assembly time is likely to be quite tangible for 
production-related functions, product designers may have problems relating to it, as 
this designer’s statement suggests: “What I could imagine to be a main conflict, is that 
this assembly time doesn’t mean anything to me, and I wouldn’t know what comes 
next. And as a first experience, it would be a black box for me” (182:26). A similar 
observation refers to manufacturing having difficulties relating to product-related 
measures. An informant was confronted with an assembly time constraint at first, 
leading him to strongly engage manufacturing to help him fulfil the constraint. When 
the constraint was changed to numbers of fasteners, he would not engage 
manufacturing anymore, but simply figure solutions out for himself. Reasons provided 
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thereof were that manufacturing is not used to deal with construction-related choices 
of fasteners, therefore not being able to help him with that constraint (154:11).  
Meaningfulness for involved interfaces and tangibility of the constraint type appear to 
have an impact on both cooperative intensity and cooperative ability. A lack of these 
features may discourage cross-functional counterparts to engage in an interaction. 
Presuppositional constraint types, which require a certain level of understanding or 
calculation effort from functional partners to assess potential consequences on their 
work, may impede a discussion at eye level, therefore entailing negative 
consequences on cross-functional integration that have been identified before.  
In the empirical setting of CarCo, both number of fasteners and assembly time seem 
to be disadvantageous constraint types for reasons of tangibility for either design or 
manufacturing. Therefore, variable manufacturing costs may be seen as the preferred 
constraint type from the perspective of the CarCo case.  
From this identified aspect arises an important question for further research: Which 
constraints satisfy the external contextual applicability in a way that all functional 
participants are able and willing to accept them?  
Comparability to other design requirements 
Comparability of the constraint type to other design requirements appears to be of 
significant importance for the acceptance of the constraint itself. “Experience tells us 
that, if it’s justifiable with numbers, data, facts, why it is like that, then they [product 
design, author’s note] are willing to support it. We once had a case of quality issues, 
with the interlocking. There, we went together with product design to the manufacturer. 
And the quality specialists presented information on which defects they’ve had in 
comparable products, and what it means in terms of rework or defect volume. Then it 
was decided to do a monetary assessment to see if the design of a new plug would 
pay off […]. And it turned out to be a big lever, of course it’s always a bit of reading the 
crystal ball, but the facts and numbers were accepted and the designer said ok. And 
they did it” (151:28). At CarCo, monetary measurements appear to have the most 
powerful strength as an argument in cross-functional discussion. This is likely owing to 
the almost universal comparability of financial units. A constraint type such as 
manufacturing costs can be challenged against most other design requirements. Being 
asked what would contribute to his identification with the constraint, an informant 
answered correspondingly: “The overall amount. Bucks. Saving money. The total sum. 
Is this only to make the production department’s KPI’s green, or is hard cash, quality 
or something like that. What’s in it for me, or is it only that [names a production 
department manager, author’s note] is able to go to his boss to say look at that, 
awesome stuff” (179:36).  
 
Another feature of constraint types appears to be important, which is related to 
quantifiability as described above: the assessable contribution to the cross-functional 
optimum. Naturally, this suggests quantifiable measures in general and financial 
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measures in particular. Informants at CarCo have recognized that the quantifiable 
contribution to the overall optimum can well be utilized to convince cross-functional 
counterparts of considering functional design requirements. Being asked what she 
would do if the product designer would refuse to make a design change that would 
bring down the assembly time, an interview participant proposed the following 
argumentation: “Costs: 10 minutes times 100.000 pieces, that’s much more than a 
month of [product design’s, author’s note] work. So, expressing it as the overall time 
or overall money, one way or the other, if you multiply it with volumes, even if it’s only 
a second, two or three, then it will be coming out of this, that a design change is indeed 
reasonable. And usually, they will acknowledge that” (157:35).  
During the exploration, informants were asked to conceive new constraint types that 
they believe to be most effective beyond the three proposed types. Often, such 
unprompted propositions resume the motive of quantifiability: “Actually, the boss 
should not introduce a manufacturing cost target, but an overall cost target. Because 
then you can figure out, if you give it into manufacturing costs or material costs. And if 
you buy finished modules, it’s material costs, and the other things rather go into 
manufacturing costs […]. If I take minutes or time, if it’s Euros or minutes, doesn’t 
matter in the first place, it’s basically the same, just converted with a multiplier. But I 
believe you have to look at the overall […] optimum” (172:10).  
 
Comparability to other design requirements is likely to moderate constraints’ impact on 
the competition dimension in particular. If a chosen constraint type hardly allows for 
quantification in general and comparability to other design requirements in particular, 
it is likely to discourage rigorous cross-functional discussions on the cross-functional 
optimum. In the case of CarCo, variable manufacturing costs is concluded as the best 
choice for this aspect; with assembly time following closely due to its easy convertibility 
into costs: “Time is money, and variable manufacturing costs are nothing else than 
labour costs” (158:52). 
7.6.2 Internal dimensioning 
Two second-order themes emerge from the exploration of the moderating impact of 
constraint types that seem to be less dependent on external contextual aspects. 
Allowing for actionability and ensuring calculation accuracy are requirements towards 
the constraint type which appear to be transferable to other contextual environments, 
as they address the constraint’s internal construction. They will be explained in more 
detail in the following. 
Allowing for actionability 
In the theoretical research body on constraints there is much discussion on constraints’ 
nature as limitators or openers of a solution space. Interestingly, this discussion is 
resumed by informants during the empirical analysis. While accepting and even 
advocating the introduction of constraints in a majority of cases, informants attach 
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importance to design the constraints in a way that grants them actionability. To be 
more concrete, they strive to be able to actively work with the constraint, let it guide 
their solution finding process and being able to fulfil it lastly. 
 
“So there’s one large condition in this company, targets that we set ourselves should 
be realistic and achievable. It’s one of our principal values, and I would like to take this 
up here as well” (169:28). Achievability of constraint satisfaction by its recipient is 
repeatedly mentioned. “It should be well substantiated […], he should somehow be 
able to – how should I say, it shouldn’t be too far from reality, this constraint. Thus, the 
organization who generates it, should be in some way familiar with the product concept 
and with the production concept” (169:27).  
 
Besides achievability, informants prefer constraint types that grant flexibility with 
regard to how the constraint is to be fulfilled. Explaining which constraint type he likes 
better, assembly time or fasteners, an informant stated the following: “So, the 48 
minutes of course provide me, as a product designer, freedom in a sense of how I can 
achieve these 48 minutes. If I directly break this down to the details, then you almost 
already predefine the solution […]. That’s why, saying 48 minutes, if this is explained 
to me why I need 48 minutes, but then I’m granted the freedom, if I reduce the screws 
by 90% but have to set 3 clips for it […]. So it would be somehow the designer’s 
freedom, and in the end we’ll get to a technically better product, than we would have 
by just applying a flat watering can principle, that we have to take out 20% of all 
fasteners” (168:9). Being granted the flexibility of pursuing different options to fulfil the 
constraint seems to foster the motivation to optimize the design, as the following quote 
suggests. An informant reasoned about which constraint type he prefers, assembly 
time or fasteners: “I’d see the time as the more important one. Because if I say I save 
that and that much material costs if I take only one module connector, and if I have 
extreme constraints here, it would take a lot of flexibility from me. And then I had the 
feeling that I wouldn’t enjoy designing anymore, because you would feel the limits 
more. You’d always think, oh man, I have only ten module connectors, why can’t I take 
one more module connector and omit five screws for it. So, I want to be rather pushed 
by the time, and not losing the felt freedom” (182:32).  
 
There seems to be consensus in the case study database that a constraint which is 
determined on an arbitrary basis will not find acceptance. Being asked how the 
constraint should be designed such that it fosters his identification, an interview 
participants stated that “it should be plausible. It must not be determined by just rolling 
the dices. It has to be some kind of understandable target value” (149:35). The 
constraint type number of fasteners in particular appears to be vulnerable to the 
allegation of arbitrariness, as it cannot be easily related to the overarching corporate 
goals or the product’s overall optimum. During the exploration of a scenario involving 
the fastener constraint, the following statement occurred: “It would be interesting to 
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see where the value comes from, and if it really has to be exactly these eleven module 
connectors. Why does it have to be eleven, and not twelve or fifteen? And where’s the 
connection, ok I manage to do it with eleven but for this I’d need 60 screws instead of 
48, did I do that rightly? The connection would interest me in any case” (154:13). 
 
In an attempt to relate informants’ desire for an actionable constraint to the impact on 
coopetitive behaviour, requirement internalization is assumed to play a central role. 
Much of the identified tendency to internalize manufacturability constraints stems from 
mutual understanding and interest. Only if both awareness and acknowledgement of 
cross-functional requirements are given, they can be internalized. Mere awareness of 
a seemingly arbitrary constraint is likely to be rejected by the constraint recipient, and 
not internalized. Likewise, an arbitrary constraint does not provide the transparency on 
the cross-functional optimum that a plausible constraint would grant. Besides, a non-
achievable constraint lacks the motivational spur to inspire constraint fulfilment.  
In summary, if a constraint allows for actionability as described above, it likely will have 
a positive moderating impact on both cooperative ability and competition.  
 
In the case study’s empirical setting, variable manufacturing costs and assembly time 
fulfil this feature; on the contrary, number of fasteners is prone to be perceived as an 
arbitrary measure and leaves less flexibility on how to achieve the constraint.  
Accuracy of constraint calculation  
“The fundamental condition is that it’s correct by 100%, and that there aren’t any 
parallel structures where it says well, it says 56 minutes here, but with the 48 nuts I 
actually know that this is calculated too high. It really has to be strictly specified” 
(182:50). Repeatedly, informants emphasize the importance of constraints being 
calculated in an accurate and traceable manner. Certainly, reasons for this claim are 
harmful consequences on cross-functional interaction if the value is found to be 
incorrect. “A precondition is of course, that it is well thought through. Maybe you can 
[…] define it with some kind of standard, whatever it is, thoroughly defining these 
values, maybe if there are some kind of macros or something like that, that these 
calculations are really clean, because much is based on them. If the production planner 
relies on them, and the calculation is wonderful but in the end it actually calculates 
some kind of bullshit, then you’ll have even more problems because you cannot 
straighten it out anymore. That would be my demand, to ensure that” (165:29).  
 
To strengthen accuracy and unambiguity of the constraint value, informants 
recommend setting an absolute value instead of a relative one: The latter would require 
transition calculations, reducing traceability and giving room for biased computation of 
the value. When asked why he would prefer an absolute value as a constraint value, 
an informant answered: “Because otherwise, everyone would fake that. That would be 
a big classic […]. It wouldn’t be possible with an absolute value” (172:15). This answer 
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relates to the identified risk of smokescreening and non-transparency at the cross-
functional interface, which is facilitated by complexity and holds up competition for the 
cross-functional optimum.  
 
In summary, accuracy of the constraint calculation, whether ensured through a reliable 
calculation method that used the growing availability of data in the design process or 
through an unambiguous absolute value, appears to contribute to cooperative ability. 
If it is correct, it enhances cross-functional understanding. Non-accuracy, on the other 
hand, can quickly destroy trust at the cross-functional interface and thereby contribute 
to the emergence of solid functional walls. Moreover, an unambiguous absolute value 
enhances transparency at the cross-functional interface, again fostering competition 
on the cross-functional optimum.  
Looking at the examined constraint types at CarCo, assembly time and number of 
fasteners would be most consistent with the identified accuracy requirement. Variable 
manufacturing costs, with their complex calculation method, bears the highest risk of 
errors and ambiguity.  
 
Summarizing the findings for the constraint type, this leaves assembly time as the best 
constraint out of the three tested ones for the CarCo case. Beyond those three, other 
constraints likely exist which fulfil the identified aspects even better. This will be 
proposed as an avenue for further research.  
7.7 The moderating impact of organizational embedding 
Based on the general morphological analysis as explained above, the author was able 
to develop a morphological field for the organizational embedding of constraints. All 
identified variables come out of the interactive discussion. Evidently, as it was 
developed based on the interaction with case study informants, the morphological field 
comprises of dimensions and values that are relevant to the studied empirical 
environment.  
Due to German-speaking informants, the morphological field was originally developed 
in German language. The herein presented version is translated.  
 
Illustration 49 depicts the morphological field, with dimensions P to X and respective 
values in 33 to 66. As an overview, the field touches upon the motivation to fulfil the 
constraint (see dimensions of constraint rigidity, relative prioritization towards existing 
design requirements or incentivization), recipients (functions or hierarchy levels), 
fulfilment tracking (hierarchy and frequency) and introduction (point in time during NPD 
and introduction mode). Dimensions, values and participants’ rationale will be 
explained in the following. Furthermore, the illustration sheds light on which values 
within one dimension are favoured by the participants based on their respective 
mentioning frequency.  
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Illustration 49: Favoured values within organizational embedding dimensions 
 
 
(P) Constraint rigidity
33. Voluntary 
reference value
34. Binding committee 
decision
35. Formal orga-
nizational objective
36. Stage-gate 
criterion
(T) Recipient function
48. Product design 49. Production plan-
ning / Process design
50. Manufacturing 51. Strategic product
management
(Q) Priority with regard to existing design requirements
37. Non-binding 38. Inferior 39. Equivalent 40. Superior
(R) Incentivization
41. Fulfillment monitoring 
without direct consequences
42. Fulfilment incentivized like 
organizational objective
43.Fulfilment incentive 
monetarily
(S) Recipient hierarchy level
44. Individual
employee (0)
45. Group manager 
(+1)
46. Department
manager (+2)
47. Project manager 
(+1/+2)
(U) Fulfilment tracking hierarchy
52. Operational level (0) 53. Group level (+1) 54. Department level (+2)
(V) Fulfilment tracking frequency
55. Less than 
monthly
56. Monthly 57. Bi-weekly 58. Weekly 59. More than 
weekly
(W) Introduction point in time during NPD
60. Strategy 
phase
61. Initial phase 62. Product 
concept phase
63. Series
development
64. Series 
production
Morphological field – Organizational embedding
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
(X) Introduction mode in existing enterprise
65. Gradual introduction within existing system 66. Disruptive introduction
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Constraint rigidity 
Informants proposed various ways of exerting pressure on constraint fulfilment: Should 
the manufacturability constraint be invariably fulfilled, with passing a stage-gate being 
subject to constraint fulfilment (P36)? Alternatively, should it rather be introduced as a 
reference value, stating a potential optimum, but which does not need necessary 
fulfilment (P33)? Otherwise, should constraint rigidity be somewhere in between these 
two extremes, e.g. resemble a binding committee decision (P34) or a formal 
organizational objective (P35)?  
Overall, most participants argued for a rather rigid constraint fulfilment, with formal 
organizational objective (P35) being mentioned most frequently and stage-gate 
criterion (P36) right next to it. “If you want to get things moving, you have to introduce 
it hard” (167:36). Apparently, this is related to CarCo’s usual business posturing: “If 
you introduce it too weak, then I’d say it’s like a KPI which isn’t monitored, no one 
abides to that either. If you don’t track the KPI, it is simply not a KPI anymore. I just try 
to put myself into the real CarCo world” (164:24). In particular if the constraint reflects 
a monetary value, a rigid implementation is well appreciated by informants, as it directly 
contributes to the overall optimum: “I tend towards demanding this quite rigidly. With 
that background […], there’s more behind this 180€ than just manufacturing the whole 
thing. There maybe is a market behind that, a sales target and all of that. In the end, it 
all boils down to this topic, and some things stand or fall with it. That’s why for me, it’s 
a rigid value” (163:40).  
Moreover, organizational pressure resulting from a rigid demand for constraint 
fulfilment seems to support overall acceptance of the constraint. “If it’s a requirement 
that comes down from above, and coming down from above meaning that it has been 
recognized that it’s a very important topic, then they will absolutely attempt to abide by 
it […]. But otherwise, if there’s no such requirement, then these are demands that they 
will definitely not accept, because they would feel limited in their creative freedom” 
(151:27).  
 
Possible drawbacks from a rigid constraint introduction comprise a potential disregard 
of the overall optimum. Again, informants feel that a too rigid introduction may lead to 
over-emphasis of the constraint value, while others may become deprioritized beyond 
the equilibrate optimum: “I’d say an organizational objective, because I believe if you 
set the value too rigidly, everyone runs towards this value and the other targets get 
neglected. So you optimize only to this point, and everything else falls off the table” 
(164:23). Moreover, high constraint rigidity, e.g. as a stage-gate criterion, risks to block 
progress in the NPD process. “If we demand it this rigidly, as a stage-gate criterion, 
we’ll just obstruct ourselves” (153:28). 
 
A number of informants judge that rigidity of constraint fulfilment should be made 
dependent on the respective NPD phase, suggesting that it should increase in rigidity 
the closer target agreement is approached: “I’d say it depends on the phase, what you 
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enforce in the organization. Even severely, depending on how much uncertainty there 
is. So in an early phase I’d rather go into the direction of a committee decision. And if 
you really know what’s possible, you would have to look at sensitivities, when you really 
know what goes on in the system, then I’d go into this direction [pointing at stage-gate 
criterion, author’s note]” (166:32). 
 
When discussing constraint rigidity’s impact on coopetitive behaviour, it seems likely 
that a balanced constraint rigidity may help to stimulate competition: If the constraint 
is introduced too rigidly, there is a risk of over-emphasizing the constraint dimension 
at the cost of other requirements, hence impeding a balanced discussion on the overall 
optimum. If constraint fulfilment is not enforced consequently enough, however, the 
constraint is at risk of perceiving only insufficient recognition.  
Priority with regard to existing design requirements 
Naturally, the introduction of manufacturability constraints will need to co-exist with 
other requirements towards product design, such as functionality, material costs or 
weight requirements. Should the introduced constraint be considered superior (Q40), 
equivalent (Q39) or inferior (Q38) to these other requirements, or even be considered 
as a non-binding reference (Q37)? ”In the end, what matters, is the bottom line, the 
overall result counts. That’s why I’m heading towards equivalent, because I have to 
look at all sides and manufacturing costs are only one aspect of the overall enterprise, 
and I need to have the overarching overview” (163:41). The majority of case study 
participants shared this view. In particular, when constraints can be measured 
financially and hence can easily be weighed up against other financial requirements, 
equivalence is suggested on a broad basis. “Principally, € are € and that’s why it should 
be equivalent” (172:18). Again, informants argued based on the overall optimum, which 
requires different requirements to be weighed up equally against each other: often, 
requirements have interdependencies with each other, partially with inversely 
proportional relationships: “I’d say equivalent in any case. Between automatization and 
investment, it’s always manufacturing costs, that’s virtually inversely proportional. 
That’s why we have to optimize it on the same level in any case” (156:43).  
 
On the other side, a few participants argued for superiority with regard to other 
requirements, reasoning that manufacturability has little chance to withstand an 
equivalent comparison with material costs. Probably, this opinion is strongly driven by 
the empirical reality of the examined case, in which material costs constitute a much 
more powerful cost lever and therefore often are prioritized compared to 
manufacturing-related costs. Other informants built on the same aspect but drew a 
different conclusion, arguing that a manufacturability constraint should be considered 
inferior to other requirements. “Inferior, because other levers to save costs are simply 
bigger” (167:37).  
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With regard to its impact on coopetitive behaviour, priority with regard to existing 
design requirements appears to have significant influence on cross-functional 
competition. The majority of informants consented on the essential importance of the 
equivalence of the constraint dimension with other design requirements, in order to 
encourage transparency on and optimization towards the global optimum.  
Incentivization 
Interview participants discussed options for incentivizing constraint fulfilment that 
range from monetary incentives to simple monitoring without direct consequences. 
Incentivization similar to an organizational objective (R42) was also included as a 
middle option; at CarCo, this would be an indirect monetary incentive for managers, 
because performance bonuses are subject to objective fulfilment.  
No clear picture evolved among participants when discussing which option to favour. 
A slight tendency towards non-monetary incentivization was visible, with simple 
monitoring emerging as the most frequently mentioned value. A frequent 
argumentation in this regard was a potential distortion of the overall optimum caused 
by an overly emphasized optimization of the constraint value at other requirements’ 
cost. Pointing at fulfilment monitoring without direct consequences (R41), an informant 
reasoned as follows: “Because a bonus system is the worst existing system. Everyone 
just works for his bonus, and not for the overall view anymore” (158:58). Similarly, an 
informant mentioned that “I consider a monetary incentive as the wrong path here. It 
possibly leads to a situation, where you attach importance to the one thing, and what 
happens at the other side may fall off the table. That’s the wrong incentive” (162:36). 
Another reason provided against monetary incentives (R43) was that it might induce 
moral hazard of constraint recipients in achieving constraint fulfilment at the cost of 
other requirements: “I’d maybe see that I take one screw out, even if I’d be responsible 
to keep the battery watertight. But I’d say perfect, I’ll get my €1000 and I’ll have 
changed departments in one year anyway” (166:34).  
Furthermore, informants viewed a monetary incentive as potentially demotivating, as 
in early phases of NPD the achievability of constraint fulfilment is hard to assess. 
“Bonus in no way, you cannot punish someone if you give him a target, of which you 
do not yet know if it’s realistic” (179:42).  
 
Other interview participants found that the incentivization intensity should depend on 
the project phase, and possibly even on the ambition level of the introduced constraint, 
as the following quote suggests: “It depends a bit on how ambitious the target value is 
in itself […]. If you take a reference product and tighten this value by a not-so 
insignificant percentage value, I’d be quite a friend of a certain incentive. If you simply 
say, derive a value and it’s only about realizing it, then it would certainly be only 
monitoring or something like it” (169:25). 
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On the other hand, the absence of a direct incentivization may lead to non-
consideration of the objective. Actors in large-scale industrial enterprises tend to know 
well how to make initiatives come to nothing if they are not sufficiently implanted, as 
the following quote indicates: “There are so many topics, if I really want to prioritize 
them, and really want to introduce them, then I really have to incentivize it.” “What 
would happen if you wouldn’t?” “It would be waited out. I think that happens quite often. 
You would simply wait, and hope that it’s not there anymore next year” (182:36). 
 
Like other organizational embedding dimensions before, incentivization seems to have 
a significant impact on the competition dimension. Similar to constraint rigidity, 
incentivization may have a balancing impact. If incentivization is strongly pronounced, 
there is a risk of over-emphasizing the constraint dimension, entailing negligence of 
other requirements at the cost of the overall optimum. If, however, incentivization is 
insufficient to encourage constraint consideration, the constraint may fall off the table 
and the constraint introduction becomes a matter of sitting out for constraint recipients.  
Recipient hierarchy level 
With regard to the hierarchical level of the constraint recipient, there was astonishing 
consensus among informants: The majority argued for a hierarchical level one or two 
stages above the operational level. Besides, almost everyone agreed that the recipient 
should be someone in the project organization as opposed to a manager in the line 
organization. Pointing at the project manager (S47), an informant described his 
reasoning: “He’s responsible for the production system and the value stream that is 
linked to it. So he’s virtually the custodian of the entire thing, who also needs to keep 
a project in balance. I have several component areas, and all are somehow interlinked 
based on the minutes [minutes of assembly time, author’s note], and I need to balance 
these costs somehow. So he’s the one who needs to adopt a global approach to it” 
(162:37).  
A certain hierarchical power is thought to be supportive, if not indeed necessary to 
assert oneself at the interface. “The group manager, maybe he can really demand 
something from the interface partners, an individual employee can’t actually do this” 
(156:44).  
Surprisingly, informants repeatedly argued against the operational level (S44) as 
constraint recipient, dreading that respective employees would neglect the topic. “I’d 
make the department manager responsible. Then you’d know – because an individual 
employee, forget about that, because he’d argue that some other reason was even 
more important, there surely will be some reason, and then it falls off the table” 
(181:30).  
 
While the large majority agreed with a management position in the project organization 
being the right recipient level, a few informants recommended that the hierarchical 
level should not be too high, as required detail comprehension might be insufficiently 
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available in these levels. “I believe that the project manager is too far away, he wouldn’t 
go into detail that much” (182:38) 
With regard to the impact of the recipient hierarchy level on coopetitive behaviour, 
there seems to be a relationship to cooperative ability. If contextual dynamics make 
cooperation dependent on a formal process, as it has been identified for the CarCo 
case, the recipient hierarchy level is recommended to be well above the operational 
level. Hierarchical pressure is necessary to exert sufficient influence on the cross-
functional counterpart to be able to impose the constraint.  
In addition to cooperative ability, the competition dimension seems to be of relevance, 
too. Case study participants fear that an operational-level constraint recipient, due to 
her detail knowledge, is able to deliberately distort the constraint calculation, thus 
decreasing transparency on the overall optimum. Moreover, informants suggest that 
constraint recipients should be a member of the project organization as opposed to the 
line organization, as these are likely to have an overarching view on the cross-
functional optimum, thus accommodating cross-functional competition.  
Recipient function 
With regard to the functional home of the constraint recipient, there was surprising 
dissonance among interview participants. Both product design (T48) and production 
planning / process design (T49), both production representatives that are close to 
product design at CarCo, found frequent mentioning. Interestingly, respondents often 
argued for a shared responsibility of design and production representatives. 
“Production should be responsible as well in any case. Because if it’s only product 
design, they don’t care. It has to be a common responsibility. Either they drown 
together, or they both swim” (149:42). Reasoning for this shared accountability is often 
provided on grounds of required input efforts to fulfil the constraint. “I’d say production 
and design. Because if they don’t talk to each other, it won’t work […]. They both have 
levers, design and production, that’s why it would be wrong to just look at design, but 
it would also be wrong to just look at production” (179:43). 
 
Manufacturing, however, was seldom mentioned, not even in the context of a shared 
responsibility. When asked who would be the ideal recipient function, an interview 
participant answered as follows: “All together. But there must be a superior one in the 
lead […]. Design is somehow always the master clock. Making manufacturing 
responsible is nonsense for the NPD, because they have to concentrate on the series 
phase. So I’d say design and production planning” (156:45). 
 
In a few data points, strategic product management was considered to be able of 
performing a parenthesis function to design and production representatives, and 
therefore should be involved as recipient function. “I’d say it must be strategic project 
management, because design and production would fight each other anyway. For 
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example, if you would make production responsible, design would say again that he 
doesn’t care. Then these cockfights would start again” (159:43). 
 
In summary, shared responsibility between design and production representatives 
seems to impact all coopetition dimensions. To begin with, cooperative intensity may 
be insufficiently stimulated if the functional responsibility for constraint fulfilment is 
attributed to only a single function. With regard to cooperative ability, separate 
responsibilities would not be sufficiently able to encourage cross-functional 
counterparts’ inputs in different scenarios: When product design is given a 
manufacturability constraint, production representatives would likely not provide 
sufficient input and support for product design to fulfil the constraint, if they are not 
taken into co-responsibility. In another exemplary scenario, when production planning 
is given a manufacturability constraint, they would likely be unable to exert sufficient 
influence on design to achieve constraint fulfilment if the latter is not made co-
responsible.  
Fulfilment tracking hierarchy 
“I’d hang the whole thing up at a higher hierarchy, because they should have the sum 
of all targets, the overall optimum in their view. And if only the operational level looks 
at it, then they’d only consider their own goal but not if it’s synchronous to the other 
goals which the project has […]. They [management, author’s note] have to decide, 
because they have the overall view and optimally know the sum of all designers, with 
one of them having his focus on the screwing, and another one on the material quantity, 
and the third one on weight and they can decide where the optimum is” (164:27). 
This quote is representative for the majority of discussions during the exploration of 
the following dimension: the hierarchical level by which constraint fulfilment should be 
traced and evaluated. Most informants agreed on the importance of a certain 
hierarchical power being involved; managers were ascribed of being able to keep a 
better overarching perspective than the operational level. Department managers (U54) 
and group managers (U53), who are two, respectively one, level above the operational 
base at CarCo, were favoured in the discussion. 
 
Other informants did not attach great importance to the hierarchical level of the 
fulfilment tracking committee. Instead, they emphasized the composition of this 
committee to be essential; representation of all interfaces accordingly needs to be 
ensured. “The main thing is how the project team is made up, and that’s indeed a point. 
Of course, someone from product design has to be in there, and here it becomes 
important. It’s not much of an help if a project manager is in there to moderate a bit, 
there really should be a production planner, a process designer and a product designer 
who really discuss on this level, and maybe also someone from procurement” (169:26). 
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Again, informants’ suggestion of hierarchical power being necessary to trace constraint 
fulfilment can be interpreted as a reflection on the competition dimension: If tracking 
would be carried out by the operational level, critical discussion on the cross-functional 
optimum would hardly be encouraged.  
In addition to this possible impact on competition, composition of the tracking 
committee seems to have an impact on cooperative intensity. If the committee 
comprises all relevant functional interface partners, cross-functional communication 
and exchange would naturally be facilitated.  
Fulfilment tracking frequency 
The frequency of tracing and discussing constraint fulfilment appeared to be a matter 
of controversial discussion among informants. While there seems to be a slight 
tendency towards a rather frequent tracking schedule, e.g. weekly (V58) or even more 
than weekly (V59), overall opinions did not converge to a consensus. Instead, the case 
study data base has many records of answers that postulate a certain dependency on 
situational factors. Most often, dependency on the NPD project phase was attributed 
by informants. “In the beginning more often, there you might have to discuss the topic 
quite intensively, in the beginning you might still question if often, if it’s an achievable 
goal, what is the feedback from different design areas. And then you could let things 
run for a bit until it has advanced a bit in the series development, and then review it. 
So in the beginning, weekly in every case” (170:38).  
Other respondents found the tracking frequency to be dependent on product design 
complexity and the resulting iteration loop duration. “Depending on how long iteration 
loops are. If it’s a component which is construed within half an hour, then I could talk 
monthly about it. So I’d make it dependent on the time it needs to design” (182:42). 
 
Suggestions for a low tracking frequency were provided on grounds of avoiding a 
“steering frenzy”. Constraints should be trusted to be internalized soon after their 
introduction, such that frequent tracking becomes more and more obsolete: “You are 
not told every week, or more than every week, that it has to be functionally working 
either, or that it has to be cheap - at some point you should know this for yourself, 
hopefully. I think that once a month should be sufficient, as long as it’s communicated 
and discussed” (161:20). 
 
With regard to fulfilment tracking frequency’s impact on coopetitive behaviour, there 
seems to be a relationship with cooperative ability. If situational dynamics entail 
dependence of cooperation on formal processes, as it is in the CarCo case, tracking 
frequency needs to be high in order for the constraint to be effective.  
In addition to that, informants warned against creating a steering frenzy if tracking 
frequency is too high. Perceived inefficiency of formal relations, as being part of the 
formal aspects of cooperative intensity, may therefore be increased. 
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Introduction point in time during NPD 
When exploring which NPD phase might be best suited to introduce the constraint to 
its respective recipient, there appeared to be consensus on early phases. Pointing at 
the initial phase (W61), which is the second phase out of five before SOP at CarCo, a 
respondent explained: “Quite early indeed. It’s always the point that, shutting the stable 
when the horse has bolted, when the concepts are finished already, then you don’t 
have any lever anymore. They tell us every to-do and discuss, but we don’t have a 
chance anymore, if the concept direction is set. Therefore, early” (163:45). A few 
informants even proposed the very early strategy phase (W60) as the right point in 
time, some mentioned the later product concept phase (W62) and a few respondents 
argued in favour of series development (W63) or even series production (W64). 
Fundamentally, however, the broad majority of CarCo informants voted in favour of the 
initial phase.  
 
Most reasoning drew on a similar argumentative base. The later the constraint is 
introduced into the process, the less room for action enabling to fulfil it remains. “It’s 
important that they get it early enough, such that they still have scope for action. It 
shouldn’t be as it is now for us, that everything is already decided but you still have to 
achieve your goals” (159:42).  
In particular, if the constraint is to encourage an innovative solution for fulfilment, early 
introduction becomes outright necessary: “In the strategy phase, I would be able to 
already figure out if I reach the target with the normal incremental improvements, for 
example just taking a larger screw […]. Or do I need something completely new which 
is not yet done, that I wouldn’t take a screw but would weld it. I would have to figure 
that out already early, because in the concept phase it could already be too late, then 
I could only recourse to topics which lie already in the drawer” (164:29). 
 
However, a few interview participants feared that a very early introduction may result 
in an unrealistic, and thus demotivating, constraint value. “Working towards a concrete 
value of 17€ does not make much sense much earlier, because the product might still 
change so strongly in an early phase, that my work would be pointless. If I can break 
it down to 17€ by then, there may be a spurious accuracy in that given scenario, which 
may be gone in three weeks after 50 product changes have occurred. So rather in the 
concept phase, maybe towards target agreement” (168:22). Obviously, this contradicts 
the other notion of an early introduction enabling innovative solutions to fulfil the 
constraint.  
 
Introducing the constraints in early NPD phases allows cross-functional discussion to 
take place without design pushing back cross-functional requirements, because their 
late introduction would cause additional efforts and require additional product 
validation. Therefore, the integration point in time is assumed to be an important lever 
on the competition dimension of cross-functional coopetition. 
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Introduction mode in existing enterprise 
While the point in time during a project is one important aspect to consider, the 
introduction mode is certainly another one. Case study informants discussed whether 
a disruptive introduction, making a clear differentiation to existing channels of 
transferring manufacturability requirements into product design, was preferable over a 
gradual introduction, which successively integrates manufacturability constraints into 
NPD. The following quote summarizes this discussion, eventually coming to the 
conclusion that sheer size and complexity of CarCo’s processes suggest taking a 
disruptive approach: “If you really want to create a dogma shift, you have to work 
disruptively sometimes. Then you really have to say, we’ll do that in this project. And 
talk about lessons learned afterwards. But if you let it slowly flow into the existing 
process, then it would probably always being pushed away […]. So either you say, you 
make everything new for this project, this goes up and this goes down, and let’s get 
started. Or you introduce it successively in small steps, so others have to give off more 
and more, and you get a bit more. But I think this would be more difficult […]. We’re 
too big for that, the whole company is too complex for that, that you could just introduce 
something step by step” (156:48).  
Among interview participants, there seemed to be a tendency towards such a 
disruptive introduction. Similar to the quote above, many participants argued based on 
entrenched processes and mindsets within CarCo, requiring to take a sudden 
approach in order to be able to overcome deep-rooted behaviour. As an example, a 
production planner talked about problems that may occur when introducing the 
constraint method gradually within the existing system. At the core of his quote is the 
learned expectation, that a target will be gradually tightened with the advancing NPD. 
If constraints are introduced without a palpable differentiation, it risks to be seen as 
just another target which cannot be trusted, as it might also be tightened in the course 
of the NPD, therefore requiring the same buffer-logic to achieve constraint fulfilment 
which is already applied to many of CarCo’s targets. “It can only be a reference value, 
because otherwise you would have to have another value for every stage-gate […] If 
you would say 45 minutes for SOP, it would be 55 minutes at stage-gate one and 
maybe 50 minutes for stage-gate two” (171:37).  
 
On the contrary, a number of informants argue that a gradual introduction mode would 
be preferable in order to be able to thoroughly test and evaluate the new method. “You 
could start a pilot project, and calculate it, maybe for a sub-project and try it and see if 
it works, and if you see advantages you can roll it out to the big picture” (163:47).  
 
Most of the argumentation in favour of a disruptive introduction of the constraint 
method is based on self-sustaining structures which would resist a gradual change. In 
such structures, a disruptive introduction mode may be able to improve cooperative 
ability by removing or reducing deeply entrenched functional structures. Therefore, this 
dimension of organizational embedding may well impact cooperative ability.  
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7.8 Manufacturability constraints’ impact on creativity 
Until this point in the case study, the exploration of manufacturability constraints and 
its moderators was motivated by the overarching question of how to improve cross-
functional integration by impacting coopetitive behaviour. For the research question to 
be examined in the following chapter, this overarching field is left to examine 
constraints’ impact on creativity instead. This can be justified by the persisting 
academic dispute in constraint research about constraints improving or impeding 
creativity. Likewise, the broader context of NPD success, for which creativity plays a 
role just as cross-functional integration does, substantiates the following examination.   
 
According to the qualitative methodology of the case study at hand, interview 
participants were asked open questions on creativity after having explored the 
introduction of constraints with them. Surprisingly, answers converged towards a few 
similar areas, such that five emerging second-order themes could be derived. They 
can be positioned along a spectrum stretching between positive and negative impacts 
on creativity. Illustration 50 displays the second-order themes allocated to their 
aggregate dimensions: positive impact on creativity, contingent impact on creativity 
and negative impact on creativity.  
 
To provide an overarching impression of informants’ opinion, second-order themes are 
displayed together with their mentioning frequency. It shows that a majority of interview 
participants attributed a positive impact on creativity (30 mentionings overall), with 
much fewer mentionings of a negative impact (4 mentionings). Those informants who 
said that it depended, be it on the NPD phase or the granted scope of action, make up 
a noteworthy share (14 mentionings) as well.  
In the following, individual second-order themes will be explained in detail.  
 
 
Illustration 50: Mentioning frequency of aggregate dimensions of impact on creativity 
 
(Y) Pressure to conceive 
radical ideas
Positive impact Negative impactContingent impact
(AA) Contingent on NPD 
phase
(AC) Limiting solution 
scope
(AB) Contingent on 
granted scope for action
(Z) Increased interaction 
inspires creativity
Impact on creativity
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
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Pressure to conceive radical ideas 
“I think more creative […]. Because necessity is the mother of invention” (157:46). The 
quote above is representative for many others within the most frequently pronounced 
second-order concept. Informants are convinced that pressure to fulfil the 
manufacturability constraint forces constraint recipients to go new ways and find 
innovative solutions. “He has to become more creative, because he has to 
accommodate an additional requirement which he didn’t consider before, and this will 
force him to think outside the box” (167:40). Similarly, another informant provided a 
specific example in the manufacturability context: “I think it would expand it [creativity, 
author’s note], so you would become more creative. Because otherwise, I’d say you 
put three screws in it, or maybe a bit different, but now I’d think ok, I know how long 
screws - they take a long time, what else could you do, maybe gluing or other things 
which I never had thought of. Thus, I believe there would be more creative approaches 
in any case” (161:21).  
 
In order to be able to exert this creativity-stimulating pressure, the constraint seemingly 
needs to be ambitious: “You only start to really give some thought in such cases, if you 
receive targets which are not necessarily easy to solve” (164:31).  
Increased interaction inspires creativity 
Informants named another driving force of creativity which is excited by the introduction 
of constraints: inspiration for new ideas coming from an exchange with other 
individuals. Accordingly, constraints cause increased interaction, for example with 
cross-functional counterparts, which may help to create new ideas. “Foster it [creativity, 
author’s note]. Because I have to go figure it out. Just going on doesn’t quite work 
anymore. I have to find new ways, have to give some thought, trying it out like this, 
maybe some new materials… And I have to go talk to people, also talking with 
production, and that’s not bad. Therefore, it would foster it” (179:45).  
Certainly, the drive to look for other person’s input and ideas is related to pressure 
exerted from constraints as discussed above. “If I’m at my wits’ end, then I’d go and 
ask colleagues, or ask process design, what you could do differently” (164:21). The 
resulting effect, however, is another one, but also one with a positive outcome on 
creativity. In this case, pressure would encourage the constraint recipient to reach out 
to other people’s input, providing her with new ideas for creative solutions to constraint 
fulfilment.  
Contingent on NPD phase 
Timeliness has been a repeated topic of different research aspects within this case 
study. For creativity, it seems to play an important role as well. As the following quote 
indicates, constraint introduction in early phases may well stimulate creativity, but not 
anymore in later phases. Even more so, introduction in late phases risks to bring about 
frustration when an ambitious constraint enforces going new ways, but the solution 
scope is restricted within narrow limits of an existing design. “I’d say neutral, because 
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you could say that it would encourage creativity, if you already have a specific goal, 
and within this scope it can indeed encourage creativity. But too much creativity could 
also be counterproductive, if you set the goals much later, and before that you were 
free as a bird and now you have to make it fit somewhere into this” (150:19). 
In a similar manner, another informant described how constraints would encourage 
creative problem solving focusing on essential use considerations. He emphasized 
that an early introduction in NPD is essential to enable this stimulation. “I think that 
he’d become more creative […], because you’d be inclined more to think about 
alternative concepts. Because you’d realize early that the standard path doesn’t work, 
and he doesn’t figure that out only late, when it’s too late already maybe, but ideally 
already early. And he’d sit down and think fundamentally, do I need to screw this at all, 
or do I need a lid at all. I’d start like that, ok if I’d have to screw on a lid, thinking quite 
revolutionary, do I actually need a lid? If I’d be a product designer, then this would be 
the next logical step. We build some kind of block, and it has to be waterproof and fit 
into the assembly space in the car. And I have the high voltage battery, and I have the 
underbody, so it would actually be logical to say that I take the underbody as a lid of 
the high voltage battery” (164:30).  
Contingent on granted scope for action 
Frequently, informants attributed dependency on grated scope for action to a 
potentially positive impact of constraints on creativity. According to them, constraints 
can only induce creativity if frame conditions allow for a certain degree of freedom in 
problem solving. “If it encourages or impedes creativity? In my view, it’s encouraging 
if he has the freedom to use these things to the full limit. If they say to him, design it to 
56, you’ll get a tap on the head if it’s 57, and if it’s 55 I take away your bonus. Then it’s 
impeding, then you’ll have a system which restricts you even further” (166:41). 
Naturally, this freedom or scope for action is associated to the above category of 
contingency on NPD phase: If constraint introduction occurs in an early phase, more 
scope for action is given; in late phases solution space is too narrow to allow for 
creativity. While the above category, however, only refers to the timely dimension as a 
possible limitation of scope for action, informants go beyond this dimension in many of 
their statements. Corporate target setting or product-related system limitations may 
constitute creativity-impeding limitations of scope for action, as well.  
 
In addition to that, informants mentioned that transparency on the scope for action is 
another required precondition for creativity to emerge. Some kind of trigger or starting 
point, making it clear to the constraint recipient that she is granted a large scope for 
action, is accordingly required to induce creativity. “It is such and such with creativity; 
at least I know this from my old department, you have to put forward a shift in thinking 
at least once to make something start. For example, if you say, how would a car without 
wheels look like […]. Such that the colleague would start to think, ok, how could this 
be done completely different?” (165:18).  
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Limiting solution scope 
Besides informant opinions that attributed a positive or contingent impact of constraints 
on creativity, there were a few interview participants that clearly designated a negative 
impact on creativity. “For me, it would limit me as a production planner, if I get this 
constraint. Because it’s something else that I have to consider” (181:32).  
Often, these informants put forward an argumentation which reproaches constraints to 
limit the solution space and therefore restrict creativity. “Rather less creative. For 
example, there was a workshop recently, and I intentionally decided not go there, 
because I wanted to give them the maximum possible solution space, and these and 
those possibilities are there, and decide only later which possibilities would be the best 
ones for production. Otherwise, they’d be already limited from the beginning” (171:41).  
Quite surprisingly, advocates for this negative impact of constraints on creativity are a 
minority when mentioning frequency within the case study data base is taken as a 
measure. 
 
Overall, the introduction of the constraint increases creativity. The participants’ 
mentioning frequency towards this category is indicative hereof. Only if the NPD phase 
and the granted scope of action are chosen unsuitably will constraint introduction risk 
to reduce creativity for the majority of involved participants.  
7.9 Summary and theoretical model 
7.9.1 Summary of analysis 
In the previous chapters, the impact of the introduction of manufacturability constraints 
on cross-functional coopetition was analysed with regard to different aspects. Starting 
off from the analysis of general dynamics caused by the constraint introduction, the 
moderating impact of constraint types and dimensions of organizational embedding 
was analysed, and finally the impact of constraints on creativity in general.  
 
As a general summary of findings, it can be concluded that the introduction of 
manufacturability constraints has a positive impact on all three dimensions of cross-
functional coopetition, and therefore cross-functional integration in general. With 
regard to cooperative intensity, it has the potential to increase interaction (A) even at 
non-adjacent interfaces, encourages to involve manufacturing in NPD (C) and sets 
focus to topics in a way that allows for prioritization of cross-functional discussions (D). 
Concerning cooperative ability, constraint introduction facilitates increased 
understanding and interest at the design-manufacturing interface (E) and fosters the 
internalization of manufacturability with design functions (F). In reference to cross-
functional competition, manufacturability constraints encourage a cross-functional 
discussion on the overall optimum (H) and help to increase transparency on where the 
cross-functional optimum lies in the first place (I).  
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However, these positive impacts are dependent on several side conditions, whose 
absence may either reduce a positive impact or obstruct it in its entirety. In this sense, 
interaction is required for the constraint to be effective (B), immediate feedback on 
constraint fulfilment is important for both constraint consideration and optimization (G) 
and finally, there is a risk of over-emphasizing the constraint dimension at the cost of 
other design requirements (J).  
Moreover, the introduction of manufacturability constraints likewise entails a potential 
negative impact. Based on additional efforts for product design, which are caused by 
the constraint introduction, the design process as a whole may be prolonged, with 
resulting negative consequences on time-to-market for any given NPD project (K).  
 
Notably, for case study participants from CarCo, possible advantages from the 
introduction of constraints appear to outweigh potential negatives. Illustration 51 
summarizes interview participants’ answers when asked for their overarching opinion 
on the introduction of manufacturability constraints, after they have explored different 
constraint introduction scenarios.  
 
 
Illustration 51: Overarching participant feedback on constraint introduction 
Besides side conditions identified from the analysis of constraint introduction in 
general, the analysis of the moderating impact of constraint type and organizational 
embedding yielded a multitude of other moderating factors.  
With regard to the constraint type, this includes different aspects on the external 
contextual applicability such as tangibility (L) and comparability (M), as well as on the 
internal dimensioning of the constraint, such as allowing for actionability (N) and 
ensuring calculation accuracy (O). Constraint types were evaluated more positively by 
CarCo interview participants, if they fulfilled these respective dimensions. Among the 
three explored constraints, assembly time (minutes/unit), as the constraint type with a 
medium abstraction level from the product, received highest appeal. As a close 
follower, variable manufacturing costs (€/unit) were also highly estimated by interview 
Overarching opinion on the introduction of manufacturability constraints
Positive Mixed Negative
In favor of realizing the introduction of manufacturability constraints at CarCo
Yes Yes, but in limited scope No
Colour shade: Mentioning frequency 
Low High
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participants. Number of fasteners (number/unit), as the constraint type with the lowest 
abstraction level from the product, was rather unpopular in the CarCo exploration.  
Concerning organizational embedding, the morphological analysis performed with 
interview participants yielded nine dimensions with two to five values, respectively. For 
the CarCo setting, a rather hard constraint rigidity (P) was considered most favourable, 
as well as an equivalent consideration of the constraint compared to other design 
requirements (Q). Monetary incentivization was rejected (R) in favour of mere fulfilment 
monitoring. With regard to recipient hierarchy level (S), the project management level, 
one or two levels above the operational level, was suggested. As the functional 
recipient (T), informants recommended product design, production representatives or 
the latter functions’ shared responsibility. Considering fulfilment tracking, participants 
viewed department level hierarchy levels (U) and more than weekly tracking frequency 
(V) as most favourable. Constraints are to be introduced in early phases of NPD (W) 
right after strategic considerations have been concluded, and a disruptive introduction 
within an existing enterprise is to be favoured over a gradual approach (X).  
 
Considering the analysis of manufacturability constraints’ impact on creativity, 
participants’ opinions converged on a positive impact based on pressure to conceive 
radical ideas (Y) and creativity-spurring inspiration through increased interaction (Z). 
Very few participants argued for a negative impact on creativity, with their argument 
focusing on a limited solution space (AC). In between, however, there was a significant 
number of respondents arguing for a contingent impact direction, with the impact 
depending on either the NPD phase (AA) or the granted scope for action (AB).  
 
In summary, the introduction of manufacturability constraints seems to have a positive 
impact on both cross-functional coopetition and creativity. It may, however, have a 
negative impact on time-to-market due to increased design effort.  
Furthermore, the positive impact is dependent on a multitude of different aspects that 
include the moderating impacts of constraint type and organizational embedding. 
Inherent relationships within this pool of moderating aspects will be illuminated in more 
detail in the following. 
7.9.2 Theoretical model 
When taking an overarching view across all moderating or contingency-inducing 
aspects that have been brought to light with regard to very different questions of the 
previous analyses, which includes (B), (G), (J), (L)-(O), (P)-(X), (AA) and (AB), there 
seem to be content-related overlaps and similarities. To name an example, the original 
second-order themes of comparability to other design requirements (M) and 
equivalence with regard to other design requirements (Q) stem from different 
backgrounds and describe the moderating impact of different objects, namely 
constraint type and organizational embedding. However, they point at the very same 
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purpose, namely comparability of the constraint dimension to other design 
requirements in order to optimize for the cross-functional optimum.  
Building on such relationships, a structured analysis was performed of all moderating 
and contingency-inducing aspects that were identified as second-order themes during 
the analysis of manufacturability constraint introduction. As a result from the analysis, 
which is provided in detail in the following, eight overarching moderating factors were 
found. They all include a moderating impact based on the constraint type or the 
organizational embedding, in four instances even both of them, and likewise includes 
contingency factors derived from other aspects of constraint introduction.  
 
Notably, it seems that neither constraint type nor organizational embedding have a 
direct moderating impact, as opposed to the author’s initial hypothesis. Instead, there 
appear to be mediating factors involved, which comprise different constraint 
characteristics and which have a direct moderating impact on the examined 
relationship. These characteristics, the eight overarching moderators as described 
above, determine the constraint’s overall quality. Therefore, their joint impact is 
denominated constraint quality in the following. The findings suggest that constraint 
type and organizational embedding, on the other hand, have a direct impact on 
constraint quality, either simultaneously or individually. With regard to the above 
example, the constraint quality characteristic comparability may be achieved by both, 
by choosing a quantifiable constraint type such as €/unit or by choosing an 
organizational embedding that ensures equivalent consideration of the constraint 
dimension with other design requirements, e.g. though simultaneous weighing up of 
all requirements in one steering committee. Therefore, the characteristics of constraint 
quality assume a mediating role for the impact of constraint type and organizational 
embedding on coopetitive behaviour or creativity.  
 
Table 9 summarizes the structured analysis, naming samples from the CarCo case 
study for exemplary moderating impacts.  
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Structured derivation of constraint quality characteristics moderating 
the impact of manufacturability constraints 
Character-
istics of 
constraint 
quality 
Moderated 
coopetition 
dimension / 
creativity 
Under-
lying 
second-
order 
theme 
Moderating impact of 
constraint type (case 
study examples) 
Moderating impact of 
organizational embedding 
(case study examples) 
Inducing 
interaction  
Cooperative 
intensity 
(B), (T), 
(U) 
  Constraint introduction 
accompanied by 
explanations 
 Shared functional 
responsibility as 
constraint recipient 
 Cross-functional 
composition of fulfilment 
tracking committee  
Tangibility Cooperative 
ability 
(L)  Uncomplicated 
constraint calculation 
 Meaningfulness of 
constraint for involved 
interfaces 
 
Actionability Cooperative 
ability, 
creativity 
(N), (W), 
(AA), 
(AB) 
 Achievable constraint 
value 
 Solution flexibility how 
to fulfil constraint  
 No arbitrary 
determination of 
constraint value 
 Constraint introduction in 
early NPD phase 
 Introduction with explicit 
mentioning of scope for 
action 
 Corporate target-setting 
allowing for flexibility on 
constraint fulfilment 
Accuracy Cooperative 
ability 
(O), (S)  Accurate calculation of 
constraint value 
 Absolute constraint 
value 
 
 Hierarchically high 
constraint recipient to 
avoid distorting details 
 
Disruptive 
introduction 
Cooperative 
ability 
(X)   Disruptive introduction 
mode  
Providing 
immediate 
feedback 
Cooperative 
ability 
(G)  Uncomplicated 
constraint calculation 
 Tool-supported constraint 
allowing for real-time 
calculation of constraint 
fulfilment  
Compara-
bility 
Competition (M), (Q)  Quantifiable constraint 
 Comparable with other 
design requirements 
regarding contribution to 
overall optimum 
 Equivalent evaluation of 
constraint with regard to 
other design 
requirements 
 
Balancing 
constraint 
importance 
Competition (J), (P), 
(R), (S), 
(T)  
  Incentivization balancing 
constraint consideration 
and over-emphasis 
 Constraint rigidity balan-
cing constraint consid-
eration, over-emphasis 
 Constraint recipient 
(function and hierarchy) 
accountable to pursue 
cross-functional optimum, 
e.g. project manager or 
shared functional 
responsibility 
Table 9: Structured derivation of constraint quality characteristics 
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Accordingly, each characteristic and its roots in the analysis will be explained in the 
following.  
 
Inducing interaction is based on a prerequisite for effective constraint introduction (B), 
requiring that constraints should serve as a trigger for discussion at the cross-
functional interface and not simply be thrown over the wall without explanations. Two 
organizational embedding dimensions take the same line. With regard to the recipient 
function (T), many informants argued for shared functional responsibility as they are 
convinced that this forces functions to talk with each other, an essential requirement 
for integration. Considering fulfilment tracking hierarchy (U), informants repeatedly 
mentioned the importance of the composition of the tracking committee, which is ought 
to consist of all involved functions in order to make them interact with each other. 
Naturally, this characteristic impacts the coopetitive intensity dimension. 
 
Tangibility is based on the second-order theme (L) and includes meaningfulness of the 
constraint type for involved interfaces and easy value derivation, such that the 
constraint value can be easily calculated and comprehended by all involved functions. 
It mainly concerns the cooperative ability dimension, as a lack of tangibility would 
discourage cross-functional counterparts’ interest in the constraint and in the functional 
requirement it represents, impeding internalization and mutual understanding. 
 
Actionability involves different underlying second-order themes that empower the 
constraint recipient with the flexibility and ability required to fulfil the constraint. In 
reference to theme (N), this includes achievability of the constraint value and the 
related avoidance of an arbitrary value determination. In addition, the constraint 
recipient needs to be provided with a certain flexibility on how to fulfil the constraint. If 
the solution is already predetermined by the constraint, such as in the case of the 
fastener constraint type, or scope for action is narrow for any other reason, actionability 
is not given. Second-order themes (W) and (AA) suggest the introduction of the 
constraint during an early NPD phase, as in later phases scope for action becomes 
more and more narrow. (AB) refers to other factors that could possibly limit scope for 
action, such as governance, product-related or system-related limitations. Actionability 
moderates the impact on cooperative ability, as a lack thereof impedes the motivation 
to fulfil the constraint, therefore encumbering internalization and understanding of the 
constraint. Moreover, it impacts creativity, as scope for action and early introduction 
have been identified as contingency factors for creativity. 
 
Accuracy builds largely on (O), which includes the reliably accurate calculation of the 
constraint value and the suggestion to take an absolute value in order to avoid potential 
non-transparency in using transition bridges for relative values, where information 
asymmetry could lead to moral hazard. Informants’ discussion on the organizational 
embedding dimension of the recipient hierarchy level (S) is related to the latter: 
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Respondents argued that the hierarchical level should be rather high, because only 
operational levels would be aware of all details to a sufficient degree such that 
information asymmetry could be used to their advantage at the cost of the constraint 
accuracy. Since an accurate value enhances cross-functional understanding and a 
lack thereof potentially destroys trust at the interface, accuracy concerns the 
cooperative ability dimension. 
 
Disruptive introduction stems from the introduction mode in the existing enterprise (X), 
which many case study informants recommended to be disruptive to be able to break 
through entrenched functional structures. In a gradual introduction, those functional 
structures would otherwise constantly undermine constraint consideration. The 
disruptive introduction characteristic therefore concerns the cooperative ability 
dimension of cross-functional coopetition.  
 
Providing immediate feedback builds on second-order theme (G), which indicates that 
immediate feedback on the constraint fulfilment after a design modification is 
necessary for both constraint consideration and constraint optimization. Again, 
uncomplicated constraint calculation would facilitate providing immediate feedback. 
Alternatively, a tool-supported constraint embedding, as it was explored in the CarCo 
case study, would enable immediate feedback. As this characteristic helps to generate 
a better understanding of consequences on the respective cross-functional 
counterpart, immediate feedback influences the cooperative ability dimension.  
 
Comparability stems from the second-order themes (M) and (Q). Both themes 
advocate equivalent comparisons of the constraint dimension to other design 
requirements in order to optimize for the cross-functional optimum. This can either be 
achieved by a quantifiable nature of the constraint type or any other form that allows 
to assess a constraint’s contribution to the overall optimum. Alternatively, mechanisms 
of organizational embedding, e.g. governance- or system-related features, could 
enforce direct comparisons of the constraint dimension with other design 
requirements. As it facilitates open competition between different functional 
requirements, comparability relates to the competition dimension of coopetitive 
behaviour.  
 
Balancing constraint importance includes several second-order themes which require 
to seek a balance between the constraint not being considered and the constraint 
being over-emphasized at the cost of other design requirements (J). Different 
dimensions of organizational embedding allow to introduce such a balance, e.g. by 
fostering motivation for constraint consideration in a subtle way that avoids over-
emphasis, such as through constraint rigidity (P) and incentivization (R). Choosing an 
appropriate recipient hierarchy level (S) and recipient function (T), which bear 
accountability for the overall optimum, allows to achieve balance of constraint 
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importance, too. Because balancing constraint importance allows to critically pursue 
the cross-functional optimum, it contributes to the competition dimension.  
 
Illustration 52 depicts all characteristics of constraint quality and their respective impact 
on coopetition dimensions and creativity. It graphically shows how each characteristic 
mediates the impact of constraint type, organizational embedding or their joint impact.  
 
 
Illustration 52: Impact relationships of constraint quality characteristics 
In a simplified illustration of the identified relationships, as depicted in illustration 53, 
the findings are summarized. The assumed moderating impact of constraint type and 
organizational embedding does not directly influence the relationship between 
constraint introduction and coopetitive behaviour. There is an overarching moderator, 
denominated constraint quality, which moderates the impact of constraint introduction 
on coopetitive behaviour. Constraint type and organizational embedding, in turn, have 
an impact on constraint quality. Notably, the impact of constraint introduction on 
creativity seems likewise impacted by constraint quality. Therefore, though being 
unable to empirically underpin this hypothesis, the author assumes that constraint 
quality impacts the relationship of constraint introduction on time-to-market alike.  
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Illustration 53: The moderating impact of constraint quality 
In search of an overarching theoretical model, this study’s findings provide the author 
with reason to assume that the introduction of manufacturability constraints has a 
positive impact on cross-functional integration at the design-manufacturing interface 
as well as on creativity, with a potential negative impact on time-to-market. These 
impact relationships are moderated by constraint quality, which itself is determined by 
constraint type and organizational embedding. Constraint quality can only be 
determined in accordance with a specific setting. For example, the characteristic 
tangibility is dependent on industry- and product-related prior experience of the 
involved participants. 
The author is not able to take statements on neither strength nor complementarity nor 
substitutability of this moderating impact. There is a chance, that each of the individual 
characteristics of constraint quality represents a knock-out criterion, meaning that if 
one characteristic is not given, the positive impact of constraint introduction on cross-
functional integration disappears. Alternatively, and more likely from what the study’s 
findings suggest, constraint quality is made up by a weighted mix of the inherent 
characteristics and has a moderating impact that makes the relationship stronger or 
less strong, while not eliminating it at a whole.  
The impact direction of the different constraint quality characteristics, on the other 
hand, can be solidly stated based on this study’s empirical findings. All eight 
characteristics follow a trade-off in their impact direction: If the characteristic is fulfilled 
in any given constraint design, their moderating impact is positive. If the characteristic 
is not fulfilled, the moderating impact is negative. Illustration 54 depicts these trade-
offs in the impact direction of every identified characteristic.  
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Illustration 54: Impact direction of constraint quality 
As an example, if a certain constraint is tangible, actionable, accurate, comparable, 
balances constraint importance, provides immediate feedback on its fulfilment, induces 
interaction and is introduced disruptively, the moderating impact of the constraint will 
certainly be positive.  
 
In summary, the author is confident to assume that the introduction of manufacturability 
constraints, if characteristics of constraint quality are satisfied by choosing the 
appropriate constraint type and/or organizational embedding, will have a positive 
impact on cross-functional integration at the design-manufacturing interface, as well 
as on creativity, while potentially prolonging time-to-market. The resulting theoretical 
model with all identified relationships is portrayed in illustration 55.  
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Illustration 55: Theoretical model of the impact of manufacturability constraint introduction 
8 Conclusions 
8.1 Review of research questions and findings 
The following chapter will highlight important findings that have been made for the five 
research questions that guided the empirical study at hand.  
1. How does cross-functional coopetition impact cross-functional 
integration at the design-manufacturing interface of NPD? 
 
Based on a profound analysis of all dimensions of coopetitive behaviour in form of a 
case study at a German large-scale industrial NPD project, the author is able to draw 
conclusions on cross-functional integration which consider inherent socio-
organizational and contextual aspects. In this regard, the employed coopetitive 
perspective enabled capturing cross-functional integration holistically, covering all 
aspects that existing theoretical conceptions suggest. Taking Kahn’s (1996) two-pillar 
model as a reference, the following can be concluded: Cross-functional cooperative 
intensity and cross-functional cooperative ability translate into Kahn’s interaction and 
collaboration pillars. Cross-functional competition is able to gauge the effectiveness of 
cross-functional integration, likewise encompassed in Kahn’s conceptions. It goes 
beyond a mere behavioural measurement of whether functions talk to each other and 
share resources and information, asking if the observed interaction effectively finds 
expression in a product that accounts for all functional requirements, be it customer 
usability, manufacturability or design requirements. While other measurements that 
operationalize cross-functional integration for empirical research have been found to 
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be limited to behavioural aspects, cross-functional coopetition covers attitudinal 
aspects and effectivity in addition.  
Indeed, the deployment of the coopetitive perspective on the case study at hand 
revealed that effective integration requires more than a transactional exchange of 
information and resources. Socio-organizational and contextual aspects shape 
integration in the NPD context to a significant extent; analysing them from a coopetitive 
angle allows to derive a structured categorization and impact prediction as presented 
in the theoretical contribution of this thesis.  
 
In conclusion, this study’s results suggest that cross-functional coopetition is a strong 
predictor of cross-functional integration. In reference to the research question, this 
leads to the conclusion that cross-functional coopetition has a direct and positive 
impact on cross-functional integration at the design-manufacturing interface of NPD.  
 
2. How does the introduction of manufacturability constraints impact 
coopetitive behaviour at the manufacturing-design interface? 
 
From the empirical analysis, it can be concluded that the introduction of 
manufacturability constraints has a positive impact on all three dimensions of cross-
functional coopetition. Concerning cooperative intensity, it increases interaction even 
at non-adjacent interfaces and encourages manufacturing’s involvement in the design 
process. Second, it arouses interest for the cross-functional counterpart and enhances 
understanding and even internalization of their requirements, thus increasing 
cooperative ability. On the competition dimension, it increases transparency on the 
cross-functional optimum and encourages critical cross-functional reasoning and 
discussion on it, hence fostering constructive competition at the design-manufacturing 
interface. The findings suggest that the positive impact on coopetitive behaviour is 
dependent on several conditional aspects. These include communication 
accompanying constraint introduction, immediate feedback on constraint fulfilment and 
a risk of over-emphasizing the constraint dimension at the cost of other design 
requirements.  
In conclusion, the introduction of manufacturability constraints has a positive impact 
on coopetitive behaviour at the manufacturing-design interface as long as identified 
preconditions are met.  
3. What is the moderating impact of the constraint type on this relationship? 
 
Differences with regard to the constraint type have significant influence on the 
relationship of manufacturability constraints on coopetitive behaviour at the 
manufacturing-design interface. My analysis shows that if the constraint type fulfils 
certain characteristics on both the external applicability and the internal dimensioning, 
the relationship is moderated positively. These characteristics include 
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presuppositionless tangibility for involved interfaces, comparability to other design 
requirements, allowing for actionability in terms of achievability and solution flexibility 
and lastly, accuracy of constraint calculation. Among the three explored constraint 
types, the constraint with a medium abstraction level performed best in fulfilling these 
characteristics.  
In an overarching analysis of all identified moderating impacts and preconditions, it 
was found that the constraint type does not have a direct moderating impact on the 
relationship between constraints and coopetitive behaviour. Instead, the constraint 
type impacts different characteristics that can be summarized as constraint quality. 
The latter, in turn, is found to have a moderating impact on the relationship of 
manufacturability constraints on coopetitive behaviour at the manufacturing-design 
interface. 
 
4. What is the moderating impact of the organizational embedding on this 
relationship? 
 
A morphological analysis performed with interview participants generated nine 
dimensions with two to five values, respectively, that were found to have an impact on 
the relationship between manufacturability constraints and coopetition. Dimensions 
comprise constraint rigidity, priority with regard to existing design requirements, 
incentivization, recipient hierarchy level and function, fulfilment tracking hierarchy and 
frequency, introduction point in time during NPD and introduction mode in the existing 
enterprise. For different values of the respective dimensions, the impact of the 
introduction of constraints changes in direction and can have a negative or positive 
influence on coopetitive behaviour.  
Organizational embedding was found to have no direct moderating impact, though. 
Alike the constraint type, organizational embedding shapes characteristics of 
constraint quality, which itself has a moderating impact on the relationship of 
manufacturability constraints on coopetitive behaviour at the manufacturing-design 
interface. 
5. How does the introduction of manufacturability constraints impact 
creativity? 
 
Creativity was found to be positively impacted by the introduction of manufacturability 
constraints based on both pressure to conceive radical ideas and creativity-spurring 
interaction. According to a number of informants, the positive effect may be dependent 
on contingency factors including the NPD phase of constraint introduction and the 
granted scope of action for the constraint recipient. Both factors are part of the 
characteristics that are aggregated in constraint quality. Therefore, the impact on the 
introduction of manufacturability constraints is positive, but moderated by constraint 
quality.  
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8.2 Contributions to literature 
8.2.1. Contributions to cross-functional integration in NPD 
In-depth understanding of the dynamics of cross-functional integration in NPD 
In existent research, the belief in a positive impact of cross-functional integration on 
NPD success persists without fundamental doubts. However, there remains a lack of 
clarity on surrounding aspects and contingency factors. Empirical efforts on the 
relationship between various measures of NPD success and various facets of cross-
functional integration yield widely ambiguous results. Based on this recognition, the 
author set off to gain a profound understanding of the dynamics that shape cross-
functional integration in a NPD context. Qualitative research, as opposed to 
quantitative efforts which dominate the research field, enabled getting a grasp on less 
tangible items and accounting for contextual, social and organizational factors, all 
widely acknowledged in their importance by academia but seldom incorporated in 
empirical studies so far.  
The qualitative analysis painted a detailed picture of socio-organizational and 
situational dynamics that shape cross-functional integration in a case, which can be 
considered typical for large-scale industrial innovative environments. Such a profound 
and wide-ranging study with nominally unlimited items of observation is unprecedented 
in the research field of cross-functional integration in a NPD context and is able to 
create a new basis of understanding for these matters. The study is able to show that 
social and contextual dynamics have tremendous impact on patterns of cross-
functional integration. Effective integration, with a positive outcome from a cross-
functional perspective, requires much more than a transactional exchange of 
information and resources, to which existent survey items often are limited. Indeed, the 
CarCo case shows that a transactional exchange can indeed occur without effective 
integration resulting from it. Given the significance of social and contextual dynamics 
that have been identified, the author hopes to spark a shift in thinking such that future 
empirical studies provide room and effort to conceive these dynamics on their survey 
questionnaires.  
 
Beyond proving their significance, the study at hand allows for a structured impact 
analysis of these dynamics. When previous research may have dismissed social or 
contextual particularities as part of a wider error term, the model of cross-functional 
interface dynamics which emerges from this study allows to systematically attribute 
likely dynamics to certain setting preconditions and predict their impact direction on 
cross-functional integration in NPD. The findings suggest that function-specific 
dynamics will be observable only for a certain functional pairing at the interface, but for 
a broad range of contexts and environments. Contextual dynamics, on the other hand, 
are assumed to be valid for all functional pairings but limited to a certain context. The 
third category, social dynamics, will be observable in all contexts and at all interfaces 
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at which human beings participate. The study at hand contributes to existing literature 
not only by identifying function-specific dynamics for the design-manufacturing 
interface, contextual dynamics for innovative and large-scale industrial settings, and a 
set of social dynamics. It also provides a structure and blueprint for future research 
efforts to complement dynamics for other contexts and other functional pairings.  
 
Third, the study at hand answers researchers’ call for empirical efforts on the design-
manufacturing interface, which has often been neglected in existing research efforts. 
The findings contribute an in-depth analysis of underlying mechanisms at the interface 
that is believed to be able to complement academia’s understanding of different 
functional interfaces. Indeed, the findings show that the design-manufacturing 
interface has its own particularities, with dynamics and barriers to integration differing 
from those of other interfaces. 
Theory on a new method to enhance cross-functional integration 
This study contributes theory on a new method to enhance cross-functional integration 
in a NPD context, building on the introduction of constraints that embody certain 
functional requirements. The method is grounded in an empirical environment and 
therefore is likely to receive better empirical acceptance than existing methods, which 
are reproached with a high theoretical burden and insufficient recognition of empirical 
requirements. Exploration within different empirical scenarios has shown a positive 
impact on cross-functional integration and proven wide acceptance in a corporate 
setting. Moreover, the method produces a beneficial effect on creativity in design 
problem solving.  
In addition to the empirically explored approach, a theoretical backbone is contributed 
that derives cause-effect relationships from observed underlying mechanisms. 
Potential negative effects on time-to-market and moderating impacts have been 
analysed and depicted in an overarching model. With regard to moderating impacts, a 
set of characteristics of constraint quality has been derived from the empirical 
grounding. The study’s findings suggest values thereof that are able to positively 
impact the relationship; constraint type and organizational embedding have been 
explored as factors that, in turn, impact constraint quality.  
8.2.2 Contributions to coopetition research 
In the course of this study, a coopetitive perspective was taken to analyse behaviour 
at the design-manufacturing interface and to draw conclusions on cross-functional 
integration. In substantiating connections between cross-functional integration and 
cross-functional coopetition, this study contributes the first empirically founded 
analysis of this relationship. The findings suggest that cross-functional coopetition is 
indeed a good predictor for cross-functional integration. Even more so, it permits to 
capture cross-functional integration in the comprehensive way that theoretical 
fundamentals are calling for, but that existing models of cross-functional integration 
  229 
are unable to cover. To be more concrete, cross-functional integration allows to 
measure attitudinal aspects of integration through its cooperative ability dimension and 
provides an indicator of the effectivity of integration efforts through the competition 
dimension. By contrast, existing empirical measurements building on constructs of 
Kahn (1996) or Olson et al. (2001) assume a narrower perspective and focus on easily 
measurable behavioural aspects of integration. The case study at hand places an 
interesting counterpoint to this in showing that behavioural integration may well be 
observed without effective integration emerging from it, in a sense that would create 
NPD outcomes that are optimized from a cross-functional perspective. 
The author believes this recognition to contribute to existing literature in proving a 
better alternative to measure cross-functional integration by taking a coopetitive 
perspective. This may help to elucidate some of the ambiguous results that empirical 
studies, building on a poor measure of cross-functional integration, have generated.  
 
Second, this study contributes to coopetition theory by bringing forward empirical 
research on coopetitive behaviour on micro level I, which has been scarce overall and 
non-existent with regard to qualitative research. The profound qualitative analysis of 
the study at hand helps to establish a solid base for the nascent and thriving research 
field striving to illuminate essential mechanics and antecedents, which support or 
impede the emergence of cross-functional coopetition.  
Additionally, this thesis represents a contribution to empirical research on micro level I 
coopetition in a NPD context, which has been very limited albeit being recognized as 
a promising research field.  
8.2.3 Contributions to research on constraints in innovation  
Despite its proverbial existence, the role of constraints in an innovation context remains 
unclear for academia. Different research efforts come to contradicting results on 
whether innovation fosters or hampers innovation, while missing out on going beyond 
a superficial level of analysis. The study at hand contributes to the theoretical body on 
constraints in an innovation context by presenting the first in-depth qualitative analysis 
of this relationship. The findings confirm Hoegl et al.’s (2008) presumption that 
constraints impact different antecedents of NPD success, which helps to explain 
ambiguity in the wide relationship between constraints and innovation: While cross-
functional integration and creativity seem positively impacted, time-to-market may be 
negatively influenced. Furthermore, the study is able to identify and categorize 
boundary conditions as well as organizational and contextual moderating impacts, 
which further influence the relationship between constraints and innovation. Therefore, 
the study confirms that there is no simple answer to whether constraints foster or 
hamper innovation, but it explains underlying mechanisms that lead to this ambiguity 
and it provides a structured analysis under which conditions it has a positive or a 
negative impact. Identified characteristics of the moderating impact of constraint 
quality and explored effects of constraint type and organizational embedding provide 
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a theoretical basis to further structure the relationship between innovation and 
constraints.  
 
In addition, the author believes to contribute to constraint literature by exploring the 
deliberate use of constraints, and indeed yielding a positive result. So far, research 
has focused on examining constraints as a given frame condition and did not make 
use of constraints’ advantageous side effects in an organizational application. By 
presenting a possibility how such an application can be successful through this study, 
the author hopes to encourage other purposeful usages of constraints to be developed 
by future researchers.   
 
Empirical research on constraints in innovation concentrates to large parts on resource 
constraints. By adding an empirical effort on product constraints, this study 
complements existing literature.  
In addition to that, the thesis includes a grounded, comparative analysis of different 
product constraints which is unprecedented in existing research. The findings suggest 
that it is less the abstraction level from the product, but more a set of characteristics 
defined in the constraint quality that decides if a certain constraint type has a positive 
impact or not. These findings may be able to contribute to the success of future 
research efforts in the field of constraints in innovation. Furthermore, they potentially 
represent a basis for the continuation of a structured comparative classification of 
different constraint types. 
 
Finally, the study at hand makes a case for constraint research on an intra-
organizational level of analysis with an incumbent firm. While most research efforts in 
this field focus on start-up or bottom-of-the-pyramid settings, existing corporations 
remain important breeding grounds for innovation and thus deserve increased 
attention. The thesis at hand answers this call, affirming that indeed there are 
interesting applications for constraints in incumbent settings.  
8.3 Limitations 
Research results and proposed contributions to theory should be considered in light of 
the study’s limitations, which can be allocated to three fields. First, dependence on the 
researcher’s judgement, second, generalizability of results and third, explanatory 
power of derived theory.  
 
Despite a rigid methodological approach that takes account of established quality 
criteria, any qualitative research effort remains dependent on the individual 
researcher’s judgement and interpretation to a certain extent. Explanations derived 
from the original data may be biased by the researcher’s own experiences or personal 
perspective. As the researcher in the study at hand took a participant-as-observer role 
within production management at CarCo, particular prudence had to be applied to 
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ensure objectivity of results. For data that was collected during participant observation, 
a risk of a perception bias that enforces empathy for the problems and requirements 
of production management remains.  
Besides, the study’s findings represent the majority of involved participants, not all of 
them. For all questions, there were respondents whose opinion differed or even 
opposed presented results.  
Furthermore, explanatory power with regard to involved abstract concepts in this study, 
predominantly coopetition, may be reduced by their operationalization. Participants 
were not presented the abstract concept of coopetition, but with operationalized terms 
to suit participants’ empirical contexts. For example, competition, as one constituent of 
coopetition, was operationalized as “friction”, “conflict” or “rivalry for budget or 
management attention”.  
 
For different parts of the analysis, alternative explanations can be stated that provide 
conclusions which are different to the ones drawn in the course of the study. With 
regard to the model of interface dynamics, derived contextual, social and function-
specific dynamics could also be explained by particularities of the people involved at 
the observed interfaces. In consideration of the introduction of manufacturability 
constraints, the observed positive impact could also have been induced by the tools 
that have been programmed to support constraint exploration in a realistic scenario. 
Although the researchers asked for feedback on the constraint introduction and tools 
in separate questions and applied different codes, informants could possibly have 
projected their positive perception of the tools on the constraint introduction. With 
regard to the derivation of quality constraints as a moderating impact, there could be 
a latent variable, representing an alternative explanation. Albeit empirical grounding of 
the identified characteristics makes their obsolescence unlikely, there could be hidden 
variables besides the characteristics, which remained unidentified in the study at hand.  
 
Based on their methodological nature, case studies are unable to postulate definitive 
generalizability of their results to other cases. Empirical grounding entails invaluable 
advantages as a research method with regard to richness and applicability of data and 
theoretical insights. On the other hand, however, it naturally represents a challenge for 
the generalizability of results. Even though CarCo can arguably be considered as a 
typical case for an innovative project in a large-scale industrial setting, generalizability 
to other contexts, for example cross-functional integration in a start-up, or other 
functional pairings, may be limited. Certainly, there also is a risk that derived theory 
reflects particularities of CarCo as a single company, with limited generalizability on 
other firms, even if they are subject to similar contextual factors.  
Potentially, in other industrial contexts or other cultural settings, dynamics may be 
different and therefore results limited with regard to their generalizability.  
Besides, data collection and resulting empirical grounding of the case study at hand 
was limited to the observation of certain NPD phases, covering the beginning of the 
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initial phase, concept phase and the beginning of series development. A very early 
phase or a very late phase in NPD could be subject to dynamics different to the ones 
covered in this study’s theoretical contributions.  
 
With regard to the explanatory power of derived theory models, possible limitations 
may be of relevance. The model of interface dynamics categorizes and describes 
entire dynamics patterns and refrains from placing model items connected by simple 
cause-effect relationships. Although such relationships would take the model to a 
simplified, easier-to-interpret scheme, it would, however, not be able to live up to 
contingencies and dependencies found in the empirical grounding. For this reason, the 
model’s full explanatory power emerges only in relation to a certain setting, within 
which it can be interpreted and for which it can provide projections on the dynamics 
impacting cross-functional integration.  
Furthermore, the model does not provide a full projection on how integration at a 
certain interface is likely to be; instead, it permits statements on social, contextual and 
function-specific dynamics that shape cross-functional integration. Naturally, cross-
functional integration depends also on involved personae, products and processes – 
which differ from individual organization to organization.  
The theory on the introduction of constraints has been derived based on the 
exploration performed with CarCo interview participants in different scenarios. 
Although the exploration environment was assimilated to real conditions that prevail at 
CarCo, this approach can only approximate a real introduction of constraints. As a 
potential limitation coming out of this, interview participants may be negatively biased 
if they were unable to dissolve from the status quo within NPD, or may be positively 
biased if they overlooked negative consequences because the scenario didn’t seem 
realistic to them. 
Besides, the author did not include time-to-market as an object for analysis from the 
beginning of the study, therefore lacking the appropriate theoretical backing during 
data collection. Statements on time-to-market derived from this base should therefore 
be judged with particular caution.  
8.4 Propositions for further research 
Different theoretical contributions of the study at hand open up promising avenues for 
future research, which will be described in the following.  
 
The model of cross-functional interface dynamics at the design-manufacturing 
interface, which was derived from the in-depth analysis of integration mechanisms in 
the case study at hand, represents an unprecedented effort to structure social, 
contextual and function-specific dynamics that impact integration at any given 
interface. Certainly, it would be an interesting path for future researchers to find generic 
dynamics for other functional pairings or other environmental contexts. For example, 
grounded qualitative research would be able to discover dynamics specific to a start-
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up context or the marketing-design interface. Similarly, a qualitative effort in another 
cultural background would allow to confirm or disprove the general validity of social 
dynamics across different cultures.   
 
Besides such an enlargement or continuation of the model of interface dynamics, 
individual dynamics identified from the case study at hand offer promising starting 
points for further research.  
To begin with, the interplay of time lag, information asymmetry and responsibility 
considerations towards a game of power and enforcement in the “avocado game”, 
which has been identified to take place at the design-manufacturing interface of NPD, 
might be an interesting explanation pattern for other related phenomena. Modelling 
organizational processes, decision or negotiation procedures as a corresponding 
social game has the potential to generate new explanation patterns.  
Second, the finding that innovation complicates integration carries potential for a new 
research impulse on the heavily debated inverse question, namely how cross-
functional integration impacts innovation. As in the case study at hand, this 
counteraction may influence the effect of interface integration on NPD success in other 
cases alike. Integrating this recognition into future quantitative or qualitative research 
efforts on the topic could improve their explanatory power.  
The dynamic suggesting that integration is “lost in complexity” could represent an 
application field of complexity research. It embodies a situation where complexity that 
has deliberately been created by an organization, though well-intentioned, distorts 
organizational targets, in the case at hand cross-functional integration. Explaining and 
solving this or similar organizational dilemmas could be an interesting path for future 
research.  
Similarly, the identified dynamic of formal integration as a “house of cards” may be an 
interesting field of engagement for organizational research and innovation research: 
How can corporate structures of incumbents be maintained resilient and flexible 
enough to support innovation?  
In interface research, the importance of adjacent interfaces has remained 
unacknowledged so far. This study suggests that indeed, adjacent interfaces are major 
determinants of integration. Potentially, these bridging functions, that exist in empirical 
reality but so far have been neglected by research, could bear importance for other 
matters within organization research as well.  
Finally, further research on the identified mechanism on wall building between 
organizational functions would be useful for all empirical efforts to increase cross-
functional integration. If research would be capable of explaining the forces that build 
up these walls, it would be in a better position to make recommendations on how the 
build-up can be prevented in the first place, instead of providing theory on how to 
remove them.  
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The theory that emerged on the introduction of constraints and its impact on NPD 
success raises a few intriguing avenues for further research. Based on this study’s 
qualitative research findings, the author is able to propose several relationships that 
would be interesting to validate by means of a quantitative research effort.  
 
To begin with, the findings strongly suggest a close relationship between micro level I 
coopetition and cross-functional integration. This is valid to such an extent, that the 
author suggests to take coopetitive behaviour as a measure for integration at cross-
functional interfaces. A survey study, building on established scales for cross-
functional coopetition and extensive measurements for cross-functional integration 
which include attitudinal behaviour and effectivity of the integration effort, could usefully 
examine this relationship. Specifically, it is proposed: 
 
Proposition 1a (P1a): The stronger cooperative intensity is at a cross-functional 
interface in a NPD project, the stronger will be cross-functional integration at the same 
interface and the closer will the NPD outcome be to a cross-functional optimum.  
Proposition 1b (P1b): The stronger cooperative ability is at a cross-functional 
interface in a NPD project, the stronger will be cross-functional integration at the same 
interface and the closer will the NPD outcome be to a cross-functional optimum.  
Proposition 1c (P1c): The stronger competition is between two interfaces in a NPD 
project, the stronger will be cross-functional integration at the same interface and the 
closer will the NPD outcome be to a cross-functional optimum.  
 
Exploring the introduction of constraints and assessing their impact on cross-functional 
integration and other antecedents of NPD success, such as creativity and time-to-
market, led the author to derive a number of theoretical propositions. These constitute 
new theory, which emerged grounded in an empirical setting. In order to substantiate 
initial theoretical propositions, a laboratory study could be helpful, as it would enable a 
neat comparison of outcomes achieved with and without the introduction of constraints, 
which certainly should be a next step for the initial theory to receive acceptance and to 
be refined for empirical application. While empirical grounding that explicitly 
accommodates contextual aspects was essential to establish the theory and 
understand its mechanics, the author believes the theory to be functioning laboratory 
conditions alike.  
While it would be intriguing to test different functional constraints in such a kind of 
study, the author recommends to test manufacturability constraints, as the established 
theoretical understanding of function-specific dynamics will facilitate interpretation.  
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Proposition 2a (P2a): The introduction of a manufacturability constraint during NPD 
at the design-manufacturing interface increases cooperative intensity at this interface. 
Proposition 2b (P2b): The introduction of a manufacturability constraint during NPD 
at the design-manufacturing interface increases cooperative ability at this interface. 
Proposition 2c (P2c): The introduction of a manufacturability constraint during NPD 
at the design-manufacturing interface increases cross-functional competition at this 
interface. 
 
Similarly, testing propositions from this study on other antecedents of NPD success 
would be insightful in such a laboratory study.  
 
Proposition 3 (P3): The introduction of a manufacturability constraint during NPD at 
the design-manufacturing interface enhances creative design problem solving. 
Proposition 4 (P4): The introduction of a manufacturability constraint during NPD at 
the design-manufacturing interface prolongs the NPD process.  
 
In order to facilitate future testing of the propositions derived from the theoretical 
findings, a graphical representation thereof is presented in illustration 56.  
 
 
Illustration 56: A framework for testing propositions on constraints' impact on NPD antecedents 
The study at hand considers a moderating impact of constraint quality on the 
relationship between constraint introduction and both cross-functional coopetition and 
creativity. Constraint type and organizational embedding were found to impact 
constraint quality, but it is well possible that other factors have an impact alike. Further 
qualitative research would help to bring light into this issue, but it would require another 
exploratory setting with informants. As an alternative, an exploratory factor analysis, 
based on an extensive survey that inquires factors potentially impacting constraint 
quality, would likely be insightful. It could be executed with participants of a sufficiently 
dimensioned laboratory study as explained above. Subsequently, structured equation 
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modelling would help to substantiate, or disprove, the moderating impact of constraint 
quality on the relationship between constraints and cross-functional coopetition.  
 
Furthermore, it will be interesting to identify constraints that satisfy the identified 
characteristics of constraint quality. Going beyond the three tested constraints in this 
study, there may be quantitative indicators that satisfy all identified characteristics to a 
high degree and thus would likely serve as effective constraints. While constraint 
quality will always remain specific to the industry- and product-related case, it is likely 
that some constraints work well for many of these cases. It would be interesting to 
identify a variety of constraints, for which constraint quality in certain contexts is likely 
good, and from which practitioners could choose from. A laboratory study, which tests 
a series of constraints that have been selected based on their constraint quality, may 
be helpful for this purpose.  
 
This study’s results show that a deliberate use of constraints to impact antecedents of 
NPD success could be successful. The author hopes that this result is able to 
encourage similar endeavours. With this study making the case to enhance 
manufacturability requirements in product design, the author believes that other 
functional requirements from stakeholders downstream the NPD process could 
strengthen their voice in product design by using constraints in an equal manner. For 
instance, environmental considerations such as sustainability of used materials or 
energy consumption would be an intriguing and relevant case. Customer usability 
concerns, often neglected by technology-affine design engineers, could be another 
interesting case. Qualitative research that accompanies a real introduction of such 
constraints into the design process of an organization would be useful in this respect. 
Furthermore, any deliberate use of constraints to enhance NPD success seems 
promising based on the results of the study at hand; not only through an increase of 
interface integration, but also through an increase of creativity or even other, still 
unknown related antecedents. Further empirical or theoretical efforts that develop this 
thesis’ initial theoretical basis to substantiate a purposeful use of constraints in an 
innovation context would constitute interesting avenues for further research.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Detailed tables of empirical research on effects and contingencies 
of cross-functional integration in NPD
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Relationship between cross-functional integration and NPD success 
 Scope 
Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Measurement 
NPD success 
Measurement 
CFI 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Results 
Olson et al., 
1995 
Organizational 
moderators for 
the impact of 
cross-functional 
interaction on 
NPD success 
Survey data from 
45 cross-industry 
projects 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 New product 
effectiveness 
(e.g. new 
product quality, 
time to reach 
break-even) 
 New product 
efficiency (time 
required and 
budget 
adhered to) 
 Psychosocial 
satisfaction 
with the 
outcome 
 
 Functional 
interdepend-
ence, resource 
flows, 
participant 
satisfaction, 
task difficulty, 
functional goal 
attainment 
 Product 
innovativeness 
 Formalness 
of coordination 
mechanisms 
(e.g. 
bureaucracy or 
centralization) 
 Impact of cross-functional 
integration on NPD success is highly 
dependent on product innovativeness 
and coordination mechanisms 
 Generally, a fit between all 
elements is important, e.g. more 
bureaucratic structures are more 
successful for non-innovative 
products 
Kahn, 1996; 
Kahn and 
Mentzer, 1998 
Investigation 
whether 
collaboration or 
interaction 
increase 
company 
performance 
Survey data from 
514 US 
American 
Electronic 
industry 
managers  
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
5 performance 
measures on 
scales, one of 
them product 
development 
performance 
 Interaction (9 
items on 
meetings and 
documented 
information 
exchange) 
 Collaboration 
(6 items on e.g. 
mutual 
understanding, 
same vision) 
 
  Collaboration has a strong positive 
impact on development performance, 
while interaction alone is not 
sufficient 
Song et al., 1997 Antecedents of 
consequences of 
cross-functional 
integration in 
NPD projects 
Survey data from 
598 managers 
from Mexican 
high-tech 
companies 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
4 items (Product 
quality, NPD 
cycle time, NPD 
objectives met, 
NPD program 
success) 
3 items 
(Communication, 
task orientation, 
interpersonal 
relations) 
  Significant positive impact of cross-
functional integration on NPD 
performance 
 Internal antecedents impact the 
degree of cross-functional integration, 
external antecedents don’t 
 Results were similar for all three 
functions 
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Song and Parry, 
1997 
Identification of 
NPD success 
determinants, 
with cross-
functional 
integration being 
of the examined 
determinants 
Survey data on 
788 NPD 
projects from 
cross-industry 
Japanese firms 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
4 items on 
relative success 
of the new 
product (general, 
sales volume, 2x 
profitability)  
3 items on “good 
integration” pair-
wise of R&D, 
manufacturing, 
marketing 
  Within various examined 
determinants, cross-functional 
integration is one of the most 
important success factors 
 Cross-functional integration impacts 
NPD success by having a profound 
impact on technical and marketing 
proficiency and the relative product 
advantage 
 
Langerak et al., 
1997 
Impact of cross-
company and 
cross-functional 
integration on 
NPD success in 
different 
competitive 
environments 
Survey data from 
103 Belgium and 
Dutch 
companies 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
Several 
performance 
measures (e.g. 
development 
period, payback 
period, share of 
new product in 
sales) 
Relative time 
spent by each 
function in each 
phase 
 NPD phases 
(pre-
development, 
assessment, 
product 
development, 
commercializati
on) 
 Turbulence of 
external 
environment 
 Optimal degree of collaboration 
depends on the competitive 
environment 
 
Sherman et al., 
2000 
Impact of five 
forms of cross-
functional 
integration on 
product 
development 
cycle time 
Survey data from 
65 business 
units/companies 
in the US and 
Scandinavia 
Several bilateral 
pairings, R&D 
manufacturing 
integration one 
of them 
 Product 
development 
cycle time (1 
item) 
 5 items on 
R&D/manufact
uring 
integration (e.g. 
close 
collaboration, 
attention to 
manufactura-
bility during 
design) 
  Positive impact of 
R&D/manufacturing integration on 
cycle time, but other forms of 
integration with stronger impact 
Lovelace et al., 
2001 
Role of conflict 
communication 
for cross-
functional NPD 
teams’ efficiency 
and 
innovativeness 
Survey data from 
43 US American 
NPD teams 
Unspecified  Innovative-
ness of team 
outcome 
 Efficiency of 
team outcome 
(budget and 
time 
adherence) 
Functional 
diversity of 
teams (entropy-
based diversity) 
  Cross-functional diversity is not the 
decisive factor for neither product 
innovativeness nor NPD efficiency 
 Instead, the communication 
management of task disagreement 
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Frishammar and 
Ake Horte, 2005 
Impact of 
external 
information (with 
cross-functional 
integration being 
of them) on 
innovation 
performance 
Survey data from 
206 Swedish 
companies 
Unspecified  3 items on 
innovation 
performance 
 Personal 
interaction (4 
items 
 Impersonal 
interaction (5 
items) 
 Collaboration 
(6 items) 
  Collaboration with positive impact 
on innovation performance 
 Both personal and impersonal 
interaction without impact on 
innovation performance 
Table 10: Empirical research on cross-functional integration in NPD - development of research field 
 
 
Comprehensive exploration of moderators and mediators 
 Scope 
Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Measurement 
NPD success 
Measurement 
CFI 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Results 
Song et al., 1998 Impact of cross-
functional joint 
involvement 
across 
product 
development 
stages 
Survey data from 
236 US 
American cross-
industry 
managers 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 Product 
effectiveness 
(6 items, e.g. 
relative product 
quality and 
price) 
 Product 
efficiency (1 
item: relative 
timeliness of 
NPD 
introduction) 
4-8 different 
items for joint 
involvement 
measured for 
each NPD phase 
5 NPD phases: 
market 
opportunity 
analysis, 
planning, 
development, 
pretesting, and 
launch 
 Strong dependence of impact of 
integration on NPD success on NPD 
phase and interface 
 For certain functional pairings in 
certain stages, cross-functional 
integration can even be detrimental, 
e.g. involvement of all three functions 
in market opportunity analysis 
 Specific function- and stage-specific 
patterns evolve, where integration is 
supporting or impeding NPD success 
 
Kahn, 2001 Impact of 
interdepart-
mental 
integration and 
market 
orientation on 
product 
development 
performance 
Survey data from 
156 US 
American Textile 
managers 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 Product 
development 
performance 
(pre-launch) 
 Product 
management 
performance 
(post-launch) 
 Interdepartme
ntal Interaction 
 Interdepartme
ntal 
Collaboration 
 Interfunctiona
l Coordination 
NPD phase  Both marketing and manufacturing 
managers see positive impact of 
interdepartmental integration on NPD 
 R&D managers do not reflect any 
relationship  
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Olson et al., 
2001 
Impact of cross-
functional 
integration on 
NPD project 
performance 
Survey data and 
supplemental 
interviews from 
34 U.S. 
American cross-
industry NPD 
project teams 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 5 items on 
NPD Project 
performance  
 3 items 
(communicatio
n, information 
exchange, 
transferred 
work) 
 
 Early and late 
NPD stages 
 Project 
innovativeness 
measured by 
prior product 
experience 
 Higher NPD performance for 
integration of R&D/marketing and 
R&D/manufacturing in early stages 
 Higher NPD performance for 
integration of 
manufacturing/marketing and 
R&D/manufacturing in late stages 
only for innovative products 
 Integration of 
manufacturing/marketing in early 
stages positive for non-innovative 
products and negative for innovative 
products 
 
Vandevelde and 
van Dierdonck, 
2003 
Identification of 
success factors 
at the design-
manufacturing 
interface for 
production start-
up phase 
Survey data from 
53 Belgian 
companies 
R&D, 
Manufacturing 
Smoothness of 
the production 
start-up  
 Formalization 
of the process 
 Empathy from 
design to 
manufacturing 
 Communicati
on 
 Design 
involvement in 
production 
start-up 
 Complexity of 
the product 
 Newness of 
the product 
 
 Empathy from design to 
manufacturing ensures a smooth 
production start-up 
 Formalization of the process 
ensures smooth production start-up 
 
 
Troy et al., 2008 Impact of cross-
functional 
integration on 
NPD success 
considering 
diverse 
moderating 
factors 
Meta-analysis of 
146 correlations 
25 quantitative 
studies 
Diverse, no 
specification 
given 
Diverse, no 
specification 
given 
Diverse, no 
specification 
given 
 7 
management-
controlled 
moderators 
(e.g. 
Integration at 
team vs. 
organization 
level, 
integration as 
cooperative 
climate vs. 
information 
sharing only) 
 2 researcher-
controlled 
 Relations are indeed highly 
complex  
 Positive impact of integration on 
NPD can be stated, but strongly 
dependent on the moderators 
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moderators 
(e.g. objective 
or subjective 
success 
measures) 
 3 contextual 
moderators 
(e.g. services 
or goods, non-
western or 
western) 
 
Brettel et al., 
2011 
Impact of cross-
functional 
integration on 
NPD efficiency 
and 
effectiveness 
Survey data from 
118 German 
cross-industry 
companies 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 NPD 
Effectiveness 
 NPD 
Efficiency 
 
 5 items on 
goal alignment, 
resource 
sharing, formal 
and informal 
interaction, 
information 
exchange 
 Project phase 
(development 
& 
commercializati
on phase) 
 Innovativenes
s of product 
(incremental & 
radical 
innovation) 
 
 Relations between various aspects 
of cross-functional integration and 
NPD performance measures are 
highly complex 
 R&D/Marketing: positive for 
efficiency, but not effectiveness. 
Impact of integration dependent on 
phase and innovativeness. 
 R&D/Manufacturing: Positive for 
efficiency in development phase 
 Marketing/Manufacturing: No 
relation for radical innovations, 
positive for effectiveness in 
commercialization phase 
Table 11: Empirical research on cross-functional integration in NPD - comprehensive research ambitions 
 
 
Relationship specification 
 Scope 
Methodology/ 
sample 
Functional 
units 
Measurement 
NPD success 
Measurement 
CFI 
Moderators/ 
Mediators 
Results 
Nakata et al., 
2006 
Role of cross-
functional 
integration, 
customer 
Survey data from 
259 cross-
industry NPD 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 5 items (e.g. 
relative sales 
volume, 
3 items on good 
integration and 
communication 
for pairwise 
Mediating role of 
new product 
advantage  
 Cross-functional integration with 
positive impact on new product 
advantage 
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orientation and 
new product 
team proficiency 
on new product 
advantage, and 
the latter’s 
impact on NPD 
success 
projects from 
Korea and Japan 
relative 
profitability) 
between 
manufacturing, 
marketing and 
R&D 
 New product advantage with 
positive impact on NPD success 
Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima, 
2007 
Examination of 
the impact of 
cross-functional 
collaboration 
and market 
knowledge 
dimensions on 
NPD success 
Survey data from 
363 Chinese 
managers 
Unspecified, 
survey asks 
generally for 
“integration with 
other 
departments” 
5 items (e.g. 
relative 
profitability, 
relative share of 
sales) 
3 items on 
cooperation from 
different 
departments 
Mediating role of 
knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms 
 No direct impact of cross-functional 
collaboration on NPD success 
 Positive impact of cross-functional 
collaboration only via knowledge 
integration mechanisms 
 
Engelen et al., 
2012 
Examination of 
cultural 
contingency 
factors of the 
impact of cross-
functional 
integration on 
NPD success 
Survey data from 
619 companies 
in 6 different 
countries 
Unspecified, 
survey asks 
generally for 
“integration with 
other 
departments” 
 4 items on 
new product 
(2x relative 
sales, 
profitability, 
market share) 
 4 items on 
collaboration 
(e.g. collective 
goals, 
teamwork) 
 3 items on 
interaction (e.g. 
engagement in 
circulated 
reports, memo-
randums) 
 
Moderating 
effect of national 
and corporate 
culture  
 Both cross-functional collaboration 
and interaction with positive impact 
on NPD success 
 Impact is stronger for collectivist 
cultures, and stronger for strong 
company cultures 
Graner and 
Mißler-Behr, 
2014 
The application 
of methods in 
NPD and its 
impact on cross-
functional 
integration and 
NPD success 
Survey data from 
400 cross-
industry NPD 
projects from 
Germany, 
Switzerland, 
Austria 
Unspecified, 
survey asks 
generally for 
“integration with 
other 
departments” 
6 items (e.g. 
relative 
profitability, ROI) 
4 items on 
cooperation from 
different 
departments 
Mediating role of 
NPD method 
application 
 Cross-functional collaboration leads 
to better NPD performance 
 Application of NPD methods leads 
to higher integration and hence to 
better NPD performance 
Tsai and Hsu, 
2014 
Development of 
a mediated 
moderation 
model for the 
role of 
Survey data from 
182 Taiwanese 
companies 
R&D, Marketing, 
Manufacturing 
 10 items (e.g. 
relative sales, 
relative time-to-
market) 
12 items (e.g. 
information 
sharing, 
willingness to 
cooperate) 
Moderating role 
of competitive 
intensity 
 Positive impact of cross-functional 
integration on NPD success under 
low competitive intensity, but no 
impact under high competitive 
intensity 
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competitive 
intensity on the 
relationships  
knowledge 
integration 
mechanisms, 
cross-functional 
integration and 
NPD 
performance  
Nafisi et al., 
2016 
Involvement of 
Manufacturing 
(operators & 
engineers) in 
NPD 
Exploratory 
single case 
study in heavy 
automotive 
industry 
(qualitative, 8 
interviews) 
R&D, 
Manufacturing 
n.a. qualitative n.a. Manufacturing engineers are more 
often involved than operators, latter 
confirms other studies that it is very 
difficult to involve manufacturing in 
NPD  
Cho et al., 2017 Examination of a 
potential 
moderating role 
of international 
orientation within 
the impact of 
cross-functional 
integration on 
NPD success 
Survey data from 
189 Korean 
(Vandevelde and 
van Dierdonck, 
2003)companies 
Unspecified  3 items on 
new product 
outcome (time-
to-market, 
number of new 
products, 
product quality) 
 3 items on 
new product 
performance 
(customer 
acceptance, 
sales growth, 
profitability) 
3 items (not 
specified) 
Moderating 
effect of 
international 
orientation 
 Cross-functional integration with 
positive impact on NPD success 
 International orientation not a 
moderator of the latter relationship, 
but a factor with direct positive impact 
on NPD itself 
 
Table 12: Empirical research on cross-functional integration in NPD - relationship specification 
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Appendix B: Representative data for second-order themes 
 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Cooperative Intensity 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(a) High 
communication 
intensity at adjacent 
interfaces 
(a1) Communication intensity at bilateral interfaces 
Product designer: “I have more interfaces with the process designers than with the 
production planners” (128:4) 
Production planner: “I think the alignment between product design and process design 
is very good” (160:2) 
Member of production management: “There’s not much I have to do with product 
designers in my daily life” (127:1) 
Product designer: “With the manufacturer, I have nothing to do” (130:25) 
Product designer: “We have indeed nothing to do with manufacturing, we come up with 
something ourselves regarding all the screws and so on” (161:12) 
 
(a2) Strong informal relations at bilateral interfaces 
Production planner: “Between process design and product design, the connection is 
closer. When I was in process design, we often watched football together or went 
to the product designers’ barbecues” (82:66) 
Production management: “My relations are 70% to manufacturing, 25% to production 
planning, 5% to product design, roughly” (127:17) 
Manufacturer [on the typical process designer, author’s note]: “He sees the product 
designer all the time, he’s much closer to them than to us. Only when the hardware 
arrives, the process designer really gets to know the manufacturer” (147:24) 
 
(a3) Manufacturing involvement only via interface cascade 
 “That’s what I meant with the cascade product design – process design - production 
planning – manufacturing. Production planning and process planning are really 
close. But process planning to manufacturing, there is a step in between” (82:69) 
 “So the manufacturing people never sit together with the product designers?” “No, they 
wouldn’t do this” 
“Manufacturing to product design, that’s a wide span” (160:8) 
“Manufacturing is rather detached here, product design has closer contacts to the 
production planners” (167:5) 
“There is always the planner in between product design and manufacturing” (177:4) 
(b) Importance of 
informal relations 
(b1) Individual effectiveness dependent on informal relations 
“I told you, that’s all heavily dependent on individual persons. […] It all hinges strongly 
on individuals, if such a cooperation works or doesn’t work” (20:1) 
“Often, this [the integration, author’s note] depends on just one single person. That was 
the same with the injection engine development: there, they had one old liaison 
engineer, with him everything worked out perfectly” (145:28) 
“CarCo is simply built as a networking association, everything works via people” 
(160:10) 
 
(b2) Informal relations as success factor for integrated NPD 
“Most things, much, work on informal levels. This means that cooperation takes place 
on an informal level, much hinges on persons, how well you get along with each 
other” (82:70) 
“The principle of one hand washes the other is valid.” (147:57)  
[on the question how convincing cross-functional counterparts works best, author’s 
note]: “The first thing is always to have a coffee together. Try to build a relationship 
with them, independent of their department symbol.” (130:11) 
 “It’s a very personal thing if something works or doesn’t. […] I’d say that all of my 
actions are based on exchanging with people and understanding their individual 
situation” (127:15) 
(c) Perceived 
inefficiency of 
formal relations 
(c7) Bureaucracy and formal alignment hinder integration 
“We have a problem with bureaucracy at CarCo, you have to do 100.000 feedback 
loops”(159:6) 
 “The problem is how to get to a binding, simple, quick statement, because everyone is 
super-cautious in the sense of once bitten, twice shy. It first has to be aligned three 
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times, then the calculation has to be re-adjusted, then certified and only then the 
number can be passed on” (148:7) 
 
(c8) Homemade structural complexity 
“That’s really because so many people work here – if you just look at [names a CarCo 
product, author’s note], that’s not any more complex than simple plugs […]. But 
somehow, here – this is possible in a much leaner way, it would really be possible 
in a much leaner way. It would already help if the product designer just talks with 
the process designer, as an example, face to face. I don’t know, because that’s 
really extreme here.” (181:7) 
“What is not value-adding for us, I say at CarCo but that’s certainly the same for other 
OEMs, is the frequency of alignment committees. The contents that are conveyed 
there are often congruent, so you say the same thing 50 times.” (82:24) 
“Without having understood the entire committee landscape to any extent, what we 
have as committee, and preparing committee, and another preparing committee […] 
Until the run through the committees is finished, half a year is over. I think there’s 
too much time frittered away here.” (178:31) 
 
(c9) Little trust in own formal committees 
 [Talking about the project leadership committee, author’s note]: “They don’t know the 
real topics, maybe know the status, green, yellow or red, which you perhaps could 
as well just roll the dice, which would perhaps be closer to reality than what is 
reported. In my opinion, there’s much politics in all of that.” (181:15) 
 “Our steering committees are a bit too weak, they don’t succeed in what they’re 
supposed to do, namely to make decisions that are valid. And on the other hand 
[…], we notice every now and then that decisions, when they are finally taken, are 
just not accepted.” 127:7) 
 “So for example, next to the [says name of a certain committee, author’s note] there is 
the [says name of another committee, author’s note], in principal this is just the 
unrecorded part of the other committee, rather a discussion committee.” (148:9) 
(d) Late involvement 
of manufacturing 
(d10) Late involvement of manufacturing and representatives 
 “It’s crazy what we do, we have our time line and manufacturing representatives get on 
around 38 months before SOP - although the entire phase takes 72 months. So, the 
ship to take impact has already departed, and only then we get on with the entire 
team.” (158:43) 
“I think before target agreement, the manufacturer is way too far away” (160:1) 
“No one’s gonna do that for you. We’ve never seen this, that the plant manager holds 
a product line manager to account, telling him to reduce manufacturing costs. He 
gets into NPD much too late for that.” (176:4) 
“In total, we as product designers attach not enough importance on the question if that’s 
working out for manufacturing. For which reason whatsoever, that’s too less taken 
care of. Or too late, namely when the product is done.” (149:45) 
 
 (d11) Manufacturability inputs rejected due to late raising  
“Those manufacturing topics, fair enough, they are all legitimate, but they come up with 
that only now, now that the concept is done. They would have had to integrate 
themselves much earlier.” (235:1) 
“Everything that you still find after target agreement is a waste of time.” (176:7) 
“Actually it’s always like that, that the process side very seldomly dominates with regard 
to costs. […] Only in the early phase, you are granted an advantage sometimes, 
when it’s actually cost-neutral.” (171:21) 
 “The problem is not new, there are production requirements and there are design 
requirements and that these two don’t always match up is clear. Nevertheless, the 
point in time where I could still change something and have an impact – and not 
when I come after target agreement […]. If you would have said this before, we 
could maybe have still done something and it wouldn’t have cost anything. And 
that’s one of the points, and that’s actually just symptomatic for many other things.” 
(148:43) 
 “I think that for many cases, manufacturing input would help […]. But in the decisive 
moments, where they could have delivered input, they were not informed on the 
current development stage and therefore, actually were not able to assess that.” 
(143:6) 
 
(d12) Manufacturing involvement either too late or too early  
[Talking about the right point of time to integrate manufacturing in NPD] “It’s extremely 
difficult to get on a running development project with the actual team [as 
manufacturers, author’s note]. You have an extremely low hit rate that something is 
discussed at this very moment which is relevant for product design at this very 
moment. You are either too late, so product design has already come past this topic, 
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or too early, so product design has not yet dealt with the topic. And that’s never 
going to work, you cannot assume that product designers will remember this if you 
bring it up someday at a workshop. ” (176:9)  
 
(e) 
Compartmentalized 
nexus of contacts 
and channels 
 
(e13) Confusion on cross-functional channels and contacts hinders integration 
““From my view, honestly, it’s overcontrolled, the whole thing. Sure, I have many 
interfaces, and I can all put them down on such a process chart and I can say you 
go here and he comes there and then it goes again to another one and parallel to 
this one and this one will send it to IT and so on.” (164:14) 
“There are so many things that it becomes confusingly chaotic or obsolete. There is a 
lack of prioritization and some insist on details. You should organize all this in a 
much less complex way.” (146:18) 
 “To begin with, it’s not too easy to find the right product designer, I had to search for a 
while at first. The allocation of who does what is not totally clear or transparent.” 
(153:4) 
 [Manufacturer, author’s note]: “We should definitely bring the knowledge we collected 
to the new product generation. But we are having problems to do that, because we 
do not have the right people to bring this together […], such that a person could 
make a direct contact with them.” (154:28)   
 
(e14) Ideas for manufacturability improvements get lost in the process of 
addressing them 
“We do a lot of things together, how can we simplify the product, how can we reduce 
processes, we have incredibly many ideas, but at the end there’s not much realized.” 
(162:2)   
“Actually, everything is there, but you have to ask yourself why the one thing or the 
other is not neatly handed over to the other function.” (177:14) 
“As is so often the case, lessons learned disappear on some kind of server or in some 
kind of drawer, and at the end of the day it doesn’t reach the person that it should 
reach. Or the requirements are always reset, and that’s a rotten Sisyphus process.” 
(173:13) 
(f) Discussion 
topics focused on 
series issues and 
coordination 
 
(f15) Discussion topics focused on series problems  
[Answer of a manufacturer if they have something to do with product design, author’s 
note]: “Actually not much, well if there’s a modification in the series product.” (147:5) 
[On the question, for which topics manufacturing and product design are in contact, 
author’s note]: “Mostly on modifications, modification management, quality topics, 
concept topics.” (178:5) 
 [on the question where there are discussion topics between manufacturing and product 
design, author’s note]: “In the series at first, always if there are quality problems” 
(145:27) 
 
(f16) Focus on information and coordination  
“Rather alignment topics, coordination, steering them” (124:18) 
 “At the moment I wouldn’t say that there’s much of a concept exchange, and here one 
idea and there another, it’s rather – the main thing is to make sure it works 
somehow.” (82:37) 
“The only platform that we have where I’d say we are in a discussion mode is the quality 
steering circle.” (173:28) 
 
(f17) Unpleasant topics in upstream communication 
“We have the rather unpleasant job of - I usually say it like that: you have a carnival 
party, and we are the cleaning wagon, party is over, and then we clean up the 
garbage and then we have to say to the people [to product design, author’s note], 
by the way, you’ve forgotten something there.” (130:5) 
“It was actually only about escalation topics, there was never something like I have a 
content question. […] That means that you’ve always talked about problems. It’s 
always, we are either not allowed to or not able to.” (130:24) 
(g) Communication 
tone patterns 
(g18) Discussion tone: Passive in the early phase 
“That’s depending on the phase, so in an early phase it drags on, it’s only heating up 
when you slowly approach calls for tender [during series development phase, 
author’s note], and when you’re at SOP it becomes heated” (82:47) 
“Certainly, compared to the product designers, who organize these meetings here, 
we’re more passive, rather listening and receiving.” (82:14) 
“Solution-focused and factual, definitely factual. It’s less of a buddy relationship” 
(141:20) 
 
(g19) Discussion tone: Walls between manufacturer and NPD participants 
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“It’s a general principle that manufacturing screams that product design is to blame. 
That’s a standard approach. […] We have a problem and it’s product design’s fault.” 
(167:25) 
[Manufacturer, author’s note]: “Those in the plant, they are the stupid ones. The 
production planners from the headquarters, they look at you from above, look at you 
as a manufacturer, just asking dumb questions. That is quite a certain arrogance. 
For example, if I ask the product designer something, he wouldn’t say simply that’s 
not possible because of this and that. Instead, they start discussing, and then he 
just says no. That is quite a certain arrogance.” (159:17) 
“From the point of view of product design, you always had the feeling that manufacturing 
is always and only demanding, which was unfair sometimes. A famous example, 
and that is what you see again now, is that manufacturing would really send people 
to discussion groups to solve problems. That has already been the case in many 
instances, that the demand came from manufacturing, but their people didn’t grab a 
seat at the table.” (167:24) 
“So there was this guy from the XY department […], he needed a special part from plant 
[names a plant location, author’s note]. So he called there, saying I’m the new [says 
his role, author’s note], but they said no, you can’t get that. Then they talked on the 
phone three times in a row, but it didn’t work out. So then, he sat into his car, had 
two cases of beer in his trunk, also bringing a snack with him. So he got to know all 
of the boys in the plant, getting them drinks and snacks. Since then, he knows all of 
them in person, and he gets everything, really everything.” (178:25) 
 
Table 13: Representative supporting data: research question 1 - cooperative intensity 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Cooperative Ability 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(h) Different 
mindsets of 
design and 
manufacturing 
(h20) Awareness of cultural differences between functions 
“If you master the cultural aspects here, then you’ll get by fine” (82:95) 
“The cultures are totally different. During the first half year, I noticed it extremely, how 
different the production department is, the KPI orientation, let alone this strict hierarchy 
– that’s quite a bit more easy-going in product design, or you could as well say chaotic.” 
(130:29) 
“Cooperation between different types of production planners is already difficult here, even 
there the culture is very different.” (142:25) 
[On the question how he sees the cultures between product design and production]: 
“Worlds lie in between, but it’s difficult to put into words.” (183:5) 
 
(h21) Diametrical mindsets of design and manufacturing 
“In the case of manufacturing, it’s quite a bit different, as I said, they are much more hands 
on, they’re wired differently. It’s more about finding a personal access to someone, to a 
foreman or a worker at the assembly line, you have to act a bit more pragmatic.” 
(127:27) 
“The product designers love to discuss freestyle, they don’t like to be tied down.” (125:35) 
[On manufacturing]: “Abstracting things, and imagining how something might look like just 
roughly, picturing something hypothetically, they are not able to do that.” (124:7) 
[On manufacturing]: “They are very much concerned about tradition. They say, we have 
been producing combustion engines for ages, what’s all this electro mobility stuff 
supposed to be here”? (124:3) 
(i) Manufacturing 
wants reliable 
specifications 
(i22) Availability of precise specifications and hardware 
 [A member of production management on the cooperation with manufacturers]: “When I 
ask them questions, how such a system should be designed, for example, they cannot 
just answer easily. Instead, I have to provide an application, a demo, to show them how 
this looks like, how this could look like. And then, when they have some kind of 
imagination, then they can tell me their change requests. But abstracting and imagining 
how this could look like roughly, hypothetically depicting that, they’re not able to do 
that.” (124:7) 
“In the early phase everything works only on a virtual basis. Manufacturing, however, they 
are rather relying on hardware, they have incredible difficulties with CAD models.” 
(141:3) 
 “Where we had many discussions in the last time, is that there has to be a very very exact 
specification. For example, for the electric engineering planners, they all have a new 
interface defined, but this interface is not yet defined by 100% by IT, and then the 
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electric engineering planners simply say to us no, as long as this is not fix by 100% I 
won’t do it. […] They only tender something if it’s defined and specified by 100%.” 
(143:30) 
 
(i23) No advocacy of production topics without detail knowledge 
“Sure, CAD data means something to me. But to really make a methods-time-measurement 
analysis in all of its accuracy, you at least need a finished and construed product, or 
some version of it. And to get in even earlier, you’d need at least some kind of 
database.” (176:1) 
“That needs to be provided in detail, it has to match up one by one, because just a bit of 
another approach would lead to different, very different assembly times.” (159:33) 
“I’d assemble [the product, author’s note] for my own at first, or would have it assembled 
with myself observing it, and analyse it thoroughly […]. Only if I have this overview, I 
can work out how my production line should look like.” (158:38) 
(j) Social 
differentiation of 
manufacturing 
(j24) Clothing and language as means of differentiation 
 [On best practices of working together with manufacturers]: “I can’t go down there wearing 
my suit, I’ll wear a pullover and the shopfloor shirt.” (124:44) 
“I’d never go into production for example, with a suit and tie and stuff like that, then you’d 
directly be labelled as a headquarters snot.” (178:26) 
 “If you’re at the production plant, if you talk dialect then they’ll be your best friends […].” 
(124:16) 
“At headquarters, it’s not that important, but in the plant you’ll definitely have a better 
starting ground if you talk dialect, compared to someone who speaks proper German 
or something else.” (124:16) 
 
(j25) Manufacturer walling off towards indirect functions 
“The product designer always says against the manufacturer I can’t do it, it’s not possible, 
my robot can’t do it […]. That’s how clear front lines have built up. These are front lines 
that exist.” (158:33) 
 “Two years ago, we as the two current doctoral candidates, a future doctoral candidate 
and a graduated doctoral candidate, drove to the production plant, and we were greeted 
by “we’re all healthy here, we don’t need any doctors here.” (174:1) 
“Without a manufacturing department symbol, I’m not taken seriously here.” (192:1) 
 “Sometimes I find that frustrating. I had an example, where they just didn’t want to show 
me the production process for weeks, although that was just 50 meters next to them. If 
you’re not on the shopfloor yourself, they obstruct everything.” (142:26) 
“I’d send all the young engineers onto the shopfloor to let them learn painfully. That they 
can see, what a fight this is every day anew.” (147:9) 
 
(j26) Perceived distance of manufacturing 
“[Integrating, author’s note] manufacturing is difficult, because manufacturing is always far 
away.” (82:30) 
“The manufacturer topic is a bit detached.” (167:4) 
“For a product designer or a production planner it is indeed difficult, or well, there are some 
that have difficulties to go to the production site.” (177:32) 
 “My interns, so far I only took them to process designers […]. Those guys are easy and 
that wasn’t a problem at all. If we’d go to a manufacturer, I’d sensitize them a bit 
more.” (129:12) 
[Manufacturing manager]: “I was a production planner for 13 years, but now I changed to 
the dark side of the force.” (147:1) 
(k) Upstream 
functions over-
valued, 
downstream 
under-valued 
(k27) Limited cross-functional insights 
“I have absolutely no clue at all, what exactly they do in product design. Seriously, I neither 
have any clue how things work internally for them.” (156:4) 
[On the question, how much insight a product designer has into production planning]: “Very 
little.” “And the other way round?” “Exactly the same.” (151:33) 
 “I’m convinced that many product designers lack a comprehension of the processes in the 
plant. […] And obviously also the other way, the ones from the production department, 
they often lack a comprehension of the complexity.” (141:19) 
“Usually, people stay in their department and separate themselves quite strongly from each 
other. Mostly, you know little about your counterparts from the other department, or 
about what they do.” (127:37) 
 
(k28) Unawareness of downstream consequences  
 “It just doesn’t interest them, and sometimes they don’t even know how their products are 
produced.” (168:3) 
 “I find it frightening, how many young colleagues [in product design, author’s note] only 
come to the production plant for the first time after 1,5 years, finding out full of 
astonishment that the production line works like that and that.” (167:29) 
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“It’s also a lack of understanding of the production planner, sometimes he just doesn’t know 
that there’s a customer out there that he has to satisfy, namely the manufacturer. That 
happens to other functions that are downstream the process, as well.” (131:16) 
“We [in product design, author’s note] have a very limited view on what the consequences 
[on production, author's note] are of what we commit here.” (30:3)  
“The product designers […], they have no idea how things go around here, and what the 
difficulties are. They have zero insight.” (147:55) 
 
(k29) Perceived supremacy of indirect functions 
 “It took a while until I was respected at the design department with a production department 
symbol. They think, the production department builds the cars, but apart from that they 
don’t know anything at all.” (134:4) 
“I hear this often from the people from manufacturing. They say, finally, someone from 
above comes down here and hears our problems.” (124:25) 
“Sometimes it even gets personal, then I’m totally fed up with going into discussions in the 
product design teams. There, I’m tired of coming up with ideas and going into the design 
team meeting, because then you have stuff coming up to you such as, I’m quoting here, 
the product design team manager saying that only useless ideas come from assembly.” 
(142:11)  
[Manufacturer]: “Sure, it’s not as attractive for the young engineers down here [on the 
shopfloor, authors’ note], for the good ones that you want to have for the company.” 
(147:12) 
“Of course it’s much sexier to talk about products and functionalities, how fast is the engine, 
what is the torque, how smooth it is to steer, than about, well, how can I assemble this 
the quickest or the cheapest way.” (151:5) 
 
(k30) Aura of artistry around development functions 
“There is a topic of setting an example. There are always some [product designers, author’s 
note], who want to leave something behind, with some kind of technical solution or 
development or whatsoever. There are many that are a bit too artsy-fartsy there.” 
(178:40) 
“Why do we always have to reinvent the wheel? We do that much too often. But probably 
it’s also due to the product designer’s pride.” (147:47)  
[Product designer on the construction process]: “It’s a bit of a handicraft lesson here. 
Admittedly, we require from suppliers that they design neatly, but with us, it’s really 
chaotic and difficult to look through.” (16:1) 
(l) Manufactur-
ability 
requirements 
difficult to place 
(l31) Manufacturability difficult to define 
“We have a problem at CarCo to define or formulate manufacturability requirements in the 
first place. Everyone sees their own thing, everyone who is involved in some way sees 
the topic of producibility or manufacturability differently.” (141:13) 
 “For many requirements that we pose, we are partially unable to articulate what we really 
want […]. If you break it down into great depths, stating what it is that bothers me, then 
most of the time you’ll find something where you can formulate the solution way such 
that product design still has its freedom, and such that on the other hand, production 
requirements are also taken account for.” (148:21) 
 “Anyways, it doesn’t work the way it is today. It just doesn’t work. For example, there is 
nothing on manufacturability in the stage-gate criteria. Nothing at all. There is 
something like “production concept aligned”, but there’s nothing defined beyond that. 
And then you can also just drop it.” (141:42) 
 
(l32) Manufacturing-ready design as production’s obligation 
“Manufacturability is seen as a subordinate topic for most product designers. They see it 
also like, oh our manufacturing will do that, they’ll take care of it. But that it likewise 
belongs to their tasks, to design the product such that it is manufacturing-optimal, 
maybe it’s due to their academic education, that this is subordinate.” (151:4) 
 “As a manufacturer, you have to be simply penetrant [to bring in manufacturability 
suggestions into product design, author’s note], but sometimes it feels like tilting at 
windmills.” (159:4) 
“But I think product design would say [on assembly time, author’s note], that’s a problem of 
the production department, it’s not my problem. My problem is to do a neat 
construction.” (179:27) 
“A product designer would never say on his own initiative, that he puts an extra effort into 
just making it easier to assemble for manufacturing. For them, it is a production 
department objective, the manufacturability. This simply doesn’t interest anyone from 
product design, if you assemble it in ten minutes or one hour. For them, this is a 
production task.” (179:48) 
 
(l33) Downstream requirements not binding 
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[Product designer]: “Process requirements? We don’t really pay attention to them, and we 
wouldn’t write those down in the specification sheet, because they’re not real 
requirements.” (104:1) 
“I don’t know if our requirements - if they’re really seen as binding by product design. 
Indeed, we did bring in some requirements, and the requirement manager affirmed that 
they have been submitted to product design. […] But certainly, the product designers 
didn’t really look through them, because otherwise it wouldn’t have come this far.” 
(181:17) 
[Production planner on the lessons learned that they pass on to product design]: “It’s not 
binding for them. It’s more like a list.” (142:4) 
 
(l34) NPD process as unidirectional sequence 
“Actually, they should come from the customer and say hey I can sell this car for 68.000€ 
and break it down from there, but at CarCo, nobody’s able to do that. CarCo processes 
are designed for the case where you know how the product works. They are not 
designed for disruptive things.” (45:3) 
 “The rule is that product design predefines everything, and manufacturing is left with the 
realization and production. For the other way round – well, we try to have an impact 
regarding product design, but it’s much more difficult.” (155:21) 
 “As a production planner, I’d always try to see how far I can come with the manufacturer 
[in solving a problem, author’s note], before I’d go to product design. Because mostly, 
that’s what we’ve said already, the product is the master clock. The product is seen as 
fixed, and we have to plan the production system around it. Only if this dogma would 
be resolved at some point [laughing], then we could start to say […] that manufacturing 
costs would be reduced from the beginning.” (156:38) 
(m) Low 
advocacy for 
manufac-
turability 
(m35) Manufacturability as frequently deprioritized topic 
 “The product designer has always 1000 other problems, for him this one [manufacturability, 
author’s note] is the last one of all.” (176:10) 
“It is simply, regarding manufacturability, here the problem is that product design, they want 
to develop and have fun, and here, want to be creative, but manufacturability falls off 
the table. And partially, you’re becoming overtaken at this point.” (179:13) 
 “We [from production, author’s note] always have the second stand or the second position. 
If the product designer says, I don’t retrieve the performance at the moment, with this 
tin package and with three wires in the groove, saying I need four wires […], then we’ll 
always say ok yes, then we’ll try to work it out that we manage to do that somehow from 
a manufacturing side.” (169:31) 
 
(m36) Manufacturer without incentive to intervene in NPD 
“Sure, the manufacturer is wired differently, he rather says why should I care about what 
comes in 5 years, if my line stands still today” (145:32) 
“As a manufacturer, to put it simply, I don’t have any interest at all to get on board in NPD 
earlier, I don’t want to develop the products for the product designer.” (131:15) 
 “That’s exactly what I mean, you have some kind of construction thrown over, and in 
hindsight the product designer goes to manufacturing, and the latter says typically it’s 
alright [imitating typical dialect and proverbial stiffness of production plant region], but 
in fact it’s is not alright.” (149:20) 
“How do you want to create an incentive for the manufacturer [to become involved in the 
NPD, author’s note]? He’s preoccupied with his series topics, and is utilized to capacity 
in his series topics.” (150:20) 
 
(m37) Low manufacturing costs have no advocate 
“We’ve never seen this, that the plant manager holds a product line manager to account, 
telling him to reduce manufacturing costs. He gets into NPD much too late for that. At 
a maximum, during launch phase, he takes care of assembly defect risks, 
maintainability, things like that. But if manufacturing costs are really too low or too high, 
doesn’t help the plant at all, as long as he receives the money for it, he just doesn’t 
have any interest. And neither does the production planner. There is no one, who would 
actively call for that.” (176:4) 
[Production controlling]: “The topic of bringing down manufacturing costs as low as 
possible, I’d say it’s important but maybe not first priority, but rather second priority. In 
my view, the first priority is to put the manufacturing costs, which we state externally 
and which we receive in target agreement in the end, to put them on a level which 
allows us to pay our workers and build our production system.” (155:12) 
 “If I ask who has the benefit, then everyone is happy to have higher manufacturing costs. 
And most of all the plant, then they have more budget to play around with.” (176:13) 
 
(m38) Time lag in NPD distorts responsibilities 
“The production planner, after they’ve planned the production line, should actually come to 
the plant as manufacturer. Because then he has to pay for the whole shit he planned. 
  251 
Because at the moment, the planner is already in a new project when SOP comes.” 
(159:15) 
 “If we [process design, author’s note] really screw something up, then the manufacturer 
are of course typically the one who suffers. At that point, it indeed is like that, that we’re 
out of responsibility already.” (82:74) 
“Manufacturing is only hurt when in series production, there is a problem, he can’t deliver 
parts or his supplier can’t deliver parts. But what is in 2019 with the new product 
generation, he has no pain at all regarding this in his current business. ” (125:6) 
“Dear product design, you’ve developed bullshit, and we can’t manufacture this now and 
we are responsible, although it absolutely is not our fault.” (126:30) 
(n) 
Innovativeness 
inhibits 
cooperative 
ability 
(n39) Lack of cross-functional experience and contributions 
“For evolutionary approaches, the integration works fairly well, because you can refer to 
lessons learned. For radical products, this doesn’t work anymore.” (30:4) 
“That’s an important point for good work in the product design team on the part of 
manufacturing: Having someone who just sits in there and passes on information, this 
doesn’t work. You need good people from the production side in the product design 
teams, who gets across credibly that they have the experience.” (151:20) 
“At the time, in the vehicle plant, you had people with a huge experience, and even if it’s 
not seen positive at CarCo if you stay at one position for so long. But it was good, to 
have someone with experience. You don’t fool colleagues that have been around for 
15 or 20 years.” (153:11) 
 “That’s a general problem here, many fresh people are in production planning, they start 
there directly. And then you just don’t know it any better.” (159:13) 
 “That’s the difference to the product designers from the combustion powertrain, who are 
in business for a long time, they have a better understanding of the other functions, of 
the process partner. In our project, the product designer just doesn’t know what he 
damages when he’s 5 weeks delayed, that he causes such an immense delay for us 
downstream. He doesn’t mean no harm, he just has no idea what he causes.” (149:7) 
“Where it gets difficult, is to set up a new product, just as it is for us with new battery electric 
vehicles or the plug-in hybrids. You have the problem that you just don’t know yet, what 
the requirements are […]. We don’t know what the BEV customer wants, does he really 
want to race across the highway with 200 km/h, or does he wants to drive with 100 km/h 
as long as possible, and so on. That makes it difficult to prioritize requirements.” 
(160:11) 
 
(n40) Formal NPD process unsuited for innovative products 
[On the question what the main problem in NPD is, author’s note]: “The requirements, be it 
product or volume, change quicker than the process would allow it to.” (171:2) 
“Normally, they have a predecessor product where they can derive cost targets. This works 
fine, until you have a disruptive product, then it goes into the void. Then they say to us, 
well, what’s the planned assembly time, just put 10% on top of it [laughing].” (45:2) 
 “But you feel rather limited openness for changes or optimizations or just for a grain of an 
extra effort, already to just look at alternative concepts. So they really stick quite 
stringently to the process, determining what our premises are, writing them on a paper 
and going out to a supplier. Then they need four months to just think about it and to 
invite all possible offers.” (169:5) 
“Playing it like all other components, that everyone does one’s bit and then it’s integrated 
in the regular process, this doesn’t work for completely new innovative topics.” (173:16) 
“You have to see carefully that the new structure doesn’t fight the old one.” (129:27) 
“Looking at the current project […], the processes that exist, they exist only on paper.” 
(163:1) 
[Product designer]: “I don’t know what will come here, maybe we’ll have another cable 
harness here or it remains a connecting block. It’s changing all the time, and you can’t 
really optimize for manufacturing if it’s changing all the time.” (16:3) 
 
(n41) Liaison people lacking due to small size 
 [Talking about cross-functionally oriented liaison people, author’s note]: “All of these 
functions are passed on and on like a hot potato, no one wants to have them on his 
cost centre. And as they sit naturally in between the functions, you push them around.” 
(153:15) 
“What is also a problem is the fragmented capacities, which you have when the projects 
are still small. There is a person, who takes care of topic X for 0.1% and topic Y for 
another 0,1%. Of course he can’t do this very successfully at the end.” (131:11) 
[On the question why the manufacturing opinion is less heard in NPD, author’s note]: “This 
goes pretty wrong I would say. If you compare it to the vehicle projects […], they have 
some kind of interface function between production planning and product design, who 
exactly cares about these manufacturability topics, [names a person, author’s note] is 
doing this there. This role is too weak at our project, or doesn’t exist at all.” (157:18) 
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(o) Supplier 
relationships 
inhibit 
cooperative 
ability 
(o42) Supplier relationship as another difficult interface 
“Another problem is the high share of purchased parts, which is often a matter of fact for 
OEMs. There, the cooperation becomes even more difficult because, when the 
company Bosch comes, you don’t know if that’s their manufacturer of the two people 
that are there, it’s just the company Bosch. So at the end, I don’t know if I talked to the 
manufacturer or to whom I talked. And even the product designers don’t do much by 
themselves any more, they outsource much to service providers, and there I don’t know 
which cooperation or which alignment took place.” (131:12) 
“At the moment, there is a gap in the process, because as long as it’s not decided if the 
part is purchased or produced inhouse, no one looks at the manufacturability.” (141:11) 
 “And additionally, we have many external providers that plan our processes for us. 
Partially, you can’t interfere with them at all, because of service contracts and so on.” 
(159:31) 
 
(o43) Required experience lies with supplier 
“What is really sad, is that we really build up so much new, create new production lines, 
that we are really able to follow a greenfield approach. But in fact, that’s just the 
suppliers that do all that, all the know-how lies with them.” (142:28) 
“For production planning, if I’d formulate that in an evil way, I often have the impression, a 
subjective impression that they are just technical purchasers […]. They just develop 
some specifications that they hand over to the supplier, and sign off at the end if the 
supplier has fulfilled all of these specifications.” (143:35) 
 “Product design is often outsourced as well, they don’t do barely anything themselves any 
more, only rough assessments, the actual work is done [name of a product design 
service provider], that work through the eight hours. That doesn’t really facilitate the 
cooperation between product design and manufacturing.” (153:17) 
 
(o44) Supplier distorts importance of manufacturability  
[Production planner on the dominance of material costs compared to production costs, 
author’s note]: “But that’s certainly a problem that we have created ourselves through 
our good [ironical, author’s note] procurement. The suppliers get the money of course 
through product modifications, that’s why it always comes out so expensive.” (142:10) 
 “It’s a classic to compare material costs and production costs. The product designer sees 
that he could save 1 cent per part, and he has 1 million parts, so he has large amounts 
to save. Then we have of course the burden of proof, what this would mean for the 
production system, and of course we have difficulties there because the supplier 
provides an exact value, 1 € per battery or per component. And we always say well, the 
process behind that might be somewhat more complex, and that’s always a bit like 
comparing apples to oranges. We try our best to bring all of that together, but those are 
the topics. How much is the effort, and where it gets exciting is for service costs and 
rework costs, because these are topics for which you’d need experience values, which 
of course you don’t have.” (170:21) 
“If I come into NPD in an early phase, then I can say to the product designer I’ll save 0.2€ 
of production costs if you spend 0.1€ of material costs […]. But the supplier, he 
naturally adds the expenses only later in the process.” (145:19) 
(p) Functional 
structures are 
self-sustaining 
 (p45) Corporate steering mechanisms work functionally 
 “I think we never stand up and say yes, we can do that, if anything we stand up to say no, 
there’s no chance we can do that. Also we don’t have this cross-functional thinking, 
which we should have, and that’s often entailed by the objectives, because there is no 
objective for the e-drive process chain but only for the functions.” (157:20) 
“We have a functional steering, all our steering mechanisms at CarCo are functionally 
oriented.” (125:16) 
“There’s much of potential there, but we don’t dare addressing this, we’re prisoners there, 
also with the cost centre structure, because much is decided by money and budget, 
and as long as this is functional you will go on with this power and trench warfare 
forever, because everyone first sees that he’s clean. In particular, when money is 
involved - and the higher you come in hierarchy, the more money is involved.” (125:46) 
“Because we have totally different processes, the product design and production 
departments. As well regarding budget stuff, they are steered totally differently.” 
(126:14) 
“There’s little permeability […]. Usually, people remain in their department and they strongly 
differentiate each other from the others. Mostly, you don’t know much about people in 
the other department, there are few connecting exchange platforms and little 
permeability of employees, it’s not seen very positively if you change across. Likewise, 
HR does not encourage this, quite on the contrary, everything is organized such that 
this does not happen. HR is also organized following a departmental structure.” 
(127:37) 
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(p46) Power considerations entrench functional orientation 
“The thinking in the hierarchies, as you have created them, there are just too many well-
beloved features that you maybe do not want to give off […]. Because that could mean 
as well that I’d have flat hierarchies, and therefore possibly not so many hierarchies 
anymore.” (162:12) 
[On the question why agile structures are not enforced at CarCo, author’s note]: “I mean, if 
you look at which companies act in such more open structures, there the salary 
differentials are not as large is here with us [laughing].” (129:28) 
“It’s sad, but I feel that in large companies, much too often, that it still depends on these 
egos, in particular in the upper leagues, there is really much showing-off [verbally: 
snapping their braces, author’s note]. You don’t say we have, but I have.” (158:48) 
(q) Lack of 
cross-functional 
trust 
(q47) Trust as success factor for cross-functional integration 
“The best thing is simply to solve problems together. In 2013 or 2014 […],within 24h we 
had a team of fifteen people, ten product designers, five from production, and solved 
the problem on-site. And afterwards, we went drinking a beer together, and on the next 
day, it was as if this was one unit. Such stories weld people together, when you 
recognize that you have the same problems.” (126:25) 
“If you come into a discussion for the first time, you’ll see right away that this is hopeless. 
But if later, for the other it has become clear, through shared experiences and activities, 
that you’ve been through together, that you come to the table with some experiences 
which are also important for him – only then he’s willing to really discuss the topic with 
you on a factual basis.” (151:19) 
[Manufacturer on best practices for cross-functional integration, author’s note]: “Ideally, 
you’ve eaten a bag of salt together at some point.” (176:20) 
 
(q48) Lack of trust and openness across functions 
[Discussion with production planner on new cost estimation based on assessment of new 
product design, author’s note]: [Interviewer]: “But you can easily argue that it’s getting 
more expensive because the product has gotten more complex?” [Production planner]: 
“Yes, but no one wants to hear that. No wonder that everybody plays his cards close to 
his chest [verbally: no one lets down his pants, author’s note], regarding saving 
potentials if you are always held accountable like that. Openness and transparency, 
they say [laughing ironically, author’s note].” 
“I’d first question what’s behind this calculation. And again, that’s the trust problem between 
product design and production planning.” (153:22) 
[On the question what company culture he wishes for, author’s note]: “That for once, you 
simply trust what the department says, even if you don’t fully understand it, but you 
agree before you lose the time for explaining the last 20%.” (171:16) 
[On the cooperation with his cross-functional counterparts, author’s note]: “Then you have 
some, and you don’t notice it from the beginning, they say there are problems, and we 
don’t know why – but in fact, there’s something with the entire plant and it doesn’t have 
to do anything with it, they set you on the wrong track with a hidden agenda to distract 
you from the real issues.” (165:9) 
“Product design wants to be on the safe side, and we from production cannot prove the 
opposite, that’s the problem.” (166:7) 
 “By nature, the manufacturer is in a position where he has a right to say something, but 
will not decide in the end. So he always has to pay for everything.” (150:7) 
(r) Integration 
dependent on 
formal process 
(r49) Formal process / agreements necessary for cooperation 
 “They just want one thing, they want a specification sheet, that’s what you have to do, and 
then that’s what they’ll do.” (129:2) 
[Talking about a product design team, author’s note]: “There is no feature, where you might 
say we have a problem there and we need to solve it, and the feature would help us. It 
costs just a few cents, but they won’t discuss it, according to the motto we have our 
target value and we will stick to it.”(163:21) 
“The specification sheet certainly drives product design. Production planning has to fill in 
their requirements, because later, they [product design, author’s note] don’t care 
anymore.” (131:3) 
 [On the push-back of innovative ideas, author’s note]: “For him it is like, there’s someone 
here who wants something crazy, doesn’t really know why, and doesn’t have an order 
or instruction, so he won’t do it in the first place. Do you have a ticket, no, do you know 
how you can build that, no, can you tell me the sampling rate, no – well, bad luck.” 
(164:13) 
 
(r50) Push-off mentality / no voluntary extra efforts made 
“That’s exactly the CarCo approach, at first I try to find out how it does not work. I try to find 
out how to get the topic off my desk. That’s really a problem here, it makes cooperation 
more difficult.” (149:28) 
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[On the question what he would do when he would be all-responsible for designing a flying 
car, author’s note]: “Well at first trying to push everything away from my desk 
[laughing].” (153:10) 
 “At first, they’ll do finger pointing. If there’s a problem, then this one or that one is to blame, 
but not myself. The culture at core is that, if there’s a problem und it’s not my problem, 
I won’t take the task.” (146:19) 
 
(r51) Dependency on formal process detrimental for innovative NPD 
“What hurts us is that we have to think like a start-up, we grow as fast as a start-up, but 
we’re caught in the mechanisms of a large corporation.” (125:44) 
 “We handicap ourselves structurally, I think the NPD process is very well structured and 
well described, but we can’t live these processes, I don’t know any generic schedule 
that has been adhered to.” (162:9) 
“We’re no dictatorship, we take decisions in committees, and I think this is a good thing. 
That’s a good way to find a decision. However, speed in the electrified mobility is 
different from the one of the combustion engine, and maybe that’s just not enough.” 
(149:15) 
  
Table 14: Representative supporting data: research question 1 - cooperative ability 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Competition 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(s) Little 
competition on 
the cross-
functional 
optimum 
(s53) Design requirements with predetermined hierarchy  
“His product is brought to work in the first place. Afterwards, it’s checked that the product 
can be integrated into the assembly space, so function, material costs, and only material 
costs, assembly space - and we’re quite behind that.” (180:21) 
“They take care that their product fulfils all functions and fits into the assembly space, and 
the rest actually doesn’t matter.” (176:18) 
 “For significant product changes, it [the successful introduction of a production 
requirement, author’s note] is only possible if we A) cannot at all sort out how the 
process could work, and B) after all we mostly manage to sort out the process in the 
end.” (142:7) 
 “If you say it’s not producible, then the product designer says […] but then I don’t get my 
product, and at CarCo, you never attack the product requirement.” (82:107) 
“The product is firmly set, and we have to plan our production around it.” (156:39) 
 
(s54) Functional orientation deters cross-functional optimum  
 “Missing my own objectives, in favour of my neighbour or for the success of the entire 
company - even if it would be better for the cross-functional optimum – no one would 
do that.” (125:15)  
 “CarCo is a development-driven company, and therefore product design has the power.” 
(160:25) 
“We are strongly following product design’s sayings. We [from production, author’s note] 
can mail some things, and say that these are high costs, and beg them to develop the 
product a bit differently. And the answer is well, okay, production wants something, but 
in the end we follow product design’s will, in the end it’s all about product performance 
and a neat technical solution.” (166:4) 
 
(s55) Call for more competition on cross-functional optimum  
“Product design happens only once, it determines the product. But I have the production 
for quite a long time, and it determines the costs. You have to find the balance in the 
cross-functional optimum.” (131:21) 
[Talking about his idea of a better NPD organization, author’s note]: “There would of course 
be conflicts, but they would be exactly where you’d want to have them, that’s the good 
thing […], it would be on the matter itself. A conflict could be like, a product designer 
often can build in his technically sophisticated functional solution, but the manufacturer 
could say if you build that in, every third part will be scratch, because it’s not yet ready 
for series production. But that’s exactly how such a sparring should emerge.” (158:29) 
“If you have such a cuddle system, then it is like, oh well, it doesn’t work, but that’s not so 
important now.” (165:11) 
“The overall optimum has to be the focus, and for this you have to talk to each other. It 
doesn’t help if we only optimize manufacturing costs. Product design has its focus, 
  255 
production planning has its focus, but it needs to be the overall optimum, and for this 
we have to talk to each other." (152:24) 
 
(s56) Cross-functional structures create no competition 
 “That’s exactly the point, where I say, I now sit here, having my project work, having this 
theoretically cross-functional topic, having this cross-functional team with selected 
people from manufacturing, with a production planner, a process specialist… all of 
these people that should in fact be key figures for manufacturing, having the big 
overview and also the expertise. But nevertheless [pauses, author’s note] - that’s what 
I say, that’s where it suffers.” (163:8) 
“The communication base between product design and production has been created. The 
difficulty now really is integration.” (183:2) 
“So these walls and borders, actually we’ve invented the simultaneous engineering for it, 
that you do not just throw things over, but these walls still stand strong. That’s why 
they introduced the simultaneous engineering teams, to make the functions sit 
together. But only product designers are sitting in there.” (181:23) 
(t) Informal 
relations inhibit 
competition 
(t58) Informal relations inhibit competition 
“The production planner is only product design’s attorney in the end. That’s because the 
two of them discuss, against each other, but at some point they have to find an 
agreement. When the planner discusses with the manufacturer later, then of course the 
planner has to defend the result he achieved, and that’s how he automatically defends 
the product designer’s opinion […]. On a hardware concept workshop they are aligned 
to the point that also the process designer defends the product designer’s concept just 
like an attorney. And certainly, the planner also takes the product designer’s position. 
You see the sequence here.” (131:33) 
“You do a lot of networking, and I notice that I learn more for myself, but the product is not 
necessarily becoming better through that.” (154:36) 
(u) Upstream 
functions wait 
out conflicts 
(u59) Upstream functions sit out conflicts playing for time 
[On the question what happens when manufacturing costs optimization is conflicting with 
material cost optimization by product design, author’s note]: “They’d definitely wait it 
out. That happens quite often in our company. Then you would just wait, and hope that 
it’s not there anymore next year.” (182:37)  
“If you’re a product design team manager, you’ve perfected your defined mechanisms. 
Then you have open ears, namely on both sides, here in and out there.” (176:17) 
“Actually, there’s always a CAD model available. But they often play it like that, that you 
don’t get the access rights in an early phase, that the product designer doesn’t release 
it.” (145:25) 
“We bring in requirements for manufacturing-ready design. But you can see that the 
execution of these topics is often very very chewy, they only work off these topics very 
slowly, assess them, play them back. That’s a lot of backbreaking work that’s in there.” 
(151:2) 
“The difficult thing is that in an early phase, you don’t know yet exactly what will expect you, 
or you cannot describe the consequences of it exactly. And as you say, at some point 
the topic is over. Where you might say now is the point where we collected all the 
requirements, and now it’s over, and afterwards you barely have any possibility left to 
still take influence.” (148:19) 
 
(u60) Upstream functions play out information asymmetry 
 “But of course, if I [production planner, author’s note] tell him [product designer, author’s 
note] that this screw hurts me, I could save that much money, he says to me I need it 
for the product stability, so when he says he needs it there’s not much I can say.” 
(180:27) 
“We’re never on eye level with product design in the discussion, they always say, it doesn’t 
work due to product design requirements. There’s nothing we can say against it, we 
always sit at the smaller lever.” (39:1) 
 “When it’s on manufacturability, for the battery for example, [names person, author’s note] 
had quite many ideas, but they were always like, yeah yeah, it’s alright. She was simply 
being ignored.” (179:10) 
 “There are always discussions that we wouldn’t achieve our development or production 
goals [by implementing a manufacturability optimization, author’s note], but I don’t 
always believe that. Then it shows through, that it would be indeed achievable, it would 
just be a new way.” (162:5) 
 
(u61) Path dependency from preceding products impedes competition 
 “It’s easier for the product designer to take an existing product and derive and optimize 
from it, than to go a new way that would maybe require me to perform a new product 
validation, unknown risks and the need to realize the whole thing.” (162:3) 
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“What you’ve seen in product design is that […], manufacturing tries to optimize, for 
understandable reasons, as much as possible in the new product generation, what 
they didn’t like in the old one, what was inconvenient. However, on part of product 
design, there is the statement that we’ve got order to design a technical overhaul of 
the old generation, in which some things are changed but the rest is take it or leave 
it.” (167:20) 
(v) Downstream 
functions avoid 
conflicts 
(v62) Bridging functions don’t live challenging role 
 “Process design is continuously driven to, hey, please also think of series production. The 
process design employee, however, views himself as a designer.” (177:29) 
“They [prototype production, author’s note] get their work orders from product design, and 
they have their interfaces there. They simply don’t know anyone from manufacturing.” 
(145:12) 
 [Process designer]: “Sure, we know the problems of the manufacturer, but in fact it’s not 
our daily problem and we can’t represent it the way it would be necessary from the 
manufacturer’s view.” (170:8) 
“Process design does it just the other way round, so he doesn’t live the role but even rather 
backs off, and, as you say, rather takes sides with product design instead of 
manufacturing.” (157:18) 
 
(v63) Downstream functions react with cynicism 
“That’s certainly poka-yoke [ironical, author’s note].” [Process designer to an evidently not 
poka-yoke cable harness, while no to-do list point is attributed for the topic, author’s 
note]. (68:1) 
“That is all well thought through [ironical, author’s note].” [Prototype worker to a not well 
thought-through plug, without any further call to the present product designer to change 
it, author’s note.] (68:1) 
“Oh man, I hoped no one would notice this.” [Prototype worker on an extra manual activity, 
author’s note.] (68:1) 
[Process designer on production management’s proposal how manufacturing costs could 
be reduced, author’s note]: “It’s clear anyway that we won’t make any money with this 
car. That’s just to satisfy the market.” (67:1) 
 
(v64) Targets bring downstream functions to the table 
“The closer we come to target agreement, where it’s all about agreeing targets long-term 
and irreversibly, the higher is the own incentive to join the discussion.” (155:6) 
A service representative, as another downstream function, is always present in all hardware 
concept workshops, and service requirements are as well quite present at product 
design. This corresponds to the fact, that service representatives have strict quantitative 
objectives regarding the amount of time and effort a service employee needs to 
dissemble a component. (189:1).  
[Production planner]: “We know exactly what it costs to insert a screw here that might 
have to be disassembled in service. And that under no circumstances may it happen 
that something more or less has to be done there. But with regard to production, I’ve 
never seen a similar discussion.” (161:25) 
(w) Cross-
functional 
conflicts are 
escalated away 
(w65) Cross-functional conflicts are escalated quickly 
“I’m not involved in any conflicts between the product design and the production department 
at the moment. I have the feeling that these are relatively quickly handed over to the 
management hierarchy, maybe because the interlinking on the operational level is not 
the closest.” (127:38) 
[On the question if conflicts between production planning and manufacturing are rather 
solved on an operational level due to their organizational interlinking, author’s note]: 
“No, I don’t quite think that […]. Unfortunately, this is also often sorted out on the 
management level.” (127:39) 
[Product designer on conflict handling, author’s note]: “If there’s something with the 
production plant, or something already in series production, then the management level 
is quickly getting involved.” (128:25) 
 “I said to the foreman, please invite him [the product designer, author’s note], we knew 
who he was, but he just didn’t come to look at it. We have to solve it together, but no 
reaction from him, we followed this through for quite some time. Then our direct 
manager send him a note, still nothing happened. And only when we went through the 
very upper level, he came down to us with quite some anger.” (154:41)  
 
(w66) Management avoids conflicts for political reasons 
“What I notice are topics that are discussed on a management level – well it’s political there, 
[...] and many conflicts are avoided […]. On the working level, or the group leader level, 
I didn’t notice any real clashes with product design.” (127:29) 
“Often, on a working level, we had quite cool ideas, and we also knew that our competition 
is better than us partially. But as soon as you brought it onto the management level, we 
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know we have objectives, and you have to be better than competition, and the whole 
thing was looked at from a political view - let’s better not show this bar, it looks so 
negative.” (143:30) 
“Regarding manufacturability, there was one example for the battery, [names production 
planning person, author’s note], he had quite some ideas, where they always said yeah 
yeah, it’s alright. Who was quite ignored, in fact. And then, at the SOP of this battery, 
we really had these problems […]. So [names production planning person, author’s 
note], he could tell you quite some things. But in the end he was made a victim of all 
that.” (179:11) 
(x) Low 
decisiveness 
holds up 
competition 
(x67) Instances of weak decisiveness in NPD 
“We are a bit weak in decision-making. But that’s not because the facts are not on the table, 
it’s because we don’t dare to decide.” (160:14) 
 “The department interfaces, you need them, and they’re not super-efficient, but internally 
we go around in circles more often […] but that’s related to the decisiveness around 
here. Because we analyse the same topic 100.000 times.” (82:35) 
“They have difficulties to sustain a decision.” (82:39) 
“That’s all quite a bit indecisive here, they keep on dithering.” (45:5) 
“In a later NPD phase, we start throwing over everything that we’ve defined in an early 
phase, we’re incredibly bad at this.” (82:45) 
 
(x68) Time pressure impedes competition 
“By now, there’s not much you can change anymore, anyways. If you now start to run at 
each other [at the cross-functional counterpart, author’s note], you’ll get your stuff done 
even less so.” (128:18) 
[On the question why manufacturing does not engage more for manufacturing-ready 
design, author’s note]: “If people are so much working to capacity, then they do their 
daily business and when they’re done with that the day is over. Only if you have a bit 
more time, then you come up with such ideas, or have the time to push something 
significant through.” 
 “At the beginning, they did it really well [to discuss manufacturability concerns with product 
design, author’s note] but since we came into this rush mode, all they say is, the main 
thing is that the product’s okay.” (82:103) 
“It’s quite a spiral, the less projects you decide the more you get into such situations, and 
the more you come into situations where you have to provide some security aspects 
to avoid something like that, but if everyone builds his own small buffers…” (148:10) 
(y) Complexity 
allows for 
smokescreening 
(y69) Financial steering logic induces buffers 
“Somehow, we always reach our objectives, however this works [laughing, author’s note]. 
And just in case, there is a bit of turning or discussing until we arrive there.” (153:34) 
“The largest problem that production planners have is, that in large companies as CarCo, 
you’re always praised when you give back budget. And you always get hit at the head 
if you calculate your product very sharply, hoping if it’s really on the edge you’ll receive 
another few millions. If we would manage to introduce a shift in this thinking, I’m sure 
that cost-efficiency would raise by 10% in the next years. I’m a 100% sure, because we 
hide 10% and we are educated by top management to hide this 10%. […]. It’s a two-
sided medal, I’m aware of that, but sadly it’s steered like that, that every, and really 
every reasonable project leader relies on buffers. And for the manufacturer it is the 
same.” (158:15) 
 “What makes the whole thing a bit difficult, we give a plan value, and then there is a savings 
potential just drawn over it, and from your plan value only a target value is left over 
[…].The consequence is that in the next project, the planners pack 30% on the value 
which is given to the company. And this is a whole lot of money, and these are wrong 
values. But just because there comes a savings potential (180:22)” 
“And then perhaps it’s cut, so it’s clever to go in there with a bit more, because generally 
there’s always a cut.” (124:41) 
 
(y70) Border walk of handling complexity  
 “In an early phase, you need a certain abstraction level, where in the past it was said that 
you shouldn’t simplify it to the point where it becomes wrong. And here we are at a 
point, where you can’t give a generic answer. It’s a border walk, a certain simplification 
is necessary, such that things stay manageable, but on the other hand, the things you 
simplify can lead to large problems, and we’ve experienced masses of them ourselves.” 
(148:42) 
 “That’s a bit the crux of the entire matter. We stand in our own way with that way of 
calculating [the business case of our products, author’s note]. I discussed with the other 
OEMs, and they all have the same problem. Although the solution is so close. It’s damn 
complicated, you barely get to achieve any transparency.” (158:37) 
[Member of headquarters project team, who consolidates the individual plan values or 
production planning, on the question if he challenges the numbers as some kind of 
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lawyer of the cross-functional optimum, author’s note]: “I only draw the numbers 
together, I don’t actually look into them. My boss is quite technology-loving, and he 
looks into the numbers in detail, but surely he’s an exemption among the product line 
leaders.” (137:28) 
(z) Governance 
functions unable 
to challenge 
results 
(z71) Governance functions with insufficient insights 
“Controlling, as the guardian of the entire product-related costs, has a large interest in 
minimizing them, and with them we have most discussions around manufacturing costs. 
They’re always too high in their view, in general, and likewise the calculation 
methodology. We had a discussion with one of the controlling colleagues earlier this 
year, and they have not a clue of an idea how we calculate that.” (155:8)  
“You should actually have some kind of training process for the manufacturing costs, you 
would need experts that know the content. Who can say, are you crazy, for such a 
process you want 20 workers? Or who say, for this assembly content of five minutes, 
you’ll be able to get that down to three minutes.” (156:20) 
“Procurement controlling for example, they countercheck our planning. But we have 
production processes at the new product, which they just don’t have […]. What came 
out at the end, we talked about it, and they just took our values minus 5%. Well, thank 
you. Because they just don’t know any better.” (163:22) 
 “The controllers have a completely different focus on it than someone from product design 
or from production, and it’s just not possible to clear up all questions to 100% […]. It’s 
quite complex, and quite cumbersome across so many hierarchical levels.” (143:23) 
 
(z72) Governance functions versus operational functions 
“The designer himself does barely arrive to do his job, because he’s permanently externally 
steered and controlled, because we pack on a product design team, with two to three 
designers on board, we pack seven to eight controllers on it.” (158:2) 
“Sadly, we had more hand-raising functions than people that actually do the job.” (158:2) 
“We create nothing but managers, no experts anymore.” (158:66) 
 “From my view, honestly, it’s overcontrolled, the whole thing. Sure, I have many interfaces, 
and I can all put them down on such a process chart […]. If I only follow the process, 
then often it doesn’t work, and maybe that’s the danger, because you create a super 
process, but which is somehow so complex that many would say, that’s too complicated 
for me, I’ll do it on an informal level.” (164:14) 
“There are departments that take more time for themselves than you as a value-creating 
department have. For example controlling, It’s really like that, they sometimes have four 
weeks of time to evaluate and you yourself have only two weeks to do the work.” 
(171:12) 
“Now I know why the stage-gate evaluation takes half a year, but the actual evaluation is 
granted only one week of time: until all the evaluation assumptions and guidelines are 
worked out and match up, most of the time is already over.” (137:2) 
 
(z73) Acceptance of target setting process 
“Controlling derives a target for product-related costs from different methodologies. 
Implicitly, a target for manufacturing costs is included in there, mostly via preceding 
products, profitability ambitions and so on. Controlling derives that out of the blue, just 
as he likes.” (126:36) 
“Before target agreement, they [targets, author’s note] are rather spongy, but as soon as 
the product steering committee gives its okay to the overall sum, then the whole thing 
is through and the target is set. They’re measured hard against this target, but before, 
they have the chance to build up endless buffers.” (143:64) 
[On the acceptance of NPD guidelines set by controlling, author’s note]: “That’s always 
difficult, as most of the guidelines that controlling provides, it’s not always transparent 
and understandable.” (168:6) 
“The target guideline, actually it’s there relatively early on the vehicle project level and on 
the platform level, but just not as granular as it would be of relevance for us.” (155:25) 
(ab) Competition 
scarcity around 
innovative 
projects 
(ab74) More interface conflicts for brown field projects 
[On the question where there’s competition between functions, author’s note]: “Always for 
product changes, who caused the change, has to pay, there is quite some competition. 
For existing processes, for example if you look at the combustion engines, where the 
production plant exists already, that’s also a point in the NPD process. Because real 
costs would emerge from a change. For us, with a new product, it rather starts close to 
SOP. ” (131:27) 
“I know that my colleagues from the combustion engine, they have conflicts [between 
manufacturing and production planning, author’s note], but there the starting point is a 
different one. You have a grown structure there […]. For us, at the end of the day, 
everything we plan is on a green field and therefore there are less conflicts.” (148:35) 
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“When I started here, there wasn’t anything, there was no manufacturer who could have 
intervened in product design […]. And likewise production planning, they had never 
planned an electrified engine before, they just had no clue.” (147:2) 
 
(ab75) Path dependency pitfall for succeeding projects 
“Actually, at the beginning, you should invest a lot more of thinking into it, I have the chance 
to make it right for once – because when an idea has been established at some point 
we’re in the same situation as all are, that you say I’ve created a solution somehow, 
which emerged from out of my guts or on short term, then it’s perhaps not the optimal 
solution, but nevertheless I have to live with it in the long run.” (148:36) 
 “I think what is very important are the volumes. In the case where we start a new project 
and are in the early phase, volumes are still quite manageable when compared with 
other projects at CarCo […]. And I think that product design still has that perspective, 
that those few high voltage batteries, we’ll get them manufactured somehow.” (170:36) 
“For us in the electro mobility, this all has been just toys. No one has taken that seriously, 
the processes and all.” (149:4) 
  
Table 15: Representative supporting data: research question 1 - competition 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Impact of constraint introduction on coopetitive behaviour 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(A) Increased 
interaction 
(A1) Increased interaction downstream 
 [On the question how interaction frequency with downstream functions would change, 
author’s note]: “It would rise by many times. If I had only the [mentions constraint value, 
author’s note], then I indeed would have to ask them every time. Then I had to choose, 
if I get someone from them on board from early on, who does the first constructions 
together with me, and instructs me there.” (161:1) 
[On the question how he would start working if he’d be given a manufacturability constraint, 
author’s note]: “I would first have to get a manufacturer or production planner, saying 
so here’s what the tool’s displaying me, how do you view this value, is that realistic from 
your point of view? Because they are the ones who determine the process times, 
calculate them and procure the plants and make the investments. Without an exchange 
with them, I wouldn’t be able to optimize the product.” (162:23) 
[On the question how interaction would be with manufacturing given the constraint 
introduction, author’s note]: “I, as a production planner, would have to sit on the 
manufacturer’s lap […]. I’d go to manufacturing to get my own impression, how does it 
look like, do you have enough workers, where does the shoe pinch, where doesn’t it, 
let’s be clear here […]. Transparency, as early as possible, that’s the first step towards 
optimization, but so far we often don’t have it.” (158:45) 
 
(A2) Increased interaction upstream 
[On the question how he would start working if he’d be given a manufacturability constraint, 
author’s note]: “I could go to product design, saying give me five screws and not seven. 
Or to process design, can’t you join this in another way. I’d have to go to the designing 
functions, to everyone who’s involved before me.” (181:27) 
[On the question how he would start working if he’d be given a manufacturability constraint, 
author’s note]: “If I’d be able to say to the product designer with the help of this tool, 
please take out some screws, then my problem is solved, clearly. I’d discuss more with 
the product designer.” (166:27) 
[On the question how he would start working if he’d be given a manufacturability constraint, 
author’s note]: “If I’d see already in the benchmarks with others, 85 minutes is the goal, 
no one else builds it below 110 minutes, then I’d get the product designer on board, 
saying I’m your counterpart from production, I’ll be having a huge problem if we don’t 
work together from early on.” (158:42) 
 
(A3) Increased interaction of non-adjacent interfaces 
 [Process designer on the question how he would start working if given a manufacturability 
constraint, author’s note]: “I think I’d prefer to ask the person who actually does the 
work […]. Because they have the best feeling where they lose time.” (154:10) 
[Product designer on the question how he would start working if he’d be given a 
manufacturability constraint, author’s note]: “I’d talk with them [manufacturer, author’s 
note] more often, in any case at the beginning. I’d start with something like, how do you 
say in new German, a brainstorming, or a kick-off. Sure, the guys from production don’t 
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have to sit side by side with me when I do my lines in the CAD. But as a first input, I’d 
sit together with them in a workshop. And subsequently, I’d align with them regularly in 
any case, we’ll see if that would be monthly or weekly. But the guys from production 
would have to sit in there from the beginning on, quality also. That would really be a 
good thing. And I don’t try to kiss your feet here, I really mean it.” (149:29) 
[Product designer on the question what he would do if he would not be able to fulfil the 
constraint, author’s note]: “I’d ask manufacturing, what they would do.” (182:7) 
(B) Interaction 
required to be 
effective 
(B4) Constraint should be trigger for discussion 
“You’d nevertheless need the exchange, meetings where you discuss and hardware where 
you say, no we can’t do that. You don’t want to fight this creative part.” (166:10) 
“This will be difficult [introducing a constraint to product design without further explanation, 
author’s note]. It’s always the topic for me that you have to talk with each other.” 
(145:22) 
 “Probably a platform, to convince the two departments to talk with each other, to bring 
them together.” (141:35) 
“If I had a constraint, I’d always rail, are they too stupid to manufacture or what… I don’t 
care. I think you’d have to explain the big picture to them first, saying, if that takes 75 
minutes longer to assemble, it’s gonna cost us that much money. But you have to know 
that first.” (179:35) 
 
(B5) Constraints should not be thrown over the wall 
“If I only had the constraint, I’d probably don’t know what to do with it.” (170:32) 
[On the question if he would be in favour of introducing constraints, after having explained 
the idea, author’s note]: “I’d say we should do it. Maybe starting it initially in a project, 
but you should accompany it in way that ensures it doesn’t end in a KPI fetishism. 
Because often, you simply look at the KPI, it’s green, and if it’s green everything’s fine. 
But the problem is in between. If two departments show they’re green, the problem isn’t 
solved.” (162:42) 
[On the introduction of constraints, author’s note]: “If you show them the manufacturer’s 
view, then it has the potential to be really effective. Sure, if you only execute it in a hard 
way, if you just hold the gun against their heads… but if you don’t, it has the potential 
to bring them together.” (179:40) 
(C) 
Manufacturing 
encouraged to 
get involved 
(C6) Encourages manufacturer to get involved 
“I think it’s a fundamental thing that you try to assess it [the current product design, author’s 
note] from a realistic assembly time perspective, and try to cover the worker 
perspective. I believe it’s a good thing. And what’s good is that, the manufacturer, he’s 
well acquainted with MTM and the line balancing, and with this method he might be 
more open to approach future processes from early onwards.” (150:16) 
 “In an early phase, manufacturing is still relatively open […], the people from production 
become angry quite quickly if it’s only about the question whether we can or cannot 
manufacture it, then they say we can’t do it, because the process is very error-prone. 
But if it’s about minimizing assembly time, I don’t see a problem, I think they’d be open 
and would cooperate here.” (150:12) 
[Product designer on the question how he would start working if he’d be given a 
manufacturability constraint, author’s note]: “I’d go indeed to manufacturing, really 
getting the specialists’ opinion. We did that for a recent workshop, and it’s really cool. 
First, they are really up to it, because they usually are not involved enough, and second 
they really know if they can assemble it or not. A production planner can do it as good 
as he wants, he just doesn’t do it every day. With that tool, you manage to interlink 
design and manufacturing, that’s what I meant, the chain that’s still missing.” (166:19) 
 
(C7) Pressures manufacturer to get involved 
“It would be the right approach that production determines the value. And of course, then 
they’d be forced to cooperate, because they know it best.” (149:24) 
“I would have to align that with manufacturing, I would have to talk with them anyway.” 
(153:26) 
“And it’s quite important, that manufacturing is not able to say that they haven’t been 
asked.” (147:21) 
(D) Focus is set 
to interaction 
(D8) Prioritizes interaction topics 
[On the question how he would start working if he’d be given a manufacturability constraint, 
author’s note]: “In the first moment, seeing which topics are present, and maybe then, 
clustering them. These topics, we’ll examine them correspondingly faster and deeper, 
going down to an operational level here, and screen it in much detail.” (163:15) 
“I would know exactly, for these fasteners, I could make better savings, and I could as well 
look at these with the [cross-functional, author’s note] colleagues. Maybe they don’t 
have an MTM training, but they’d still understand nevertheless what’s it’s essentially 
about. In a sense that, this costs me so and so much time, and if you could remodel it 
somehow, we could do the math quite quickly in front of the colleagues.” (168:14) 
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 “If I don’t have pressure here, I’ll invest my time differently, where I’d maybe have more 
pressure. And also invest less thinking effort, and move less.” (157:47) 
(E) Increased 
understanding 
and interest 
(E9) Increases cross-functional understanding of production 
[On the question how the understanding of the production would change with the constraint 
introduction, author’s note]: “Better, definitely. I assume, if I wouldn’t have this value, I 
would maybe have over-engineered the design, I simply would not have cared for 
assembly time at all. So I would have taken more screws than clips fasteners, I wouldn’t 
have had that in mind.” (182:4) 
“It makes it possible to not only have the designer’s perspective, but somehow 
simultaneously take production’s perspective into consideration. And I find that helpful.” 
(164:17) 
“I think it improves comprehension [of production, author’s note].” (162:31) 
“I get at least a feeling for what the cost drivers in production are.” (154:23) 
 [On the question if the understanding of the production would improve with the constraint 
introduction, author’s note]: “Yes, of course.” (158:49) 
 
(E10) Increases interest in manufacturing  
 “I think that it would indeed raise interest [in manufacturing topics, author’s note]. And that 
you would take care of it a bit – sure, everyone would, even if it’s not his target 
constraint, see how his targets can be achieved […]. But if it’s in there as a constraint, 
the interest would naturally grow.” (161:7) 
[On the question who he would involve to check a design idea triggered by a 
manufacturability constraint, author’s note]: “I’d have to go into the production plant to 
see if it will work for 100%.” 
[On the question how he would address problems in fulfilling the manufacturability 
constraint, author’s note]: “In each case, as a production planner, I’d try to find out as 
much as possible about current production processes. If I’d be in a very innovative 
project again, then I wouldn’t have a manufacturer who I could ask by that point in time, 
then I’d approach the people in the prototyping plant. And ask them, because they work 
with the plant and the processes day by day, asking their expertise what you could 
shorten, what you could make quicker.” (150:10) 
 
(E11) Increases mutual respect across interfaces 
[On the question if the introduction of manufacturability constraints would weld product 
design together with production or infuriate them against each other, author’s note]: 
“Weld them together. And that’s the interesting point. Because transparency, when the 
department really says, have a look at it, I know it’s annoying. And if you really show 
them the manufacturer’s perspective on it, then it can weld you together […]. It has the 
potential to make them weld together, saying that, well, the other one is an expert, too.” 
(179:40) 
“I think they’d had a bit more respect of each other, such that, you think, well, the other one 
had quite a few thoughts on the matter, and now we’ll just have the details optimized 
[…]. That will simplify the whole work.” (182:15) 
(F) 
Internalization of 
manu-
facturability 
(F12) Constraint leads to internalization of manufacturability 
 [On the question how introduction of constraints would alter cross-functional alignment 
efforts]: “I think it would be reduced […]. If I’ve worked with my counterpart on an 
operational level in beforehand, then communication will be easier. Simply because I’ll 
know, what I have to pay attention to.” (182:11) 
[On the question if manufacturability constraints should be introduced as a method, author’s 
note]: “Yes, from an entrepreneurial perspective it would be very reasonable. Because 
you bring together these two worlds, and reduce those parallel structures a bit. Because 
I think this barrier is the largest problem, and I had, right on my PC, my production 
counterpart. Probably I’d save myself a lot of meetings, in which I’m told that the 
component is too complex or too difficult to manufacture.” (182:47) 
“From my point of view, this would not only concern product design, but every interface 
area. With this tool, or the overall approach with the constraints, you could improve the 
interface between all departments. Or reduce iteration loops, because you see the 
consequences at once.” (182:51) 
 
(F13) Interest for consequences of design on manufacturing 
“It would be useful if I had some guidance, some kind of sensitivity analysis, which product 
design or which component needs the most assembly time in manufacturing. At the 
moment I wouldn’t know, how complex these differences are […]. Because actually, 
without that, I wouldn’t be able to construe. At the beginning, some big rubbish would 
come out of my design, which I would have to entirely discard again. Because I wouldn’t 
know that a clip takes longer than a plug. Thus, actually, I’d need an info how long takes 
what. At first, I’d need to gather that.” (182:6) 
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 “At first, I’d try out what leads to the assembly minutes. So, I’d see where I build in screws, 
and how many minutes one screw causes. How many minutes one module connector 
or a nut causes. Such that I see, where do I have the levers to reduce down to the 56 
minutes.” (167:34) 
[When asked for feedback on the constraint introduction of assembly minutes, author’s 
note]: “Maybe some other visualization. Sure, at the end, the minutes count, but just as 
a compensation, as a gamified element, that you’re shown, hey you’re saving that much 
money with it, I’d find that important. And, that you get some list how the elements 
contribute to it […]. I need that transparency such that I can learn from it. Generally, 
everyone who uses it, will have to learn, by this transparency or trainings or so, which 
components have which consequences on assembly time.” (182:48) 
(G) Immediate 
feedback on 
constraint 
fulfilment 
important 
(G14) Immediate feedback for constraint consideration 
[On the question which pathway would be best to bring manufacturability requirements to 
product design, author’s note]: “It’s all about the channel. If it’s a PDF file, then of course 
it would be the worst conceivable solution. Then no one would react to that. But if there 
would be some tool to calculate the fulfilment of these assembly requirements 
automatically… It would have to be intuitive and playful, then you could introduce as 
many [constraints, author’s note] as you like. Only, controlling and tracing these values 
should not produce any additional effort for the designer.” (141:41) 
“At the moment, it’s like that, the product designer construes and only when he has finished 
the design, he gets feedback. Weight, manufacturing costs, eHPV. And that’s only after 
his construction is finished. But what it actually should be, is that you have to get 
improvement suggestions all the time, such that feedback accompanies design. In a 
sense, you have to co-develop. ” (176:16) 
[Asked about the frequency in which he would look at the current status of constraint 
fulfilment, author’s note]: “So, if I get the info where I’m standing currently at a push of 
the button, depending on the project’s responsible level – on an operational level, I’d 
look at it weekly, almost daily, as soon as there’s a product modification […]. It should 
be assessable at once on a digital basis. If you look at our evaluation phases, for 
example, we’re in the sixth evaluation run now for the new product generation. And now 
you discard all premises again, we’ll experience a seventh or eighth run probably […]. 
Thus, I believe that a quick assessment is important. That you can get the values at 
once.” (172:16) 
 
(G15) Immediate feedback for constraint optimization 
 “The cool thing is that you can easily try things out. At some point, you’ll start to optimize 
the thing yourself. You construe it, and I can’t imagine that there’s only one solution in 
the end, and then you think you’re at a point where you could go left or right. And until 
now, you would have always gone left, because as a product designer, you’ll follow the 
function. But now, if no big differences with regard to the function are there, and you 
don’t see cost differences in your view, then you might more easily try the other path.” 
(166:15) 
“It would be a cool effect if, if you’re working at it and understand at some point – well, one 
example: You construe one or two quick-fasteners at the housing, then you think, what 
would actually happen if I put in a third one. And then I suddenly see that the value 
explodes, because it causes a huge time amount for the transport. Then I’d think okay, 
if it’s so extreme, I might try to get down to just one. So you could play around a bit in 
the beginning.” (165:17) 
“It would be important, well, option 1, that’s x minutes and y €, and it has a function of this 
and that. Then it would be interesting to see where the real pain threshold is […]. 
Generating options, you can do that super easily with that thing, and see how much you 
can get down, you’ll try out an extreme option. So, generating quick options, that would 
be the solution.” (166:17) 
(H) Discussion 
on cross-
functional 
optimum 
encouraged 
 
 (H16) Encourages production to critically discuss with design 
“I find it quite good, because you would discuss with them [product design, author’s note] 
much more intensive, how it would work [for manufacturing, author’s note].” (162:26) 
“I’d have the values earlier, and with them sound arguments to influence something [at 
product design, author’s note]. Not taking away from him the development function, but 
helping him to modify his design. It’s not that much more power for me […], but I can 
help him to reach his targets and I can also discuss his targets.” (166:29) 
“If the constraint would be 20 minutes, with or without the tool, I’d have to discuss with both 
of them, with all functions [process design and product design, author’s note] anyway.” 
(168:13) 
“With regard to the product, I’d ask design which processes have to be done in any case 
and which ones we could maybe omit to simplify manufacturing.” (150:11) 
 “Every project leader, who would get the constraint, would have to design his production 
system in accordance. And would have to influence product design in accordance. I 
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mean, we’ve tried already many things, like clips instead of screws, but until now, that 
has always failed.” (155:16) 
 
(H17) Optimization first within production, then design 
“I would first see where I can - which lever I can draw, without having to change something 
in the product design. Because if I had to fight in the product design teams with product 
design, and they would have to alter the entire design to make me save 20 minutes... 
Then, I would have to prepare a presentation, why do I want that, and I’d have to take 
care that the developers jump on that train, and if it’s not working, I’d have the same 
struggle again. Thus […] my first step would be to look for the quick wins.” (168:12) 
“I’d draw a value stream analysis, from the broad view to the details. Then I’d look at 
processes which are existent already, asking for expertise from the plants, asking other 
planners, and I’d get the assembly times out of the plants, of the processes that really 
match. It has to be detailed, it has to be an exact match, because just a little bit of a 
different technology has different, very different assembly times. Then I’d jump into the 
value stream to identify exactly where I’m too slow […].” “And if you’ve asked everyone 
there, if you’ve taken out everything, and still wouldn’t reach the value? If everyone says 
to you, with that product, it’s not gonna be possible to get anything more out of it?” 
“Then I’d address the product and ask the product designer.” (159:36)  
„I’d also have a look at the logistics around, the provision of material around is important 
as well. How is the provision of material, building the shelf differently somehow. Let’s 
say, the interface of how material provision and the work place is, and how I can 
improve it. And only after that, I’d approach the separate system, product design, to 
change something there.” (168:17) 
(I) Transparency 
on cross-
functional 
optimum 
increased 
(I18) Quantification allows for transparency on optimum 
“From a production planning point of view, you could underpin requirements significantly 
better, saying, look, you have 48 screws and 15 module connectors here. If we’d do it 
like this, we’d save 5 module connectors and 24 screws, so on hand we’d have savings 
in the material costs, and we’d have savings in the assembly time. I don’t see the 
material costs here yet, but in the end I’d have a starting point where you can say, from 
an entrepreneurial, overall perspective, this is the right way to go. Here we should try 
to find a solution.” (162:32) 
“It’s beautiful here, because you try to approach each other [the cross-functional 
counterpart, author’s note] by making something [objective, author’s note], which is 
perceived to be very subjective. You make it quantifiable, by means of these assembly 
time blocks that we’ve defined.” (150:18) 
“I’d go to the responsible production planner, asking, hey, I found a possibility to save 10 
screws, they said that’s five minutes, what’s the consequence thereof? What would you 
save, because for me it’s so and so much additional costs. A bit like business case 
calculations.” (170:31) 
“Product design has its focus, production planning has its focus, but it needs to be the 
overall optimum, and for this we have to talk to each other, because otherwise I can’t 
determine what the overall optimum is. And you’ll have the easiest time in this 
discussion when you have numbers, data, facts." (152:24) 
 
(I19) Encourages systematic approach for optimization 
 “I’d give some thought on what the main driver of these [assembly times, author’s note] is, 
and knowing this, I’d address these correspondingly and would try to adjust them 
accordingly.” (172:24) 
“Sure, I’d look for alternatives. Going new ways. Because I’d see that with my current 
approach, I’d manage to get down to 50, but from there, the we’ll-do-as-we’ve-always-
done-it approach doesn’t work anymore. I’d go and ask other groups, asking [names 
department symbol of other product designers, author’s note], do you have an idea? 
Do you have an idea how to construe it? Maybe you can omit it, I’d save 20 minutes, 
Would that work? Thus, asking around, maybe someone has an idea.” (179:30) 
“You’d probably have to allocate the 125 minutes to their respective components based on 
their complexity […]. In this manner, I’d distribute and in principle, I’d then start to think, 
which one of these costs me the most.” (172:1) 
 
(I20) Discourages from including non-transparent buffers 
“Why do I put the screws, what’s their design-related value-add, and how much security 
buffer did I maybe plan in. So now, I’d maybe have a factor of three, and it’ll be fine and 
it will hold - it’s like that pretty much. Because for design, screws are a simple thing, but 
they didn’t have the assembly aspect in focus. And now I’d look at that, seeing, well, 
the screws have the highest impact, then I would of course, from a design perspective, 
now try to reduce the screws to a minimum.” (164:20) 
[On the question with which functions conflicts might emerge from the introduction of 
constraints, author’s note]: “It’s all dependent on the kind of analysis that you do, do 
you grant a longer way time [time designated for walking distances on the shopfloor, 
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author’s note] or an additional walk – of course as a planner, you can eliminate all of 
that, because you have to achieve the 20 minutes target, which means that you plan to 
the edge.” (168:15) 
“I mean, with that, the manufacturer is actually naked.” (165:24) 
(J) Risk of 
overemphasizing 
constraint 
(J21) Risk of neglecting trade-offs to other design requirements  
[On the question which drawbacks he sees from the constraint introduction]: “Well, that he 
comes into a target conflict at some point, because he can’t do it all. It’s always a 
question of what I put first. What do you want to achieve, if you say you want to save 
construction space, it’s gonna be smaller, then it’s gonna be more complex with regard 
to the geometry, and then variable manufacturing costs are going to rise. The wider you 
pull apart the target range, the more difficult it will be to land in the middle of it. And then 
you’d have to think about what the second priority is instead.” (156:27) 
“Quality could be a discussion, so time needed for quality measure would be a target 
conflict, if I take out time there. In the end, they have a purpose somehow, at least 
someone brought them in for some reason. The question here is, if I would take quality 
risks by taking out checks or something similar.” (157:33) 
 “I think the difficulty is to have these trade-offs, what do I accept and what don’t I accept. 
For example, what may material cost me for one minute [of assembly time, author’s 
note]?” (166:21) 
(K) Additional 
effort for design 
functions 
(K22) Additional effort for product design 
“At first, this is an additional effort for product design.” (149:39) 
“For the product designer, it’s principally an additional effort, because actually he has 
reached his goals, because assembly time is usually not a goal for product design. 
Indirectly maybe, because it causes production costs. But now it would be, and of 
course, an additional target value is always annoying.” (171:33) 
“I know some product designers who would be 100% against it. Because they say, I do the 
design, and the rest is production planning’s task.” (162:27) 
“It would annoy me, because suddenly I have a target from [names department symbol of 
production, author’s note], which I actually don’t care about. So I’d have a new target, 
and targets are, first of all, annoying.” (179:39)  
 
(K23) Risk of prolonging the design process 
“It would be critical if it would force it up too much, if people would need too much time to 
design, and wouldn’t simply hand out the component design. That’s a general problem, 
because before [constraint introduction, author’s note] you didn’t have it. Then, the 
component was done when it was done. But if I see it now, it’s just like a bachelor or 
master thesis which you want to adjust more and more, and you’re unable to stop. And 
there’s the enormous risk that you only optimize for assembly time minutes without 
looking how long it has taken you to design.” (182:22) 
“Product design has different goals, they want to fulfill them as quick as possible, do the 
product validation, and don’t want to touch again what they’ve designed.” (157:34) 
  
Table 16: Representative supporting data: research question 2 - impact of constraint introduction on 
coopetitive behaviour 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Moderating Impact of Constraint Types 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(L) 
Presupposition-
less tangibility at 
the interfaces 
(L24) Tangibility and easy calculation important 
“That’s why I like the € goal, it makes it tangible. Everyone can easily conceive €. I can give 
a € target, saying here’s the deal, variable manufacturing costs are well present in the 
company, everyone knows what’s in there. There are these [names committees on 
variable manufacturing costs, author’s note], everyone knows it. That’s why in principle 
I’d consider it as the right value, quantify it in € and the consequences will be clear to 
everyone.” (172:27)  
[Being asked why he prefers variable manufacturing costs as a constraint, author’s note]: 
“Personally, I find it more tangible. The value with a € at the end.” (157:39) 
[On the question what the constraint type would need to gain his acceptance personally]: 
“We simply work by €. And certainly, that’s a fundamental condition.” (166:31) 
 “No one gets this, the €. Thus, minutes. Even I myself have problems with variable 
manufacturing costs.” (179:38) 
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(L25) Meaningfulness for involved interfaces 
[Product designer]: “With the minutes alone, that wouldn’t mean something to me, there’s 
little that would spring to my mind […].“ (182:21) 
[Product designer]: “What I could imagine to be a main conflict, is that this assembly time 
doesn’t mean anything to me, and I wouldn’t know what comes next. And as a first 
experience, it would be a black box for me.” (182:26) 
(M) 
Comparability to 
other design 
requirements 
(M26) Quantifiability required for constraint acceptance 
 “If there would be someone who said from the beginning on, we can’t make it, we don’t 
manage to, we don’t get down to this 8-minutes target. I’m afraid that this would be 
accepted, and I believe that it would always have third priority in such a scenario. Except 
if you can convert it into some costs, which at some point are higher than development 
costs or material costs. Because at the end, it’s all about that number anyway.” (161:18) 
 “Experience tells us that, if it’s justifiable with numbers, data, facts, why it is like that, then 
they [product design, author’s note] are willing to support it. We once had a case of 
quality issues, with the interlocking. There, we went together with product design to the 
manufacturer. And the quality specialists presented information on which defects 
they’ve had in comparable products, and what it means in terms of rework or defect 
volume. Then it was decided to do a monetary assessment to see if the design of a new 
plug would pay off […]. And it turned out to be a big lever, of course it’s always a bit of 
reading the crystal ball, but the facts and numbers were accepted and the designer said 
ok. And they did it.” (151:28) 
“For me, it would be essential to know what it costs, if I as a product designer wouldn’t 
know this, if I say ok, it’s in there everywhere but I nevertheless have no idea what it 
costs me to assemble a screw, or what is the cost difference to a clip and the overall 
costs. Is the clip at the end cheaper, because it maybe costs me much more to produce 
it?” (154:19) 
“Of course, if you know, that it serves the company and reduces its costs, then it should 
actually be possible.” (171:34) 
 
(M27) Assessable contribution to cross-functional optimum 
[Being asked why he prefers variable manufacturing costs over the other constraints types, 
author’s note]: “Automatization is a topic, I can’t weigh up a plant investment against 
assembly time, but only against manufacturing costs.” (157:39) 
 “And probably it’s also a topic of, down here [pointing at all different constraint types, 
author’s note], talking about what kind of target we get, what I consider in the end, that 
you lay them out in a floating manner, that you exchange credits. Maybe you could think 
about something like that.” (172:17) 
 [On the question what he would do if the product designer would refuse to make a design 
change that would bring down the assembly time, author’s note]: “Costs: 10 minutes 
times 100.000 pieces, that’s much more than a month of [product design’s, author’s 
note] work. So, expressing it as the overall time or overall money, one way or the other, 
if you multiply it with volumes, even if it’s only a second, two or three, then it will be 
coming out of this, that a design change is indeed reasonable. And usually, they will 
acknowledge that.” (157:35) 
(N) Allowing for 
actionability 
(N28) Achievability by the constraint recipient 
“It has to be achievable.” (153:30) 
“It should be well substantiated […], he should somehow be able to – how should I say, it 
shouldn’t be too far from reality, this constraint. Thus, the organization who generates 
it, should be in some way familiar with the product concept and with the production 
concept.” (169:27) 
“So there’s one large condition in this company, targets that we set ourselves should be 
realistic and achievable. It’s one of our principal values, and I would like to take this up 
here as well.” (169:28) 
“It’s important that the value is halfway realistic. It should be motivating.” (182:27) 
 
(N29) Granting flexibility how to fulfil constraint 
“It would really be depending on, if I make this [introducing the constraint, author’s note], 
on a product level, so really for every variant, instead of an overall value.” “What would 
you like better?” “As an overall target, so that you have a bit of leeway. It’s all so 
uncertain in the NPD process.” (153:31) 
[Explaining which constraint type he likes better, assembly time or fasteners, author’s note]: 
“So, the 48 minutes of course provide me, as a product designer, freedom in a sense 
of how I can achieve these 48 minutes. If I directly break this down to the details, then 
you almost already predefine the solution […]. That’s why, saying 48 minutes, if this is 
explained to me why I need 48 minutes, but then I’m granted the freedom, if I reduce 
the screws by 90% but have to set 3 clips for it […]. So it would be somehow the 
designer’s freedom, and in the end we’ll get to a technically better product, than we 
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would have by just applying a flat watering can principle, that we have to take out 20% 
of all fasteners.” (168:9) 
[Explaining which constraint type he likes better, assembly time or fasteners, author’s note]: 
“Minutes, because you have more flexibility with it. Because the other thing is my 
competence in the end, I can assess it. With the minutes, I’m flexible to distribute them 
to my will.” (179:37) 
 
(N30) No arbitrary determination 
[On the question how the constraint should be to foster his identification with it, author’s 
note]: “It should be plausible. It must not be determined by just rolling the dices. It has 
to be some kind of understandable target value.” (149:35) 
“I just want to understand a target, that’s enough for me. And if it’s not plausible, I would 
like to be able to say that it isn’t. No explanation is not an option.” (166:43) 
“It’s quite like, if it makes sense, it also makes sense to me.” (161:22) 
 “You always have to create the transparency. If I always say only, yes I give you that 
constraint, just because I’m having fun to do so - but if I say it’s simply an obligation for 
them because otherwise it doesn’t work, and it’s simply many bucks. So if you provide 
transparency to the product designer, then it makes sense.” (179:46) 
(O) Accuracy of 
constraint 
calculation 
(O31) Calculation of constraint needs to be accurate 
“I was expecting that someone has calculated that, that this is accurate somehow.” (161:22) 
“A precondition is of course, that it is well thought through. Maybe you can […] define it with 
some kind of standard, whatever it is, thoroughly defining these values, maybe if there 
are some kind of macros or something like that, that these calculations are really clean, 
because much is based on them. If the production planner relies on them, and the 
calculation is wonderful but in the end it actually calculates some kind of bullshit, then 
you’ll have even more problems because you cannot straighten it out anymore. That 
would be my demand, to ensure that.” (165:29) 
“The fundamental condition is that it’s correct by 100%, and that there aren’t any parallel 
structures where it says well, it says 56 minutes here, but with the 48 nuts I actually 
know that this is calculated too high. It really has to be strictly specified.” (182:50) 
“The question that I’d ask myself: Is this reliable, what it says. Just because I construe one 
more screw into it, is that still true now or is that based on some kind of premises, how 
are they set?” (170:30) 
 
(O32) Absolute value to avoid tricking with transitions 
“Namely, not with any transition bridges, but as an absolute value. You could maybe say 
you have a preceding product, for example [names a CarCo product, author’s note], 
that was a great car and sold quite nicely, we had 300€ variable manufacturing costs. 
So let’s say, as an overall tension, minus 10%, and that’s 270€.” (172:13) 
[Being asked why he would prefer an absolute value as a constraint value, author’s note]: 
“Because otherwise, everyone would fake that. That would be a big classic […]. It 
wouldn’t be possible with an absolute value.” (172:15) 
  
Table 17: Representative supporting data: research question 3 - moderating impact of constraint types 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Organizational Embedding 
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(P) Constraint 
rigidity 
 “If you want to get things moving, you have to introduce it hard.” (167:36) 
“Where you really have to fight, and where you have the discussions going on, my 
experience is that you must not soften in no way […] And these 56 minutes, what you 
said, then you can really escalate it and make it clear to these folks, ok, there’s 
something not right” (165:27) 
 “I tend towards demanding this quite rigidly. Alone with that background […], there’s more 
behind this 180€ than just manufacturing the whole thing. There maybe is a market 
behind that, a sales target and all of that. In the end, it all boils down to this topic, and 
some things stand or fall with it. That’s why for me, it’s a rigid value.” (163:40) 
 “If it’s a requirement that comes down from above, and coming down from above meaning 
that it has been recognized that it’s a very important topic, then they will absolutely 
attempt to abide by it […]. But otherwise, if there’s no such requirement, then these are 
demands that they will definitely not accept, because they would feel limited in their 
creative freedom.” (151:27) 
“This place is hierarchically driven, that you simply assume that targets are well thought 
through. And fair enough, they are most of the time.” (165:20) 
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“I’d say it depends on the phase, what you enforce in the organization. Even severely, 
depending on how much uncertainty there is. So in an early phase I’d rather go into the 
direction of a committee decision. And if you really know what’s possible, you would 
have to look at sensitivities, when you really know what goes on in the system, then I’d 
go into this direction [pointing at stage-gate criterion, author’s note].” (166:32) 
 “I’d say an organizational objective, because I believe if you set the value too rigidly, 
everyone runs towards this value and the other targets get neglected. So you optimize 
only to this point, and everything else falls off the table.” (164:23) 
(Q) Priority with 
regard to 
existing design 
requirements 
“Principally, € are € and that’s why it should be equivalent.” (172:18) 
“Equivalence of manufacturing and material costs. In the end, both are costs in the vehicle 
and the customer has to pay for both.” (149:41) 
“No matter if these are development costs or are manufacturing costs, I just try to reach 
the global minimum.” (166:33) 
”In the end, what matters, is the bottom line, the overall result counts. That’s why I’m 
heading towards equivalent, because I have to look at all sides and manufacturing costs 
are only one aspect of the overall enterprise, and I need to have the overarching 
overview.” (163:41) 
“I’d say equivalent […]. If I say, I need to optimize all simultaneously, then I optimally get 
the best out of all worlds.” (164:25) 
“I’d say equivalent in any case. Between automatization and investment, it’s always 
manufacturing costs, that’s virtually inversely proportional. That’s why we have to 
optimize it on the same level in any case.” (156:43) 
 “Inferior, because if you look at the relation at the moment, it is out of all proportion […], 
you would make a huge effort to come down 2 minutes.” (171:39) 
(R) 
Incentivization 
 [Pointing between fulfilment monitoring and organizational objective, author’s note]: “If I 
rate it too high, then I get exactly the thing, that as a planner I wouldn’t allow 
manufacturing costs to be three cents higher to get five € of material costs.” (157:42) 
“I consider a monetary incentive as the wrong path here. It possibly leads to a situation, 
where you attach importance to the one thing, and what happens at the other side may 
fall off the table. That’s the wrong incentive.” (162:36) 
 “Bonus in no way, you cannot punish someone if you give him a target, of which you do 
not yet know if it’s realistic.” (179:42) 
 “It would have to make sense with regard to the project phases.” (153:29) 
“It depends a bit on how ambitious the target value is in itself […]. If you take a reference 
product and tighten this value by a not-so insignificant percentage value, I’d be quite a 
friend of a certain incentive. If you simply say, derive a value and it’s only about realizing 
it, then it would certainly be only monitoring or something like it.” (169:25) 
 “There are so many topics, if I really want to prioritize them, and really want to introduce 
them, then I really have to incentivize it.” “What would happen if you wouldn’t?” “It would 
be waited out. I think that happens quite often. You would simply wait, and hope that 
it’s not there anymore next year.” (182:36) 
(S) Recipient 
hierarchy level 
 [Pointing at project manager, author’s note]: “He’s responsible for the production system 
and the value stream that is linked to it. So he’s virtually the custodian of the entire 
thing, who also needs to keep a project in balance. I have several component areas, 
and all are somehow interlinked based on the minutes [minutes of assembly time, 
author’s note], and I need to balance these costs somehow. So he’s the one who needs 
to adopt a global approach to it.” (162:37) 
“For me, the difference is that he’s in the project [pointing at project manager, author’s 
note], and he’s in the line [pointing at group manager, author’s note] – I wouldn’t see it 
with him in any case. Either with the production planner or with the project, high up [in 
the hierarchy, author’s note] of course.” (157:43) 
“Actually, the alignment should be as low as possible on an operational level, but it just 
needs a bit of pressure from above.” (149:43) 
“The group manager, maybe he can really demand something from the interface partners, 
an individual employee can’t actually do this.” (156:44) 
 “Not too low regarding the hierarchy, because they would be able to just calculate 
something to make it suit.” (182:40) 
“I’d make the department manager responsible. Then you’d know – because an individual 
employee, forget about that, because he’d argue that some other reason was even 
more important, there surely will be some reason, and then it falls off the table.” (181:30) 
(T) Recipient 
function 
 “Production should be responsible as well in any case. Because if it’s only product design, 
they don’t care. It has to be a common responsibility. Either they drown together, or 
they both swim.” (149:42) 
“I’d say it must be strategic project management, because design and production would 
fight each other anyway. For example, if you would make production responsible, 
design would say again that he doesn’t care. Then these cockfights would start again.” 
(159:43) 
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“I’d make project management responsible, because they represent both departments. If 
you only make production responsible, it’s gonna be difficult.” (170:39) 
 “I’d say production and design. Because if they don’t talk to each other, it won’t work […]. 
They both have levers, design and production, that’s why it would be wrong to just look 
at design, but it would also be wrong to just look at production.” (179:43) 
 “But if production provides not enough input, so if they say, stay below 50 minutes but 
don’t give any input – you need more input from them than just the time […]. That why 
there should be some co-responsibility from the production department.” (182:39) 
 [Pointing at product design, author’s note]: “He has to receive the target, because he 
designs, thus he has to receive it.” (167:39) 
(U) Fulfilment 
tracking 
hierarchy 
 “I’d hang the whole thing up at a higher hierarchy, because they should have the sum of 
all targets, the overall optimum in their view. And if only the operational level looks at it, 
then they’d only consider their own goal but not if it’s synchronous to the other goals 
which the project has […]. They [management, author’s note] have to decide, because 
they have the overall view and optimally know the sum of all designers, with one of 
them having his focus on the screwing, and another one on the material quantity, and 
the third one on weight and they can decide where the optimum is.” (164:27) 
 “The main thing is how the project team is made up, and that’s indeed a point. Of course, 
someone from product design has to be in there, and here it becomes important. It’s 
not much of an help if a project manager is in there to moderate a bit, there really should 
be a production planner, a process designer and a product designer who really discuss 
on this level, and maybe also someone from procurement.” (169:26) 
(V) Fulfilment 
tracking 
frequency 
 “Regularly, but I don’t have to – then I’d just come into some steering frenzy – dependent 
on the project phase, in the beginning of the strategy phase probably not at all. And the 
closer I get to SOP – from a certain point in time, maybe 18 months before SOP, I’d not 
look at the designer anymore at all.”(158:61) 
“I’d say it’s dependent on the project phase.” (164:28) 
“In the beginning more often, there you might have to discuss the topic quite intensively, in 
the beginning you might still question if often, if it’s an achievable goal, what is the 
feedback from different design areas. And then you could let things run for a bit until it 
has advanced a bit in the series development, and then review it. So in the beginning, 
weekly in every case.” (170:38) 
“Depending on how long iteration loops are. If it’s a component which is construed within 
half an hour, then I could talk monthly about it. So I’d make it dependent on the time it 
needs to design.” (182:42) 
 “You are not told every week, or more than every week, that it has to be functionally 
working either, or that it has to be cheap - at some point you should know this for 
yourself, hopefully. I think that once a month should be sufficient, as long as it’s 
communicated and discussed” (161:20) 
(W) Introduction 
point in time 
during NPD 
 “It’s important that they get it early enough, such that they still have scope for action. It 
shouldn’t be as it is now for us, that everything is already decided but you still have to 
achieve your goals.” (159:42) 
 “As soon as we’re in series development, too much has been decided already, bringing in 
correcting measures at bearable costs would be difficult.” (162:34) 
“I’d enter in the initial phase, during concept phase it should already be fully installed […]. 
As soon as product design teams start their work, I’d want to directly integrate 
production.” (158:62) 
 “In the strategy phase, I would be able to already figure out if I reach the target with the 
normal incremental improvements, for example just taking a larger screw […]. Or do I 
need something completely new which is not yet done, that I wouldn’t take a screw but 
would weld it. I would have to figure that out already early, because in the concept 
phase it could already be too late, then I could only recourse to topics which lie already 
in the drawer.” (164:29) 
”Probably during concept phase, when everything is defined more clearly, such that I know 
how the component is dimensioned. So rather late concept phase.” (182:43) 
(X) Introduction 
mode in existing 
enterprise 
 “If you really want to create a dogma shift, you have to work disruptively sometimes. Then 
you really have to say, we’ll do that in this project. And talk about lessons learned 
afterwards. But if you let it slowly flow into the existing process, then it would probably 
always being pushed away […]. So either you say, you make everything new for this 
project, this goes up and this goes down, and let’s get started. Or you introduce it 
successively in small steps, so others have to give off more and more, and you get a 
bit more. But I think this would be more difficult […]. We’re too big for that, the whole 
company is too complex for that, that you could just introduce something step by step. 
” (156:48) 
“Take it as a requirement for completely new projects. Not for existing ones, for new really 
products. Don’t introduce it if the car is launched in one or two years, and the production 
plants are already there, that would be non-sense.” (165:30) 
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“You could start a pilot project, and calculate it, maybe for a sub-project and try it and see 
if it works, and if you see advantages you can roll it out to the big picture.” (163:47) 
  
Table 18: Representative supporting data: research question 4 - organizational embedding 
Representative Supporting Data for Second-Order Themes 
Impact of manufacturability constraints on creativity 
  
Second-order 
Themes 
Representative Data 
(Y) Pressure to 
conceive radical 
ideas 
“I think more creative […]. Because necessity is the mother of invention.” (157:46) 
“He has to become more creative, because he has to accommodate an additional 
requirement which he didn’t consider before, and this will force him to think outside the 
box.” (167:40) 
“Overall, I think rather more creative solutions, maybe because you are forced to think 
completely different. And maybe you move away from the typical thinking in clamping 
rails or supporting rails, and rather rethink how could I avoid fasteners overall.” (182:45) 
 “You only start to really give some thought in such cases, if you receive targets which are 
not necessarily easy to solve.” (164:31) 
“I think it would expand it, so you would become more creative. Because otherwise, I’d 
say you put three screws in it, or maybe a bit different, but now I’d think ok, I know 
how long screws, they take a long time, what else could you do, maybe gluing or 
other things which I never had thought of. Thus, I believe there would be more 
creative approaches in any case.” (161:21) 
(Z) Increased 
interaction 
inspires 
creativity 
“Foster it [creativity, author’s note]. Because I have to go figure it out. Just going on doesn’t 
quite work anymore. I have to find new ways, have to give some thought, trying it out 
like this, maybe some new materials… And I have to go talk to people, also talking with 
production, and that’s not bad. Therefore, it would foster it.” (179:45) 
“When we say we just don’t manage to make this leap anymore. With all the optimization 
we can do, we just come to 17.50€, and that’s simply because we have a screw here. 
And we can only save it if we take out the screw, It just doesn’t work in any other way. 
There’s always much you can do, but at some point you’ve arrived at a point in time 
where you have to say, this is the end. And then you have to talk with product design.” 
(156:37) 
“If I’m at my wits’ end, then I’d go and ask colleagues, or ask process design, what could 
you do differently.” (164:21) 
(AA) Contingent 
on NPD phase 
“I’d say neutral, because you could say that it would encourage creativity, if you already 
have a specific goal, and within this scope it can indeed encourage creativity. But too 
much creativity could also be counterproductive, if you set the goals much later, and 
before that you were free as a bird and now you have to make it fit somewhere into 
this.” (150:19) 
 “I think that he’d become more creative […], because you’d be inclined more to think about 
alternative concepts. Because you’d realize early that the standard path doesn’t work, 
and he doesn’t figure that out only late, when it’s too late already maybe, but ideally 
already early. And he’d sit down and think fundamentally, do I need to screw this at all, 
or do I need a lid at all. I’d start like that, ok if I’d have to screw on a lid, thinking quite 
revolutionary, do I actually need a lid? If I’d be a product designer, then this would be 
the next logical step. We build some kind of block, and it has to be waterproof and fit 
into the assembly space in the car. And I have the high voltage battery, and I have the 
underbody, so it would actually be logical to say that I take the underbody as a lid of the 
high voltage battery.” (164:30) 
(AB) Contingent 
on granted 
scope for action 
“It is such and such with creativity; at least I know this from my old department, you have 
to put forward a shift in thinking at least once to make something start. For example, if 
you say, how would a car without wheels look like […]. Such that the colleague would 
start to think, ok how could this be done completely different?” (165:18) 
“If it encourages or impedes creativity? In my view, it’s encouraging if he has the freedom 
to use these things to the full limit. If they say to him, design it to 56, you’ll get a tap on 
the head if it’s 57, and if it’s 55 I take away your bonus. Then it’s impeding, then you’ll 
have a system which restricts you even further.” (166:41) 
(AC) Limiting 
solution scope 
“For me, it would limit me as a production planner, if I get this constraint. Because it’s 
something else that I have to consider.” (181:32) 
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“Rather less creative. For example, there was a workshop recently, and I intentionally 
decided not go there, because I wanted to give them the maximum possible solution 
space, and these and those possibilities are there, and decide only later which 
possibilities would be the best ones for production. Otherwise, they’d be already limited 
from the beginning.” (171:41) 
  
Table 19: Representative supporting data: research question 5 – constraints’ impact on creativity 
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